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K. ISHWARAN (INDIA)

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY

ISSUED BY

THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY
KARNATAK UNIVERSITY
DHARWAR, INDIA

VOLUME I

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WRANGLER D. C. PAVATE

Patron and Vice-Chancellor

Editorial

THE idea of establishing a Journal of Comparative Sociology was conceived in The Hague. The Hague is, by the way, a city noted for its international atmosphere and way of life. I happened to be there because I was doing a study of family life in The Netherlands. This work took me three years, so during that time I came to know The Hague and Holland quite well. The impressions, scientific and personal, that I gathered during the course of my studies there were quite different from those that I had received by way of books. The literature on the subject, whether by authors occidental or oriental, had somehow given me the impression that they were preaching a message of " East is east, and west is west, and never the twain shall meet." My experience is that this is not so. As I saw modern Holland through the eyes of a social scientist, I realised that indeed East and West can meet. They have too much in common for any alternative to be possible. I was treated with friendliness, cooperation, and hospitality by one and all. In fact, I came to love that country, so very different in culture and historical background from the one in which I had been brought up.

As I neared the conclusion of my stay in Holland, a colleague of mine, Mr. Stefan Christopher, from Washington, and I were commissioned to make a study of foreign students in the Netherlands. This commission came through the director of the Netherlands Universities' Foundation for International Cooperation, Mr. H. G. Quik. Being foreigners ourselves, Mr. Christopher and I experienced a new dimension in our lives. We interviewed other foreign students from practically every part of the world. As we listened to the interviewees, we were happy to be able to record many words of faith, goodwill, and mutual understanding. But we were also compelled to enter many words of indifference or even hatred into our notebooks. Such feelings were expressed by the respondents not only about their host country, but about their fellow students too ! Indians, Pakistanis, Americans, Eastern Europeans, Arabs and Jews, Dutchmen and Indonesians, British and colonials—there was so much suspicion and ill-feeling between the groups ! But we also noticed that where there was a good understanding based on scientific knowledge about others, there was love and affection for them. In other words we marked that comparative knowledge about others had helped to build up a happy life in the midst of an unpleasant atmosphere.

It was then that we realised what we could do, what small part we could play in that immense job of bringing the world together in the fellowship of understanding between societies. It was then that the idea behind the International Journal of Comparative Sociology took root.

Although the primary aim of the publication is the furtherance of pure research in the interests of truth, the main emphasis is to be on social change, especially the changes going on in traditional societies. We hardly become aware of a thing unless it or its surroundings are in motion. Today we are all in motion, and to know each other, we must know the nature of the movement going on all about us.

The efficiency and life of the Journal must depend upon cooperation and support from individuals and institutions interested in this great task. We shall be grateful if governments, universities, and other institutions spread throughout the world extend their assistance and cooperation in order that the Journal may continue to perform a useful role in collecting and interpreting data arising in the study of social change and economic development.

Many thanks are due to the associate editors, who have lent their moral support to the effort and the publication, and who are showing their generosity and interest too by the contribution of articles. Thanks are also due to Messrs. Hosali Press for printing the Journal on time.

Finally, the idea of starting the Journal could not have been realized at all had it not been for the encouragement received at the hands of Mr. D. C. Pavate, Vice-Chancellor of Karnatak University. A first class graduate in Mathematics from the University of Cambridge in 1928, later a post-graduate teacher in Mathematics for some time at the Universities of Bombay and Benares, Director of Education of the Government of Bombay during the years 1947–1954, and Chairman of the Inter-University Board of India, he combines the roles of scholar, educationist, and an able administrator. Any honour this journal wins will first of all be his.

K. ISHWARAN
Editor

Western Urban Man Faces Leisure

NELS ANDERSON

Unesco Institute for Social Sciences, Cologne †

Western man is developing a unique civilization which is at once industrial and urban as well as global in its influence. It grows out of his persistent dedication to work and his unceasing devotion to increasing the effectiveness of his work. As a by-product he has given himself abundant leisure, for which some feel he is unprepared. Work and leisure are seen as overlapping in all phases of living, and the relationship changes continuously. Society and the man-made environment of Westerners are urban-centred. Urbanism extends vigorously outward. Some of the characteristics of industrial urbanism (milieu of Western man's work and leisure) are high mobility, high tempo and time awareness, mass organization for production, consumption and sharing the agglomerate life, the emergence of a new type of individualism, as well as new social class relationships.

In this article the focus is on the work and leisure of Western man. The writer is not competent to make comparisons with work and leisure in other regions. Throughout leisure is seen against work, for it is born in work and rooted in work. Man has always lived by work and with it and, because he has worked well, he has gained leisure. He faces the problem of learning to live easily with leisure, which heretofore has had little place in his way of life. In the course of making his work increasingly productive, Western man has set himself in the midst of a new environment. In this changing environment, we ask how he is learning to live with work and leisure.

Leisure's Ambiguous Position

Domenach observes that work and leisure in our society reflect and supplement each other. Western man works that he may have leisure and he must earn to enjoy leisure against a background of work.[1] It is equally true that Western man traditionally works ever to get ahead. In the ideology of his work we find no intent to create leisure; it comes as an unplanned by-product of his work.

To say that leisure reflects and supplements work is also to say that leisure is enjoyed as release from work. Some are of the view that one who has not worked cannot enjoy leisure. They hold that while one works to earn a wage or salary, he also "earns" leisure. It is work, they say, that puts one in a frame of mind to enjoy leisure and not feel guilty.

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† This institute is now in process of becoming the European Institute of Social Sciences. The present article grows out of a study by the writer of work and leisure.

[1] Jean-Marie Domenach, "Loisir et travail," *Esprit,* No. 274, juin 1959, pp. 1103–1110.

Leisure, that curious anomaly about which books are written, comes on the scene, not in a region where life is lived easily, but in Western society where life is strenuous. It is characteristic of Western man to load himself with work, to find in work the chief values of life and to use his gains for extending his work into wider areas. Science and technology gain importance to him as they can be used in advancing his work, to get more gain out of the labour expended. With each step ahead, he endeavours to widen the scope of his activity.

Not only has Western man forced work upon himself and learned to like it, he tries with missionary earnestness to stimulate others to accept his strenuous way of life. Those who do not respond with energy are called backward. Because of this global urge, Toynbee speaks of ours as a "world-wide Westernizing society."[2] All industrialized and urbanized Western countries are identified with these missionary objectives, but the term "Westernizing" applies especially to the United States.

And now to this hard-working society leisure comes out in the open confronting its creators with baffling problems. Here is where man tries to build more efficient factories, to create more effective cities, to improve his networks of communication and transportation; all so that he can work to greater advantage. Inadvertently, he also gives himself more leisure, and this leisure in different ways gets between him and his work.

Working, building and rebuilding the structural side of our civilization, man also changes the social milieu. More people who must become urban-oriented also adopt the radically new urban way of life. As the organization of this life becomes more complex, the tempo of life quickens, which again is disturbing. More than ever people find themselves mixed in urban agglomerations, becoming part of "life en masse". And all the while this society with its level of culture oriented to organized and strenuous work finds itself confronted with leisure.

Leisure was always present in our work-conscious society, but earlier it was the privilege of a small upper class. Now this unplanned-for gift comes to the many who, as some believe, lack the background for making use of it. However, as we look about we find they are learning, but in the meanwhile the position of leisure in our society is ambiguous.

Our Industrial Culture

When we speak of Western man as a machine-user, this applies also to the Western farmer. We chronically think of making things with machines. If we own something made entirely by hand it is likely to be an heirloom. We organize machines into networks called factories, and factories are formed into networks called industries : steel, rubber, textiles, automobiles and so on. The cynic says it is all done as work to make money, but in the process man is served. The more efficient he is with machines the better he is served and the more free time he has.

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[2] Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, London, Oxford University Press, 1955, Vol. IX, p. 561.

While creating these mechanized networks, industrialized man adds to his natural environment a man-made environment which is nearer to him most of the time. As he cannot with the natural environment, he is able to manipulate his man-made environment, using it to his advantage. Thus he is able to produce more goods and services, but he is also somewhat under the influence of his environmental creations.

Meadows reminds us that industrial society is more than machines and factories ; it is the whole complex of technics and techniques, and more. Industrialism includes the machines, the labor force with its skills and the social organization which is adapted to this milieu.[3] Such a society must possess, among others, such traits as these :

1. Man no longer lives in cherished isolation, but must live in contact with large agglomerates, coordinating his interests and efforts to the wider group. This is a new form of collective living. Urban man is extremely collective in work and play.

2. The mass production needed to keep industry vigorous demands mass consumption, that means taste uniformities over wide areas, consuming the same sorts of goods and services, which may or may not affect the uniqueness of different cultures.

3. In the mechanized man-made environment one must know and be able to use a great variety of mechanisms. Being alert and informed is to adjust to their proper use, whether the mechanism be an automobile, street traffic control system, building elevator, vending machine, juke box or some gadget in the home.[4]

Modern man can neither work nor play without being producer or consumer in one industrial process or another. He must accept standards and uniformities, and he is being educated daily to do so. In his study of village life among the Ecuadorean Indians, Salz tried to foresee the problems ahead if industry established itself in that region. He saw that these close-to-nature people would have to set aside many old ways if they had to adapt to the ways of industrialism and the ways of urbanism. The experience could be none other than disturbing.[5]

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[3] Paul Meadows, "Culture Theory and Industrial Analysis," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* No. 274, March 1951, p. 14.

[4] On this subject see Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, "Urban Living Conditions," *Urban Planning and Land Policies,* Vol. II, Washington, National Resources Committee, 1939, p. 164.

Ecuadorean village life is one sort of collective living, but it withers on the approach of that other sort of collective living, industrial urbanism. Each way of life involves a different discipline. Only as one is disciplined to machines are machines able to respond effectively to his discipline. For man to live to advantage in his industrial environment, which he continually re-makes, he must have these types of competence:

1. Modern man must keep on learning; skills, habits and manners of yesterday may not suffice for today. As he learns new ways in work so he must in play. Falling behind is a mark of ageing. In gadgets or songs, he must know the latest.

2. Modern man must adjust to increasingly complex situations, for innovation tends from the simple to the complex. We see how change in the automobile has introduced changes in the work sphere, also in the use of leisure, and how public services must change (traffic control); how the automobile has affected family and individual life. The same trend toward complexity attends the evolution of most mechanisms.

3. With the greater development and integration of industry, areas of contact and influence widen. Modern man must widen his perspective. While the grandfathers were amazed that words could be sent by telegraph, grandsons are not at all impressed to hear voices radioed from the South Pole. Modern man now accepts casually the global communication and transportation networks, or the global reach of rubber, steel, coffee, oil and other markets. Basketball has become a world game much as boating and other sports. Industrial urban society is *de-localized.*

Globality of Urbanism

Meadows emphasizes that learning to live in the industrial environment calls for more than mechanical skills and knowledge. It "entails a community organization which requires living quarters and which demands behavior patterns and controls for the human beings responsible for business and industrial functions:—urbanism."[6] Urbanism, as Wirth put it in his well-known article of that title, is a way of life.[7]

A way of life is a cluster of behavior patterns (political, economic, social) to which people conform: values and beliefs they hold regarding these ways of behavior. It includes also the social inheritance from earlier generations. A way of life acquires some of its uniqueness from the material and social milieu in which a people lives, the things they use and things in their environment to which they must become adapted. Industrialism is a major part of that way of life we call urbanism.

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[5] Beate R. Salz, "The Human Element in Industrialization," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* Vol. IV, No. 1, Part 2, October 1955, p. 5.

[6] Paul Meadows, "The Industrial Way of Life," *The Technological Review,* Vol. 48, No. 5, March 1946.

[7] Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 41. No. 1, July, 1938, pp. 1–23.

Industrialism may be found in places far from cities, mining areas, for example, but the head office of the mining company will more than likely be in a great city, and the ores produced will find their way into urban controlled markets. Urbanism itself existed long before the rise of powered industry, but it was a simpler type of urbanism. We can point to modern cities in which no industry is found, but these have status only as they are linked with other cities that are industrialized.

Insofar as work and leisure are concerned, and these embrace a good part of the whole of life, urbanism today is unique in several ways. This is illustrated somewhat in such characteristics as the following:

1. Urbanism is highly non-traditional

Anciently, in the Middle Ages, or today, towns and cities have ever been places of work, trade and authority, as well as play centres where the leisure arts developed and changed. The history of types of work can be followed back, as we see in the handicrafts. Whatever the leisure activity, its development may also reach far back, as we see in the stage, music, dancing, sport, and so on. We can also trace the evolution of the structures in which people lived, worked or played.

Yet we must conclude that modern urbanism has moved so far, even from its recent past, that the evolutionary links are only lightly evident. Often they seem to be deliberately disregarded. Most factory work is quite unrelated to the old handwork crafts. The old work skills seem as far removed from the new as the fireplace in the frontier kitchen was from the modern kitchen. Consider man's all-purpose use of the streets in the modern horseless city and how different it is from the street uses of fifty years ago.

We can find links with the past in the many types of leisure today, but leisure is now enjoyed under different circumstances. The role of the individual in the family is not the same, and the role of the family in the community has changed. The relation of the individual and that of the family to both work and leisure have acquired new meanings. It all adds up to the observation that urbanism was probably never more free from the guiding hand of tradition than today.

2. Modern urbanism is highly sophisticated

One may say with truth that urbanism has always been sophisticated, more so than ruralism. But earlier forms of urban sophistication were limited to a small part of the population. That circle has now widened to include most of the population. Some will remind us, and correctly, that much of this sophistication is mere shallow smartness at a low cultural level. Even while admitting that there are levels of sophistication, we must say there is more of it today and, as always, its creative centre is the urban community.

Sophistication finds expression in the various pursuits of fashion: dress, manners, speech, reading, and even the things one strives to possess. Understandably, views will differ about what sophistication is, and who has it. Whatever the test, there is more of it among the urbanized, and more of it today than yesterday because there is more leisure for its display.

3. Modern urbanism is dynamic and outreaching

Cities emerged mainly because they were in places advantageously situated, places from which their influence could be extended. It is also true that initially they gained power as they were able to exploit lesser places, thus gaining more power and wealth. Turner postulates that cities grew because they were dynamic and were able to exert leadership over the lesser places, gathering the surpluses from the less dynamic.[8] For their subsistence cities had to give something in return, and they had to be creative. Because they were creative, they attracted creative people, and because they have always been places of work they attracted people searching work.

As cities grew, and they have grown exceedingly during the past century, they became increasingly dynamic and outreaching. They have become less the exploiters of their hinterlands and are now markets for the hinterlands, as the hinterlands are the markets for urban-made products. In this struggle for new and wider markets, urbanism has become global.

Urbanism as mere growth is one thing; urbanism as something dynamic, creative and imaginative, an expanding influence, is something else. Out of its creativeness, urbanism continually changes within itself. It continues as a way of life ever different from the non-urban, and it must extend outward for its survival, changing the ways of life in all places that are less urban. In this sense urbanism is tradition-negating.[9]

Security and Accumulation

Except to have seed for the next year and food for the winter, the farmer is traditionally not a saver, but the urban man must accumulate. Cities would not be were it not for saving and accumulation. It is not only the accumulation of wealth out of which industry grew; in the cities knowledge is accumulated and put into libraries or museums, and in the same way art is accumulated. There is accumulation of the skills of the artisan, in the findings of the laboratory and in the techniques of the work place. All this is a by-product of the work of urbanites collectively to make themselves secure against want.

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[8] Ralph Turner, *The Great Cultural Tradition,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1941, Vol. II, pp. 1250 to about 1290.

[9] On urbanism, see Nels Anderson, *The Urban Community, a World Perspective,* New York, Henry Holt, 1959, pp. 1–3, 36–39, 57–59.

Thus the communities built by Western man, becoming centres of wealth, have become centres of influence. Much of the wealth is now corporately or publicly owned. Urbanites as individuals have not shared greatly in this accumulation, which has probably always been true. They now tend to find their security in the mass accumulations, public insurance, for example. Or government assumes leadership for full employment, and now that agriculture becomes somewhat subordinate to industrial urbanism, government must assume leadership for price stability in rural production.[10]

The accumulative society was made possible by effective work, but only by collective integration can it be secure for the individual. Security means continuity of employment, opportunity to enjoy leisure, and riddance of fear against want. Western society is moving towards these goals.

Mobility and Integration

The vigor of the industrial urban order might fall to zero if people no longer moved from house to house or from place to place, and if movement from one kind of work to another were to cease. With an end to the coming in of outsiders, cities would stagnate, perhaps even decline. Every child would stay in the social class of his father, which would mean a lack of social mobility. Cities would acquire a primitive-like stability. It is pertinent here to cite a small study by Lundberg who questioned students about the meaning of the proverb, " A rolling stone gathers no moss." He found that about 60 per cent of these young Americans understood the old folk expression not as an admonition to " stay where you are," rather it meant, " if you don't keep rolling along, moss will grow on you " (our paraphrasing). This reversal of meaning suggests a reversal of attitude toward mobility itself. Once a bad thing, it is now a virtue.[11]

But people do move increasingly, cities do expand, industry is stimulated to greater development, and people in the competitive urban life are driven to greater creativeness. People dared to cross the seas and the new-found lands were occupied, and because they were challenged by the land frontiers the frontiers of civilization were extended. The land frontiers occupied, the restless mobility-hungry spirit found other means of expression. The Western farmer on holiday goes in his automobile to the city, while his urban cousin spends the holiday by driving to the country. Owen mentions that between 1948 and

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[10] The idea of social accumulation is developed by Alessandro Pizzorno, " Accumulation, loisirs et rapports de classe," *Esprit*, No. 274, juin 1959, pp. 1013–1014.

[11] This information was received from Professor George A. Lundberg, University of Washington, in a letter.

1958 American automobile ownership more than doubled, rising from 30 million vehicles to 67 million, and on a holiday most of these are in motion.[12] Each year a fifth of all Americans change their place of residence. Work changes are more frequent.

This urge to be mobile finds its fullest expression in leisure. The American holiday normally means to go some place. It is equally true now .with Europeans, of whom millions spend their vacations in neighboring countries. In 1957 nearly a million Americans spent their vacations in foreign countries, and of these 351,000 visited Europe for an average of 40 days each at an average cost of about $ 20 per day.[13] This fun-oriented mobility is also reflective of the urge to be moving about.

Work-oriented mobility, however, may be more socially disturbing. It feeds a continuous stream of strangers into the urban work force and into the residential areas of towns and cities. These must become adjusted to new work and new neighbours, as fellow workers and neighbours must become adjusted to them. As they must learn to work and live together, they must also learn to play together. As people move from place to place or from job to job, they also move up or down from one social class to another. They face the problem, also, of becoming integrated into groups, neighbourhoods and the wider community. But a mobile people is never finally and fully integrated ; as mobility continues they must be re-integrated.

Temporal Implications

Modern society is often described in terms of speed, tempo, precision, duration and other concepts which had much less pertinence to pre-industrial society. These are mobility-connected concepts, but space and distance are also pertinent. Working and living as he does in ever-widening circles, modern man must think in ever-widening spatial as well as temporal terms. He must become more time-conscious. He must *be places* at different points in time, and spatially he must conceive of persons and things as being *at places* widely dispersed; but where they are and what they do is pertinent to him. His day becomes a pursuit from appointment to appointment.

This pursuit of appointments applies not to workers alone and not merely to the working business man, but to common workers as well. It applies to their wives and their children, for they too must be continually time-conscious. This is one of the imperatives of living in mass society where individuals, as

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[12] Wilfred Owen, "Automotive Transport in the United States," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 320, November 1958, pp. 1–8.

[13] "Americans go Abroad," *The Economist,* Vol. 188, No. 5998, 9 August 1958, p. 450. Deals with the money value to Europe of the allegedly free-spending American tourist, as seen by the British. The German tourist now runs the American a close second.

Cohen saw, must learn the art of living with the minimum of strain and friction.[14]

Adjustment to such a milieu of accelerated movement in time and space calls for increasing facility in work where both the time of labor and of machines are equated in money values. The same measurement figures in the going here and there, as one must, to keep appointments. To the adjusted person such acceleration is satisfying and is normally justified, as Mumford remarks, "in terms of pecuniary rewards."[15] As in work, this tempo carries over to leisure activities, in which one is pacing himself from breakfast to bedtime by the ticking of the clock.

These temporal implications of modern life, calling as they do for precise time schedules, were not so conspicuously present when the grandparents were young. Their appointments were not so widely scattered and the number of their contacts were fewer, nor were there such demands on their time. They had no need for wristwatches.

Western man in his industrial urban environment is ever pressed against by forces outside of himself, and that is becoming true of Western rural man. But the forces pressing against the farmer are limited somewhat by the uniform rhythms of nature, which he cannot exceed. Through his own creative effort, Western man has removed himself so much from the rhythms of nature that he is hardly affected by seasonal or other natural restraints. He responds to a rhythm of his own making, which is imparted by him to all the mechanisms in his man-made environment, and to interpersonal relationships which are also responsive to the tempo of the flow of activity in his unique surroundings.

Mass Organization

Except as natural conditions prevented, man has always lived in compact groups. Most ancient cities were agglomerates of compact groups, which in turn were made up of compact family groups ; they were not urban in the present sense. Western urbanism cuts across most forms of localism to find expression in a new type of mass society which tends towards impersonal anonymous relationships, people living in mass agglomerates.

Mass agglomerations mean mass organization, mass administration, mass production, distribution and consumption, and mass communication. It also means mass leisure, with spectator amusements and so on. Finally, it means global uniformities and standardization, about which many complain. Now people must belong to mass organizations to be secure in their work, and often the uses of leisure call for mass association.

As to mass administration, here we see how the government or the management of vast agglomerations must be something different from any controls used previously. Government is not by folk rule but by law, for government is neutral, impersonal, systematic and professional, a mechanism for order, else society en masse could not function. There must be the maximum of freedom of movement for persons and goods, and the aggregate of individuals and groups must be able to work or play with the minimum of friction. To feel the pervasiveness of mass administration, one needs but consider the work of the police in a modern city. This service facilitates order in all phases of life and lends support to all other public services from factory inspectors to health officers to teachers to the life guards on the bathing beach.

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[14] Morris R. Cohen, *American Thought, a Critical Sketch,* Glencoe, Illinois, Free Press, 1954, pp. 62–63.

[15] Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization,* New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1934, p. 198.

Because of mass production these impersonal aggregates of people came to be, and without it they could not subsist. Through mass production Western man has achieved leisure and will achieve more. Mass production is possible only if there is mass consumption of goods and services. This calls for wide-reaching distribution networks to carry goods and services outward, but also goods and services must come back. Here is where mass uniformity and standardization come in.[16] On the work side, mass production is possible only if there is an ever-sensitive division of labor, not alone the occupational distinction between workers, but there also comes a division of labor between communities. It is this latter division of work that makes for the global interdependence of industrial urbanism.

Western society could not function by mass administration alone ; there is need also of mass associations of people. Without such private aggregates, mass production and distribution would flounder in disorder. As people with special interests associate in large groups, collective thinking and collective behavior over wide areas (facilitated by mass media) become possible. Some of these aspects of urban society are not new. People have long been learning to live en masse, but it is new for the aggregate to divide into large interest groups. These may compete on some issues or cooperate on others. Thus the individual is identified with the mass through the trade union, the commerce association, the Rotary Club, the medical society, the legion of war veterans, the bar association and so on. Some of his interests may be represented by the political party, by the cooperative, others by the sport club.

Some complain that such association is too anonymous or impersonal, and does not provide the intimacies of old-fashioned community life,[17] but they fail to recognize that old-fashioned community life cannot function in the mass society. Other ways of living together have evolved. Yet all of the essential primary intimacies of family and friends are present and can be experienced in the new mass society, but not in the same old way.

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[16] Pipping remarked how increasingly services for leisure are handled on a mass basis, necessary to reduce cost, although this makes for increasing uniformity in behavior and taste. " Holiday journeys, week-end trips, restaurants and movies, race and sport matches are all similar throughout the country and, to a certain extent, in different countries also." Hugo E. Pipping, *Standard of Living, the Concept and its Place in Economics,* Copenhagen, Munksgaards Forlag, 1953, p. 159.

[17] To Brownell mass society is a " fictitious solidarity of more or less massive groups." One is obliged to join hands with strangers, and contacts are ever transient or anonymous. Baker Brownell, *The Human Community,* New York, Harper & Brothers, 1950, p. 20.

In particular, these intimacies are found in the leisure phases of modern living. Here again we find mass production and mass association. They are needed in mass leisure, as mass leisure is needed in mass society. Examples are commercialized sport, the movies, television, radio and the comic-book industry. Wider and faster roads are needed so that work-connected traffic can move freely, but mass transportation may be more evident on holidays than on work days.

"As increasing productivity provides the average American family with more income and more leisure time, there will be still further opportunities for week-end and vacation trips and other leisure-time travel. It is this growing component of the transport total, rather than the week day commuter traffic, that may become the factor deciding the kind of transportation system that metropolitan regions will need in the years ahead."[18]

Western man tends to be much more facile and resourceful in his leisure than in other forms of consumption, and more imaginative than in his work. In his leisure he has more choices and greater freedom. However mass-ordered the leisure pastimes, he is learning to find relief in them from the mass regimentation of his work.

Mass society is called contractual, being outside the realm of the spoken word alone, and of agreements trusted to memory. The spoken word is no less important for informal contact, but in formal relationships the written word has taken its place. Agreements between strangers or even friends, or persons far apart, find their way into contracts enforcable by law. Records become highly essential and are kept on file. One has a record for school, for his work, as a club member or as trade unionist, and there is a record for every contact he ever had with public bodies. The story of his life from certificate of birth to death certificate can be found on paper ; almost nothing is left to memory. Thus ours is a contractual, record-keeping society, otherwise the individual would be lost in the agglomerate. For the citizen, the record may be basic to his feelings of security. In it he finds the political equalities of his citizenship, as Marshall uses the term ; it evidences his participation in society.[19]

Individualism and Authority

In many ways the modern society belongs to the individual. It is the individual, not the family, who joins the production process, and the wage is paid to him. In large measure the individual chooses his occupation, his friends and his fun. His citizenship is an individual matter and, once he has attained adulthood, his family is not responsible for him to the community. The emergence of the individual was a first essential to the rise of industrial urban society. Santayana remarked that the order of the old society is cumbrous and dull and " immerses man in instrumentalities, weighs him down with atrophied organs, and by subjecting him eternally to fruitless sacrifices renders him stupid and superstitious, and ready to be himself tyrannical when the opportunity comes." For such reasons he held that " individualism is therefore the only ideal possible."[20] Social, economic and political evolution became possible as the individual was able to shake off somewhat the fetters of traditional control, enabling inventiveness and creativity in the face of competition.

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[18] Wilfred Owen, *Cities in the Motor Age,* New York, Viking Press, 1959, pp. 81–82.

[19] T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1950, p. 33.

Americans are widely identified as individualists, and they have done much to spread the idea through extolling their self-made heroes. For them individualism was the crowning virtue of the frontier. That frontier, where success in the end often forgave the means of achieving it, has now moved into history. Americans are becoming individualists in another sense, as the spirit of the frontier carried over to the vigorous industrial urban society now developing. Commager speaks of the frontier individualism as having been born of dissent, and having such an origin, it was normal for it at times to take the shape of tolerance for nonconformity.

" Individualism, too, required nonconformity and paid dividends: The American was always taking a short cut to freedom, a short cut to fortune, a short cut to learning, and a short cut to heaven. A society which has not found time to nourish its own traditions invited nonconformity. Indeed, had the American wished to be a traditionalist, he would have found it difficult to determine what tradition he should honor......"[21]

While recognizing individualism in less advanced cultures as well, Flugel remarked that there is more individualization in the advanced society. " The individual mind takes over functions that were formerly exercised by the group." For the individual to assert himself often means a break with the group authority, " he goes it alone." Again Flugel, " This process is not without its dangers, difficulties and disadvantages, exhibited more especially in the less easy group cohesion on the one hand, and the greater liability to individual mental conflict (and consequent neurosis) on the other."[22]

The individualism of Western society was extolled under Puritanism, which transferred to man's conscience much of the authority which in other ideologies had been institutionalized in the group. Man was left to supervise himself. On the frontier he did that, although recognizing some institutionalized authority. The individual was on his own, but still he had to live with his conscience, still do good works, and finally somehow get himself into heaven. This may be one reason why among Americans, more than in the rest of the world combined, private wealth has found its way into trust funds and foundations for service.

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[20] George Santayana, *Atoms of Thoughts,* New York, Philosophical Library, 1950, p. 29, Edited by Ira D. Cardiff.

[21] Henry Steele Commager, *The American Mind,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950, pp. 20–21.

[22] J. C. Flugel, *Man, Morals and Society*, London, Duckworth, 1948, pp. 252–253.

Western individualism now tends to find expression with an orientation to the technological and economic organization of the man-made environment. It is less the undisciplined frontier individualism, often overplayed by the movies, yet it is very little "tradition-directed," to use Riesman's term.[23] The new individualism, a necessity of the industrial urban civilization, functions within the framework of essential disciplines and authority, and it finds its freedom in this relationship. It is time and technic-oriented in both work and leisure.

The individual so disciplined still has wide choice in his activity, especially in leisure, where the freedoms are greater and the disciplines less precise. His problem is to learn the use of this greater freedom, which is something new, for the enrichment of personality.

Social Class in Western Society

Western society is fragmented into many social groupings, which is nothing new, for every society has its social gradations and status distinctions. In non-industrial societies class may be hereditary and the lines between classes strictly drawn. In Western society classes can be distinguished only in general terms, while the lines between tend to waver and change. There is movement up or down between classes and this tends to increase, but the class system remains and, says Marshall, "permeates the whole community, so that its application yields a single scheme of location which, in theory, assigns a place to every component part of the whole."[24]

Marshall observes further that social class is a system of inequality, yet people cling to it. In the day-to-day associations of people they contribute to its maintenance as a privilege. This may evidence that the class system serves a function in the social order, as the caste system has done, but with less than caste rigidity.

In her study of a small German city, Mayntz found that people recognize themselves as belonging to classes but they differ widely when asked to name the classes. When asked to indicate to which class they belong they often contradict their own definitions of class. Lower-class people tend to grade themselves upward and upper-class people rate themselves downward. All admit a class system and behave towards it.[25]

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[23] David Riesman, with Nathan Glazier and Reuel Denny, *The Lonely Crowd,* New York, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1953, p. 329.

[24] T. H. Marshall, *op. cit.,* p. 94.

Under industrial urbanism the class system helps to give zest as well as order to agglomerate living, yet it must be fluid and adaptable, as it has been. As technology advances and as workways adapt to technology, the class system also adapts. On the American scene, and to some extent in other industrial countries, the common worker class is disappearing as industry uses less unskilled labor and more trained workers. But the middle class expands and tends to divide, the upper-middle class merging with the lower-upper class. However, occupation and income remain the principal criteria for identifying the social classes under industrialism. The family-origin hallmark becomes less important.

Class consciousness tends as ever to be most visible in the consumption phases of living, but still somewhat so in work. Especially is it evident in the striving for status in leisure and social activity. This was the theme of Veblen when he ridiculed the behavior of the upper classes in the 1890's.[26]

The class pattern has changed radically since Veblen wrote, yet inter-class social competition is still present, but the arena has widened. Social class striving still determines the social objectives for which people strive and how they dress and deport themselves ; one imitates the class ahead of his own or even the leaders in his own class. The leisure classes of the 1890's were indeed "conspicuous" consumers and they indulged in various brazen displays of wealth. The same class today is much more reserved and thinks of itself as being more cultured. It is in the lower and lower-middle classes today where display is evidenced in social and leisure life.

It is still the upper so-called leisure class that sets the pattern for taste and manners. The leisure class ridiculed by Veblen hardly knew how to use its new-found wealth and free time. That is much less true today. Even though this class, for the behavior of some of its members, may be charged with snobbery, the class as a whole is much more competent in the use of leisure than three generations ago when American fortunes were emerging. However we may define the cultured life, they, like the upper classes in other Western countries, are the patrons of it and the models for it.

But the upper classes are not the only models. Western man is learning to live easier with leisure because of other influences in his midst. For example, there is the widening influence of education, the base of which also widens. Some call it popular culture, but however it is identified, it is a refining influence in the leisure of Western urban man, helping him adapt to the leisure which he is creating in abundance and for which he was not prepared.

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[25] Renate Mayntz, *Soziale Schichtung und soziale Wandel in einen Industriegemeinde,* Stuttgart, F. Enke, 1958, pp. 103, 119.

[26] Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class,* New York, Modern Library, 1934 (Macmillan, 1899), p. 57.

Lineage Structure in a Himalayan Society, Himalayan District

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JAUNSAR-BAWAR is in the trans-Jamuna, cis-Himalayan region and forms the northern hilly sub-division of the Dehradun district, which is one of the 51 districts, administratively grouped into ten revenue Divisions, of Uttar Pradesh. Dehradun is in the Meerut revenue Division. As the name Jaunsar-Bawar connotes, its area formerly consisted of two Parganas, Jaunsar and Bawar, the former extending from Kalsi to Chakrata, and the latter from Chakrata to the north. Now administratively one unit, it has three natural divisions: (1) Jaunsar, being the southern part, surrounded by Lakhaundi in the north and capped by Jamuna and Tons towards east and west, triangular in shape, runs from north to south, extending over 18 miles; (*ii*) Lakhaundi, the second natural division, spread from east to west, is only about 5 miles; and (*iii*) Bawar, about ten miles in length, forms the northernmost part. Except for a small strip towards the north-east, Jaunsar-Bawar is an entirely water-locked region about 446 sq. miles in area, having 436 villages. Out of these the Community Project extends its programme to 383 villages, the rest being either forest villages or unpopulated or those lately transferred to the contiguous state, Himachal Pradesh. For about a hundred years, this region has been divided into 39 *Khats*. *Khat* is a revenue unit, having 1 to 24 villages, some big *khats* have been split up into smaller units call *khags*. For the purpose of administration, the whole of Jaunsar-Bawar is included in the Chakrata sub-division, with its headquarters at Chakrata, formerly a military cantonment. The whole population of Jaunsar-Bawar, according to the 1951 census, is 59716, of which 1247 live in Chakrata, and the rest are rural. The average population per inhabited village in Jaunsar-Bawar is about 144, sixty per cent of the villages having a population of less than 150, seventy per cent less than 200, and about 93 per cent having less than 300, only 13 villages have a population of more than 400 persons.

The people of Jaunsar-Bawar are locally known as the Khasa, and they constitute the high castes of this and contiguous areas; usually the Rajput are known as the Khasa, for they are the dominant and numerically the largest community. The Brahmins are few in number, and they intermarry with the Rajput though in recent years only hypergamous marriages are permitted. The artisan castes are unevenly scattered throughout Jaunsar-Bawar, and they own inferior social status, and ethnically belong to the proto-Australoid stock, while the Rajput and the Brahmin represent the truest Mediterranean element in the population of the cis-Himalayas. There is no doubt that there has been a lot of mixture between the two racial elements; usually higher caste blood has been canalised into the lower castes, for there are strict rules regarding marriage with woman belonging to the former. There has been some infusion of Mongoloid blood from the north, but the prevailing practice of polyandry has enabled the Khasas to maintain their ethnic identity, and it is for this polyandrous practice that the Khasa are so well known.

Over a great part of the Himalayan region, both trans-Himalayan and cis-Himalayan, it is customary for a man to share his wife or wives with his brothers. This is known as fraternal polyandry, as distinguished from the matriarchal polyandry, that once used to be commonly practised in Malabar, where the husbands of a woman were not necessarily related to one another by kinship or by consanguinity. In fraternal polyandry, the wife comes to live with the group of husbands in the latter's house. In the maternal form, she remains in her own house, her husband or husbands coming to live by turns as casual visitors. Property under the fraternal type of polyandry passes from father to son or sons, while in the maternal form, the woman or her parents or guardians own the property and pass it on to the successors in the uterine line.

A three year study of Cultural Change in Jaunsar-Bawar, sponsored by the Planning Commission, has been completed by us, and our report on the evaluation of the Community Development Project in Jaunsar-Bawar has been submitted to the Planning Commission. It was decided to work in three villages of Jaunsar-Bawar, *viz.*, Lohari, Baila and Lakhamandal. Lohari and Baila represented the more conservative elements of the Jaunsar-Bawar population, and Lakhamandal, which has been in contact with Garhwal, has had contacts with people of other parts of the cis-Himalayas. No evaluation of Culture Change is possible without a structural approach, as the society has been living under archaic conditions, and cut off from the culture of the plains below. The altitude of the villages varies from 2,000 to 8,000 ft. above sea level, and communications are difficult and for months the area remains covered with snow, and naturally cut off for all practical purposes. Below is given an analytical study of kinship in a polyandrous community. No material is available for comparative purposes, and the little that we possess lies littered in books on travel and ethnographic literature, mostly written by administrators and tourists. A reference to Briffault's *The Mothers* will bear this point out.

The study of a society requires a deep probe into and proper understanding of the kinship structure and the behaviour pattern among its members. It is more so when we are studying a rural society, the members of which are living an agricultural-cum-pastoral life, as that of the native folk of Jaunsar-Bawar, who are closely attached to land and the village.


MAP OF
TEHSIL CHAKRATA
DISTT. DEHRADUN
N
TAROCH
JUBBAL
TEHRI - GARHWAL
DEHRADUN
RIVER TONS
RIVER TONS
RIVER JAMUNA
DEVDHAR
BAWAR
PHANAR
VANADHAR
LAKHAU
SILGAON BAWAR
BHARAM
MASAU
JUNGLAT
KELO
DHANAU
MOHANA
BONDUR
CHHULTAR
DASAU
CHAKRATA
DWAR
BISLAD
UPARLI ATHGAON
RANGAU
MALETHA
BANGAON
TAPLAD
ATHGAON CHANDO
BIRMAU
UDPALTA
SELI
SILGAON
SAMALTA
SILGUTHAN
KORU
BISAHAL
PAIGAON
BAHALAD
VANA
FURTAD
HARIPUR BYAS
LAKHWAR
REFERENCES
BOUNDRY LINE
KHAT BOUNDRY LINE
ROADS
SCHOOLS BOYS ▲ GIRLS
BUNGLOW ○
HOSPITAL +
COMMUNITY-PROJECT-CENTRE ☐
POST OFFICES I
RIVERS

The Jaunsaris are well known for their polyandrous family system. The polyandry functioning among them is far more complete and tenacious than any other similar systems so far reported. In the context of our research project of evaluation of culture change, a study of the Jaunsari kinship system was considered especially important because this society has often been misunderstood and the men have been derided by their neighbours for the practice of sharing a wife amongst several brothers. An inquiry into their family system to discover possible causes for its formation and its continued existence is, therefore, a matter of great urgency.

Another characteristic and interesting feature found in the Jaunsari kinship structure is the lineage system. It is, in fact, the lineage, locally known as Aal or Thok, which has divided the Jaunsari families into groups, and it is on the basis of these groups that the villages have been established and maintained.

In addition to the system of lineage, the kinship web among affinal relatives forms another important part of the kinship system. An attempt is made here to analyse these systems in terms of their respective positions and functions. Again, the village community of Jaunsar-Bawar is generally multi-caste in composition. Such castes are likely to have different kinship systems. Further, local variations of customs, caused by cultural contacts with outsiders, are also noticed, as these customs have affected the society in different degrees at different places.

We have seen from the demographic analysis that the local society in Jaunsar-Bawar is a combination of the dominating group of high castes which consists of the local Brahmins and Rajputs, who used to be the zamindars or landowners, and the subordinate group of lower castes, who are artisans and landless labourers. Here we present in greater detail the kinship system practised both by the Brahmins and the Rajputs. The lower castes generally follow the institutionally established customs and usages among the high caste group, though there are certain deviations which result from their different socio-economic status.

There are regional differences as well, and they are much more distinctive than the usual caste differences. In fact, among the systems we studied at three field centres, that of Lakhamandal is very different from the one which we may regard as covering both Baila and Lohari. The latter is, generally speaking, a standard form which may be found everywhere in the interior of Jaunsar-Bawar and may be regarded as the traditional pattern. The kinship system as found in Lakhamandal is rather more Garhwali than Jaunsari in pattern, and the obvious reason for this fact is not only that geographically Lakhamandal lies on the border of the district of Tehri Garhwal, but also that ethno-culturally almost all of the present residents of this village are immigrants or descendants of immigrants from Tehri Garhwal. We have found at Lakhamandal that not only the polyandrous family setting as well as other structural features of the Jaunsari kinship system have undergone reorientation, but even the kinship terminology has been adjusted and adapted to that of their neighbours and relatives in Garhwali villages. We shall therefore give here a detailed description of the main pattern of the Jaunsari kinship system, on the basis of our field findings from Lohari and Baila, and make casual references to certain distinctive features found at Lakhamandal and other villages which we have come across.

A. The Family System

A family among the Jaunsaris, as among the plains people, forms a domestic unit, with patrilocal residence, patrilineal descent, patronymic designation and patriarchal authority. Further, it often takes the form of a joint family which, as found normally among the local Brahmins and Rajputs (Khasas), is a union of all male members of all living generations in the patrilineal line of descent, along with their wives and their unmarried sisters and daughters. Often there are also married sisters and daughters who remain in the family before the consummation of marriage or after divorce or being widowed. Child marriage is customary. Often a girl's wedding is celebrated during her infancy, but she remains at her father's home till her puberty. It is also a custom that a married sister or daughter, even after consummation of marriage, frequently returns home and stays for days and months together, though she is not a member of the family. The polyandrous family of Jaunsar-Bawar differs from that found in other parts of Uttar Pradesh. The nuclear family is not as stable as we find in a monogamian society, the wives are not permanent members of the family. During festivals and on other occasions they go back to their *Mait* or parental village, and divorce is so frequent that seldom does a wife stick to a family for many years together. It is in this sense that the family assumes an unilateral character and thus forms the unit of the lineage system.

The high castes of Jaunsar-Bawar, the Brahmins as well as the Rajputs, live in joint families, but what distinguishes the Jaunsari family from the joint family of the Hindus on the plains is the absence of a horizontal joint family. All the brothers marry together, and have one or more wives in common, instead of keeping separate wives. In fact, the Jaunsari family system is not only polyandrous but a combination of fraternal polyandry and polygyny. All men of each generation who are brothers, marry together with one or, as is usually the case, more than one wife.

Traditionally, the eldest brother is the representative of the family as well as the controller of all the brothers, in matters of marriage and conjugal life. It is he who marries the wife or wives, and it is through him that his brothers have access to the common wives. In principle and in practice, all the brothers form an inseparable group as " fraternal husbands ", in the name of the eldest brother ; whereas the wives, on the other hand, join the union individually, one after another, in the same way as is usually found in the polygynous system, except that the single husband is substituted by the polyandrous group of husbands. This form of marriage may, therefore, better be known as " polygynandry " and this union a polygynandrous family unit, instead of being known by the popularly used term " polyandrous ".

Family Organisation

Being a kingroup formed on the patrilineal basis, the Jaunsari family is headed by a senior male member, who may not necessarily be, but usually is, the eldest among the male members of the senior generation living in the family. He commands the patriarchal authority of the family, and is known as its *Sayana*. *Sayana* is a very popular term in these parts, and is used to designate the headman of the village or of the *Khat*. Etymologically, it means an intelligent and well-informed man. He is the general manager of the family affairs, as well as the patron of all members of the family. He represents the family, especially in the village meeting or *Khumri*, and is also expected to be able to speak and express himself. Generally, he attains his position automatically according to seniority among the male members of the family, but he may concede his place to his younger brother or his eldest son, when he grows old or becomes otherwise incapable of dealing with the family and village affairs. However, the seniormost male member, even after he has given up *Sayanaship*, is the most respected member of the family, and his opinions and advice are often sought for. At Baila, the *Khat Sayana* Birbal Singh, aged about 45 years, is the highest authority in all village affairs, yet his aged and invalid father may give a final verdict in family affairs. It is also found in the polyandrous family that a father who is the juniormost amongst the brothers may be about the same age or even younger than his eldest son, yet it is the former who has priority in the family *Sayanaship*.

The Jaunsari joint family shows its well-knit organisation in matters of division of labour among the family members. The prosperity of the family depends much upon the ability of its *Sayana* in the management of family affairs. It also needs a spirit of cooperation amongst all members of the family. These virtues are essential for a family of the zamindar class, because it has to do heavy and hard work, both in the household and in the field. The *Sayana* is responsible for the distribution and supervision of work among all of the male members of the family. Usually, he himself works in the field, besides looking after the family affairs in general. Only when the hands available are more than those needed in the field, the *Sayana* may be spared, and may stay in the house and do some odd jobs such as spinning wool, entertaining guests, etc. The male members work mainly in the field, but they also go out with the cattle for grazing, and they carry out duties connected with cottage industries. The assignments of work are given according to personal capacity and strength. The strongest man in the family is invariably given the task of grazing goats and sheep, because he has to climb up and down the precipitous cliffs and gorges, and has also to protect the flock from the attacks of wild beasts. He has often to remain away for days together, as the herds are seasonally kept in the *Channis* or livestock sheds in the field, or in rock shelters far away from the village settlement. This man does a really hard job, and he is, therefore, held in the highest esteem among all members of the family. However, all members have equal status in the family, except the *Sayana.*

The *Sayana* is the sole authority over the family property, but he should not misuse his right, and often he requires and receives advice from his brothers. The wives as well as the children are common to all brothers, but as stated above, the tradition prescribes that it is only the eldest brother who marries all the wives and it is he who is regarded as the 'social' father of all children born to the polyandrous or polygynandrous unions. Even in a case when a brother is very much younger, so that a separate wife is taken for him, it is the eldest brother who marries the woman. He also has authority over this young bride, though he may, in practice, concede this prerogative to his small brother.

As a rule, all the family members abide by the traditional pattern of behaviour and obey the patriarch in the family. The *Sayana,* in his turn, takes care to provide comforts and to cater for the needs of his younger brothers and others. This makes the family a cooperating and harmonious unit.

Like the *Sayana* of the family, the seniormost woman in the house, usually the first wife of the *Sayana,* is known as *Sayani.* She looks after household matters and makes the domestic assignments among the womenfolk. She is the commander as well as the caretaker of all *Rantis* or wives in the family. Traditionally, a special and privileged status is given to the first among the wives. She is more respected than her co-wives. All other wives have equal status, but those who have proved their fertility are more favoured by the husbands. Often additional wives are taken for begetting children, though usually the number of wives depends upon the economic condition of the family and the amount of work for women to perform. Women are great assets to their husbands. They not only perform the household work, such as cooking, washing, cleaning, fetching water, rearing children, etc., but also help their husbands in grazing milch cattle, collecting fuel, as well as in agricultural operations. They may be helped voluntarily by their daughters and their husbands' sisters or sisters who, generally known as *dhyanti,* are frequent visitors to the family. However, the *dhyantis* are by tradition not allowed to take part in any hard tasks.

Children are loved by all of their fathers, as well as by their mothers and step-mothers, and they are dependable working members of the family. Even very small boys and girls often take part in domestic work such as collecting fuel and tending cattle. In this way, all members of the family contribute to the family economy, and in return they receive their due rights and privileges, according to sex, age and status.

Although the family economy demands the maintenance of a joint unit, division of families does take place occasionally, either among the brothers or between the fathers and sons. It seems that the main causes calling for the division of a family are quarrels between women, especially when one or more of the husbands take a fancy to one of their common wives. Otherwise, it may result from the division of labour among the family members, especially when the size of the family has grown beyond the desirable limit, and the working hands are few.

There are traditional codes to regulate the shares of inheritance, and the division of the family property is usually a concern of the village *Khumri*. The father, the eldest brother, or both the eldest and youngest brothers, as the case may be, may be given the preference or the priority to choose their shares. A woman is not entitled to any share, but a *dhyanti* is always a concern of her father or brothers, whenever she may like to come and stay at home. A *dhyanti*, on the other hand, has her choice to stay with her husband or with her own sons. A mother may choose to stay with one of her sons, but her maintenance will be met by all sons born to her. It is also noticed as a special feature that, on the occasion of division of a family, it is not necessary for all the heirs to separate from one another simultaneously. Often one or two of the brothers, who may have a special attachment to one of their wives, choose to establish a new household, while the rest stay together until a further division of the family takes place.

Position of the Polygynandrous Family

Much has been said about the origin of the polyandrous family, and many authorities are agreed that it cannot be traced to a single source. As far as the development and existence of the more complicated form of polygynandrous joint family among the Jaunsaris is concerned, there is a geo-economic cause. It is true that the hardship and volume of work and labour involved in the Khasa family economy, due to their hill agricultural-cum-pastoral occupation, needs a great number of hands to work jointly in the household as well as in the fields. This need may be connected with the emergence of the joint family. It can be argued that this form of family may not be the only solution, but there is no doubt that this is one of the ways in which limited means and resources may be marshalled to cope with the environment. This argument finds support in the fact that the polygynandrous form of family is particularly prevalent among the landowners, the Khasas and Brahmins, whereas its incidence among other castes, who are artisans and landless labourers, is much lower.

The local people believe that polyandry is necessary for the securing of family property. As a rule, the family holdings of land are very small in this extraordinarily rugged hill region, and frequent separations of brothers and divisions of families would lead to the disintegration of the entire society. Further, it is argued, the joint family of the type practised by the plains people, who recognise the individual units of the monogamous brothers, are likely to be divided sooner or later, either among themselves or among their issue, whereas in the case of the polyandrous family, unity is secured by the fact that all issues are born to the family as a whole.

It is also admitted that the polygynandrous family system suits the Jaunsaris, as the number of wives can be adjusted to their economic means and personal needs. Two or more brothers may begin with only one or two wives, but they may subsequently add more wives when they can afford to. Further, a single husband or a father and son may take more wives than his or their own number, in order to get sufficient hands to work in the field. One such example is that of the family of Narayan Chand, where both the father and the son have married two wives each, and the resultant family is a joint unit of polygynous unions in two generations. On the other hand, when there are more male members in the family, the brothers usually take common wives equal in number to or less than their own. A number of wives smaller than that of the husbands is also found to be advantageous, as one or two of the husbands may have to remain outside for days together whereas all wives may stay in the village. The polygynandrous arrangement is therefore not only economic but also convenient for companionship.

Instead of leading to a state of confusion and conflict due to sexual jealousy as outsiders often believe, the polyandrous comradeship among the brothers in a Jaunsari family has helped in consolidating family unity as well as in insuring cordial cooperation among all members of the family, under the leadership of both the patriarchal *Sayana* and his household assistant, the *Sayanī*. Instances showing the spirit of mutual accommodation have been found in various ways among the brothers, the co-wives, as well as among the husbands and wives. The eldest brother or the elder brothers often try to get one or more young wives for the youngest brother or younger brothers, and concede their prerogative to the latter. On the other hand, a senior wife may ask her husbands to get a new wife to help her with the house-work, and a resourceful woman may give the same suggestion in order to let herself be spared to cater for a particular husband of her choice.

It seems that the existing Jaunsari family system has been secured under conditions not repeated on the plains of India. This, however, does not necessarily remove our doubts, for all people living in similar conditions to those of the Jaunsaris do not observe polyandry. Yet many cis-Himalayan people do practise polyandry. The neighbouring Simla states, Rawain and Kulu, are strong pockets of polyandry. In the Kumaon hills, polyandry has been abandoned but the lax-marital code still sanctions deviant sexual intimacy, and the Naik women have posed a problem of serious magnitude, that of traffic in women. In Mailani in Kulu, women are known to change their husbands as often as they want, and the unusually tolerant attitude of the society compromises with all kinds of deviant sexual relations. Elsewhere I have suggested a matriarchal matrix in this region, survivals of which are the widespread cross-cousin marriage among the lower castes, and the double standard of morality, in which the patriarchal code is insisted on for wives, but the daughters are allowed inordinate latitude and license. The wives periodically migrate to their *Mait* or parents' village, where they take the liberty sanctioned to the daughters of the village. Polyandry in Jaunsar-Bawar has been reinforced by the mythology of the Pandavas, from whom the Khasa trace their origin, but all these can explain its persistence, not necessarily its origin. Changes and modifications, both in idea and in practice, have taken place in this family system lately, under the cultural influence of outsiders, as well as due to the growth of communications in this region. The degree of change varies greatly from place to place, but the system as a whole does not seem to be dying, nor will it be terminated so long as the local environment remains.

Forms of Marriage and Types of Family

Although the joint family is, as noted, a dominant form among the Khasas and the Brahmins, yet simple or nuclear families are also found, though the nuclear families tend to become joint in course of time, in the process that characterises family life among them. Generally speaking, the high caste group maintain a big household and in general, a more complicated form of family, whereas the lower castes employ simpler forms.

An analysis of the distribution of different types of families among the various groups comprising Jaunsari society is, however, a matter much more complicated than it is in other societies. As we have seen before, it is the local geo-economic setting which appears to have created the complicated form of " polygynandrous " marital union. In a joint family of two or three generations, the combinations of different forms of marital union in different generations complicate the composition and type of the family. Before we start analysing the family types, therefore, it is necessary to study the distribution of the various forms of marriage amongst the different castes.

It is also necessary to consider the distribution of marriage forms among different generations. The form of marriage may be determined by some biological fact, such as that a man born without a brother can only engage in a monogamous or a polygynous union ; on the other hand, two or more brothers can traditionally practise polyandry or polygynandry.

Taking all of the living generations together, the distribution of marriage forms among the various castes in the village of Baila is as shown in the table on the next page.

The data there reveal that among the Rajputs, who are the dominant group in the population of Baila, the highest frequency of the polygynandrous form occurs, this being 18 out of 45 cases of existing marital unions, and account for 40% of the total. The figures given above indicate only the present marital condition, whereas some of the polyandrous and other simpler unions now in existence may have been reduced from the polygynandrous form by divorce or death of wives, or division of families. This high incidence, therefore, may substantiate our statement that the polygynandrous form of joint family is a result of adaptation. In fact, a claim that polygynandry is the normal form

Table (1) showing Forms of Marriage among various castes in Baila (December 1957)

Caste	*Polygynandrous*		*Polyandrous*		*Polygynous*		*Monogamous*		*Total*	
	Fr.	*%*	*Fr.*	*%*	*Fr.*	*%*	*Fr.*	*%*	*Fr.*	*%*
Rajput	18	40.0	2	4.4	13	28.9	12	26.7	45	100.0
Brahmin	1	50.0	1	50.0	—	——	—	——	2	100.0
Badi	3	25.0	2	16.7	2	16.7	5	41.6	12	100.0
Sunar	—	——	-	——	—	——	2	100.0	2	100.0
Bajgi	3	33.3	1	11.1	3	33.3	2	22.2	9	100.0
Kolta	4	21.1	2	10.5	4	21.1	9	47.8	19	100.0
TOTAL	29	32.6	8	9.0	22	24.7	30	33.7	89	100.0

of marriage among the Khasas and Brahmins in Baila is supported by the fact that all the deviant forms enumerated above have resulted from the polygynandrous family. As a rule, when there have been two or more brothers in the family, they have married together, except in the family of Bir Singh Basrand, where his two sons have married separately owing to the great disparity between their ages (Tika Chand, the elder son, aged 37 years, married a wife a little older than himself, while his younger brother Dhoom Singh, aged 13, married a wife of 10 years of age).

A more detailed study of the marriage forms in terms of their generation-wise distribution among the Khasas of Baila is presented in Table (2).

Table (2) Showing Marriage Forms among Khasas in Baila (December 1957)

Generation	*Polygynandry*	*Polyandry*	*Polygyny*	*Monogamy*	*Total*
Senior	... 6	5	1	5	17
Middle	... 11	4	1	7	23
Junior	... 1	4	-	-	5
TOTAL	... 18	13	2	12	45

Here the three generations, senior, middle and junior, are divided with reference to the age of the head of each family. Those above 45 years of age belong to the senior generation, and those between 25 and 45 to the middle generation, while the generations of other members of each family are determined genealogically with reference to the family head. The table shows that the largest number of polygynandrous unions are found within the middle generation. Meanwhile, some of the cases of polyandry among the senior generation have been reduced from the polygynandrous form by deaths of wives, whereas some among the junior generation may sooner or later become polygynandrous as the youngsters take their second common wife.

Baila, as we have mentioned earlier, is a more backward village, and here we find the greatest incidence of polyandrous and polygynandrous forms. Table (1) shows that not only the high castes, *i.e.,* the Brahmins and the Rajputs, have contracted these marriages, but the same forms are also found in high frequencies among the lower castes. Statistics collected from Lohari point to a similar situation, but the condition in Lakhamandal is somewhat different. Separation of brothers has taken place more frequently in Lakhamandal than in Baila and Lohari. As a result, the frequency of polygynandry is much less than that of monogamy. An analysis of the marriage forms among the Brahmins of Lakhamandal is shown below :

Table (3) Showing Marriage Forms among the Brahmins in Lakhamandal (December 1957)

Generation	*Polygynandry*	*Polyandry*	*Polygyny*	*Monogamy*	*Total*
Senior ...	1	4	1	7	13
Middle ...	3	2	2	5	12
Junior ...	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL ...	4	6	3	13	26

Table (3) shows that the incidence of polygynandrous union is reduced to only 4 out of the 26 cases of marriage. This forms about 15 per cent of the total, in contrast with the 40 per cent found among the Brahmins and Rajputs in Baila. On the other hand, the frequency of monogamy rises to 13 out of 26 cases, *i.e.,* 50 per cent of the total. These figures indicate a great change in the custom. This change may have resulted from cultural contacts from the Garhwal side, as also from the fact that many immigrants are coming with small families.

It is obvious that the usual classification of families into joint family (or extended family), nuclear family, etc., would not serve our purpose here, since the polyandrous union and the consequent family structure is quite different in nature from these forms. It is hoped that the scheme we adopt here will indicate clearly the position of the various polygamous forms of marriage, especially polygynandry and polyandry, in Jaunsar-Bawar society. Here again, we take the families in Baila as an example. It must be noted that the types of family referred to below are not stable, and there is a constant shift from one type to the other due to frequency of divorce and of taking multiple wives. Every monogamous family may change to one or other of the forms indicated below, and polyandrous and polygynous families may be reduced to monogamous unions.

TABLE IV

Family Type (I) Polygynandrous

Sub-Type	*Rajput*		*Brahmin*	*Badi*	*Sunar*	*Bajgi*	*Kolta*	*Total*	
	Fr.	*%*	*Fr. %*	*Fr. %*	*Fr. %*	*Fr. %*	*Fr. %*	*Fr.*	*%*
1. Simple poly-gynandrous	4	13.8		1		1		6	10.0
2. Multi-poly-gynandrous	3	10.3					1	4	6.7
3. Polygynandrous cum-monogamous	2	6.9		2		1		5	8.3
4. Polygynandrous cum-polyandrous	5	17.2	1			1	2	9	15.0
5. Polygynandrous cum-polygynous									
SUB-TOTAL	(14)	48.3	1	3		3	3	24	40.0

Family Type (II) Polyandrous

Sub-Type	*Rajput*		*Brahmin*	*Badi*	*Sunar*	*Bajgi*	*Kolta*	*Total*	
	Fr.	*%*	*Fr. %*	*Fr. %*	*Fr. %*	*Fr. %*	*Er. %*	*Fr.*	*%*
1. Simple Polyandrous	3	10.3		1		2		6	10.3
2. Multi-Polyandrous	2	6.9						2	3.3
3. Polyandrous-cum-monogamous	1	3.4					1	2	3.3
4. Polyandrous-cum-polygynous				1			1	2	3.3
SUB-TOTAL	6	20.7		2		2	2	12	20.0

Family Type (III) Polygynous

Sub-Type	*Rajput*		*Brahmin*	*Badi*	*Sunar*	*Bajgi*	*Kolta*	*Total*	
	Fr.	*%*	*Fr. %*	*Fr. %*	*Fr. %*	*Fr. %*	*Fr. %*	*Fr.*	*%*
1. Simple Polygynous				1		1	1	3	5.0
2. Multi-Polygynous	1	3.4						1	1.7
3. Polygynous-cum-monogamous									
SUB-TOTAL	1	3.4		1		1	1(7.7)	3	5.0

Family Type (IV) Monogamous

Sub-Type	*Rajput* *Fr. %*	*Brahmin* *Fr. %*	*Badi* *Fr. %*	*Sunar* *Fr. %*	*Bajgi* *Fr. %*	*Kolta* *Fr. %*	*Total* *Fr. %*
1. Multi-monogamous	2 6.9		1			1	4 6.7
2. Appended monogamous	1 3.4						1 1.7
3. Nuclear monogamous	3 10.3		1	2	1	6	13 21.7
4. Broken	1 3.4						1 1.7
SUB-TOTAL	7 24.1		2	2	1	7(53.8)	19 37.7

Family Type (V)

Sub-Type	*Rajput* *Fr. %*	*Brahmin* *Fr. %*	*Badi* *Fr. %*	*Sunar* *Fr. %*	*Bajgi* *Fr. %*	*Kolta* *Fr. %*	*Total* *Fr. %*
1. Single male	1 3.4						1 1.7
2. Single female							0 0.0
SUB-TOTAL	1 3.4						1 1.7
GRAND TOTAL	29 (100.0)	1	8	2	7	13 (100)	60 100.)

B. Lineage System

The lineage system is an extension of the joint family system, but it has wider scope. Among certain castes, especially the Khasas and the Brahmins, the lineage system has been elaborately worked out as a matter of tradition and as a result of adjustment to the local environment. This system, in terms of *Bhera* (sub-lineage), *Aal* (lineage) and *Dai-Chara* (allied lineages) provides the foundation on which the villages of this region were built up in the remote past.

An analytical account is presented here to show the characteristic features of this system and the way of its articulation with other parts of the local society, which, as we have mentioned before, is a multi-caste structure.

Main Features

Certain main features of the Jaunsari lineage system need to be considered before a functional analysis can proceed. Here we may study the following aspects :

1. The lineage functioning in the absence of a clan ;
2. Lineage system as a graded structure ;
3. The territorial connection of the lineage system ;
4. Caste differentiation in the lineage system ; and
5. Local differentiation in the lineage system.

Lineage and Clan

The clan, or sib, generally exists among the Hindus of the plains in the form of a Gotra, which, being a patrilineal kin group, affiliates all its members to an ancestor, real or imaginary. According to the Jaunsari tradition, the Gotra or clan is completely absent among all the local castes.

However, there is a kin group, known as the *Aal,* which is found invariably among the dominating caste group in the village. The members of an *Aal* are believed to be real descendants of a common forefather, who was an early settler in the village. Although his place cannot be located genealogically, all member families of the *Aal* count their common pedigree through the *Bhera,* which, being a sub-division of the *Aal,* consists of one or more families which are established on the division of an earlier family. In this way, they can trace their consanguineal relationship to the correct generation. As such, the *Aal* should technically be recognised as a lineage and the *Bhera* a sub-lineage.

In place of a clan or Gotra, the *Aal* as a lineage functions in matters of marriage regulation, *i.e.,* as an exogamous unit, in its strict sense. This function has been extended through the graded lineage groups up to the intra and inter-village levels among the caste community. On the other hand, the *Aal* further functions as a 'pivot' of the caste community in all affairs, personal, family and village, concerning their day-to-day life and subsistence. An *Aal* is a well organised social group on a kinship basis, which protects the interests of all its members, examples of which will follow.

Segmented Lineage System

The lineage system, as it prevails among the Khasas, is a segmented structure which appears to start from the family and end at the village or inter-village level. Needless to say, a lineage system cannot expand beyond the caste boundary. Nevertheless, it usually enrolls all member-families of the dominating caste in the village, and often includes a few allied villages as well.

This expansion of the lineage system has been made possible by a local provision of a "fictitious kinship" tie, under the name *Dai-Chara,* which means 'brotherhood' relationship. The scheme shown on the next page may help to clarify the situation.

The scheme shows that the lineage system may be considered in its 6 segments: inter-village, village, lineage-group, lineage, sub-lineage, family.

We have seen in the foregoing paragraph that the *Aal* may be technically recognised as the lineage, and the *Bhera* the sub-lineage, whereas the agnatic core in the 'family' stands at the lowest rung of the lineage ladder.

Above the *Aal,* or lineage, as the scheme shows, there are three groups of lineages, namely the collateral *Aals,* affinal *Aals* and affiliated *Aals* *. In

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* Refer to Introduction, the Field Centres, for details about settlement history and distribution of lineage groups at Baila and Lohari.

Diagram (1) showing the Segmented Lineage System

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Segments :	*Inter-village*	*Village*	*Lineage-group*	*Lineage*	*Sub-lineage*	*Family*
					Bhera 1	*Family 1*
					Bhera 2	*Family 2*
				Aal 1	*etc.*	
			Collateral Aals :			
		Village Dai-Chara		*Aal 2*		
	Inter Village Dai-Chara	(1)	*Affinal Aals*			
			Affiliated Aals			
		Village Dai-Chara (II) etc.				

Baila, for instance, there are now five *Aals* among the Khasas, who form the dominating group in the village. It is found that three out of the five *Aals,* namely Basrand, Horiyand and Ravaik, are said to be direct descendants of the founder of the Rajput (Khasa) community of Baila. The fourth *Aal,* Daland, is not directly descended but affinally related to the family of the aforesaid founder. His descendants were, therefore, not lineage members of the first three *Aals,* who were the agnates of his wife. However, they were later on ritually admitted into the *Dai-Chara* or brotherhood relationship with the three earlier *Aals,* and henceforth intermarriage between them was forbidden. Further, the fifth *Aal* was not at all related to the other *Aals.* Their ancestor, who came for service, was said to belong to a lower caste, though he married a Rajput girl from Sirmur. His descendants were formerly discriminated against by others, but they were also admitted into the same *Dai-Chara* at a later date.

The five *Aals* in Baila may, therefore, be recognised as three different groups. The first three *Aals,* being descended from the same ancestor, may be regarded as the collateral *Aals.* They are real consanguineal kins. The fourth *Aal,* Daland, may be put in the group of affinal *Aals,* since its founder was an affinal kin of the first group of *Aals* of the *Dai-Chara* union. The Lakhtate, which was originally not related to the main group of *Aals,* but which has been admitted to the *Dai Chara* by social and ritual affiliation, belongs to a third group, the affiliated *Aals.* As indicated in the Diagram (I), each of these three lineage-groups may contain one or more *Aals.* Here, in the above instance, there are 3 collateral *Aals,* and one each of the affinal and affiliated *Aals.*

The *Dai-Chara* is composed of the above-mentioned three lineage-groups. It is significant that the admission to the *Dai-Chara* union is a matter of both social and supernatural sanction. The latter has to be sought from Lord Mahasu, the guardian deity of Jaunsar-Bawar villages. This *Dai-Chara* is, in a sense, a local group, which embraces the whole of a caste group in the village, but at the same time it is a kin troup, ritual or fictitious, as the case may be, which together forms an exogamous unit. It may be argued that it is due to the necessity of cooperation between all neighbours in striving for their subsistence, that the newcomers or minorities also were adopted into the lineage system of the majority group on the basis of an affinal or fictitious kinship tie. The existence of the *Dai-Chara* has no doubt integrated the caste in the same village.

Side by side with the *Dai-Chara*, is the customary way of addressing the residents of a village by a common term, which tells of a consanguineal kinship. For example, all the Khasas in Baila are known as 'Tinniu', and the majority group of Khasas in Lohari as 'Rajeu'. Both are named after the respective founders of the villages. This term of address, however, is not co-terminous with the *Dai-Chara*. In Lohari, the *Dai-Chara* of the Khasas includes two groups, *Rajeu* and *Khakta*.

Both the *Dai Chara* and the terms of address of the local group may go beyond the village boundary. The *Dai-Chara* of the Khasas in Baila includes also the Khasas of five other villages, both in Jaunsar-Bawar and in Sirmur and Jubbal of Himachal Pradesh, on the west side of the River Tons. The Khasas of four of these villages are known as Tinniu, and those of the other two villages, Binniu. It is said that the ancestor of the Khasas of Baila was one of two brothers who came from Sirmur, while the other brother went further to the village Birnar, in *Khat* Bawar, where the residents are known as Binniu. The ancestors' sibling relationship, therefore, made the Khasas of all the six villages of Binniu and Tinniu an exogamous unit, which is an inter-village *Dai Chara*.

Territorial Aspect

A territorial aspect of the lineage system is found in its relation with the village or villages. This aspect of the lineage system is significant in the sense that the villages of Jaunsar-Bawar have, as a rule, been founded and built up by ancestors belonging to the dominant caste, that is, either a Brahmin or a Khasa group. It is due to this fact that there are usually several "collateral *Aals*" found to exist in each village. It is also on this basis that the *Dai Chara* has been established.

Another important connection of the lineage groups with the territory is found in the *'Bera'*, which is usually referred to as the habitat of a *Bhera*, but it may also refer to the whole *Aal*. Here we may trace a link between the name of an *Aal* or a *Bhera* and that of an ancestral homestead. Every *Aal*, as well as every *Bhera*, has a specific name, which is either derived from the personal name of the head of the original family or refers to some particular event connected with the family. This name was, in fact, used in the first instance as a means of referring to the house where the original family lived, but subsequently it was carried as a *Bhera* name by all the offshoot families on the division of the family. Meanwhile, all of the new family units used to build their new huts in and around the ancestral site. Consequently, the families belonging to the same *Bhera* are residing in one place, hence a *Bera* is called by the *Bhera* name. Similar was the case when an early *Bhera* developed into an *Aal,* though the rule of residential contiguity among the member families could not be rigid. This territorial tie, therefore, helped the kinship to be maintained and developed for mutual security and cooperative living.

Caste Differentiation of the Lineage System

Although a well-knit system of lineage is in existence among the Khasas and the Brahmins, the situation among the other castes is quite fluid.

Generally speaking, the establishment of lineages among members of a caste in the village depends upon the size of the community and the duration of their stay in the village. As regards the development of a lineage system, however, it depends more upon the socio-economic status of the caste.

As a matter of tradition, the village community is invariably dominated by a high caste group, either a Khasa or a Brahmin, but only very rarely by both. This group consists of a large number of families, who have a long history in the village and occupy a supreme socio-economic position among all castes in the village. The lineage system is well developed among them.

As regards the lower castes, especially the artisans, who have no attachment to land, but earn their livelihood by the traditional services they perform, it is found that they frequently migrate from village to village. They seldom stick to a village for many generations, nor are they to be found in large numbers. For example, there are only two families each of Nath and Bajgi in Lohari, one each of Badi and Bajgi in Lakhamandal, and only two families of Sunar in Baila. Naturally, no *Aal* could be founded among them. The same situation is found even with a high caste when it forms a minority component in the village, *e.g.,* the single Brahmin family in the Rajput village Baila, and the two non-related Rajput families in the Brahmin village Lakhamandal. However, the *Bheras* are found among the minority groups as well. The *Bhera* name is sometimes used to refer to the residence of the family. As such, it would be given even to solitary families.

It would, however, be incorrect to deny the existence of lineage groups among the lower castes. We have found that the seven families of Bajgi in Baila, all belonging to the same family stem, have claimed for themselves an *Aal* known as Dhanand. Similarly, all the eight families of Badi in the same village claim to have an *Aal* named Punand. It would remain uncertain whether these names should be regarded as their *Bheras,* so long as they do not have another *Bhera* name. In all probability, these castes have traditionally no sound system of lineage for the aforementioned reasons, but they may have taken the *Bhera* as their *Aal.*

Depending upon the population strength and duration of stay in the village, we may expect the Koltas to have the lineage system. In Baila, for example, 12 out of the 13 Kolta families belong to the family lines of early settlers. They have established among them two *Aals,* one of which is subdivided into two *Bheras.* All the families of both *Aals* are related to one another as *Dai-Chara.* Intermarriage among them is forbidden, though they can marry with the 13th Kolta family, which came to the village at a later date. In Lohari, on the other hand, out of 21 families, 18 are old residents, among whom there are 8 *Bheras,* but no *Aal.* Evidently, the *Aal* and the lineage systems are not the Kolta tradition. Even though the *Aal* has been found among the Koltas in Baila, is is functioning as no more than an exogamous unit, as long as their socio-economic status leaves no room for their *Aal* to exert any influence upon the village affairs.

Local Differentiation of the Lineage System

We have mentioned earlier the differences in the customs in the different parts of Jaunsar-Bawar, *e.g.,* from the interior parts, like Baila and Lohari, to the border region, like that surrounding Lakhamandal. The same difference arises in regard to the lineage system.

As a matter of fact, we have chosen to present the system found in the Baila-Lohari area in greater detail, as this would represent the traditional pattern typical of the Jaunsari culture. Lakhamandal, under the Garhwali cultural influence, has a lineage system altogether different in appearance, though the position of the lineage, which is known as Thok at Lakhamandal, is not very different from those of Baila and Lohari, in so far as it regulates and controls day-to-day affairs among the villagers.

Lakhamandal is known as a Brahmin village, where Brahmins account for 21 out of 43 families. They have a well established lineage system. The next biggest group of village population is that of the Kolta, which being unstable in its composition due to the high mobility of the member families, contains no lineage or *Thok.* Here we may summarise the lineage composition found among the Brahmins at Lakhamandal in the following table :—

Table (3) showing composition of lineages (Thok) at Lakhamandal (December 1957)

S. No.	*Name of Thok*	*No. of Families*
1.	Raichan	6
2.	Luman	4
3.	Gauryan	4
4.	Chaprasian	3
5.	Individual Families	4
	TOTAL	21

The more significant features found in the lineage system among the Brahmins at Lakhamandal may be summarised as follows :—

1. Instead of *Aal,* the lineage is known as *Thok,* though the nature of the latter, as a kin group, is found to be in conformity with that of the *Aal,* except that the *Thoks* of Lakhamandal are rather small in size, which points to the comparatively short history of settlement of the present group of Brahmin families in Lakhamandal. The term *Thok* has a Garhwali origin.

2. Considering that the *Thok* is an *Aal,* we find in Lakhamandal no sub-lineage equivalent to a *Bhera.* This is due to the obvious reason that the *Thoks* are yet too small to have any subdivisions. In fact, the *Thok* names also serve the purpose of denoting the houses of the families concerned, as the *Bhera* name usually does.

3. Each Thok has a *Sayana,* who is an important figure not only in the lineage but also in the village community. It is especially so in the case of the three old *Thoks, i.e.,* the Raichan, the Luman and the Gauryan, whereas the Chaprasian, which has been established in the present generation, is not a full-fledged lineage or *Thok,* as far as its position in village affairs is concerned.

4. It is noticeable that new families of Brahmins, as well as of Rajputs, were immigrating up till a very late date. This is not the case among the dominating groups of population in other villages in Jaunsar-Bawar. This fact is both the cause and the result of the unstable situation of the lineage system in this village. However, the authority and the functions attached to the three senior *Thoks* do qualify them to be lineages, in the true sense of a Jaunsar *Aal.*

A Functional Analysis

The foregoing structural study shows that the pattern of the lineage system among the Jaunsaris may vary on both the caste and the local bases. However, the system prevailing among the Khasas of both Baila and Lohari may be regarded as a standard form in accordance with the Jaunsari tradition. It is this system which has built up the villages in Jaunsar-Bawar and maintained them as they are now. The importance of this system among the local society may be further elucidated by a functional analysis, with particular reference to the following aspects :

1. The organisation of the lineage, or *Aal.*
2. Solidarity among the *Aal :* the *Aal* functioning as a kin group and as a local group.
3. *Aal* and the village community.

The Lineage Organisation

Although the lineage system is a graded structure, its main functions are focussed on the *Aal,* which is, as a lineage, itself a well organised and stable unit, with definite rules to govern the leadership and membership, as well as their rights and duties among the group.

The leadership in the *Aal* is centred in the *Aal Sayana* who is a senior member of the senior branch among all the member families or *Bheras* of the same *Aal.* He attains his position by seniority and as a matter of hereditary right. His authoritative status is derived from that of the patriarch in the Jaunsari patrilineal joint family. However, his authority is manifold and is far beyond the scope of that of the family head, though his actual position depends on the status of the village community. Normally he is, on the one hand, the authority which settles intra-*Aal* disputes. On the other hand, he also is the conventional leader and representative of the whole *Aal* in dealing with other *Aals* and other castes in the village. He is an important figure in the village meeting, or Khumri, at various levels, where he represents the interests of his *Aal* members.

There is also a *Bhera Sayana* in each *Bhera* or sub-lineage. However, the *Bhera* is not as stable a group as the *Aal.* Again, the Sayanaship in the *Bhera* is not very well defined, though the mutual obligation and intimacy among the Bhera members remains at a much higher level than that among the *Aal.* Thus a *Bhera* is a more intimate kin group than an *Aal,* but the latter has more authority. This difference is due to the fact that the *Bhera* is a direct extension of the joint family, the members of which are united by blood relationship and affection, whereas the *Aal* is a bigger unit and a part of the village community, which is more concerned with the local authority of law and order.

Membership in both the *Aal* and the *Bhera* is determined automatically and non-voluntarily by the consanguineal relationship. However, the membership of the lineage is counted on a family basis, instead of a personal one. It is the family and not the individual which is the constituent part of a *Bhera* and an *Aal,* and it is through the family that individuals get their membership in the lineage groups. Notwithstanding the fact that the *Aal* and *Bhera* are patrilineal, women change their membership after marriage. Thus a married daughter or Dhyanti does not observe the taboos on her father's side, whereas a housewife or *Rhyanti* has to follow that of her husband.

Solidarity in the Aal

As regards the inter-relationship among the lineage members and lineage solidarity, it is seen that an *Aal* is functioning both as a kin group and as a local group.

Aal as a Kin Group

As kin group, all members of the *Aal* regard themselves as belonging to a big family, or *Kutumb.* There is, therefore, among them an incest taboo which leads to a strict *Aal* exogamy. This idea goes even beyond the *Aal* level, and has led to *Dai-Chara* exogamy.

All the members of an *Aal* are obliged to help one another both in their daily needs and in family crises. The mutual obligations are binding on them on social and ritual occasions. For instance, when a family is sending away a daughter for marriage, all male members of the *Aal* to which she belongs are expected to participate in the *Jojora* or marriage party which goes with the bride to the village of the bridegroom. Similarly, on the marriage of a son, all male members of the same *Aal* and some of their wives attend the feast as well as assist the family in all necessary arrangements. It is also a custom that during such grand festivals as the Magh Mela and Bissu, invitations are sent to all families of the same *Aal*. On these occasions of the *Kimona,* an annual festival of making *keem,* a fermented cake, large quantities of which are stored for preparing country liquor all the year round, it is seen that all families of each *Aal* in the village form a work group instead of working individually. The team spirit displayed shows lineage unity and solidarity.

The lineage solidarity is further manifested in matters of enmity and rivalry between the family groups. Whenever a dispute arises between two individuals or families belonging to different *Aals,* it may soon reach the *Aal* level. When at Baila some time ago, a fight broke out between the families of Tikam Singh (Basrand) and Badroo (Horiyand), it was taken by the villagers as an inter-*Aal* fight between the Basrands and the Horiyands. An inter-family enmity often passes in the lineage line, in the form of *Chhinga* or *Barjan,* which is a ritual observance of an inter-family difference on the basis of an ancestral vow. Both at Baila and at Lohari, children are told by their parents not to go to certain houses nor to take food there. Bahadur (Sitlanh) and Bhag Singh (Biraik) are studying together in the school at Lohari. They read together and play together. They are very good friends, but they cannot eat from each other's hand. " We are at *Barjan* with each other ", said the 9-year-old boy Bahadur, " we don't know why it is so but we were told that in the past there was a quarrel between our families and therefore we can't eat at each other's houses nor from each other's hand." In fact, almost every family at Lohari is at *Barjan* with four or five families. For example, all the three families of the Biraik *Bhera* are at *Barjan* with the families of Sitlanh and Muranh, the Sitlanhs with all families of Biraik and Khakta, etc. Similar cases are found with the families in Baila, in terms of *Chhinga,* which is found not only among the Khasas but also among other castes in the village. It is a custom that when two families are involved in a prolonged dispute or serious conflict, and find no way out of it, then either or both of them may go to the temple of Mahasu to sacrifice a goat and take a vow to sever all social relations with each other. This vow, bearing a supernatural sanction, forces all the descendants of these families to keep away from one another, generation after generation, until it is removed by another ritual performance at the Mahasu's temple, by the heads of the families of *Bheras* concerned

Aal as a Local Group

The *Aal* has also a position as a local group functioning in the village community, for all members of an *Aal* are bound together by a territorial tie. We have mentioned the territorial aspect of the lineage system, according to which all the families of one *Bhera* used to remain together at an ancestral site, known as their *Bera*. This residential contiguity then intensifies the intimacy and mutuality of the member families of the lineage group and furnishes a basis for them to act as a local group in village affairs.

In a like fashion, all the *Aals* in the village generally join hands to form a *Dai-Chara,* which is as much a kin group as a local group, at the village level. At the intra-village level, the *Aals* are also attached to the locality. For instance, Lohari is subdivided on the lineage basis into two completely separate wards, the Rajeu and the Khaktad. The former accommodates three *Aals,* while the latter has a single *Aal* of the Khakta. At Baila, the village site is locally regarded as two " villages ", which are formed by two and three of the Rajput *Aals*. As a result of contiguity, solidarity and cooperation have been developed among these local groups. Thus when the families of Tikam Singh and Badroo were involved in an open fight, it was feared among all the villagers of Baila that it might take the shape of a communal feud between the northern " village " which consists of the *Aals* of Basrand (to which Tikam belongs) and Daland, and the southern one which consists of the Horiyand (to which Badroo belongs), Ravaik and Lakhtate. It is said that such fights were of frequent occurrence in Baila in olden days.

From the functional point of view, the position of the *Aal* as a local group may be regarded as established on account of the fact that the village community is dominated by the caste to which the *Aal* belongs. For instance, in a " Rajput village " as at Baila or Lohari, it is only the Rajput *Aals* which are the real constituent parts of the village community, and it is their castemen who largely dictate or have an authoritative voice in village affairs, whereas other castes in the village are only their subordinates and followers. It is, therefore, in the same way as it used to function as a kin group in the caste community, that the *Aal* is functioning as a local group in the village community. In fact, it is owing to this position of the *Aal* in the Jaunsari village community, that the institution of the *Aal* deserves special attention.

Aal and the Village Community

The position of the *Aals* in Jaunsari society, as they are today, is the culmination of historical trends. Reference may be made to the histories of settlement of the various castes and *Aals* in the village, which we have described at some length in the section of the Field Centres. We are told how the Khaktas, who were the original settlers of Lohari, became reduced in numbers, due to the alleged play of black magic by their rival group, the Rajeus. This points unmistakably to competition and rivalry between the lineage groups in the village. Similarly, the earlier groups of Brahmin settlers of Baila, namely, the Bhujreus and the Bhodiyas, could not continue their stay in the village due to the alleged displeasure of their god. All of these instances illustrate the way in which the village community came about, and how important was the position of the *Aal.* It was also at Baila that even the water source in the village came within the *Aal's* ownership, and it was this ownership which led to a great controversy and dispute among the villagers, when the C.D.P. proposed to transform the water source into a reservoir for all the villagers.

A legend is current that there was a time when no water supply was available at Baila, but due to painful efforts made by one of the ancestors of the Horiyand *Aal,* who prayed to Lord Mahasu at Hanol, a water source was created in this village. In this connection, the Horiyands were traditionally regarded as the owners of that water source. There is an interesting and elaborate system of distribution of water among the villagers. It is said that there was another water source, which belonged to the Lakhtate *Aal,* but it dried up some 30 years ago. In the days when there were two water sources in the village, the source known to be the Lakhtate's was used in the village exclusively by the Lakhtate families at night, but was open to other Rajput *Aals* by day, while the other source, which was regarded as owned by the Horiyand *Aal,* was used by the Horiyand families in the day and left for other *Aals* to draw water from at night. Since the drying up of the water source owned by the Lakhtate, that of the Horiyand has been the only source of water in the village. The Horiyands continued to draw water from it by day, whereas other *Aals,* except the Lakhtate, came in two shifts to draw water on alternate nights, as well as in early mornings. The Lakhtate, however, were obliged to go far down the mountain slope to reach another water source, in the same way as all the other castes normally used to do.

When the construction of a reservoir or *diggi* was proposed early in 1955 by the C.D.P. and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Chakrata, it was welcomed by all sections of villagers in Baila, barring the Horiyands, who were afraid of losing their hereditary monopoly of the water supply. All the six families of Horiyand, under the leadership of Kishan Singh, who is the *Aal Sayana* as well as one of the four Gaon Sayanas of Baila, put up strong opposition to the plan. They put forward the reason that the water source belonged to the deity, who was not ready to give his consent for the construction of the *diggi.* They even thought that the application of cement on their reservoir would displease the deity and, therefore, they would possibly lose even the water supply.

On the other hand, all the other four *Aals* of Baila, under the leadership of Dayaram, who is the chief Gaon Sayana and the most influential village elder, were in favour of the *diggi* work. Dayaram, being well informed and respected, as well as being the Sarpanch of the Adalti Panchayat of Kandoi Bharam Khat, to which Baila belongs, raised his voice in public challenging the *Aal* ownership of the water source to which the Horiyands had their claim. He also refuted the alleged displeasure of the deity, and even blamed the village Patwari, who was sent by the Government to prepare an estimate some time earlier, for misleading Kishan Singh and his party. Notwithstanding the majority support for Dayaram's views, it was rather difficult to disregard the objections of Kishan Singh's party as long as it was a matter of the hereditary privileges of their *Aal*. For a time, feelings ran high and a fight was anticipated between the Horiyands and the other *Aals* in the village. Kishan Singh personally appealed to the Tehsil at Chakrata, and this delayed the construction, which was due to begin in May of that year. Even the Panchayat Secretary's and the V. L. W's. repeated persuasions could not prevent the dispute from continuing for half a year. It was only due to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's strict order that the spadework could be started on the 19th October 1955, while the reservoir was completed only by the end of the following year. It may be added here that up to now, the construction of this *diggi* has been the biggest achievement of the C.D.P. from the villagers' standpoint.

Aal in the Village Khumri

Much of the importance of the *Aal* in village life lies in its voice in the village *Khumri*. The *Khumri* is invariably monopolised by the dominating caste in the village, whereas the component *Aals* of the caste are the contending parties in the meetings.

Although the representatives to the *Khumri* are there on a family basis, more importance is attached to the *Aal* participation. As a rule, all families of each *Aal* cooperate under the leadership of the *Aal Sayana,* in the interest of all members of their *Aal*. The village *Sayanas,* as also the *Sadar Sayana* in case of the *Khat* headquarters, are hereditarily determined on the basis of the *Aal,* even though such individuals, once selected, demonstrate general interest in the welfare of the community. It is the *Aal Sayana* and the *Bhera Sayana* who take leading parts in the discussion. Thus the village *Khumri* is the stage for all *Aals* in the village to contend against one another when it is necessary. However, as a matter of tradition, the rightful privileges and interests of the individual *Aals* are respected by all, and a general balance of power is usually maintained among all the *Aals,* as far as intra-village affairs are concerned. It is on this basis that the village life and village affairs go on smoothly. Thus, in Baila, all the five Rajput *Aals* are well represented in the village *Khumri*. There are, besides a *Sadar Sayana,* four *Gaon Sayanas* from different *Aals*. Their positions are determined as a matter of tradition. Though Dayaram from Lakhtate is the most important among the four and is the real village *Sayana* in action, both inside and outside the village, the other three *Gaon Sayanas* have equal status with him in the village *Khumri*. Besides, there are other spokesmen of the various *Aals* and *Bheras*.

Village peace and solidarity depends much upon the leadership both in the village and in the *Aals*. In Lohari, for instance, there is a general confusion of authority and a state of chaos in the village. Apparently much of this is caused by the lack of general leadership, as the late village *Sayana* Jas Ram was, owing to his personal defects and weakness, very unpopular among the villagers for quite a few years, till he died in December 1957, while Ganga Ram, who is known as the " small *Sayana* " of the village, is too self-contained to have any voice in the *Khumri*. Further, there is a lack of leadership in the individual *Aals*.

On the other hand, strong leadership and close relationship among groups of families have led to considerable solidarity of the lineage among the Brahmins of Lakhamandal, specially in the case of three main *Thoks,* namely, the Raichan, the Luman and the Gauryan. Each *Thok* is headed by a *Thok Sayana* who is the judge and controller of affairs among *Thok* members. He also represents the interests of his *Thok* in the village community. In the village *Khumri* the *Thok Sayana* is as important as the village *Sayana*. The village Sayanaship of Lakhamandal is held by the *Thok Sayana* of Raichan, but his rightful position has been challenged by the Lumans. The Lumans and the Raichans may have different origins, but they have had an equally long duration of stay in the village, as well as equally great economic strength and social influence. The Gauryans also have a position comparable to that of the Raichans and Lumans. As a convention, the affairs of the village are managed by the common agreement of all the three *Thok Sayanas,* though the *Thok Sayana* of Raichan, at the inter-village level, represents Lakhamandal as the village *Sayana*.

The Thok Sayanaship points to the lack of unity among the Brahmins of Lakhamandal. This is probably due to the difference in origin of the groups of families, who have migrated to Lakhamandal from Tehri-Garhwal from time to time. A few Brahmins as well as Rajput families, which immigrated recently, have their respective attachment with one or another of the main *Thoks* in the village, on either kinship or economic grounds. As a result, local groups have evolved from the kinship groups. It has been a local convention to count the gross strength of the *Thok* by adding the number of its member families, those of the affiliated families, and the Kolta families serving them.

The comparative position and importance of a *Thok* in the village, therefore, not only depends on its net strength as a consanguineal kin group, but also varies according to its gross strength as a socio-economic constellation and a local group. It is this way of affiliation of newcomers to the old groups of families, which determines the balance of power among the *Thoks* of the Brahmins of Lakhamandal.

Colonial Expansion and Urban Diffusion in the Americas

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BY virtue of European penetration and domination, the entire world became after 1500 an increasingly interrelated system. The process of expansion took time, but by 1800 there was hardly an inhabited corner of the earth that had not felt, directly or indirectly, the impact of the European. Urbanization, like all other basic modifications in human life, could not fail to be affected by this world development.

The nature of European penetration, however, was not everywhere the same. It differed according to the type of overseas area and the kind of Europeans involved, as well as with the particular time and circumstances of contact. Any account of urban diffusion in colonial areas must therefore give attention to the contrasting factors affecting different regions.

Latin America

The Portuguese and Spaniards found the New World so sparsely inhabited and so weakly defended by natives that European colonization was entirely feasible. The main purpose of the invaders, however, was not colonization as such, but ready exploitation. This is indicated by the fact that they gave prime attention to the tropical regions. These warm regions were not only the points of initial contact in the New World but also the most promising sources of immediate wealth and the most abundantly supplied with native labor. Yet tropical areas are normally resistant to European settlement; although the conquerors did settle in significant numbers, it is noticeable that, as with the English and French later, the racial composition of the tropical colonies seldom remained predominantly European. In any event, the planting of permanent nations abroad which would be economically self-sustaining was not the main Iberian goal. The Portuguese and Spaniards thought rather of extracting wealth as quickly as possible, and their complex colonial policy was bent to that end.

Towns as Instruments of Policy

One of the elements in the Spanish colonial policy[1] was the deliberate founding and maintenance of towns. In some cases this simply meant taking over the cities of the aborigines. Tenochtitlan (Mexico City), for instance, was rebuilt after 1522 as the metropolitan center for New Spain; and Cuzco, the erstwhile Inca capital in Peru, was retained as an important center. The native cities, however, were too few in number and too far from the coast to serve all the urban needs of Spanish policy. The conquerors therefore set out with remarkable speed to create what was for that time and under those frontier conditions a large number of new towns. In Mexico, as soon as Cortes landed on the coast he founded Vera Cruz (1519), and only a few years later "all authorities engaged in a steady, unsystematic, and prolific campaign of urban creation."[2] In Peru there was not at first such a wholesale policy of town-founding, yet in 1535 Lima was started near the coast as the seat of the Viceroy of a huge region, and Potosí and La Paz followed within ten years. In 1538, in what is now Colombia, Bototá, was "laid out from scratch on a vacant site."[3] Far to the South, in Chile where the indigenous people had no towns at all, Valdivia founded Santiago, and on the other side of the continent Buenos Aires was started in 1570. In Brazil, in the meantime, the Portuguese had founded Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo. Thus with a century after the discovery of America, when the European population in the new territories was still extremely small and the native population severely decimated, the conquerors had already established a surprising number of towns, many of which are great cities today.

The motives for this emphasis on towns and cities were several, all of them connected with the central features of the Spanish (and, to a lesser extent, the Portuguese) colonial system. First of all, the Spaniards, confronted with the most advanced natives of the Americas and still influenced by their long war at home against another non-Christian people (the Moors), had their minds bent on military action. They thus pursued the invariable policy of establishing towns "as bases from which to carry on the work of military conquest."[4] Having no intention of developing a balanced and durable economy with a large transplanted European population, but rather of making the quickest gains for the government and the elite at home, they needed towns in America both to protect and to control their own people—to protect them from the more numerous natives, and to regulate their economic and political life. It was thus recognized that a highly centralized colonial administration could be made effective only through a few powerful urban centers and a network of secondary towns. Since the Spaniards did not engage mainly in agriculture or industry but rather in mining, the production of hides, and the appropriation of native products, they could congregate in towns with little hindrance to their economic gain. As collecting points or mining centers, inland towns thus had an economic function, as did the seaport cities for shipping goods out and receiving supplies in return. In addition, the towns played a role in the control and utilization of the Indians, who were of most value as laborers and most easily governed as subjects when they were assembled in particular spots. In this regard the church and its mendicant orders formed an effective instrument of imperial policy, shepherding the Indians together in compounds and settlements for purposes of religious indoctrination and thus helping to subjugate them.[5] The church, moreover, being highly centralized like the government, located its headquarters in towns and cities.[6]

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[1] This was not true of the Portuguese, except for the clergy. We shall deal in what follows with the Spanish colonies, making only occasional reference to the Portuguese territories.

[2] Geo. Kubler, *Mexican Architecture of the Sixteenth Century* (New Haven: Yale, 1948), p. 68.

[3] Francis Violich, *Cities of Latin America* (New York: Reinhold, 1944), p. 29.

[4] Vera Brown Holmes, *A History of the Americas* (New York: Ronald, 1950), p. 129.

Given the motives and circumstances that made towns of strategic value in the colonial system, it is not surprising that the Spaniards adopted in the sixteenth century a deliberate and carefully developed pro-urban policy. The Laws of the Indies, first written in 1523 and revised many times, established consistent standards of design regulating the "size and form of the main plaza, width of streets, orientation of gates and walls, location of public buildings, and subdivision of land into lots." As a result, according to Violich, such widely separated cities as Bogotá and Concepcion, "and practically every city between, have exactly the same size of block, the same width of street, the same general urban pattern."[7] Not only the physical layout but also the principles of town government were standardized. "The Spanish municipality in the New World was governed in accordance with the *Ordenanzas de cabildos*," drawn up in 1574[8] and setting forth the nature of the town officials and the mode of their selection.

Not all cities conformed to the specifications. Some, like Potosí, arose too quickly and feverishly to conform to a deliberate plan.[9] The Portuguese towns were allowed to grow haphazardly, and the Spanish theory of the proper municipal government was thwarted by Spain herself and by colonial conditions. Nevertheless, it is interesting how, in this thinly peopled and far-away wilderness and in response to a deliberate policy, Spanish colonial life was organized from the very beginning to center in cities.

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[5] Towns founded for missionary purposes often remained small and backward, but they were numerous. Sao Paulo, for instance, inaugurated in 1555 chiefly for the purpose of Christianizing the natives, had no immediate basis of wealth and remained an unimportant town for more than two centuries.

[6] "The great majority [of both regular and secular clergy] were to be found in the cities." Chas. Edw. Chapman, *Colonial Hispanic America* (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 191.

[7] Violich, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[8] Rafael Altamira, *A History of Spain*, trans. by Muna Lee (New York: Van Nostrand, 1949), p. 405.

[9] See Gwendolin B. Cobb, "Potosi, a South American Mining Frontier" in *Greater America* (Berkeley: University of California, 1945), pp. 39–58.

Urban Innovations and Continuities

As a result of this pro-urban policy, one might expect the towns of South and Central America to have had much the same character as those on the Iberian peninsula at the time. This, however, was only partially true. It should be recalled that in sixteenth-century Europe centralized nations were newer than towns. Most of the towns had their origin in the Middle Ages and were in no sense the product of national policy. The Spanish idea of utilizing a definite urban policy in handling the vast possessions of the New World was therefore a major innovation, more characteristic of the Romans than of the medieval monarchs and princes. In making this innovation, the Spaniards had to adopt new precedents to suit their national goals.

In the matter of physical layout, for example, the planned cities of America had new features. The idea of a central rectangular plaza, located at the intersection of the main streets, framed by public buildings, and constituting a monumental town center, was not embodied in the medieval towns of Europe.[10] Furthermore, the absence of walls around most of the New World towns was in striking contrast to those of Europe. Mexico City never had a wall, nor did Lima until 1683. The tendency, instead, was to fortify the central buildings, usually the church.[11] The colonists apparently felt it safe to forgo the expense of walling entire towns, being satisfied merely to have a place of refuge in the town's centre. Such urban walls as were erected were found mainly in the port towns. Both Lima and its port, Callao, for instance, were eventually walled. In such cases the purpose was protection against other Europeans rather than against natives. The same motive led to the construction of massive stone ramparts and cannon emplacements overlooking important harbors, as was the case at San Juan in Porto Rico and at Cartagena. Bitter experience showed that port towns were likely to be sacked unless strongly protected.

Apart from novel physical requirements, the colonial towns were faced with a circumstance having no exact parallel in Europe—the Indian problem. Chronically short of European labor, they were under the constant necessity of somehow utilizing the Indians. One practice, already mentioned, was to herd them into towns and compounds—a measure which multiplied urban problems.

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[10] "In the Middle Ages, such open spaces grew as markets, near the junction of old and new city quarters, or as gradual excrescences upon traffic arteries, ultimately culminating, but rarely beginning as the specialized square." Kubler, *op. cit.*, pp. 97–98.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 94–95. The nucleus of Buenos Aires was a fort, a means of defense and a place of refuge for the inhabitants.

Native compounds could not all be located at a distance from the European towns (even when desired by the mendicant orders). If native labor was to be utilized, a substantial portion of the Indians had to reside *close* to the Europeans; yet, unless living in as servants, they were too distinct in language and customs, and too poor, to occupy exactly the same parts of the town as the Europeans. The result was that the natives generally lived either in the colonial towns but *segregated* in certain parts, or in towns of their own but near by the Spanish centers.[12]

The urban agglomeration of Indians had several important consequences. One was that it subjected the natives to frightful mortality by heavily exposing them to European diseases against which they lacked immunity. As the losses occurred, still more natives were brought into towns, to be decimated in turn. The reduction of the native population was so enormous[13] that it greatly aggravated the labor shortage and encouraged the importation of slaves from Africa.

The class structure of the New World towns was unlike that found in any European city. Not only were there large numbers of Indians, but there were Negro slaves, *peninsulares,* and creoles—all added to the ordinary occupational and nobility distinctions of European communities. The creoles had a lower status than persons born in Spain (they were excluded, for example, from high political offices) because the crown feared that the creoles would be more loyal to the colony than to Spain herself. Further, although it was not made in any sense a deliberate policy, it did fit the purpose of Spain to have the creoles interbreed with Indians and Negroes; because this, by creating half-breed groups, fragmented the caste structure below the *peninsulares,* thus increasing the divisiveness among the lesser strata and minimizing the danger of popular revolt.[14] The result, though effective from the standpoint of retaining political control, was less satisfactory in terms of economic development. The *peninsulares,* a small aristocracy dependent on political ascendancy, were not required to survive by economic ingenuity. They thus exemplified and reinforced, at the highest level, the typical Spanish prejudice against labor, industry, and retail trade—a prejudice imitated by the creoles. Productive work, whether in the mines at Potosí, on ranches in Mexico, or in handicraft shops in Peru, was done by the subordinate races. These people, whose rise in the social scale was blocked by caste barriers, had no incentive or opportunity to advance the economy.

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[12] In Lima "the Indians were put into special settlements called Las Reducciones, consisting of smaller blocks and narrower streets than those of the Spanish settlement, and amounting to little better than concentration camps." Violich, *op. cit.,* p. 29. In Mexico City, they were assigned to the western and northern edges forbidden to whites, and some dwelt in neighbouring villages where they were available for labor in the city. In some towns different Indian tribes occupied separate quarters. Kubler, *op. cit.,* pp. 82–83, 148.

[13] The population of Mexico declined from about 11 million in 1520 to approximately 2.5 million in 1650. Sherburne F. Cook and Lesley B. Simpson, *The Population of Central Mexico in the Sixteenth Century* (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1948), pp. 38, 47.

[14] "The creole hated the Spaniard, but he did not rise against him, as he would have needed the assistance of the lower classes, who hated him and whom he loftily despised." Chapman, op. cit., p. 118.

If in these respects the New World cities were different from those on the Peninsula, there were of course other respects in which they were similar. For instance, the Spaniards in the colonies, like those in Europe, tended to prefer the central part of town for their residences. These were customarily on the second and third floors, with shops on the first floor, a pattern that still persists. Also, the tendency to regulate prices on a municipal basis, the persistence of gilds, the indifference to sanitary conditions and public convenience, all were reminiscent of sixteenth-century towns at home. Even in the matter of local government, the structure required by the colonial authorities was, at least in the early years, much like that in Spain, though important differences soon arose. In general it can be said that there was a transfer of urban institutions to the New World, but that the mode of transfer and the impact of new conditions altered not only the role of towns but also their physical and social structure.

Decadence of Town Government

We saw in the previous chapter how the towns and cities of Europe gradually lost their autonomy. In Spanish America they never had much autonomy, and they tended soon to lose even that. In origin they were supposed to follow the old form. The founding citizens signed an act of organization and swore to support it. A municipal council, or *cabildo,* was to be elected annually by the sworn citizens from among their number, and they were to appoint the town officers (one or two *alcaldes* and other officials if needed). The *cabildo* and officers were to have wide local powers, judicial as well as executive and legislative.[15] However, this system never functioned generally in the New World, and as time went on it functioned less and less. The crown's anxiety to control the colonies was too great to allow such local self-government.

Whereas the towns of the Peninsula possessed ancient charters of municipal liberties, these liberties were not granted to the New World towns. Soon, in addition, it became clear that the provincial governors in America, *peninsulares* to a man and representing the crown and the viceroy, would reduce the power of the elected town officials, who were mostly creoles. The governor received the right to preside over the *cabildo* of his capital city and generally to appoint a deputy to preside in the *cabildo* of every town in his province.[16] Controlling the militia, he could be highhanded if need be, sometimes imprisoning the members of a refractory *cabildo*. Acquiring the right to confirm the appointment of city officials, he might insist on appointing them himself, or the crown might do so directly.[17] Finally, the taxing and spending power of the city officials was severely and increasingly limited by the prior claims of crown officials.

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[15] Bernard Moses, *South America on the Eve of Emancipation* (New York: Putnam's, 1908), pp. 77–79.

[16] C. H. Haring, *The Spanish Empire in America* (New York: Oxford, 1947), p. 163.

A further factor in the decay of town government was a development that was also affecting the cities in Spain—namely, the practice of selling municipal offices. This procedure, adopted by Philip II for revenue purposes, grew steadily worse. Since not much money could be realized from the sale of an office for a year, appointments were sold for life or for a series of lives.[18] Small wonder that town government became scandalous. For example, " in all the cities [of New Spain] municipal finances were in a state of incredible disorder and confusion. In many towns no books at all were kept of simplest receipts and expenditures. Corruption in public administration was universal."[19]

Reform characteristically took the path of reducing still further the vestiges of municipal authority. In Mexico a general accounting office was set up to which all municipalities had to send their ledgers for audit and from which prior approval had to be obtained for *any* expenditure of municipal funds. Toward the end of the eighteenth century a new territorial administration was instituted which cut up the entire American empire into smaller jurisdictions. The rulers of these territories, *intendentes* and their subordinates, " took over virtually complete control of municipal affairs—budgeting of town funds, street cleaning, water supply, regulation of hospitals and jails, markets and bakeries, etc.," and often the administration of municipal justice. The towns were improved, but at the cost of virtually complete subjection to higher authority.[20] Thus in Spanish America the last vestiges of the once proud autonomy of the medieval city were lost, never to be regained ; the city was merely an instrument and a subject of the all-inclusive state.

Capital Cities in the Spanish Colonies

Spain's centralized administration operating through a network of urban strong-points where population was deliberately concentrated, led naturally to an emphasis on colonial capitals—an emphasis even stronger than the similar tendency in Europe. Royal courts (*audiencias*) and royal officials (viceroys, or *virreyes*) were established in America directly under the jurisdiction of the Council of the Indies in Madrid. The territory administered by each of these authorities was huge. In the whole of the Americas there were only ten *audiencias* in the sixteenth century, with only one added in the seventeenth and two in the eighteenth. Only two viceroyalties were created at first (Mexico and Peru) which divided between them the entire colonial area until the eighteenth century when two more were inaugurated (Bogotá in 1718 and Buenos Aires in 1776). Under the viceroys were the captains-general, who ruled subordinate but still large territories. Each authority was located in a city, and the higher the jurisdiction and the wider its territory, the more important was the capital. Thus Mexico City and Lima became and remained the two most important cities in the Spanish colonies

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[17] " It can easily be established that in most of the important cities of America the appointment of *regidores* was from earliest times entirely in the king's hands or in those of his colonial representatives, and that any privilege of election that might be granted to the *cabildo* was a concession from the crown." *Ibid.*, p. 165.

[18] By 1606, " all vendable offices were granted in perpetuity, with a right of resale or bequest within the holder's lifetime on condition of paying, the first time a half, and thereafter a third part of their value into the royal exchequer...... Municipal office thus became to all intents and purposes a piece of private property which passed freely by sale from one person to another, or between members of the same family,....A vacancy might even be purchased for a minor, the post being held by the father or other suitable substitute until the coming-of-age." Haring, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 176.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 176–77.

The church similarly centralized its government, concentrating its wealth, its clergy, and its control in the capital cities.[21] When it is added that the universities, when founded, were located in these centers, together with all the machinery of economic and military control; that it was in the capitals that the dominant *peninsulares* lived; and that it was here that funds were lavishly expended for governmental and ecclesiastical buildings, monuments, and such civic improvement as occurred, one can see that the capital city idea had taken firm hold. Lima, for example, "acquired many of the features of an old-world capital. All persons wishing to achieve social distinction, and all persons who had achieved such distinction, found it desirable to live in Lima. The presence of the highest officers of the government and the dignitaries of the Church made it the social centre of South America."[22]

The Spanish colonial capitals looked to Europe rather than to the native and alien hinterland for their cultural stimulation and economic orientation. A great gulf therefore came to separate them from the vast, crude domain over which they ruled. This concentration of all major functions in the dominant cities, this gulf between the city and the hinterland, has characterized Latin American urbanization to this day. Curiously, it is one of the factors that has retarded economic advancement and, as a consequence, urbanization itself.[23]

Obstacles to Urbanization

Oddly enough, the Spanish colonial policy of encouraging town-dwelling for all races was not accompanied by economic measures that would stimulate steadily increasing urbanization. Any economic advance that did not immediately redound to the mother country's profit was regarded with suspicion and was subject to repression. For instance, Spain's desire to monopolize colonial trade led her not only to prohibit the colonies from trading with other European nations but also to deny them, until 1778, the privilege of trading with one another except by special permission. In order to enforce these restrictions, the crown closed certain ports to all international trade. One such closed port was Buenos Aires. The non-use of this strategic harbor had the fantastic consequence of forcing the trade of the whole Plata region to go by way of Peru and Panama at such enormous cost that the rich pampa region of Argentina was left for two centuries in a primitive and undeveloped condition, the growth of Buenos Aires being far less than it could have been.[24] "In general, throughout the colonial period the Spanish restrictive trade policy resulted in shortages of goods, exorbitant prices, depressed living standards, universal smuggling, and wholesale bribery from one end of Spanish America to the other."[25]

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[21] "About one-sixth of all the churchmen in New Spain were in Mexico City alone. In Lima in 1778, according to Antonio de Ulloa,......there were 40 convents, and those of the nuns were so crowded that, as he put it, they could populate a city." Chapman, *op. cit.*, p. 191. The seat of the Inquisition in South America was located in Lima.

[22] Moses, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

Some measures were taken to promote agriculture—the dispatch of seeds, plants, and breeding animals to America; the encouragement of native crops such as Indian corn and vanilla; and the facilitation of farm-labor migration from the Canaries. But, on the other hand, crops that competed with those in Spain—grapes, olives, silk—were discouraged and forbidden, and processing plants were often disapproved.[26] Furthermore, the colonists themselves avoided agri-

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[23] Portuguese America was less urban-oriented than Spanish America, partly because of the self-sustaining and isolated plantation economy that arose in northern Brazil. An aristocracy of wealthy land-owners living on their latifundia served as a counterweight to the officials and merchants living in the towns. Nevertheless, Rio de Janeiro was unquestionably the capital city. When the royal government was transferred there from Lisbon in 1807, it acquired more of the accountrements of a Latin capital. Naval and military academies, a royal printing press, a school of commerce, a national library and museum were established in Rio de Janeiro shortly after that event. By the time the royal household returned to Portugal in 1820, the city was more the center of Brazil than it had been before. It can be seen, however, that this development came late in the colonial period.

[24] Two hundred years after it was founded, Buenos Aires still had only 25,000 inhabitants, whereas New York City, the same length of time after its founding by the Dutch, had approximately 150,000. The speed with which Buenos Aires, once its shackles were removed, surpassed Lima also indicates the depressing effects of the early restrictions on the Argentine city.

[25] Holmes, *op. cit.,* p. 184.

[26] From 1618 to 1794 the construction of sugar mills was prohibited in Peru, as was the making of brandy. Grape cultivation was frequently, though not always successfully, suppressed, and Peruvian wine could generally not be sold in other parts of the Americas. For a while coca plantations were forbidden, the ostensible reason being the protection of the Indians who were thus permitted (or forced) to work (or die) in the mines from which the Spanish government took one-fifth of the gain. Moses, *op. cit.,* pp. 300–309.

culture, disdaining the labor involved and preferring quicker avenues to wealth. They liked to own land, to be sure, but they left the work to be done by the subordinate races. ' Partly because of this individual dislike of farming, and partly because of primogeniture which kept large holdings intact, vast plantations became a characteristic feature of Spanish America. Both the favored Church and the heavily rewarded conquistadores soon built up huge landed estates which they worked with servile labor and with primitive methods...., actually cultivating only a small portion. This wasteful form of farming prevailed throughout the colonial age...." [27]

With respect to industry, the obstacles were overwhelming. The fact that "the Laws of the Indies forbade the colonies to have any form of manufacturing which might compete with the same industry in Spain " [28] would not alone have been of much consequence, because Spain did not have much industry. But, since Spanish merchants were the middlemen in the trade of goods from other European countries to the colonies, almost any kind of manufacturing in the colonies would endanger an important source of profit. The colonial industrialist, if permitted to exist, could have at best only a local market, since he was hampered by monopolistic middlemen in the trade with Europe and by prohibitions against intercolonial trade in the American markets. Owing, however, to poverty and depopulation, the local market was thin. Finally, the inappropriateness of the Spanish institutional order for industrial development was even more of a retarding factor in America than it was in Spain herself. " Spaniards in the colonies, most of whom were of the real or quasi nobility, felt the normal aversion of their class for the mechanical industries. Even the artisans who came from Spain refused to work at their trade in the Americas, affecting to despise it...." [29] None of the government officials, ecclesiastics, and soldiers who dominated the colonial regime had a knowledge of industry, and few realized its importance in the creation of wealth. Like agriculture, it was too slow an avenue to riches for the impatient Spaniards ; the latter had come to the colonies to fight, plunder, and rule, not to work. The elite of colonial society, the *peninsulares,* were by definition temporary ; if they held office they were required by law to return to the mother country, and if they did not return, their sons born in America of course lost their status as *peninsulares.* The next class, the creoles, although permanent, were parasitic on Indians and slaves. As a laboring class, however, the Indians and slaves were by no means the equals, in skill or motivation, of the artisans of Holland, England, Germany, or even Spain. They were not only untutored and resentful, but also so frequently riddled by disease and death that they could scarcely acquire industrial skills. Such a labor supply was ill suited to industrial development; in fact, no industrial society has ever been built by labor of that sort.[30]

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[27] *Ibid.,* p. 186.

[28] Chapman, *op. cit.,* p. 147.

[29] *Ibid.,* pp. 146–47.

Economic progress in the Iberian colonies was also discouraged by the predominance of the church. Not only vast rural holdings fell into ecclesiastical hands, but also much urban real estate.[31] In addition, despite papal admonition, the church engaged in business and finance, often charging exorbitant interest rates. The disadvantage of ecclesiastical dominance was that, whereas its means were economic, its goals were not. The wealth of the church was inalienable and non-taxable. The entire weight of supporting the government and community development fell upon laymen, whose position became progressively weaker *vis-a-vis* the church. The church used its increasing wealth, not to capitalize economic enterprise, but to multiply its own edifices and increase its power.[32]

As a consequence of these factors in the colonial situation, the lack of economic advance during three centuries was extreme. As late as the end of the eighteenth century there were still few roads suitable for wheeled vehicles. No road was opened across the Isthmus of Panama until 1846. Transport was still chiefly on the backs of animals. Chronic unemployment and poverty prevailed dispite the enormous resources and the sparsity of population. Spain restricted immigration in an effort to keep foreigners and non-Catholics out of the colonies. The lack of foreign ideas, the Inquisition, the prevailing illiteracy all gave the colonists a xenophobic and ultra-conservative frame of mind. The colonists reacted to their economic problems by general corruption. Smuggling and bribery were essential parts of colonial life, along with piety and ignorance. Efforts the colonists might make to get together to discuss their common problems were effectively discouraged. Early in the sixteenth century, for example, some municipalities, thinking of cooperation, appointed delegates to meet together. "Disapproval came promptly from Spain, Charles V in 1530 despatching the specific order: 'Without our command it is not our intention or will that the cities or the towns of the Indies meet in convocation'."[33]

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[30] For rather similar reasons, Portugal gave little encouragement to colonial industry. When gold and diamonds were discovered in Minas Geraes and Matto Grosso, it was ordered that in those territories "all factories or other establishments not essential to the extraction of gold or diamonds should be closed." Joao Pandiá Calogeras, *A History of Brazil* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1939), p. 39. The purpose was to divert labor to mining and thus to obtain government revenue (diamonds were a royal monopoly). The crown hardly governed the colony at all except in those areas where quick mineral wealth was obtainable.

[31] In Chile, for example, the Jesuits came to own about 70 rural estates, "some of them as large as a modern province." (Moses, *op. cit.*, p. 239.) In the cities of America, soon after the Conquest, "a large part of the choicest municipal property had passed into the hands of ecclesiastical corporations." The Mexico City *cabildo,* in 1578, complained that the Dominicans and Augustinians possessed the largest and best part of the property in the city..... In 1748, it was reported of Lima by special royal investigators that, of a total of 2,806 buildings in the city, 1,135 belonged to religious communities." (Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 327.)

[32] In Mexico fewer civil buildings were constructed than churches; "religious architecture was the dominant mode, and secular buildings rarely assumed durable and monumental forms." Kubler, *op. cit.,* p. 187.

As a result of the failure to develop industry, to create a stable and skilled labor force, to evolve a diversified and progressive agriculture, or to integrate the cities culturally and economically with the hinterland, the early promise of urbanization in Latin America was not fulfilled. The crown's encouragement and interest in townbuilding was not accompanied by a policy of laying an economic and social basis for continued development. The creoles long remained an exploiting class, gaining their living through the use of subordinate labor in mining, ranching, and agriculture, while the *peninsulares* dominated government and commerce. Both groups were looking always for a quick profit, wasting resources, and, with the help of the clergy, keeping the bulk of the population in a state of ignorance and poverty.

It is not strange that urbanization showed little progress during the colonial period. The speculative character of the economy reflected itself in the ups-and-downs of mining towns, such as Potosí and Villa Rica.[34] Even the more permanent places gained little headway. They "remained small colonial towns completely under the domination of Europe".[35] Lima, capital of a huge viceroyalty, housed only some 87,000 people by 1810; Mexico City, about 135,000 by 1820; Rio de Janeiro about 130,000 by 1807; Buenos Aires about 45,000 in 1806; and Santiago de Chile, about 30,000 in 1790. During the eighteenth century the total population was probably growing. The cities were growing too, but not much faster than the rural areas. As a result, the Iberian part of the New World was not very urbanized by the end of the colonial period—far less than France or England at the time. Even the largest cities were diminutive compared to Paris, London, Naples, Berlin, and Madrid. Since no basis was laid during the colonial era for industrialization, the Latin American countries lagged behind Anglo-America in urbanization from about 1840 on, despite their head start.

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[33] Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

[34] Two years after silver was discovered on a bare Andean mountain in 1545, Potosi reportedly had 2,500 houses and 14,000 inhabitants. It sprang up fast and haphazardly, "so that the streets were winding and narrow and ran in every direction." (Cobb, *op. cit.*, p. 51). Since no produce could be grown near by, supplies had to be hauled by llama and mule over tortuous routes. Fantastic inflation resulted, and the government of the town was corrupt and violent. Yet the population grew to something like 160,000 by 1650, and, according to a census taken about 25 years later when the silver mines had started giving out, it was still 120,000. In 1650 Potosi was probably the largest city in the hemisphere, but by 1825 it had only 8,000 inhabitants. (Chapman, *op. cit.*, p. 149; Cobb's study of Potosi is excellent).

In Brazil the mining towns had similar histories. Villa Rica (now Ouro Preto), in the gold region, rose to a reputed 100,000 population, but later sank to a bare 8,000. Tijuco (now Diamantina) reached 40,000 at the peak of the diamond rush, but later declined to 10,000. (Pandiá Calogeras, *op. cit.*, p. 44).

[35] Violich, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

The English Colonies

Urbanization in British America differed from that in Spanish America for four reasons: (1) The British, due to their late start—about a century after the Spanish and Portuguese conquests—were limited mainly to regions as yet unclaimed or poorly occupied by their European rivals. These regions, in contrast to Mexico, Peru, and Brazil, seemingly lacked such means to quick wealth as gold, silver, or diamonds; and they were too sparsely inhabited to supply even a temporary pool of native labor. Yet, to a great extent, they were temperate in climate and suited to European settlement. Once colonization was started, they received a greater influx of settlers than the Iberian colonies did, and these settlers spread over the land and started a rural economy. (2) The governing of the English territories, though mercantilistic, was less autocratic and centralized, hence less opposed to colonial enterprise, than was the case in the Spanish and Portuguese areas. The home country, being more industrial, had a greater economic complementarity with its colonies; and its class structure, being more fluid, led to more conflict and compromise in colonial policy. (3) Since England was Protestant, her colonization was not influenced by the centralizing tendency of the Catholic church. (4) Unlike Spain, England had no pro-urban principle in her colonial administration.

The net effect was less urbanization in the British colonies. There were no cities where administrative headquarters, clerical institutions, native compounds, and nobility were concentrated. The towns were smaller, more spontaneous, and more exclusively dependent on economic activity. Yet a broader and more dynamic foundation was being laid which would lead, after the colonial regime, to a more rapid urbanization than Latin America as a whole would experience.[36]

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[36] Haring, op. cit., pp. 158–59, attributes the town emphasis in the Spanish colonies primarily to Spain's own municipal tradition. My view is that the decisive role was played by the conditions the Spaniards encountered in their part of the New World and by the type of colonial policy adopted. As to the *consequences*, however, Haring's conclusion is the same as mine. "Town life," he says, "was more characteristic of Spanish colonization than of English. The first English settlers in North America concentrated in towns or villages in the beginning, only to scatter soon to individual farmsteads or plantations; and the creation of early English towns was very informal. In Spanish America urban communities remained the dominant type of political and social organization......and owing to the presence of aboriginal labor to exploit in fields and mines, the rural population remained almost entirely Indian."

Britain's Tropical Colonies

What has just been said, however, hardly applies to the Caribbean islands. The British and French came to these islands toward the middle of the seventeenth century with the purpose of raising tropical crops for sale in Europe. Endowed with more capital and better markets than the Spaniards enjoyed in similar circumstances, their great need was for cheap labor—a need soon satisfied by slavery. Sugar, which proved the most lucrative crop and required European capital and managerial skill, was also adapted to the massive use of unskilled labor. Soon, therefore, the number of Negroes came to outnumber the whites (many of whom returned home as absentee owners or as retired personnel). By 1791 it is estimated that the British Caribbean islands had only 65,000 whites as compared to 465,000 blacks, and the French islands had 58,000 whites as against 406,000 slaves.[37] This rise in the slave population makes clear that the islands had a plantation society in which the white planter was supreme, an economy in which unskilled labor was predominant and in which virtually no manufacturing existed except the crude processing of raw sugar.[38] All manufactured goods were brought from Europe or New England, paid for by agricultural exports. The system, already archaic by the end of the eighteenth century, concentrated in the hands of the owning class the little surplus produced by the slave masses. The owning class looked to Europe as its home and spent its profits there.

Under such circumstances there was little urbanization. As late as 1861, for example, Jamaica's largest town, Kingston, had only 27,000 inhabitants, or 6 per cent of the population.[39] In what is now Haiti, Port-au-Prince had in 1790 about 600 houses; Cap François, about 850. Barbados was probably the most urbanized island, its capital, Bridgetown, having in 1765 about 1,500 houses, the insular population being about 80,000.[40] The plantation economy neither produced much urbanization nor laid a basis for it in the future.

The Mainland Colonies

With respect to our analysis the British mainland possessions resembled the Caribbean in only one way: they did not become very urbanized. In other ways the two areas differed sharply. For instance, the low urbanization on the mainland was not due to the absence of towns—for a number of thriving towns and cities grew up along the coast. It was due rather to the amazingly fast increase of the rural population, which kept pace with urban growth. The greatest difference, furthermore, was that the mainland colonies, in contrast to the English, French, Spanish and Portuguese colonies to the south, laid the foundation for an eventual post-colonial urbanization that was to be the greatest in the New World. This was the ultimate consequence of certain distinct advantages that the North American colonies enjoyed.

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[37] Bryan Edwards, *The History of the British Colonies in the West Indies* (London: Stockdale, 1801), Vol. 2, pp. 2–3.

[38] The product was mostly brown sugar ("muscovado") with many impurities. Theoretically, the sugar could have been more profitably refined on the islands, but the method of doing so in those days (called "claying" the sugar) demanded such care that slave labor produced too much spoilage. So the crude sugar was shipped to Europe for refining. J. R. H. Moore, *Industrial History of the American People* (New York: Macmillan, 1913), pp. 42–43.

[39] Geo. W. Roberts, *The Population of Jamaica* (Cambridge: University Press, 1957), pp. 43, 51.

[40] Edwards, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 348–49; Vol. 3, pp. 139, 141.

One advantage was the variety of climate, topography, and resources which gave the thirteen colonies as a whole a diversification of agriculture and commerce that stood in marked contrast to the "sugar colonies" of the Caribbean. Fishing, whaling, shipbuilding, grain-raising, and trading in New England had little in common with tobacco, rice, indigo, and cotton cultivation in Virginia and Carolina. Although particular regions might fall into a monocultural system (*e.g.*, Virginia's reliance on tobacco), this could never be true of all the mainland colonies as a whole.

A second advantage was that the population of the British mainland territory grew much faster than it did anywhere else in the New World. By 1790 there were nearly four million people there, as against only a little more than half a million in the British Caribbean. European conditions encouraged emigration, and the British government, in contrast to France and Spain, placed no obstacles in the way of foreign migrants to the New World. Most of the migrants went to the mainland because there the climate was more temperate, the resources greater, land more available, religious and political groupings more varied, and freedom from government and taxation more marked. Health and sanitary conditions, moreover, both in the town and in the countryside, were superior to those in Europe or in South and Middle America, with the result that natural increase was greater.

A third advantage was the minor role of slavery. Although slaves were used in rice, indigo, and tobacco cultivation in the southern colonies, they were not particularly profitable even there until after the invention of the cotton gin in 1793.[41] Consequently, slave labor did not displace free labor or discourage European immigration, and manual labor did not become a badge of low caste. Indeed, in New England where the Puritans were dominant, and in Pennsylvania where the Quakers held sway, slaves were few and hard work was regarded as a virtue, idleness as a sin.

A fourth advantage was the seemingly inexhaustible supply of land. Although the colonies had divergent rules governing land acquisition—rules that the speculators often turned to their advantage—sentiment was against huge grants, the policy generally being to grant free or cheap land to new settlers. Farm labor was therefore scarce, because no-one wanted to work for somebody else when he could work for himself. In working for himself, each farmer was limited in the amount of land he could actually cultivate. The family farm thus came to be the normal organization of agriculture,[42] and industry, thrift, and ingenuity the corresponding virtues. Sheer ownership of land could hardly symbolize upper-class status, because land was not the scarce item. Nor could institutional leisure serve as a symbol of status, because, except among the relatively few big slave-holders of the South and the most successful town merchants, leisure was not profitable. The ever-present frontier thus minimized rigid class barriers.

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[41] Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 117–30. At no time in the colonial regime did slaves constitute as much as 20 per cent of the total population.

In these terms we can understand why the economy was vigorous. Individuals were self-reliant; whatever they did redounded to their own credit or discredit. As the eighteenth century wore on, the growth in population and production was so great that the self-willed colonists could wage a successful revolutionary war against the world's most powerful nation.[43]

At first glance, realizing that the thirteen colonies had progressed beyond any other colonial area of the time, one would expect an unusual degree of urbanization. Exactly how much urbanization occurred is impossible to say, but our information is enough to show that it was actually very slight. The main towns themselves, though economically vigorous, were small as compared either with the main cities of Europe or with the chief centers of Latin America. Table IX-1 gives approximate figures for the leading places. It can be seen that during the colonial regime no city exceeded 35,000 inhabitants. Although Philadelphia, New York, and Boston compared well with the secondary cities of England and the European continent, the fact remains that the proportion of the total colonial population living in urban centers was quite small. This is revealed by the following estimates of the percentage living in places of more than 5,000 :

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[42] Even in the South, where plantations were common and eventually reached huge sizes, the average farm was small. See Harold U. Faulkner, *American Economic History* (New York: Harper, 1954), pp. 67–68; and Edward C. Kirkland, *History of American Economic Life* (New York: Crofts, 1934), pp. 71–79.

[43] The British mainland colonists succeeded better than the French. The latter concentrated on the highly profitable fur trade under monopolistic controls. Fur was to them what gold and silver were to the Spaniards — a source of quick wealth leading to the neglect of more prosaic but durable enterprises. In search of the easily exhausted supply of fur, the French went farther and farther into the hinterland. Since the fur trade was controlled from above, the government autocratic, and land tenure feudalistic, few immigrants came over. Also, entrance into New France was forbidden to the one group most likely to succeed in colonization — the Huguenots. Consequently, "instead of the 1,300,000 inhabitants which the English colonies boasted in 1754, more than nine-tenths of whom were engaged in agriculture, compactly settled along a fringe of seacoast and firmly established, the French had only about 80,000 scattered along the rivers and Great Lakes from the Mississippi to Nova Scotia." (Faulkner, *op. cit.*, p. 45). No wonder the British and Americans conquered New France and annexed it in 1763.

TABLE IX–1

Approximate Populations of Main American Towns and Cities, 1750–1800[1]

	1750	*1755*	*1790*	*1800*
Philadelphia	16,000	35,000	35,000	41,200
Boston	15,700	16,000	18,500	25,000
New York	13,000	25,000	33,000	60,500
Charleston	7,500	12,000	16,000	20,500
Newport	5,500	9,200	6,700	6,700
Providence	3,500	4,400	6,400	7,600
Salem	2,500	5,300	7,900	9,500
Baltimore	100	6,000	13,500	26,500
Richmond	——	——	3,800	5,700
Albany	——	——	3,500	5,300

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[1] These figures are only more or less approximate. Those for 1750 and 1775 come mostly from Evarts B. Greene and Virginia D. Harrington, *American Population Before the Federal Census* (New York : Columbia University, 1932), with some consideration given to estimates by economic historians and material in Carl Bridenbaugh, *Cities in Revolt : Urban Life in America 1743–1776* (New York : Knopf, 1955), p. 5, 216–17. The estimate usually given for Philadelphia for 1775 is 40,000 (*e.g.*, Bridenbaugh), but it is impossible to say what boundaries the estimate refers to ; in view of conflicting reports, I have scaled down the figure to 35,000. The estimate for New York in 1775 sometimes is given as low as 20,000.

The data for 1790 and 1800 come from the U.S. censuses taken in those years. This does not mean that the figures are accurate, for there was confusion concerning the enumeration of urban populations. The figure for Philadelphia in 1790, for example, is given as 28,522, but the suburbs had an additional 13,998. Assuming that the suburbs were one-half urban, I arrived at a rough estimate of 35,000. In 1800 the census made no mention of suburbs but simply gave the population of Philadelphia as 41,220. In the case of New York, the 1790 population refers to the city proper (including the Harlem division), but in 1800 it refers to the whole of New York County. Although the county was not large, it nevertheless would appear that the figure for 1800 is an exaggeration ; in that year the city probably had 45,000 to 50,000 inhabitants. Some New England places are omitted from the list – *e.g.*, New Haven, Middletown, Norwich – because it is impossible to tell whether they are towns proper or merely townships. In the latter case the territory is large and includes a large fraction of rural residents. Bridenbaugh gives the population of New Haven in 1771 as 8,295, but in the census of 1810 the city proper had only 5,772.

In view of the inaccuracy of the figures, I have rounded the numbers in order to avoid the appearance of exactness.

Percentage

1700 ...	4.2[44]
1750 ...	4.8[45]
1775 ...	4.3[46]
1790 ...	4.0[46] (47)
1800 ...	5.2[48]

It appears that during the colonial regime between 95 and 96 out of each 100 inhabitants were living either on a farm or in a town of less than 5,000. Actually most of them were on farms, for in 1790 the proportion in places of less than 2,500 was 94.9 per cent. It would have been hard to find at that time a more rural European population.

Why so little urbanization ? The answer is threefold : First, and most important, the dominant economic activity was agriculture, in a region with a seemingly endless supply of good land. Second, the commerce of the colonies was in part dominated by the mother country. Third, the colonies were governed as separate entities.

When the English first came over, they naturally settled, for mutual protection against the Indians, in tiny villages along the coast. Since the chief aim was farming, however, the extension of settlement away from the coast was accompanied by a greater use of land. In New England the land allotted each new village ordinarily comprised 36 square miles. Each of the original proprietors got a strip of the upland, meadow, and marsh land and received rights in the commons. The New England township thus included an extensive agricultural area surrounding the village. This arrangement, which lasted for about a century, did not result in the growth of sizable towns because, as the danger from Indians diminished, the inhabitants sold their scattered strips in order to buy a compact farm. They then lived on this farm instead of in a village. Furthermore, newcomers were often unable to get property in an old township and had to strike out on their own. In short, as time went by, the agricultural population became spread out on isolated farmsteads, as it is to this day. In the meantime, New England had become commercially active, so that the ports along the coast grew to be real towns; but they remained small in relation to the agricultural population now spread out and continuing to spread out over the interior.

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[44] Towns over 5,000 were Boston, 6,700 ; and New York, 5,000. Total colonial population, 275,000. Needless to say, the figures are very rough.

[45] Towns over 5,000 were as shown in Table IX-1. Total colonial population, 1,207,000 (*Historical Statistics of the United States 1789–1945,* Bureau of the Census, Washington, 1949, p. 25).

[46] (47) Towns over 5,000 were as shown in Table IX–1. It is possible that one or two places were actually over this figure but not included ; yet the urban proportion is the second highest on the list. Total colonial population, 2,500,000, by interpolation.

[48] Population in places over 5,000 and in the United States as a whole from *Historical Statistics of the United States 1789–1945,* pp. 25–29. This source evidently used a lower figure for Philadelphia's population in 1790 than we have used, but it may also have exaggerated the population of some of the lesser towns, especially those of New England. Consequently, we have used the figures as given.

Settlement in the middle and southern colonies was even more rural than in New England. Until 1735 Boston's commercial preeminence was undisputed, seconded by such neighboring towns as Newport, Providence, and Salem. This commercial activity was based on fishing, shipbuilding, rum distilling, the carrying trade, and a bewidering variety of domestic manufactures. Agriculturally, however, the New England hinterland did not produce staples suitable for exchange with Europe.[49] It was the middle and southern towns which, as their hinterlands opened up, began to export crop staples on a large scale, enabling them during the war years after 1743 to make serious inroads on the commercial position of the New England ports. Not only was the hinterland of the middle and southern colonies larger and richer, but the land laws were such as to encourage new settlers to move westward.[50] This basic dependence on agriculture meant that cities like New York and Philadelphia tended to grow as the rural population itself grew, although they soon increased their share of the shipbuilding and carrying trade. The southern colonies were still more rural, because their major exports were plantation products, and the middlemen who handled these were often British merchants with offices in England rather than in the colonies. In Virginia, since the tobacco plantations all fronted on a navigable river, the ships simply docked at the wharf of each plantation to load the produce. "The planter was thus able to ship his product direct to England, where it was handled by a merchant who sold the tobacco and in turn bought what the owner needed."[51] Clearly, no large growth of port cities was necessary. Furthermore, since tobacco cultivation soon exhausted the soil, each plot was usually abandoned after three years. This meant both that the plantations had to be large (with much of their land unused) and that people had to keep moving to new areas. The southern colonies, like those to the north, tried to stimulate settlement on the moving frontier by offering cheap or free land and by exemption from taxes. Everything thus contributed to a pattern of scattered plantations, farms, and ranches, with hardly any growth of towns at all. Virginia, feeling this utter ruralism to be a disadvantage, "passed several acts in the seventeenth century to encourage the establishment of towns," but to little avail.[52] In 1790, with 748,000 people, Virginia was the most populous state in the Union, but its principal city, Richmond, had not yet reached 4,000 inhabitants. Georgia's main town, Savannah, had reached only a little over 2,000. The main southern city, Charleston, though it was fourth in size in 1790, remained more purely a collecting and distributing center for its vast hinterland than did the others.

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[49] Carl Bridenbaugh, *Cities in Revolt* (New York: Knopf, 1955), p. 46.

[50] In New York the continuance of the Dutch system of large manorial grants caused much of the best land along the Hudson to lie idle and forced the tide of immigrants to go farther west. In Pennsylvania, toward the middle of the eighteenth century, the orderly distribution of land broke down and gave rise to squatting.

[51] Reginald C. McGrane, *Economic Development of the American Nation* (Boston: Ginn, 1942), p. 33.

The influence of agrarianism in producing rurality was reinforced by the lack of political and economic integration among the thirteen colonies. Limited by severe problems of land transport and by their divergent beginnings, the colonies, at least until the last 35 years of the colonial regime, had more intercourse with England than with one another ; governed as separate entities, their mutual distrust and isolation constituted, as is well known, one of the great problems in the formation of the United States. As a consequence, they had no principal city which operated as an exchange center for the entire colonial economy (If anywhere, that role was fulfilled by London). Similarly, they had no political capital. Each colony had its own capital, to be sure, but this, as the cases of Richmond and Savannah illustrate, was usually a small place indeed. In marked contrast to the Spanish colonial regime, there were no cities where governmental functions for huge areas were concentrated. (Mexico City and Lima each ruled over territories far larger than the entire region from Georgia to Massachusetts.) In short, since there was no city which had all of the thirteen colonies as either its economic or its political hinterland, no primate city of good size was possible.

The important towns that did arise in the British territory were located exclusively along the coast, predominantly in New England and the middle colonies. The reason for the coastal location was that the towns were built on commerce, and commerce was necessarily water-borne, predominantly international, and connected with fishing and shipbuilding. The colonists, though overwhelmingly agrarian and adept at meeting their own needs by household industry, never had the least intention of practicing a subsistence economy. Always viewed by the mother country as instruments of trade and profit, they eagerly sold their products in exchange for wares from abroad. Commercial enterprise was thus always pursued, limited mainly by frontier conditions and England's mercantilism. One of the frontier limitations was the paucity and expense of overland transport.[53] By contrast, water transport was abundant and cheap. The fall line of the New England streams was too near the coast to maximize their use as commercial arteries, but elsewhere rivers like the Hudson, Delaware, Schuylkill, Susquehanna, Potomac, James, Appomattox, Tar, and Santee were open highways for the easy and safe transfer of goods and people. The streams connected the coastal ports with their separate hinterlands. In addition, the ocean served the purpose of inter-colonial coastwise trade, which, though never equalling in value the international trade with Europe and the West Indies, did serve to link the diversified colonies into an economic network.[54] It was water transport that caused the towns to lie along the coast and the center of population, as late as 1790, to be 23 miles *east* of Baltimore. In addition, the fact that the towns were located more abundantly along the northern than the southern portion of the coast is explained by the fact that industry, fishing, and shipbuilding were pursued more vigorously in the north. The northern colonies, with a poorer agricultural outlook, turned their energies in other directions. Pushing handicraft production as well as Newfoundland fishing, they made a good thing of the famous triangular trade in fish, rum, casks, and slaves. It will be noticed from Table IX-1, however, that though the New England towns were the most prominent at first, they had begun to lose out by 1750. Such places as Boston, Newport, Providence, and Salem showed far less growth from 1750 to 1800 than did New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston. As the colonial economy gained momentum and spread westward, the better rivers and the more central location of the middle colonies began to pay off and to give their towns an advantage.

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[52] Kirkland, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

[53] In the regions back from the coast, the impenetrable forests, lack of bridges, dispersed settlement, and long distances virtually prohibited commercial transport over the trails. Philadelphia fur traders, for instance, added 20 to 30 per cent to the price of their goods for shipment over the mountains. The only articles that could bear the cost of overland transfer were those of high value in relation to bulk — salt, iron tools, tea, furs, whiskey.

If it is understandable why the British mainland colonies were less urbanized than their Spanish counterparts to the south, it is also understandable why, by the time of the Revolution, they had laid a much firmer basis for future economic development and therefore for future urbanization. Their agriculture was regionally diversified and therefore proof against the afflictions

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Near the coast, the situation improved, because the population was denser. It was around the main towns that the best roads were developed (*e.g.*, between Philadelphia and Lancaster) particularly after 1743 (Bridenbaugh, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–58). But the roads were still slow and inadequate by the end of the colonial era, and water-borne traffic was the lifeblood of the colonies. It was this feature that accounted for the rise of Baltimore, which diverted trade down the Susquehanna into Chesapeake Bay. The chief element in the working population of the main towns was always the seamen. On the roads, see Kirkland, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–93.

[54] The coastwise trade employed by 1769 a substantial tonnage. It served not only to collect colonial products at certain entrepots for overseas shipments and to distribute to lesser ports imported articles, but also to make the peculiar products of each colony available to the others — *e.g.*, butter, salted meats, cider, fish, and rum from New England to the South; tobacco and naval stores from the South to the North; pig iron from Pennsylvania and iron ore from Maryland to Massachusetts, etc. Kirkland, *op. cit.*, p. 94. Bridenbaugh, *op. cit.*, Ch. 2 and elsewhere, lays particular stress on the vigor and variety of intercolonial commerce.

of a one-crop nation. Their commerce was buttressed by a shipbuilding industry, a sizable merchant marine, a profitable fishing trade, and an active and varied handicraft output from local resources. Their population was predominantly European and free, drawn from a variety of nations, imbued with the ethic of hard work and democratic opportunity, compactly settled in comparison with the total French or Spanish populations, and growing faster from natural increase and immigration than any other population in the Americas. With this start, given the vast resources ready at hand, it was inevitable that industrialization would take place on a huge scale.

Perhaps the most significant harbinger of the future was the colonial iron and steel industry. With ironworks in every colony except Georgia, "in 1775 there were most blast furnaces and forges in the colonies than in both England and Wales, and the colonies produced more pig and bar iron than the mother country," turning out about one-seventh of the world's supply of iron.[55] With abundant charcoal and iron-ore, with an active demand both at home and abroad, this basis of heavy industry was sure to grow. In addition, some processing industries in the colonies had already been brought to a more advanced stage of technical development than in England.[56] It was no accident that the thirteen colonies gained their independence before the Spanish and Portuguese colonies did, and that they eventually eclipsed the latter in degree of urbanization.

Other Continents

The expansion of European people and culture affected not only the Americas but also Asia, Africa, and Australia as well. Australia and New Zealand, like North America, were relatively empty areas to which European civilization could be transferred in its entirety. Their settlement, however, came much later, almost two centuries later, than it did in North America. As a consequence the history of their urbanization falls wholly after 1800 and its analysis must therefore be deferred until later chapters. In the case of Africa, European settlement never amounted to much except in the temperate south. The Dutch settled the Cape in 1652, but very little immigration occurred until after 1814, when the British secured definitive possession of the territory. The penetration of tropical Africa was very retarded, most of it occurring in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with relatively little permanent European immigration. The chief non-American area affected by European contact prior to 1800 was Asia, where the Portuguese, Dutch, French, and English were establishing empires at the same time that they were doing so in the New World. Let us state briefly the interconnection between European contact and urbanization in Asia, remembering that the region will receive fuller consideration in a later chapter on underdeveloped areas.

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[55] Arthur C. Bining, *Rise of American Economic Life* (New York: Scribner's, 1943), p. 93.

[56] "The sawmill was constructed in the colonies before it was in the mother country, and its equipment remained superior. The flour mill, transformed by American inventions, startled and awed European observers. The Lynn iron furnaces were not surpassed in capacity by European furnaces." Kirkland, *op. cit.,* p. 90.

In Asia the Europeans did not, for the most part, encounter virtually empty lands or wholly primitive peoples. Instead they found great regions far more densely settled than Europe itself, with ancient and complex civilizations. The economic base was intensive agriculture, heavily dependent on irrigation, with a considerable development of household handicraft. The people were therefore not highly urbanized. Since, however, many regions were organized under dynastic rulers, and since a lively trade existed in commodities and luxuries, there were cities of substantial size located at strategic spots throughout much of Asia. These cities had an archaic character resembling in many respects the ancient cities of the Near East that had flourished 2000 to 3000 years previously. The Europeans did not bring urbanization to Asia as they were doing in North America and would eventually do in Australia and New Zealand. They did not take over and profoundly modify the native cities as they did in the Inca, Maya, and Aztec regions of America. The main reason is that too few Europeans came to Asia to transfer their own urban patterns there. They found the hundreds of millions of natives too numerous, the climate too different, the societies too alien and too firmly established to make the formation of full-blown European colonies either feasible or necessary. Instead of attempting colonization, the Europeans gained their ends by gaining control of international trade in Asia and by gradually obtaining direct or indirect control of government. They also took over the most strategic sites, whether these were aldeady going cities or required the founding of new ones. Regardless of when the cities were founded, however, they always had far more Asians than Europeans in them, so that Asiatic institutions and cultures put their stamp on them. The Westerners, always few in numbers relative to the native population, became a tiny elite directing or at least influencing the economic and political life of far more Asians than there were Europeans in the world. In suitable areas they set up plantations for the production of tropical crops, just as they did in the West Indies, utilizing the abundant Asian labor by one means or another. For the most part, however, and especially prior to 1800, they dealt in the products grown or manufactured by the local people. Whatever the arrangements, the labor was furnished by the Asians themselves, and Asian customs and institutions remained largely intact.

Under these circumstances the effect of European contact prior to 1800 was perhaps to enhance urbanization to some degree, but not much. The contact itself was felt most directly in the cities, whether these were old ones like Canton or new ones like Calcutta and Bombay. The advent of the Europeans tended in general to create a new pattern of city location in Asia. Many of the numerous dynastic states in that area were in decay. Dominance was often in the hands of nomadic, or formerly nomadic peoples, whose capitals were inland. Cities were often shifted from one site to another with changing political fortunes. Some states depended very little on ocean-borne trade. Consequently, many of the old cities were located in the interior—*e.g.,* in India, Burma, Ceylon, Persia, and Japan; less so in sea-going regions such as China. Under European influence the emphasis on commerce was so great that many of the interior cities declined, while new ones sprang up near harbors or rivers accessible to ocean-going vessels. But regardless of location or newness, they remained predominantly Asian in population and thus continued many of the features that had characterized such places for centuries. The most novel element was the European elite itself, which usually lived in a separate European quarter. Added, too, was the new importance of the cities as entrepots for world trade—collecting points for goods produced in the Asian hinterland and destined for other continents, and distributing points for European manufactures. Caught in this new network of world mobility were people themselves. The shifting of labor and of Asian traders from place to place, a movement that became more important in the nineteenth century, had already begun before 1800, tending to give to the growing port cities a polyglot character which especially marks them today.

Despite the fact that European contact with Asia on a sizable scale dated from the sixteenth century, the main results so far as urbanization was concerned were not to be encountered until after 1800. The main reason for this tardiness was not only that European colonization was impractical but also that the industrial revolution did not have much world influence until after 1800. It was a West made more powerful and more greedy of raw materials by a rapidly expanding technology and a growing population which exercised the greatest impact on Asia. The urban significance of that impact will occupy an important part of our later discussion.

Sociology in a Rapidly Changing Society

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THE emphasis on social change is a recognition of the predominant social fact of our time. Social changes are taking place in all countries in the world. In Africa and Asia, as in America and Europe, science and technology, and the contacts of peoples and cultures present challenges, opportunities and urges to achieve higher standards of living, larger freedom and higher human dignity, social welfare and social justice. In some countries, the efforts to achieve all these goals simultaneously have resulted in social changes that have the dimensions of a revolution which profoundly affects every aspect of national life : its culture, politics, economics, religion, morality and social relations, as well as most realms of individual personality.

This situation dictates the problems of sociology, as of the other social sciences ; for sociology is inevitably involved in the social situation, and its problems are dictated by the social setting.

The concern of sociology with social change is not new. From the time of Comte to the present day, sociologists have studied and reflected upon the phenomenon of social change. They have tried to answer the questions that men have asked about society. Why does it change, and where does the change tend ? Sociologists have provided many theories in an endeavour to explain the cause or the direction of social change.

Comte thought he had discovered in social change a relation between intellectual and social development which he stated in his well-known theory that history showed that human thought passed through three stages : the theological, the metaphysical and the positive. Durkheim saw in social change a change from primitive segmentary society to an organic one marked by the division of labour. Tonnies believed social change showed a development from Gemeinschaft, a spontaneous natural unity, to Gesellschaft, a type of unity characterized by associations formed for various purposes and interests. Marx saw the cause of social change in technological development and the conflict between classes for its control. Pareto saw social change to arise from an alternation in the types of the elite who control society. Hobhouse suggested four criteria for studying social development : growth in scale, in efficiency, in freedom and in mutuality of service. Spengler saw social change as the natural process of birth, growth, maturity and decay. Veblen saw social change chiefly caused by economic forces. Toynbee's monumental historical survey explains social change in terms of the rise and fall of civilizations. To explain social change, Sorokin has formulated a cyclical theory of what he calls "cultural super-systems" which succeed one another. These examples, chosen from the many theories of social change, illustrate the diversity of explanations that have been given. How relevant are these theories for the understanding of the problems of the social changes taking place today? To test them in the light of the contemporary situation may itself prove a rewarding task for sociology. The Japanese, for example, did not consider Comte applicable to their situation in the last century. When his theories were first published in Japan in 1873, they did not appeal to the Japanese who considered them too conservative; on the other hand, when Spencer's "Social Statics" was translated in Japanese in 1877, it was widely read, and it appeared in thirty translations between 1877 and 1890. Spencer's radicalism, his defence of individual rights and laissez faire, appeared to have more relevance to the Japanese situation at that time. Thus the formulation as well as the acceptance of social theory are both influenced by the social situation.

No theory of social change has yet been accepted as satisfactorily and adequately applicable to every situation. Each theory has drawn attention to some important factor of change. The different factors that have been selected by different writers for emphasis suggest that social change results from a multiplicity of causes and appears to follow different directions: cyclical, or spiral, or linear. Such a conclusion only challenges further research for more exact knowledge, and the search continues. It is one of the dominant interests of sociologists today.

It should be noted, however, that Marxist sociologists do not accept this conclusion. They contend that the multiple factor theory is untenable. To them, Marx has already provided a theory applicable to all societies. They insist that their studies have confirmed the basic principles enunciated by Marx that, (to quote from a recent paper on "Sociology in the U.S.S.R." by Mr. Fedoseev, a corresponding member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences) "the decisive cause in the process of historical development lies ultimately in the production of material goods and that the real creators of history are the masses". He goes on to add: "In our age of rapid social changes, it is natural that great interest is paid to the main trend of historical development. The study of the most important social changes has shown that in the 20th century the concentration and the socialization of the means of production has become of decisive importance. The social outcome of this economic process is the fact that the private capitalist mode of production is being superseded by a socialist one. Socialism is the inevitable outcome of the concentration and the socialization of the means of production."

Alongside this quotation from a Russian author, I wish to set one from a paper on contemporary American sociology written by Professor Barber of Columbia University:[1] "A third leading characteristic of American sociology is that it is inspired predominantly by liberal values and ideologies. A central concern is to help achieve greater equality in all spheres: for example, social stratification, ethnic group relations, between the sexes, and in education. Another such concern is to help in the realization of greater individual freedom. Hence the protest against any great concentration of political and social power."

These two statements set side by side reveal a fact of significance not only for the study of social change, but for sociological studies generally. They show that a general theory of society and also assumptions of a philosophical nature, are implicit in sociological works, theoretical as well as empirical. Sociology would make further advances if these implicit assumptions were made more explicit, and given greater attention than they have hitherto received. It would make the differences between sociologists more intelligible. The different positions taken by the authors also make it clear that sociological truths must be sought in a cooperation which transcends national frontiers; a fact which adds importance to the international character of this Institute. It gives better opportunities for the discovery of truth, which is the object of our search. At the present stage of knowledge we have to take account of different factors in trying to understand social change. Recent studies of social change show that there is an increasing effort to base social theory on empirical data. These studies take in smaller human groupings, focus on shorter time spans, and apply more rigorous scientific methods. Comparison between different countries are drawn with greater caution. Valuable studies have covered such subjects as the effects of the growth, increasing heterogeneity or mobility of populations; the impact of science and technology on society; the effects of the development of communications; problems of industrialization and its effects on agricultural and rural communities; changes in the production process; the effects of contacts between peoples of different cultures; the influence of automation and technical changes on human relations in industry; the changing patterns and roles of the family; political parties and ruling classes; problems of power and freedom in rapidly changing societies; and ideologies and values. Such studies have been dictated by the problems posed by the social changes taking place in different countries.

The investigations have shown the need for new methods and techniques. One aspect of contemporary sociological studies is the attention being paid to questions of methodology and techniques.

New techniques ranging from experimental, observational, statistical and survey methods, questionnaire and interviews, to group analysis, and inter-disciplinary projects and regional studies have been employed. This last one, that of inter-disciplinary cooperation, is a significant aspect of the work of this Institute. There is a growing realization that the social sciences cannot individually answer the questions posed by rapid social change, if they work in isolation. The new development is full of promise, but it challenges the arguments sometimes put forward that the social sciences are autonomous in their respective spheres, as it does the imperialistic claims sometimes advanced for sociology. Social change is the occasion for a continuing search for new and better techniques and methods.

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[1] American sociology in its social context. Transactions of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology, pp. 172–3.

A noteworthy problem is one concerning the definition of social change itself. For the purpose of sociological analysis, there is a need for a clear definition of the concept. Different viewpoints and perspectives have suggested different definitions and delimitations. One view confines social change to changes in social structure ; that is, to change in the size of society, the composition or balance of its parts, and the type of its organization. Another view holds that social change embraces the changes that occur in a culture, including art, science, technology, values, as well as changes in the structure and organization of society. There is also a view which restricts social change to patterns of social relationships exhibited over some defined period of time in a given society. Those who have lived in a rapidly changing society know and experience change in every aspect of life. The search for defining the concept clearly is part of the search for understanding a complex social reality.

The preoccupation with empirical studies has not altogether diverted sociologists from what Professor Marshall has called " the way to the stars ".[2] Some of the sociological theories I have already cited illustrate the attempts that have been made by sociologists to interpret the whole course of human history, and to formulate general rules of change and development. It is this attempt to establish very general rules of historical development and social change which Professor Marshall has called " the way to the stars ". It springs from the belief that by taking a long-range historical view, and surveying events of the past, it is possible to discover patterns or regularities that enable one to understand the present, and to forecast the future. The search for a basis for prediction is due to the assumption that if future changes could be predicted, social change could be better controlled.

Comte who first proposed to extend the scientific method to the study of human relations hoped thereby to be able to understand and explain the contemporary situation better. He considered that the present could be better understood by viewing it in a broad historical context, as part of the process of social development. As we may see from examining the theories of such sociologists as Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, Marx, Hobhouse and Spengler, or those of some contemporary sociologists, social theory often comes close to the philosophy of history. That is to say, sociologists in seeking to explain the causes or direction of change have constructed theories encompassing long-range trends or patterns of history, involving philosophical concepts of the structure of society as a whole. This has largely been due to the assumption that sociological laws of the same kind as the laws of the natural sciences can be discovered for the guidance of human societies. There have been theories describing society as an organism, as a machine, as a balance of forces, or, as in the case of Marx, as a dialectical process leading to a classless society through revolution. The controversy still rages among sociologists as to whether it is better to formulate cautious theories covering much shorter time spans and based on empirical data, or to engage in this partly philosophical task of searching for general theories which seek to explain the great movements of history and human social life. But there are those who consider the opposition between the two positions to be a false one. These hold the view that the two positions merely concern different levels of abstraction. So the " way to the stars " still beckons sociologists ; for a sense of history and a search for systematic and comprehensive theory are still required for the fuller understanding and explanation of social changes.

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[2] In *Sociology at the Crossroads.*

Some of the theories of social change have been deterministic in that they assert or imply that social changes are due to agencies or forces at large in the world acting independently of human will and control. Similar theories are being elaborated in connection with studies of industrial societies. Views have been expressed that the individual loses his freedom in the large mass organizations of modern times. That the great capitalist combines, for example, work for ends which their members scarcely understand but towards which they are driven ; and again that the masses whom no one has power to control or deflect carry out the work of history, driven by forces they do not apprehend. Man. therefore, it is asserted, is in a state of " alienation ". This is attested by the vast industrial and political organizations which no one controls and which nevertheless determine the lives of individuals. This type of analysis implies that instead of the greater freedom for the sake of which men organize themselves into larger and larger groups, unions, and associations, their freedom is diminished through these very organizations. Social change is thus presented as the result of massive forces operating through large impersonal organizations. This adds yet one more theory of determinism to those that have already been put forward to explain social change. In the history of social theory, geographical, physical, biological, racial, psychological and cultural factors, the last including religion, politics, economics, technology and the institution of the family have all been submitted as active forces, each with its own dynamism to determine social change independent of human will.

Marxist sociologists put their theory of determinism differently. They agree, in the words of Professor Fedoseev again, that " while social formations of the past were the result of a spontaneous development, the new socialist socio-economic formation being prepared by the whole course of the preceding historical process did not arise spontaneously, but was brought about by the revolutionary activity of the masses ".[3]

The various factors which have been selected and endowed with their own active forces, even though we reject determinism, may serve the purpose of bringing home to us the fact that the scope of human choice is limited by such factors as heredity, physical or social environment, education or biology, or by the interplay of these factors.

If the theories were true that free choice and human activity had nothing to do with social change, then sociology would have little, if anything, to contribute to the study of problems of rapidly changing societies, and still less to their solution.

On the contrary, empirical studies of social change support the view that the decisions, choices, and purposeful acts of men are among the factors of social change. Changes, for example, often occur when persons in key positions take decisions which affect large numbers of their fellow beings. Rapid social changes have occurred when men in such positions have decided to industrialize an agricultural country, take measures to increase agricultural productivity, expand the school system and introduce legislation for compulsory primary education, initiate welfare services or community development, bring about changes in local or central government structure, or move whole populations from one place to another.

The Constitution of the Republic of India, for example, lays down certain principles which shall guide the State in promoting the welfare of the people, and these launch India into the creation of a welfare state. The State is enjoined to secure for the citizens adequate means of livelihood, equal pay for equal work, to protect workers against exploitation, provide for the health and education of the citizens, and so on. All this sets out a social policy to be realized through planning. To cite but one result, the rapid transformation of life is taking place in Indian villages is due to the direct activity of the government. The social change in rural India is revolutionary, but it was initiated by human decision and choice.

There are many changes in social life which are attributable to the actions of men, in conflict or in cooperation, or to their responses or reactions to particular social situations. It is because theories of determinism imply the elimination of human responsibility and free human wills and choices that questions of freedom and determinism form part of the subject of enquiry in the study of social change. Is social change the product of forces acting without conscious intent, as Engels held, or do social forces, as Ginsberg has suggested, consist of the energies of men in conscious or unconscious interaction ?

The question is not merely an academic one for sociology. Those whose concern is with empirical matters and with the actual life of human beings in space and time, have to work on the assumption of the reality of human choices, and the freedom of the human will. This is fundamental to all sociological enquiry. It may be elucidated from actual social situations. The threat of disintegration, or the actual disintegration of traditional values and moral standards is frequently one of the most serious aspects of rapid social change in Africa.

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[3] Transactions of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology, Vol. I, p. 181.

Africans brought into contact with European culture and technology, or men and women who are flung from village or rural life into industrial or urban society have to make adjustments not only to new physical and social situations, but also to ways of life and ideas and goals which demand fundamental changes in outlook and personality. These call for responses, decisions and choices.

Technical development does involve decision and choice ; and the choice has to be made within the context of a people's culture. The studies of capitalism by Max Weber, Sombart and Schumpeter show that it is a social system with its own techniques, structure, attitudes, symbols and values. In Asia or in Africa, capitalism, with its techniques, values, institutions and structures confronts the people with decisions and choices which have to be made against the background of their own culture. The choice initiates a whole series of changes, some of them revolutionary in their tempo. The acceptance of technical development, whether in a capitalist or socialist structure, leads to changes in their social systems, culture, goals and values.

Social change, it should be noted, connotes the development of new meanings and values, or the substitution of new goals for old ones. There is a tendency for some empirical studies of social change to restrict analyses of the social situation to structure and function, in terms which ignore that part of the situation is spiritual, and involves men's search for faith, for meanings and goals that will help them cope with the lostness, loneliness and frustration that often afflict those involved in social change. Their needs are not only material but also spiritual. To illustrate the reality of this, I would draw attention to the development of sociology in India. Spiritual values are so vital a part of the culture and heritage of India that one result of the impact of the West on India has been the re-interpretation by Indian scholars of their own religious concepts and values. This was engendered by the encounter with Europe and is as much a part of social change as is the growth of cities or factories. Professor Saksena of Agra University in a paper on recent developments of sociology in India has this to say : [4] " it may, therefore, be said that in our sociological thinking there is a preponderance of belief in nature and divinity. . . . Hence sociology in India cannot be entirely " objective " in content and approach. It has to contain a little bit of abstract philosophy, which provides a continuum between the past and the present, which constitutes the dynamics of Indian society ". Does not this point to man's spirituality which is nearer the truth than an " objective " positivism which seems to disregard it ? The problems of those who experience rapid social change cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of their concepts of nature, of man and society, of the supernatural, and their world view, for it is these that motivate their choices and responses to situations of social change. Spiritual bewilderment and uncertainty about moral standards are a part of the negative effects of social change as are slums and overcrowding.

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[4] Sociology in India. Transactions of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology, Vol. I, p. 61.

Social change has creative as well as negative possibilities. Investigations of the pathological aspects of social change have centered on such problems as crime, housing, delinquency, mental disorders, unemployment, insecurity, family break-up, industrial accidents, prostitution, old age, and the like. It is this which brings sociology and social welfare close in their respective purposes.

Such studies recall the fact that many sociologists, among whom may be mentioned Comte, Spencer, Ward and Hobhouse, embarked on their sociological studies avowedly to make a contribution towards the solution of social problems. It was Comte who wrote : " It is for the heart to suggest our problems, it is for the intellect to solve them. The only position for which the intellect is primarily adapted is to be the servant of the social sympathies ".

Indeed when Comte considered the idea of progress, he came to the conclusion that altruism, the growing sympathy and concern for others in an ever-widening circle of the human family was the mark of progress.

Sociology therefore fittingly takes its place here among the disciplines studied at an Institute founded as a contribution to international understanding and cooperation. The service of mankind is an ideal which has inspired and continues to inspire many who have taken up sociology as a special study. Right through the history of sociology is discernible a practical and reformist bent which is an expression of faith in the possibilities for good that social change promises.

A fundamental question which has engaged the attention of sociologists is whether the social sciences can provide the basis for a unified ethic, an international ethos, on which international peace and interdependent existence can be built. Sociological studies of the moral codes of different communities suggest that amidst the variations and diversities of these codes, striking similarities are also discernible. Comte had no doubt that a unified ethic for mankind was possible.

Hobhouse who entertained similar hopes for human progress believed that history exhibited a general expansion of the human mind, and a greater respect for the human person. Reviewing the international situation in 1924, he wrote:

" There are in the world today the elements of a world polity ; there are also forces making for tyranny, rebellion, confusion, and the ultimate renewal of an ever more destructive war. The opposing tendencies seem nearly balanced, and which shall prevail is perhaps a question of time. In this question lies the issue between an advance to an international order which, by relieving the peoples of the burden of hate and fear, may set free ethical and economic forces great enough to carry the race to a height of civilization hitherto unknown, and on the other hand to a recrudescence of warfare in a form calculated to bring the entire structure of civilization as we know it to a violent end ".[5]

It has been the hope of sociologists that their studies will contribute to human understanding and cooperation and so help mankind to escape the doom to which Hobhouse refers—the violent collapse of the entire structure of civilization. Technical advances and the invention of the atom bomb which have taken place since Hobhouse wrote now face the entire human race with the possibility of extinction.

But mankind need not come to this tragic end. Studies of conditions in areas of rapid social change afford some ground for optimism. In the new states and nations emerging in Asia and Africa there are evidences not only of the impact of the science and technology of Europe and America, but also of certain ideas, values and goals which have been accepted and which are shared in common with Europe and America.

The findings of sociology and cultural anthropology emphasize that cultures are learnt, and that racial differences should constitute no permanent barrier to the sharing of cultures and ideals and values. This offers hope for human brotherhood.

Further, and this bears out Comte's hopes, there is mounting evidence of increasing understanding and of enlarging sympathy and concern of man for man which in certain instances have been expressed in humane activities and sacrifices made by peoples of one country or culture to help those of another. The twentieth century has seen many examples of this both in the help given through the agencies of the United Nations and by individual countries. This Institute itself is a testimony and a concrete expression of this hopeful trend. Comparative studies of the problems of social change show that all mankind share a common humanity, and that co-operation, friendship and active sympathy are as possible, on the basis of that common humanity, as are competition and conflict. International peace is an attainable goal. Current sociological research on value systems and ethical codes should contribute to this end.

Just as technical advances are making possible a common material and technical civilization, so advances in mind and spirit could spread a challenging awareness of the common humanity of man, and of the possibilities of advancing through cooperation and reciprocal giving, in the words of Hobhouse, " to an international order which, by relieving the peoples of the burden of hate and fear, may set free ethical and economic forces great enough to carry the race to a height of civilization hitherto unknown ".

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[5] *Social Development,* p. 297.

The Concept of "Social Change" in Sociological Theory

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THE term "social change" has become such a general one that it might be of some importance to ask what weight it carries in sociological theory. This, obviously, does not mean that sociological theory is a unified system, and that one can speak in any simple fashion about the place of a given concept within the context of sociological thinking.

Consequently, it will be the aim of this study to deal with some aspects of this concept and with some of the dominant theories, without any pretense of being either exhaustive or complete as this would be clearly impossible within the framework of an article.

However, some preliminary psychological observations of a more general nature should be made. The fact that the term "social change" has become such a stereotype which is used continuously in popular publications has undoubtedly a certain psychological significance. In Western civilisation, both religious as well as rational thinking stressed the more permanent aspects of life while economic and sociological thinking placed much greater emphasis upon change.

This means that the concept of social change is a dualistic one : it is an expression characteristic of a certain mentality while, at the same time, it refers to social reality itself. This relationship creates a number of logical possibilities :

1. Social change occurs in social reality, but this fact is not accepted by group-mentality or, to use a different expression, it is not absorbed into the value-system. An example would be a society where interest on loans is taken with the expansion of credit while the value-system continues to ignore this.

2. Social change occurs in the value-system, but is not transferred into social reality. An example would be a society which grants universal suffrage, but suppresses informally the exercise of it.

3. Social change occurs both in the informal and the formal structure of a social group, and there is a constant process of interaction.[1]

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[1] Henceforth the terms informal and formal structure will be used as the current sociological terms.

In addition, social change can be seen as a process of increasing social complexity, but also as one of disintegration and of decay. In other words, as a concept it is neutral, but it can receive either a positive or a negative value.

A major difficulty which confronts us is whether there is any possibility of an objective analysis of social change, separate from investigating social change as a factor in the mentality of either an individual or a social group.

An objective presentation of social change, without reference to a value-system, seems only possible if we present it in the terms of a general science of Man, but one cannot legitimately claim the existence of such a science. If social change is seen in terms of social evolution, we tacitly accept a biological theory as the basis of our social thinking, but this biological theory has not been universally accepted while, in addition, it contains itself highly speculative elements.

Upon an empirical basis, we can only chart a few major trends with a reasonable degree of certainty. There is no scientific reason to doubt that the evolution of Man took place over a period of about half a million years of which 99% falls into the period of relatively simple societies while only 1% of this span of time has shown us the emergence of more complex social groups.

In the past this has led many social thinkers to refer to static and dynamic periods, but the English historian Toynbee has shown quite convincingly that it would be much more correct to speak about a low and high rate of social change rather than about static and dynamic periods.

In addition, if we relate social change to biological evolution, there is obviously question of a process of growth which goes through slower and more rapid stages, but there can never be question of no change at all.

Thus, terminologically we must first determine whether we wish to consider social growth and social change as identical concepts or whether it is preferable to attribute a different value to them.

There is no satisfactory solution to this problem, if we do not consider Man's social evolution as a natural process, subject to certain biological conditions, and in modern social science this viewpoint must be considered as acceptable. Theological explanations of Man or certain systems of idealistic philosophy do not place Man within the context of nature, but these metaphysical arguments will not be taken into consideration in this essay, though this does not imply that they are without value.

The basic assumption of this study is that Man's evolution must be regarded basically as a biological process and, secondarily, as a social process. But social evolution is possible only if certain biological factors are given.

Thus, we obtain three basic concepts: biological growth, social growth and social change.

As far as biological growth is concerned, we only need the basic aspects of the evolution of a given species: origin, growth, increasing adaptation to the environment, optimum adaptation and decay, either from internal or external factors. Social growth refers to the increase in the size and adaptation processes of social groups while the term social change is often used for the changes of an existing social pattern into a different one, or, for *partial* change.

None of these terms seems to have a generally accepted sociological value and to attempt to give them such a value would require a survey of the entire literature of sociology. Already Comte and Spencer[2] started to give totally different interpretations to these basic aspects of social change, to say nothing of the voluminous modern literature. It is obviously impossible to present such a survey in this article. For the present purpose, however, the analysis will continue upon the basis of the rather loose definitions which were given above.

Between biological and social evolution there is a strange divergence which is exceedingly difficult to explain, even in a wholly speculative fashion. Why was it that out of the total life-span of Man up to the present, almost 99% elapsed before more complex social groups emerged? The explanation can certainly not be found in the natural environment as its changes could never furnish the explanation for this strange phenomenon. Why was there such a tremendously long period of a very slow process of gradual adaptation?[3]

It seems not possible to offer any social explanations for this phenomenon, except tautological ones, and one would have to look to biology and perhaps neurology to find explanations. Obviously Man's capability had not advanced to the stage when more comple social groups became possible or one would have to say that no challenge had arisen that made these groups necessary.

If we consider the first civilisations as the first more complex social groups, we generally find them explained in terms of an outer challenge which brings about the unification of smaller tribal groups. Nevertheless, it is the capability to overcome the challenge rather than the challenge itself which presents a most puzzling question.

It does not seem logical or satisfactory to assume that these challenges arose only after Man had been in existence for nearly half a million years. The factor of his capability to meet the challenge must have had its origin in the reaching of a stage of adaptation which made this process possible. The awareness of the possibilities which the environment offers has undergone tremendous changes in our social history while the environment itself was relatively static.

In other words, the prerequisite of social evolution lies in certain biological stages of adaptation on which the social sciences can shed no further light. As social evolution depends upon these stages, we can refer the stages of social evolution back to stages of biological adaptation. The tremendously long period of preliterate society must have had as its basis a very slow and gradual process of biological adaptation, followed by a stage of what the biologists call "explosive evolution ".[4]

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[2] Cp. the chapters on Comte and Spencer in H. E. Barnes ed. *An introduction to the history of sociology,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948.

[3] An explanation has been attempted by the author in terms of changes in the energy-structure of the individual in *Pause for transition*. The Hague, Nijhoff, 1957.

This stage up to the present time has only occupied about 6000 years of the total life-span of Man, and it has not shown a regular process of change, but one in stages. After Man had gained the capacity to turn more of his energy outwardly, we get the fairly rapid emergence of the societies of Antiquity which culminated in the Roman Empire. The Roman Empire, comprising about 100 million people, as has been estimated, reached a high technical and social level and, if one were to define social evolution by group-size and group-technology, it was a long time before the adaptation took place which brought social adaptation to the level of more complex social groups than the societies of India, China, Rome and the Islamic world.

In fact, it lasted practically until the 19th century until improved technical means made the emergence of still larger social groups possible, at least if we refer to more integrated social groups rather than to the loosely organised groups of the world-religions which now seem as the first stage of emerging world-societies, or to the expansion of Europe prior to the 19th century. If we consider the power-bloc of the present time as an integrated social group, this would mean that group-size has risen to groups of 500–1000 million, to give a very rough figure.

Charting these very general data we obtain the following picture :

500.000 B.C.—6000 B.C.	Small groups.
6000 B.C.—Roman Empire	Groups of less than a million to 100 million.
Roman Empire—1850	No great difference in group-size, but horizontal spreading of loosely organised groups and of class-groups.
1850—Present time	Increasing group-size (to 500–1000 million) and increasing group-integration.

This chart is obviously a very rough one, but it may suffice to illustrate the assertion that social change must be in terms of a rate of change rather than in terms of an absolute or linear concept. This chart also alters the significance of the rate of change because the first period obtains a different perspective if seen in terms of increasing group-size. It also illustrates that social growth is not as rapid as is often assumed, but that it has taken Man a considerable period to reach the stage of capability which makes larger group-size possible. There is also no room for any general theory of progress, as increasing group-size obviously depends upon group-capability plus available room for expansion. If the world becomes occupied by large groups, though obviously of varying size, the room for expansion diminishes and our social adaptation-forms will by necessity become more permanent ones. In other words, as soon as the equation Man-Environment reaches its optimum limit--as has been the case for most other species—the rate of social change would fall off and there might even be regression. If social evolution is seen as related to biological adaptation, this means obviously that the biological adaptation would become a much more constant one.

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[4] Cp. George Gaylord Simpson, *The meaning of evolution.* The Haven. Yale University Press, 1950. Also : W. B. Scott, *The theory of evolution.* New York, Macmillan, 1917.

It may seem quite unwarranted to attach such significance to group-size in the process of social evolution. However, this may become more acceptable if it is realized that only integrated groups have been taken into account, and integration is only possible if a certain social and technological level has been reached. At all times, we find numerous social groups like family and kinship groups, economic and professional groups, political groups, state-groups, religious groups, ideological groups, etc., but generally we can designate one as the dominant group, meaning that it controls the greatest part of human action.

It is not, however, always a change in the type of dominant social group—like from tribal group to civic society—that is characteristic of social evolution, as the same group may continue to be the dominant one. Increasing size in that case means generally improved social control and improved technology. The expansion of a kingdom or an empire presupposes these changes while there is no change in the basic structure of the group or in the character of its dominant group.

While group-structure and group-size should be both taken into account if we speak about social evolution, it can be assumed for our general purpose that group-size is not an altogether unreliable measure if it remains restricted to integrated groups as this integration presupposes the social and technical means needed for integration.

Thus it can be justified to assert that the integrated group remained small in preliterate society, except some general loose federations like those of the American Indians when the threat of white dominance arose. *

The empires and kingdoms of Antiquity present the next stage of integrated larger groups while it could be claimed that the Roman Empire as well as the Indian and Chinese empires were not surpassed for a long period.

While the national states of Western Europe reached a higher economic and technical level, they did not fully integrate the territories outside their own borders until the second half of the 19th century when the integrated still larger group appeared on the horizon. It could be said that technical development in Western Europe was often seen as a cultural activity, like in ancient Greece, but these technical means were not fully used for social control until a relatively late period, and only completely by the emerging large nations, like the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. which had the natural prerequisites for the formation of integrated large social groups, *viz.*, territory, resources and population.

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* This example refers to a preliterate society, but obviously not of the early period.

If we use the integrated social group as the yardstick of social evolution, we get a different perspective on social change because it then becomes a gradual and slow process, spread over long periods, while the rate of change was obviously in some respects much higher in the earlier periods than in the later ones. If we take religious and political institutions into account, we get a much higher rate of change in the earlier periods than in the later ones, to say nothing of intellectual, educational and artistic development.

The creation of an integrated social group often seems to cast its shadows far ahead. Religion often established the first loose unity of large areas while also new ideologies have broken the ground for larger-than-national social groups. Once a social group becomes more integrated, it retains its ideology as a value-system. The national states of Western Europe developed national cultures and national philosophies while the supergroups of the present time have become the carriers of ideological systems which enable them to reach beyond their own borders, just like religious systems did in older periods.

It almost seems as if the formation of a larger social group first takes place in the realm of the imagination, then it is gradually transferred into the political and state realm, and later it begins to seek the means of its economic and technical implementation. There is also interaction between these various realms and technical inventions undoubtedly stimulate political appetites.

However, to ignore the basic stage of social change and to reserve this term for economic and technical innovation is not justified from a sociological viewpoint. On the contrary, social change is a very slow and gradual process of which the rate may be diminishing rather than increasing.

This is no more than natural if we see social evolution in terms of biological adaptation. One would not expect a species to show its highest rate of adaptation in the early stages, but one would also not expect it when the equation Species-Environment seems to be nearing its optimum. We would have to place ourselves in a transitional period in which larger integrated social groups are emerging and, once these social structures have taken up the available social space, an infra-structure may develop between these large societies rather than a still larger fully integrated social group.

The latter possibility is sociologically conceivable, but if we take into account the very long periods which have been needed for the formation of integrated large societies, this does not seem likely, while there is the additional factor that a number of the potential large societies have not reached full development and may be still a long way from it.

If we reserve the term "social change" or "rapid social change" for this process of further integration of larger societies, we can do this, but we must be aware that we use the term in a very specific way and that we are not employing it in terms of general sociological theory. In terms of general sociological theory, it would be preferable to speak about "rapid techno-economic implementation", but these implementation-processes can only occur after certain prerequisite cultural, ideological and political changes have first taken place.

The implementation-processes bear on the creation of the infra-structure of already existing societies, but not on the creation of new ones. The implementation-processes can be borrowed or taught, but the basic social ones cannot: they are a phenomenon of social evolution which operates first in the ideological and political realm. As these processes of evolution and adaptation depend upon group capability, natural resources and general power-structure, the implementation techniques assume a different function in each individual case while they are also subject to the influences from the ideological and political realm.

Thus, the system of sociological categories which is needed for the analysis of social change looks somewhat as follows:

A. A general biological theory of evolution and of adaptation processes as a base.

B. A general theory of social evolution with due regard for the findings of A.

C. A method to describe stages of social evolution. Often technology is used as a measuring rod of social evolution. In this essay, the fully integrated social group has been used. This group depends upon technological means to reach its full development, but this stage is reached later than the technical means themselves which are not immediately integrated, but first exercise a rather superficial power upon the basis of their novelty.

For this reason it seems preferable to choose the integrated group as the unit of measurement also because sociological theory should not contribute to the superficial emphasis on technical means that is a part of the general modern creed.

D. An analysis of the different aspects of the integration-process: the ideological and symbolic preparation, the creation of new political forms; the structural changes involved in the creation of new group-patterns; the implementation of the integrative process by economic and technical means.

E. The probable future social forms after the new group-patterns have acquired a certain stability and continuity.

F. The interaction-patterns of the large-group societies and the impact of E upon these interactional processes. Their influence on small-group societies (medium and small states which are not integrated in larger units).

In this categorical system what is often called 'social change' in contemporary literature falls under the implemention-processes of Section D.

As this article concerns itself with the development of these theoretical concepts, it does not have to be stressed that the actual scheme used is meant only as an illustration. It would require a great deal of work to fit categories of this type to social reality, and this is not the purpose of the present article.

There is room, however, to investigate what perspectives would be acquired through the use of these categories for the analysis of social change.

If it is admitted that the first stage of social change involves the creation of a superstructure in terms of a religious or ideological pattern and of a general political and economic creed, it follows that the later stage of implementation and of creating an infra-structure must remain within the confines of the superstructure, or this secondary social change can easily become disruptive. This danger is less if the superstructure has evolved very gradually and is sufficiently elastic. As a superstructure requires considerable time to become " internalized ", it is not surprising that new superstructures are more rigid and that they lead to centralised and autocratic political forms.

De-centralised and individualistic political forms we mostly find when the civilisational or ideological pattern has already been absorbed into the action-patterns of the individuals.

It is a general phenomenon that the sub-goals of a society, like economic and technical implementation easily become goals in themselves which influence the superstructure. If the secondary goals replace the primary ones, a new social structure emerges but, during this process of transition, the existing superstructure weakens while the new social forms have not acquired sufficient strength.

In modern society this phenomenon has become most pronounced as the relation between general goals and sub-goals has become obscured by the overwhelming weight of the latter ones.

Almost all modern societies have elevated the high standard of living society to the ultimate goal, and in this manner, this goal and the goals of technical and economic development seem to coincide. This amalgamation of goals, however, neglects that the high standard of living society needs a certain cohesion to be a society, and this very factor of cohesion is overlooked. If a society advances technical and economic development to the role of final goals, it makes the groups which are most essential to this process almost into sub-societies while the cohesion of the group as a whole weakens.

This happened in the latter part of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century when, in Western society, class-goals were substituted for general ones, and this process completely undermined Western society.

It has become customary to regard civilisational and cultural values as " out-moded ", but this way of thinking contains very grave dangers. The cohesion of a society is more important than its standard of living. This tends to be overlooked because it is frequently assumed that the " withering away " of group-controls would be harbingering a new world society. This universal world society is, however, more a figment of the imagination, because social reality shows us the emergence of the " large group " societies rather than of a universal society.

In these 'large group societies' the relationship between primary and secondary goals is quite different. If this relationship were everywhere similar, there would be no reason for concern. In some societies, however, the secondary goals are becoming the dominant ones, and, in this way, these societies might lose the cohesion which is essential for their survival.

In other words, the existence of a superstructure, in terms of a culture-pattern or an ideology, is not a luxury, but a necessity if we read the chart of social development correctly.

The superstructure is that mechanism of a society which holds it together in periods of strain and of adversity and when the society has to meet crucial challenges.

This entire relationship is of great importance for the new countries where it must be decided what the primary goals are, and how the secondary ones can be related to them. Cohesion does not come automatically out of an increase in the standard of living because this may stimulate the egotism of individuals and groups, while it leads in addition to an almost invisible transformation of the society itself.

It is also of great significance that the predominance of secondary goals leads to friction between the large-group societies while the matter of global coexistence of these societies should be a part of their ideology or philosophy in order to make a functioning world society possible. If the goal of cooperation remains a verbal one which is not absorbed into the internal pattern, the momentum of internal economic-technical development will generate external tensions, even of the superstructure formally condemns such tensions.

It is therefore quite essential that we recognize the " large group society " as the basis of modern development, but this recognition must lead to the realisation that the infra-structure of these societies is the most crucial factor in future development.

If the infra-structure generates tensions or if it is insufficiently developed, these tensions or—and this can be equally dangerous—the lack of them will be carried into the interrelationships of the large-group-societies and become a source of conflict.

The development of those societies is therefore not a negative aspect, but a very essential one, because it is the prerequisite for the formation of a world-society.

In this process of the building of large group societies, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., India, China, a federation of W. Europe, the Arab League, etc., the economic factors have often been given excessive weight in relation to those of a unifying superstructure although this differs in each individual case.

In some instances the superstructure has existed over a long period and is therefore less visible. It would be wrong to conclude, however, that it is not essential and that " new countries " can develop without paying heed to it.

In fact, the lack of appreciation of this factor has led to the resurgence of nationalism in many parts of the world, because the role of an adequate superstructure is not sufficiently realised or because—and the two phenomena are interrelated—there are no other alternatives.

It could be argued upon this basis that a cultural revival is as essential for new countries as economic or technical development. Cultural values can give cohesion with avoidance of the bigotry of nationalism or of the opiate of international power-competition.

This power-competition if continued will undoubtedly engender disastrous conflicts as it has in the past. But the past teaches us also that the conflicts have been between the countries which made power their primary goal while those which aimed at normal development have survived better in the long run.

It is, however, not the purpose of this article to moralize. It attempts to point out in a preliminary fashion that natural social development is towards the large-group society, and that the recognition of this trend will help as " to live in the direction of social change ". If social change has ultimately a biological basis, it is a natural force which we must know in order to guide it into regular channels.

The basic characteristics of the " large-group society " are quite different from those of the national states of the Western world of the 19th century, and those changes have penetrated only partially into the mentality of the present times. In the first place, the " large group society " of the 20th century possesses greater inner cohesion, though partially imposed by external means like ideological pressure and limitation of individual freedom, than the preceding societies in which class-groups and individuals possessed a great deal of liberty. The original civilisational superstructure of the Western world had weakened in this period while the state-group limited itself to formalistic controls.

As a reaction the " large group societies " place greater stress on ideological and civilisational patterns while the state has almost identified itself with the values of these patterns. As a result, the divergence between church and state has diminished or disappeared, and state-governments function as promoters of ideologies and civilisational patterns, while they also exercise intensive or complete controls over the processes of economic and social implementation of the societies' general goals.

As the " large-group-society " exercises more extensive controls, it leaves less room and, in a number of cases, no room for independent activities of class-groups and individuals. As a result, the expansionistic trends of the " large groups societies " have become more a function of the societies as a whole and are exercised or controlled by ideological principles and by state-governments. If expansion becomes a function of the " large group society " as a whole, this means that the cost of expansion has risen and in the case of war may be in the process of becoming prohibitive.

On the other hand, the " large group societies " show far greater self-sufficiency than the Western states of the 19th century, and the trend is towards a certain autarchy of the " large group societies " with adhering smaller societies.

Nevertheless, the thinking about international matters continues in the traditions of the 19th century and the communication-forms which are needed for the 20th century develop only slowly. They could only become effective if the " large group societies " arrive at a compromise about their general goals, but in this regard there are few developments as the balance between the "large group societies " is only emerging and is not as yet clearly visible. The idea is often expressed that the bipolarity of the present world will be replaced by a multi-polarity, but realistic indications that this process is under way cannot be found at the present time.

On the contrary, several of the " large group societies " (the U.S.A. and Western Europe, the U.S.S.R. and China) cannot be fully considered as separate societies, and there is no reason to assume that their internal integration will become more important than the bloc-integration which took place so far. Internal integration would only assume a more significant role if the tensions between the power-blocs would diminish.

It has been argued in this article that the " natural trend " would be towards the internal integration of the " large group societies ", but while this might be natural, this does not mean that it will happen as much in modern society could no longer be described by this adjective which presupposes the dominance of normalcy.

This leaves only India as a " large group society " in the making which may follow its own road. In order to do this it would have to evolve a philosophy which lies somewhere between the ideology of the Communist bloc and the civilisational pattern of the West. If this philosophy were to contain the image of a permanent society, India would render a great service to the world, particularly if it could also evolve the technical and social techniques necessary for such a society.

In the thinking of classical India, the idea of balance and of continuity dominated, but it is a great question whether these ideas can be reconciled with those of development. Development towards a stable society is far more complex than the creation of greater power because the first requires not only a new philosophy, but also new types of social and economic control.

The permanent society which would be the outcome of social development is neither visualized by the West, nor by the Communist world while it is this very image which would make coordination of goals possible. Simply to pose the question is already of crucial importance, and if India could bring the thinking of its classical philosophy in tune with the modern ideas of development, it would carry out a highly significant intellectual task.

The Western world has gone through centuries of change, and change has become so ingrained in its thought-patterns that it does not even consider the question of the purpose of social change as a legitimate one. Change itself is the purpose. This holds true even more for the Communist world where the ultimate goals of socialism have disappeared beyond the horizon or are no more than empty ideological values.

As long as social groups define their goals in terms of those of other groups, competition is the underlying purpose while there is no question of internal values.

This brings us back to the significance of the value-system of social groups which should define internal rather than external values. The first task is more difficult, more complex and requires much more courage, as these human values become obscured in societies in which change becomes the purpose rather than a means to an end.

In modern society there seems to be an underlying fear that the vision of a more permanent society will set off disintegrative forces or that the modern economy needs tensions and international competition in order to function properly. The idea of a reduction of armaments, for instance, causes fear for unemployment and economic crises.

This is a strange situation because there is no reason why the economy could not be geared to the consumption-needs of the individual, and, beyond this, there is no function for the economy in a permanent society. There seems to be nothing so alarming about this idea, and there is every reason to ask these questions. This does not mean that disarmanent fits the present needs of the most complex societies, but questions as these should be considered upon their own merits, not in the light of vague fears about economic disintegration.

If we ask now again the question about the function of social change in reality and of its projection in group-mentality, we can formulate a number of preliminary conclusions:

A. The concept of "social change" must be seen as a general one, covering civilisational, ideological, political, social and techno-economic factors.

B. These factors are interrelated and to consider aspects of change separately can easily obscure their impact on other social factors.

C. Social change is a slow and gradual process while only the economic and technical implementations of change can take place fairly rapidly. These implementation processes can easily become disruptive if they cannot be fitted into a corresponding value-system which is well-established and needs a considerable period for its evolvement.

D. While imitation is possible in all social spheres, like imitation of ideological forms, political forms, technical-economic forms, etc., the configuration of these factors in the pattern of a social group is an individual one, and it is this configuration which decides whether the combination of factors will be effective.

E. Social change leads ultimately to new structural forms, and if these forms present successful adaptation, they will tend to perpetuate themselves. As a result, the pattern of social change is an irregular one as it is not possible to predict the adaptation-patterns in which unknown future factors play a role. Only over very long periods does social change acquire a certain regularity if it is seen as the social outcome of a process of biological adaptation. These processes therefore deserve more study, as well as the neurological ones which form a part of them.

F. Purposive planning by individuals or governments is a factor in the processes of social change, but should not be confused with social causation. Social causation is a far more complex problem, involving a number of factors which are outside human volition, like the vitality rate. Purposive planning can also become a factor in the value-system, without having any great impact on social reality as social change is subject to structural limitations.

This means that the scientific evaluation of social change and the evaluation in the value-systems of social groups will mostly lead to totally different results unless sciences function as a part of the ideologies of societies. An objective social science is, however, of great value for the future of our society. For this reason, the use of terms of ideological or popular-political value is a danger which should be avoided as much as possible.

In our present social thinking, both the image of the results of social change as well as of its structural limitations are lacking. A gain in one respect can easily mean a loss in another one, and, due again to popular thinking, social change is often presented as if its impact is favorable in all segments of a society. This would only be true if social change is due to the increasing maturity of a social group, and this process is undoubtedly a very slow and gradual one. One-sided social change, on the other hand, can also cause a loss in maturity, judgment, willingness to make sacrifices, etc.

As in every other respect it is possible only to analyse social change adequately in each individual case and with many reservations in regard to the factors of which we have no adequate knowledge. Purely empirical studies often neglect long-term aspects and underlying trends and tend to give a one-sided picture. Cultural sociology is therefore an essential element in the analysis of social change, and one cannot do without general theories.

But the social sciences are a part of the living mind of a social group and only compulsive and dirigistic societies can assume that they can create the type of social science which can be used directly for social control.

This is an abuse of the term "social science" which is a part of Man's search for truth and happiness, and these two qualities are the attributes of individuals. In a society which is alive science is also alive and changes, and this life depends upon the minds of individuals. If social science becomes rigid and deterministic, we can be certain that new ways of thinking and feeling will arise in order to proclaim anew the freedom of the individual because it is only the individual who really exists and who, in his emotions, reflects and guides our social processes. In this same manner social change means change of the individual, or it has no meaning whatsoever.

Selected Problems of the Family in Urban and Rural Austria

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THE topic of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology, " Sociology and Society ", presented ample opportunity for the discussion of the relationship between so-called " pure " or " basic " sociological research and " applied " studies. This paper is intended to continue such a discussion. At the present time the status of our science heavily depends on the applicability of its findings and the practicality of its results. This pressure, though it may be hard on sociology as an academic institution, has had a rather rejuvenating effect during the last fifteen years, it has forced sociologists to deal with concrete research and has created a much higher standard of precision and complexity of all their statements, theories and judgements.

Some of the topics of our Social Science Research Center in Austria may be similar to the foci of interest in India, others may be of quite a different nature. It should be recalled at any stage of this paper that the results are not presented for their immediate content only but, as stated before, in order to gain a better grasp of what the *range of aims* in sociology can be. Sociological work of this character will, in all probability, spread over many Asiatic countries in the near future and it therefore seems to be of general interest to raise the question where it leads to. In doing so, we do not want to limit ourselves to a statement on the philosophy of social science ; we want to illustrate it by examples from our own research and by a discussion on the use of their results.

1. Concern with Social Problems as a Motivation for Sociological Research

Having experienced such a demand for the applicability of results and having acquired some control over the means of obtaining them, sociologists are today in a better position to discuss the relationship between " pure " and "applied" research. It is the thesis of this paper that there is *less* of a difference between " pure " and " applied " sociology than is generally assumed, and we hope to show some evidence toward proving it through the examples we will furnish from our own research. We feel that this distinction itself has certain shortcomings and that it tends to result in stereotypes. We have reasons to believe that research starting with *interest in a social problem* will lead to practically applicable results and will also have theoretical significance.

By " social problem " we do not mean solely the openly visible deplorable state of a certain group in society which may be changed through material support from the rest of society, or social work and charities. Although the classical social problems, such as substandard housing (slums), unemployment, poverty and maladjustment of immigrants, still exist in many parts of the world, there has been both an *extension and a refinement of social sensibility,* which results from the partial solution or improvement of the first level social problems (as just mentioned) in some societies. It also results from an increased understanding of human problems in matters of *interhuman* (*e.g.,* social) interdependency and relationships and in types of problems *common* to certain groups (age groups, occupational groups, ethnic groups) in society.

In this paper we therefore call a " social problem " such things as the treatment that old people receive in their families, or in old age homes, or the special difficulties in matters of authority such as the rejection of social and cultural values and deviant and destructive behavior of a pre-delinquent nature which are shown by adolescent youth. The list of examples of this second kind of social problem, objects of refined social perceptiveness, could be turned into a catalogue of socio-cultural tensions in modern industrial society. Instead of drawing up such an inventory we want to note that the discovery of social problems has even gone beyond this second level and has become more general. We realize that every human problem connected with the well-being of the personality and its self-knowledge and self-control is a problem also of interhuman contact and relationship. A " concern with a social problem " may therefore originate not only from the desire to find a remedy for an underprivileged social group but may also arise from an intellectual concern, the wish to know more about the influence of certain social conditions and backgrounds of human motivation and reactions (*e.g.,* the impact of social class and mobility on fertility or the influence of the position in the sibling group on certain types of tensions in personality or on social constellations under which certain reactions of anxiety occur etc.).

We therefore hypothesize that any concern, intellectual or ethical, concentrating on the *social aspect of a human problem,* provided it has some major significance especially for the society where it is discovered and on the condition that it can be established as such a concern for scientific investigation, will result in findings meaningful for sociological theory as well as for practical decisions in social life (*e.g.,* legislative and administrative measures, direct and indirect social action, regional planning, educational and therapeutic practices). The categories of " pure " and " applied " research in the traditional philosophy of science are convenient and justifiable only if they are regarded as defining an emphasis in the elaboration and presentation of results, but not as a distinction of principle in the selection and classification of research topics or methods.

The following three examples, recorded in an abbreviated fashion, are selected from the research activities of the Social Science Research Center at the University of Vienna in order to support this hypothesis and to furnish concrete material for its discussion.

2. Some Aspects of Family Relations of the Aged in Vienna

An important social problem of the city of Vienna is inherent in the age distribution of its population. 20.1% of the 1.6 million inhabitants of the Austrian capital* are more than 60 years old. This figure takes on more significance if compared with the quota of old people in other European cities. Belgrade has 6.9%, Rome 8.3%, Amsterdom 11.7%, Paris 13.4% and Hamburg 16.7% of inhabitants over 60. As more than 80% of the dwellings in Vienna are constructed by the City Government, the City Planning Department wanted to find out whether the special types of dwellings it had started to build for the aged in the preceding seven or eight years had been positively received by the inhabitants they had been designed and constructed for. In response to this request of the City Government, research was conducted on three groups of aged people:

1. those living in special old age apartments (Altersheimstätten), one story, flat topped houses mostly in the courts and gardens between blocks of flats, or one-family houses arranged in the form of residential communities;
2. old people living in various types of urban dwellings, partly together with their adult and married children;
3. old people living in the traditional old age homes, with hundreds or, in some cases, thousands of inmates, sleeping in public dormitories etc.

The number of old people interviewed in the course of this research was 1032, 0.4% of the total of this age group in Vienna. The results of the research demonstrated the enormous weight of habit in the life of old people. The evaluation of objective housing conditions (size and quality) depended predominantly on the number of years a person had already inhabited the dwelling he or she was living in.

Criticisms of the housing policy referred to utilities which we will not discuss here[1] and, above all, to the location of the special old age apartments (Heimstätten) within the city, especially if the old people lived within the publicly established neighborhoods on the urban fringe or on the outskirts of the city. Such isolation from their relatives, friends, children and grandchildren was a matter of complaint. As to the applicability of results three basic recommendations could be formulated :

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* The total population of Austria is 6,933.905 (1951).

[1] For further information on this Old Age study see L. Rosenmayr, "Der alte Mensch in der sozialen Umwelt von heute", in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozial-psychologie, 10. Jahrgang 1958, Heft 4, Westdeutscher Verlag Köln—Opladen, pp. 642–657, and the report of the Social Science Research Center to the the City Planning Department of Vienna "Alte Menschen in der Grossstadt", mimeographed, Vienna 1959.

(*a*) recommendations referring to stairs, doors, windows, bathrooms etc.,

(*b*) recommendations concerning special types of social work to adjust old people to a new environment and suggestions on how to facilitate the continuation of regular contacts between the aged and their relatives, in particular their children ;

(*c*) recommendations concerning the desirable location of special old age apartments (Heimstätten) within the area of the city and concerning other urbanistic matters.

As can be seen, our research led to a series of results practically applicable to measures to be undertaken by the City Planning Department and the Social Welfare and Social Administration services of the City of Vienna. Up to this point it has not become clear which theoretical contributions our study could possibly make. This comes forth, if we mention another thematic focus of the same old age study, namely the family relations of old people.

We investigated the frequency with which old people were regularly visited, and we found the expected correlation between the number of social contacts of the old people and the number of adult children which they had. The study demonstrated the desire old people have for such contacts, since the number of contacts demonstrates how much they are valued by others, and since they expect to be looked after and to be nursed in case of sickness. Our results at the same time furnished evidence that the old people's desire to live together in one household with their adult children was relatively low. Only 29% of the two groups living in the city (862 respondents) wanted to live in households with their families. Of those who actually lived in one household with their adult children more than one third would actually have wished to dissolve this close, day by day association.

Such results led us to look for existing sociological theories concerning the relationship between the generations in the family, and we found on the one hand the theory of Ernest W. Burgess and others[2] stressing the dissolution of the multigenerational extended family and on the other the theoretical conclusions drawn from a study by Peter Townsend in London which emphasized the close intergenerational collaboration especially between mothers and daughters in London.[3] Our study, valid, of course, only for the city of Vienna, brought out some points relevant to the wish structure of the aged concerning the *type* of contacts and the degree of intimacy with their families: the old people desired regular social exchange and contacts, but, in a strong majority of cases, not to live in households with their families. We were led to the notion of an *intimacy "par distance"* to characterize the model of family contacts as old people in Vienna desire them.

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[2] E. W. *Burgess*, "Probleme des alternden Menschen in der modernen amerikanischen Gesellschaft", in : Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 9. Jg., 1957, pp. 447 ff.

W. F. *Ogburn* and M. M. *Nimkoff*, Technology and the Changing Family, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, New York, Chicago, Atlanta, Dallas, San Francisco, 1955, p. 15.

Such results have implications also for design and planning of homes and neighborhoods and for the social administration renting the publicly built homes. It will be the task of social scientists, city planners, architects and administrators to arrive at concrete solutions and propositions considering that it is neither recommendable for old people to be separated from and neglected by their families nor to live in households with them.

3. The Dependence of the Social Role of the Viennese Mother on her Status in the Labor Force

The special topic of the meeting for which this paper has been written is "Class and Cultural Difference in Marriage and Family Roles". It therefore seems appropriate to select as a second example for our thesis on the intrinsic connection between "pure" and "applied" research a study on the female role which was carried through in Vienna by our Social Science Research Center.

In 1957, 240 depth interviews were planned and undertaken as an investigation into the woman's role.[4] The study also served to test, among other factors, the influence of the gainful employment of married women on their fertility. It was known from previous studies that fully employed women have fewer children than those who remain at home.[5] The question of fertility is of great significance for the Austrian population, particularly as the population of old people (men aged 65 or over and women of 60 or over) is expected to increase from 931,000 in 1951 to 1,260,000 in 1971, an increase of 35.5%. The number of old people per 1000 persons of working age will increase by 38% and the number of young people under 15 in the same length of time will fall from 1.58 million to 1.4 million.[6] The Vienna birth-rate is of special importance in this matter, since with its population of 1.6 million the Austrian capital holds about one fourth of the total Austrian population. Although the Viennese birth-rate has gradually risen from 7.1 in 1951 to 9.3 in 1958 it is still one of the lowest of all metropolitan areas in Europe and in the world. The low birth-rate is not only a cause of, but is also a consequence of, the high quota of people over 60 which has been described above, in connection with the previous example of research in Vienna.

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[3] P. *Townsend,* The Family Life of Older People, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1957, pp. 141 ff.

[4] L. *Rosenmayr,* The Role of the Woman and Mother in the Viennese Family of Today, Report given at the fifth meeting of the International Seminar on Family Research (UNESCO), Madrid, September 22–26, 1958.

[5] Alva *Myrdal,* Nation and Family 1945, p. 408.

[6] Demographic Trends in Western Europe, OEEC, Paris, 1956, p. 55.

In the course of the extended discussion of fertility[7] in Vienna it seemed to be necessary to investigate the relationship between female employment and the attitude toward the further procreation of children. Female labor is of great socioeconomic importance in Vienna ; in 30.1% of the 209,556 married couples, in which the husband was 50 years or younger, the wife was gainfully employed.

These demographic facts indicate that the problem of the working mother is widely distributed throughout Viennese society. Our first question was therefore concerned with the reason for this high rate of female and "maternal" labor. Although the amount of female labor in Vienna has not increased from 1900 to 1950 its structure has changed from the various "typically" female servant jobs in the households of the upper and middle classes at the turn of the century to the more impersonal yet economically and socially more secure and elevated positions in factory, office and government. During the last few years with the labor market expanding, the rate of female labor has risen again, and in 1957 42% of all women were employed. The fundamental question concerning the reasons for female labor arises and we will offer some explanations from the findings of our research.

A representative study (3623 families) conducted several years ago and not further discussed here already demonstrated to us that female labor was—in general—less motivated by an interest in the job than man's work was.[8] Women who worked "because they liked the job" were in several groups of occupations approximately 15% fewer than the men who did so.

Further evaluation of the data of our survey study showed that the female labor when viewed predominantly as money earning was a function of the husband's income. The results to the question of our depth study (240 women) which was worded : "How much more money would you need monthly at your disposal to make you give up your job ?" tended to bear out the results of the representative survey. With the increase in the number of children the mother's labor becomes a function of basic requirements of the family budget ; women without children are much less certain than mothers with 2, 3 or more children about the additional amount of money they would need in order to give up their job. It is interesting to see how the percentage, indicating the monetary wishes of the groups with no children and with one child, decreasing considerably from 1,000 to 1,250 shillings, remounts again toward the 1,500 shilling margin, showing thereby a certain desire for some luxury in the standard of living of small families.[9] The monetary desires of the working women seem to be inhomogeneous in nature, and we may distinguish between a main type of "necessity requests" and "semi-luxury" desires.

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[7] *L. Rosenmayr,* Der Wiener Geburtenrückgang im Lichte soziologischer Forschung, Internationaler Bevölkerungs-wissenschaftlicher Kongress (International Population Conference), Wien 1959.

[8] Remarkable differences from these general findings could be seen with women working as teachers, artists of various types and levels or employed in medical care and social work.

A very subtle and difficult aspect of the woman's role, the woman's attitude toward further procreation of children, was explored carefully by our investigation of 240 women. Although the research concerning this matter was carried through on various levels and with the help of different devices of questioning, the problem was not exhaustively dealt with. Our plan was to get a first but reliable insight into it.

One question directed toward this area was deliberately worded simply and bluntly : "Would you like to have more children ?" The responses to this question showed that there were no significant differences on this level of the wishes between women who have jobs and those who do not. The two curves shown in figure 1 are very close to each other. The calculation of significance



FIG. 1
Percentage of women who would like to have more children

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[9] 26 Austrian Shillings — 1 US $.

proves the result indicated by the curves. A fundamental difference[10] can be found, however, between women with no and one child, and those who have two, three and more children.

At this point we have to analyze the depth and weight of the wish for more children, its power to motive action. In our research design the question to bring out the *general* feelings about further children was followed by an open-ended exploratory question : " Would you please give us reasons for your own attitude concerning the question of offspring ?"

This question brought out a *second level* of the wish-structure that has to be described here. The most outstanding fact of this " second level " is that it differs widely from the first. A high percentage of the same women who had just said they would like to have more children, a minute later gave concrete (or apparently concrete) reasons why in fact they " could " not have more. Only 26% of the women who had declared their wish to enlarge their family, when questioned on the second and deeper level continued to have this wish.

The final result appears to be that only $\frac{1}{8}$ of all the women *really* think of having more children. In figure 2 is indicated the strong difference between first and second level wishes.

Of the women who declared from the beginning that they did not want any more children, more than half rather brusquely argued that they " had



FIG. 2

Percentage by level of women who would like to have more children. First level indicates general feelings and second level the results of the exploratory question enough". It is interesting also to note that among the women who had reacted negatively already to the first question concerning their offspring, the percentage who gave medical reasons for this reaction was less than one third of those who at the first question had said they would want more children. The " medical reasons " of the ones that said " yes " first and " no " afterwards thus appear as a sort of category that impresses by its seriousness and respectability and may still cover other motives.

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[10] The calculation shows that the value is significant at the 1% level.

The discrepancies between the two levels that we found need not discourage us from continuing to ask direct questions and should not lead up to the conclusion that first level replies have no value. The first level answers represent a certain sphere and *stratum of emotions* that is not unimportant as far as generally accepted norms (or more vaguely : *should be* and *ought to be*) are concerned. Any analysis of obligations and guilt would have to dwell on such first level responses and use them as a continuous " line of reference " for further psychological analysis of behaviour patterns and motivation processes.

Further combination of results disclosed that the wish for more children does not rise with an increase of the size of the apartment, it seems to be connected with the existing number of children and with the general idea, a quasi-norm in Viennese society, that two children are a maximum to be had. A " revolt " against it implies some opposition to the older generation. It means, of course, also a restriction in certain aspects of consumption and entertainment. With the ideals (guiding images, models) of the standard of living constantly rising and exerting a certain exigence, the family with more children is bound to lag behind and to become socially de-classed.

Only if the wife has a job do the economic foundations for a bigger family with a somewhat average standard of living appear to be laid. But the moment the wife goes to work, a family with more than two children becomes a practical impossibility if grandparents or other relatives cannot take on parental roles ; governmental family allowances (approximately US $ 5.—monthly for one child) do not solve the difficulties—a fact also expressed by our respondents when asked about the state's role in family policy.

We may sum up that the woman in Vienna not only from a biological point of view, but also from a socio-economic viewpoint is the decisive factor in the problem of offspring. It depends on her solution of the dilemma between a socially negative and low standard of living and a bigger family or a more advanced standard with a reduced family or none at all. There is a wide spectrum of individual solutions to this alternative, but as such it is part of the socio-economic as well as the cultural scene. What our research shows—a relatively high amount of " first level " wishes to extend the family and a small number on the " second (action-motivating) level " is one of the results of the difficulties described.

Some theoretical results of this study undertaken with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation, New York, are pertinent to the problem of fertility.

The data give evidence that despite a commonly observed relation between female labor on the one hand and planned fertility on the other there is no necessary connection between them. Although it seems to have some general validity to say that the entry of the woman into the labor force " lays the foundation for a whole new level of attitudes and aspirations which inevitably affect their sex and family life and thus lay the basis for declines in fertility ",[11] it may, as we hypothesized in order to explain one important type of mothers' labor in Vienna, occur that women go to work in order to lay the socio-economic foundation for a home with children.

Such a result leads to a series of consequences in regard to social action for the family. It demonstrates a certain socio-economic " necessity " of female labor and orients family-policy toward the amelioration of female labor and its adjustment to some basic aspects of the female role in marriage and the family rather than toward its negation.

Without going into further detail we may see from this and the foregoing example dealing with problems of old age that results from " basic " research may just as well contribute to the orientation of social policy and legislation as " applied " studies may lead to results promoting sociological theory.

4. Special Tensions in the Female Role in Underdeveloped Rural Areas

Our third and last example will be taken from a study conducted at the request of a regional planning institute working for the Government of the most eastern Austrian Federal State, the Burgenland. It was the aim of the research to study the impact of a special type of commuting, weekly long distance commuting, involving the absence of the employed person from his domicile over the span of the whole week and necessitating a second residence close to the place of work.

Let us first characterize the Burgenland by a comparison with the other 8 provinces of Austria.

(The total Austria population according to the 1951 census was 6,933.905. The total agrarian population amounted to 1,515.945).

Out of the total working population resident in the Burgenland, 141,470, 39% (55,175) are non-self-employed. Of these 55,175, 16,060, between one fourth and one third, work outside the federal state where they are residing. For the overwhelming majority of this group this means weekly commuting. Although in some parts of the Federal State Burgenland the percentage of the agricultural population is high, and although many of the non-self-employed labor find work within the community or the district they are residing in, some other parts of

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[11] G. W. *Roberts*, L. *Braithwaite*, Fertility Differentials in Trinidad, International Population Conference, Vienna, 1959.

Federal States	*Percentage of the agrarian population of the total population*				
	in general	*in communities with ...... inhabitants*			
		up to 2.000	*2.001 to 5.000*	*5.001 to 10.000*	*10.001 and more*
Vienna	... 2	—	—	—	2
Lower Austria	... 32	46	15	6	4
Upper Austria	... 26	46	32	12	2
Salzburg	... 22	44	29	14	3
Styria	... 30	53	23	6	3
Carinthia	... 25	40	27	8	2
Tyrol	... 26	44	22	8	2
Vorarlberg	... 18	37	17	8	5
Burgenland	... 47	50	42	7	–
Austria	... 22	47	26	8	2

the Burgenland are characterized by a high percentage of commuters travelling to work for three and more hours and who, if they are married, spend the week far away from their families. 45% of the non-self-employed persons in the regional district and 57% of the married heads of the households in the local community where we carried out our research were commuters working outside the federal state they were residing in. In this region this means that practically all of them became weekly commuters or met their families only once or twice a month.

Our research was carried out in the form of a time budget study. We based it on a sample of 37 married couples covering the work day of husband and wife hour by hour and describing their leisure in half hours. In order to get a fuller view of the life cycle of the family we studied four complete days, Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday. We thus obtained precise data on 296 daily time budgets.

We cannot discuss here in detail the social problems of these weekly commuters who are, in the region where we conducted our study, practically 100% part time farmers. The fact that all of the weekly commuters felt that if they had more leisure they would spend it on work on their farms their wives were running for them, demonstrates the time pressure they are under. As we collected data not only on the men but also on their wives, as one aspect of our study, an interesting difference in the time budget of two partners in marriage came forth. We will present it in the form of two curves, one showing the difference in work hours, the other rendering the relative amounts of leisure available to husbands and wives. The results will be shown for three of the five different groups that we investigated :

1. weekly commuters (all workers)
2. daily commuters working in the town 7 miles away from the community they were living in (all white collar)
3. farmers.



FIG. 3 *Daily hours of work*
(Commuting time is not included)

———————— men
— — — — — — — women

Th.....Thursday
Fr......Friday
Sa......Saturday
Su......Sunday

Comparing the three groups we find that the difference in working hours between husband and wife is greatest with the weekly commuters. In this group



Fig. 4 *Daily hours of leisure*
(Commuting time is not included)

the wives exceed their husbands by five hours of daily work. This difference primarily results from the fact that the wives of the weekly commuters (most of whom work in Vienna as masons or carpenters) do the work in the farm. The wives of the weekly commuters have an average of 11 work hours per day, a quota we arrive at if we form an average of two week days and the two days of the week-end, Saturday and Sunday. For the husband there is, at least on Sunday, a series of leisure hours available for his relaxation. The women however are active for more than an average working day of 8 hours. The high number of working hours with the farmers' wives especially on Fridays and Saturdays should be noted. Here the fact that husband and wife work together all week long contributes to a significant decrease in the work hours of the wife on Sundays.

The findings of our study point out to us that a solid and clearly distinct period of leisure is the result of the achievements of industrial society. In social groups at the fringe of this industrial system (small farmers, laborers forced to travel to work over great distances and continuing these farming activities with the help of their wives) the benefits from this industrial system are not drawn. Rural society with its two groups of farmers and laborers commuting to industrial centers in the less developed areas shows traits of pre-industrial patterns of living as far as leisure is concerned. On the other hand the emancipation of the woman has occurred with the group of laborers and part time farmers. There it is the wife who rather independently runs the farm. This " independence ", however, does not lessen the burden of work, it does, as other observers have noted, present a real overcharging of the role of the rural woman.[12]

The transition from a generalized and theoretical grasp of marriage and family problems in less developed rural areas to ideas applicable to practical measures is not difficult to make. Industrial and regional planning will have to contribute to a reduction of weekly commuting by establishing a prudently planned system of decentralized plants and industrial undertakings within a better reach of the labor force available.[13] Education of the rural population, especially of the young generation toward a better and more efficient way of farming and of performing household work will probably help especially if connected with the creation of an understanding of the importance of leisure for marriage and the family. Socio-economic measures affecting the region will probably be much more effective if adult education and special training bring about a recognition of both the psychological and the cultural values inherent in leisure.

With this third example, reporting on some findings on the female role in a less developed rural areas, we conclude our argument. We have tried to show that there is more continuity between " pure " and " applied " research than generally accepted, on the basis of the abstract juxtaposition of the two concepts. Research has taught us that intellectual concern may soon turn out to end in results that prove to be of practical use, and, what started as a task of applied research may lead to knowledge, new concepts and their integration into theories of our science to understand society.

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[12] Marcel Maget, " Les Ruraux ", in the Special Issue of " Esprit " on Leisure, Paris, June 1959, p. 921.

[13] The construction of traffic arteries and interconnecting roads is of course another important element of improving less developed regions.

External and Internal Causality in Cultural Change

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THE transfer of cultural traits may be considered to be a normal phenomenon in society. The cultural make-up of persons and groups is to a very large extent determined by this transfer. We are inclined to class the transfer of culture among the factors affecting social change in a given social category, group or community. At first sight this is only partly justified. The transfer of elements of culture sometimes causes changes in the existing pattern of culture ; sometimes, however, it is a conservative force. In every society we may distinguish between a kind of transfer directed to cultural change and a kind of transfer directed to immobility. These two " forces " are interdependent. The effectiveness of the one force is dependent on that of the other, in such a way that strength on the one hand is conditioned by weakness on the other, and *vice versa.*

If we examine the phenomena of culture transfer systematically we arrive at three channels along which cultural traits are transported : *viz.,* in time, in space, and from group to group in a limited period at a definite place. Translated into concrete terms this means : from generation to generation, from one geographical area to another, and from a group or milieu with prestige and radiating power to other groups and milieux not endowed with these qualities and ready to accept new elements and to follow the example set by prestige-bearing groups. The transfer from generation to generation we call " tradition ", although semantically tradition might include all forms of transfer of culture. The transfer of cultural elements in space includes in the first place the emanation from the cities to the surrounding countryside, but also the processes of acculturation in interregional and international contacts promoted by trade and tourism. The third kind of transfer we perceive in, for instance, the transition of cultural elements from the upper classes to the lower classes of the social ladder.

So far we have assumed that there is mainly a one-way traffic : from the older generation to the younger ones, from town to countryside, from upper to lower classes. In the cultural contacts of an interregional or international nature, of course, there may be a process of mutual influencing. It is also possible, however, for the older generation to borrow cultural traits from the young people, especially in an age in which great emphasis is laid on being " modern ", " up to date " or " young " in ideas or in physical appearance. Certainly the city may also take over elements prevalent in the countryside, and the upper classes have quite often integrated in their pattern of culture elements—*e.g.*, words—that emanate from the lower classes. Colonial rulers have often borrowed ways of thinking or habits from the peoples they dominated. As a rule, however, we may assume that the traffic will be one-way.

Now it is clear that the transmission of culture may sometimes have the effect of conservation of the cultural pattern of a group. Where tradition is dominant, society is static.

There is reason to consider the importance of tradition as a conservative factor. Sociologists are convinced that tradition is a social force. There are societies where tradition seems to be a powerful drawback to all kinds of change, mentally and materially. They then formulate a very simple causality : tradition leads to immobility, to a static condition. I am not so sure that this causality is valid. It is useful to recall the famous words of Ricardo : " Corn is not high because rent is paid, but rent is paid because corn is high." Perhaps in this case also the causal link is just the other way round. In this way : " Immobility is not caused by tradition, but because there is a static society, tradition has a chance to be effective, to be a social force." I do not say here that tradition only seems to be a social force but in reality is not. I venture only to suggest, in accordance with what I have said about the interdependence of the different kinds of transfer of culture, that the effectiveness of tradition as a force depends also on the strength of the dynamics present in any society. In a very dynamic society the channel of tradition is blocked. A dynamic society is characterized by social change. Ogburn [1] enumerates the following factors leading to social change : inventions, accumulation of culture, spread of culture and adjustment. The spread of culture (other than tradition) along the above-mentioned channels is one of the causes of more dynamics and therefore it is contrary to the influence of tradition. So long as a society is static in a situation of relative isolation it is very difficult to say whether or not tradition is a mighty force, because it is not put to the test. The transmission of culture from generation to generation is thtn a matter of course.

There is another reason to place tradition opposite the other two kinds of transfer of culture. When dealing with the transfer of cultural traits we have to make distinctions as to the nature of the elements to be transferred. We may take as our starting point a clear polarity. At the one end there are the elements of a material or instrumental character, at the other the elements with an immaterial, mental content such as religion or philosophy of life. Now it is a well-known fact that new technological changes are more easily accepted by a group than elements belonging to the sphere of ideas. At least, sociologists presume so. After the foregoing considerations it is as well to be careful. If we exclude for a moment the transfer from generation to generation, the statement holds true. In the contact between town and countryside machines and tools are rather more easily transmitted, than attitudes in matters of religion. Refrigerators move more quickly than patterns of birth-control. The lower classes do not hesitate to imitate the upper classes in matters of furniture or television sets as soon as they have the financial means, but this is concerned only with the material outlook on life. It takes far more time to rouse their interest in literature, for instance. As early as the end of the last century E. A. Ross [2] wrote that the desire for parasols, billiard-tables and bathrooms went down in a series of cataracts from the upper to the lower classes. Every class, he wrote, imitates the class just one step higher. We realize, however, that he mentions only material goods going " down ". It is clear that bicycles find their way to all nations, regions and social classes more easily than the emancipation of women. [3]

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[1] W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, New York, 1922.

This knowledge has a practical significance too. Unnithan [4] in his work on social change in India in relation to Gandhian ideas points out in a well-argued thesis that in society the biological and natural factors are the most static ones. The mind is the next, being already relatively less static. Then follow traditions, customs, religion, ideas. Habits and attitudes are somewhat more dynamic still. The social, economic and political organizations, however, really belong to the dynamic elements. Gandhi's idea was to attempt to make some dynamic factors relatively static and certain static factors more dynamic. He wanted to transform the mind and to make it more dynamic. Here his ideals of change represent an important deviation from modern conceptions of social change. It may be admitted that by this attempt to change the minds of people the highroad to a better society is indicated. However, we must agree with Unnithan that in a number of respects " the practical application of Gandhian ideas meets with almost insurmountable difficulties which result from the dictates of the social and economic forces of a world society " (p. 247). So " the present social policy of the Government of India offers indications of a considerable deviation from Gandhian ideas. The major difference is visible in the increasing emphasis on economic development through large-scale industrialisation " (p. 224).

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[2] E. A. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology,* New York, 1905, p. 33.

[3] Alfred Sauvy, *De Malthus a Mao Tse-Toung,* Paris 1958, says moreover that the techniques of consumption are far more easily integrated in a pattern of culture than techniques of production. (p. 138).

[4] T. K. N. Unnithan, *Some Problems of Social Change in India in Relation to Gandhian Ideas,* Groningen-Djakarta, 1956, p. 242.

Returning to the possibilities of the transfer of cultural elements but still excluding transfer by means of " tradition " in the ordinary sense of the term, we may make some finer distinctions. Between the two poles of mere instrumental goods and immaterial elements in which the individual is involved, we may discern cultural traits that have an intermediate position. Unnithan in his book placed the habits and the way of life midway between the mind on the one hand and the social, economic and political structure on the other. Our distinction is somewhat different, though we have no objection to Unnithan's presentation. Between machines, gadgets, and other amenities at the one end of the polarity line and the mental climate embracing national character, religious beliefs and attitudes towards family life at the other, two categories may be recognised : First, those elements of an instrumental character that have a close link with the personality, such as clothing, footwear, hair-style, sometimes furniture. These things may be considered as part of our personality. We wear clothes, but these clothes determine our physical appearance, they are an expression therefore of our Self. They do not belong fully to the mental sphere, but they come close to it. For this reason they do not change as easily as the material equipment of a farm or workshop. In some villages in the Netherlands the old costume of former centuries is still worn, but the cows are milked by means of electric milking-machines.[5]

On the other hand, we may state that by no means all ideas are so little dynamic as religious convictions or habits. Political and social ideas are not so deeply rooted as beliefs or superstitions. Often radical doctrines are accepted, whereas at least the flavour of the old " traditional " religious belief is still the underlying basis of the whole mental outlook. It is a well-known fact also that political ideas easily change as a person climbs up the social ladder.

In a small country like Holland the transfer of culture from city to country-side, from region to region, from class to class is very intensive. This does not mean, however, that there is a complete levelling-out of cultural differences. The process of levelling has made considerable progress in the field of technical equipment, but little in the field of mental attitudes. The way people are dressed and the way they walk (farmers *versus* city-dwellers) are not quite the same all over the country. Political ideas differ from class to class and from region to region. It is remarkable, however, that shifts at the national polls show the same trend throughout the country. This means that reactions to the social and economical situation are just the same in the different parts of the nation.

It is time to return to the medium of tradition. It has already been stated that whereas the other two media of culture transmission lead to changes in the pattern of culture, tradition is effective in the direction of conservation. By

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5 Cf. Sj. Groenman, *Staphorst,* Meppel–Neth. 1948.

means of tradition, habits, attitudes and beliefs are transferred to the next generation. In this way society gets temporal depth or, in other words, acquires stability. The cultural inheritance passing from generation to generation especially includes the way we understand our position in this world in relation to our fellow-creatures and in relation to the Power that is mightier than Man. It is attached, moreover, to habits concerning marriage, births, festivities—in short the things that function as landmarks on our path through life. The elements transmitted by tradition are exactly those elements which it is very difficult for the other two media to transfer. The transfer of material goods, which are certainly composed of matter and are therefore already destined to a relatively short life, is far more difficult by means of tradition. Against the changes in technology, tradition does not manifest itself as strong. In line with the foregoing is the fact that it is stronger in the field of costume and other things which come closer to the sphere of feelings and personal involvement. Political and social ideas, however, though of a non-material character, are not so easily transmitted from generation to generation.

Tradition, we may say, is strong where other forms of transfer of culture are weak. Another time we may ask whether or not tradition is a real social force. Perhaps we might say that tradition means nothing more than the statement that a society is static because there are no strong factors propelling the societal life to new forms. When we say that tradition offers resistance to social change, this merely signifies that a force of a definite importance is needed to mobilize a situation of relative rest, just as a stone is moved only when a certain force is applied. But this would be an exaggeration. Tradition as a process of transmission is, implicitly or explicitly, desired by the older generation. The latter wishes to implant its ideas and habits into the younger generation. Of course, in a situation of relative rest the older generation feels no doubts as to the rightness of tradition. In a situation of dynamic changes, however, it may feel uncertain and may not be able to offer coherent resistance. It is also known that in rural districts the first agricultural implements were sometimes destroyed by the furious farmers.[6] But against machinery the resistance was only short-lived.

So long as we speak of tradition and other forms of transfer of culture as social forces, we are dealing with them as external factors to which man will or will not offer resistance. He seems to be a puppet in the hands of forces coming from the outside. Their balance of power seems to determine his behaviour. In this way his attitudes and actions would be, as it were, the predictable result of progressive and conservative influences. The " force " of tradition might be strong in matters of religion and philosophy of life and to some lesser degree in matters of physical appearance ; the " forces " of culture transfer along the other channels might be strong as far as instrumental elements are concerned and to some extent in political and social convictions.

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[6] Sj. Groenman, *Staphorst.*

I prefer to emphasize an internal causality. The surroundings wherein man lives offer him a great number of cultural elements. Some are offered occasionally, others continuously. They are presented with or without a certain power. Some elements do not appeal to him because they are too strange, others correspond closely to his familiar life. Some touch the deeper layers of his spiritual life, others have to do with the outside alone. There are elements that will give prestige in accordance with the prevailing values, whilst others have no significance in this respect. It is no wonder that man, when confronted with the offer of cultural traits, will sometimes easily accept these traits, but will sometimes reject them. This explains why people who seem " traditional " in some respects are easy receivers at the same time. They cling to their old religious convictions but they have no difficulty in accepting television sets. It is not the transfer of culture that is strong but the feeling of attachment, the desire for prestige, or the inclination to rationality. It is only where conscious imprinting, persuading or social controlling are discernible that we might call the transfer of culture a social force.

Whether or not a process of culture transfer will lead to fundamental changes in a given pattern of culture will certainly depend on the force with which the new elements appear, but still more on the nature of these elements. We may say that once the personality of a human being is formed, he will not easily adopt elements that are incompatible with the basic structure of his mind. What the essence of his ideas is depends, however, on the social environment in which he grew up. In a culture where religion is not ingrained in the people—unlike the case in, for instance, the Netherlands !—they may be flexible in matters of religion. In the Netherlands a marriage between a Roman Catholic and a Protestant gives rise to serious trouble. " Good Catholics and Calvinists are expected to condemn mixed marriages. In fact, they are rigorously endogamous." [7] This, however, is a socially conditioned phenomenon and the trend is towards " acceptance of mixed marriages when once they occur ".

As we live in a dynamic society, the resistance to the adoption of new cultural elements is waning. The traditional elements we foster with our whole heart often belong to a domain that is not touched by technological change and rational thinking. English judges wearing wigs, guards in Copenhagen, university professors in gowns and coronation ceremonies do not interfere with modern dynamic life characterized by technological change and rational production. In this respect they are not " vital ". Nevertheless we may cling to these elements transferred by " tradition " because we feel they belong to that essential feature in culture we call ' style '.

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[7] K. Ishwaran, *Family Life in the Netherlands*, The Hague, 1959, p. 118.

Is the Joint Family an Obstacle to Industrialization?

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THAT the joint family is a deterrent to industrialization is a charge which I frequently heard during my stay in India in 1958–59. This is a serious accusation, especially in light of the fact that the government of India has made industrialization one of its principal goals, as the five year plans attest. I propose in this paper to examine the charge more fully and to consider whether or not it is supported by the evidence.

The joint family, it is alleged, militates against efficient industrial development in a number of ways. First it is said to lower the level of competence by encouraging the employment of persons in industry on the basis of family connection rather than merit. This is the charge of nepotism which runs directly counter to the increasing rationalization of industry in the West which Max Weber so well described, a process which is thought to be governed by the universalistic concept of competence rather than the individualistic concept of loyalty to members of one's own group (family).

The term nepotism is said to have originated five hundred years ago after Pope Calixtus III awarded cardinal's hats to two of his young nepotes (nephews). The phenomenon is, however, clearly older than the term, probably as old as family life itself, or at least family life which is lived under conditions where economic or political offices exist under the control of a family head. Even among primitive hunters where the position of headman is hereditary, one often finds a rule to the effect that the chief's son may succeed him only if he is competent. This example is interesting in showing how the group acts to protect itself against an appointment to office solely on the basis of family membership.

If nepotism is as old as the human family, it is manifestly not solely a function of the joint family. The joint family is a variety of the extended family, and the extended family is relatively rare among primitive hunting societies.[1]

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[1] M. F. Nimkoff and R. Middleton, "Types of Family and Types of Economy" (Paper presented at annual meeting of the American Statistical Association, Washington, D.C., December 27, 1959.

In the highly industrialized societies of the West, the dominant family type is the relatively small nuclear or conjugal variety. And nepotism is not absent from these industrialized societies. In 1959 a tempest blew up over nepotism in the U.S. Congress, but it quickly subsided because employment of kin by members of congress is a deeply-rooted practice. In 1933 an unofficial check made for the United Press showed 37 senators (out of a total of 96) employing relatives, some of whom, it was alleged, performed no service whatever.[2] There are anti-nepotism laws in a number of the separate states affecting state payrolls, and the Federal Civil Service Act states that not more than two members of the same family shall be employed in the classified Civil Service but such restrictions do not apply to the federal legislature.

Since our concern in this paper is primarily with anti-rationalistic influences in industry, stemming from family sentiment, it is pertinent to note that a survey of the top executives of 175 of America's largest corporations in 1957 revealed no less than 55 per cent of the companies had relatives in positions of management in the same company. DuPonts and their relatives held 12 of the 86 management jobs in the company. A survey of 23,000 companies in 1955 showed only 28 with stated policies against the employment of relatives. In still another study of 8,000 executives it was found that two of every five men whose fathers were key executives and three of every five whose father owned large businesses held jobs in their fathers' companies.[3]

Nepotism is an ethical problem where the business is a public corporation, not a family business but it is uneconomic in all instances where appointment is not based on competence. There is a tendency however to designate appointments as nepotistic when members of the same family are involved without regard as to the merit of the appointees. The study by *Fortune* magazine, referred to above, found four types or degrees of nepotism: "out-and-out nepotism," as in the appointment to a top job of a relative with little or no experience and no evident qualifications; "nepotism plus training" where a relative is put in a beginner's job with the idea of training him for a number of years before advancing him to a position of executive responsibility. A variety of this type is an appointment of a relative subject to company veto if the candidate is found unsatisfactory. Finally, there are cases where a relative is given only an ordinary job where competence is not of great moment.

Since nepotism is seen to exist in the highly industrialized United States with its independent type of family, the question regarding India is not whether nepotism exists in industry but rather, whether there is relatively more nepotism associated with the joint family than with the independent family. On theoretical grounds there is, it seems to me, reason for believing that this may be so. Both the range of obligation and the feeling of responsibility are greater in the joint family. This means that there are more relatives who have a legitimate claim on the family head in the joint family than in the nuclear family, giving more scope to possible nepotism. This is in any case a hypothesis to be tested by the facts, if they can be assembled in a comparative study.

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[2] R. Clapper, "Congress and the Pay Roll," *New Republic*, 74 : 98–100, March 8, 1933. Names and positions are given in G. F. Nieberg, "All in the Congressional Family" *Atlantic*, 148 : 514–23, October, 1931.

[3] P. Stryker, "Would You Hire Your Son?" *Fortune*, 55 : 132, March 1957.

Nepotism appears to be a function of family loyalty or family solidarity rather than type of family, although family loyalty may as a rule be greater in the extended family system than in the independent family type. But some independent family systems are highly charged with family sentiment ; in short, they are familistic, as are extended families. An example is the family in the Netherlands.[4] The predominant type of Dutch family is the *gezin,* the elementary family. It is possible of course that the intense familism of the *gezin* in a carry-over from earlier, though fairly recent, times when the *familie* (the extended family) was the prevailing type. As to evidence of family favoritism in industry in the Netherlands, the writer has no information. But in the United States, the family life of Jews, although independent in form and essentially in function too, is characterized by extreme cohesion.[5] While the group of kin among Jews is not a corporate group, that is, not an extended family, it shows some of the same characteristics, notably mutual aid in times of need and the frequent use of relatives in jobs controlled by the family.

In Latin countries with their agricultural base, the extended family is very common. Willems writes : " The Brazilian system, as that of Latin America in general, is largely family-ridden. There is probably not a single major institution in Brazil that is not to a considerable extent controlled or deflected by family interests. In areas of heavy foreign immigration, new elites have arisen to challenge the old families but the new elites have adopted the same patterns of familism and nepotism that characterized the traditional power structure." (573)[6]

In the Philippines, where a comparable Spanish tradition exists and the economy is agricultural, the extended family is a power to be reckoned with. In Manila there are universities which are the private property of families. Family control of politics is considerable. I was told when in the Philippines that the principal families hold conclaves to decide which member is to represent the family in politics. Robert Fox used the phrase " anarchy of families " by which he ment that the rule of law was undermined by the rule of families.

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[4] K. Ishwaran, *Family Life in the Netherlands* Utgeverij Van Keulen, N. V. The Hague, 1959.

[5] Stanley R. Brav, *Jewish Family Solidarity : Myth or Fact?* Vicksburg, Mississippi : Nogales Press, 1940.

[6] Emilio Willems, " Brazil ", in *The Institutions of Advanced Societies* edited by Arnold M. Rose. University of Minnesota Press, 1958.

Strangers, I was told, are not trusted as are members of the family. What if a member of the family steals? It is too bad but at least it will be in the family.

I heard, in Manila, of a labor dispute which was being adjudicated by my informant. It seems that one of the demands made by the labor union was that the sons of workers should inherit their fathers' jobs. Another demand was that they should also inherit their fathers' seniority.[7]

Nepotism is employment or the award of special favors on the basis of family not merit. In the United States rules such as those obtaining in many universities, forbidding the employment of two members of the same family in the same occupational unit, are erroneously called anti-nepotism rules whereas in actuality they are anti-family employment rules. Those who defend the employment of family members in the same institution claim as advantages that it adds workers whose qualities are more fully known and who can be more completely trusted. Those whose oppose the policy say emotional bias is more likely to enter into dealings with kindred and that the morale of non-family workers is often affected adversely because of real or imagined favouritism shown to relatives.[8]

Before leaving the subject, it is appropriate to observe that, notwithstanding the great social significance of nepotism and its prevalence in the United States in industry and politics, the topic has scarcely been the subject of scientific study. The *International Index to Periodicals,* which reports on most of the leading social science journals in the United States, does not carry a single title on the subject of nepotism from January, 1938 through March, 1958. It would be interesting to inquire why the phenomenon has been so thoroughly neglected as a topic for study. The investigator who did the study for *Fortune* magazine, to which reference was earlier made, reported a reluctance on the part of business executives to discuss the topic. Few executives in the survey were willing to have their views on the subject attributed to them. It is as though any negative comment may be interpreted as a reflection on one's relatives.

Nepotism is not the only way in which the joint family is said to hinder the progress of industrialization in India. Even when employment in industry is on the basis of individual merit, not family ties, it is claimed by some that the joint family acts to lower the incentive of the more capable members of the family. The joint family supports all members of the family who make claim of it, some of whom may make no economic contribution. An American university professor of economics, who had looked into the matter, reported managers of industrial plants as saying some of their potentially most able workers did not care to put forth maximum effort because if their income increased it would go to the joint family. Why work harder if the gain went to others?[9] The evidence here is somewhat anecdotal and scarcely warrants any firm conclusions but it does suggest the desirability of research on the point at issue. The argument appears to be somewhat similar to one often heard in the United States: why work harder to earn more if your income tax rate goes up and you have to pay most of the gain to the government in taxes? You may not belong to a joint family in the United States, but you have to reckon with Uncle Sam.

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[7] Reported by Thomas E. Posey, Labor Productivity Advisor, Labor Division, USOM/Manila. January 26, 1959 before the Committee on Rapid Social Change of the Federation of Christian Churches in the Philippines.

[8] R. M. Lightfoot, Jr., "In defense of nepotism", *Library Journal,* 82 : 1610–16, Je 15, 1957.

In still another way, according to some, the joint family limits industrial development, namely by restricting the freedom of endeavor of family members. Foreign observers of the joint family have been impressed with the burden which the family places especially on the eldest male.[10] He may, for example, be required to sacrifice opportunities for professional advancement in order to look after the interests of younger members of the family. An Indian acquaintance of the writer relinquished an opportunity for further graduate training in the United States in order to look after his younger brother who suddenly became seriously ill. Nor is this kind of self-sacrifice uncommon. In India there are few if any outside agencies in a position to help in a situation like this, and the dependence on the joint family is extreme. "Without the joint family," said one colleague to the writer, "we could not live." Some sacrifice is made to send a younger brother to school, after which he in turn is expected to help a still younger brother, or perhaps a nephew. And so it goes. There is not the freedom, the independence of the individual such as is found in the West which enables him to further his own interests. Industry in India must compete with the family for the loyalty of the worker. The situation resembles somewhat that of the married woman worker in the United States, who is said to be less reliable in her employment than her male counterpart because she is more subject to demands made upon her by her family and therefore more irregular in her employment.

Special demands made by the joint family are not the only obstacle to full participation by family members in the industrial process. Another, more inclusive handicap is the authority of the head of the joint family. Subservience to authority and conformity to tradition are functional requirements of the joint family. Subordination is in general by age and sex, the younger to the older, and the female to the male. No important decision, such as the occupation an individual is to follow, or the place of his residence, is to be made without the sanction of the head of the joint family, perhaps in consultation with other members of the family. In any case the individual is not so free an agent as he is in the West, and the question arises as to whether this limits his usefulness to industry.

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[9] Reported by Dr. Daniel L. Spencer, Southern Illinois University, U.S.A. in conversation with the writer.

[10] Gardner Murphy, *In the Minds of Men* (The Study of Human Behavior and Social Tensions in India). New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1953.

In the West, part of the freedom of the young adult is the freedom to leave his family or orientation in search of work, even at a considerable remove from his family. Moreover the mobility in employment is relatively high, with employees moving from plant to plant or from office to office. It is not so much that the shifts are imposed by the employer as it is that advancement is greater for the worker who is free to be mobile. And the plans of industry for development are more readily achieved with workers who can be mobile if necessary. It is easier for a small independent family to be mobile than an extended family, and the unattached individual is freest of all. If it were a question of transporting a joint household when a member seeks or finds work in another community, then the joint family would be more of a handicap than the smaller independent family. But in actuality the joint family is often a saving factor for those seeking employment away from home. A wife and children can be left in the joint family in the village with knowledge they will be secure while the husband and father tries his luck at finding work in the town or city. In a study[11] of migrants to Bombay, only 4 per cent of 503 respondents said they brought the whole family to the city, 13 per cent brought father, mother, brother and/or sister, and 44 per cent came with wife and children. These data are interesting but what are needed are studies of the comparative mobility of industrial workers from independent and joint families.

Still another way in which the joint family may limit industrial development is through the personality trait of passivity which the family encourages. It is assumed that the opposite trait of ambition or activity or diligence is of functional value in an industrial society. Yet no less a figure than Nehru[12] has been quoted as saying publicly that Indians do not work hard, not as hard as Americans or Russians. The poverty of the Indians may be a factor in their apathy, and the apathy in turn contributes to the poverty. But it has also been suggested that the joint family contributes to the apathy by encouraging dependence on others. Here is a family system that makes decisions for the individual : whom he shall marry, what work he shall do, etc. The stereotype of the Hindu as passive and mild, taken as a hypothesis, was sustained by evidence based on Indian motion pictures, proverbs, and themes in Hindu culture.[13]

The importance of human values for economic productivity was emphasized by Max Weber in his celebrated thesis that the Protestant ethic of thrift and of salvation through work was a compelling factor in the development of private capitalism in the West. Weber argued that it was no accident that the Industrial Revolution prospered more in societies where the Protestant ethic predominated than in societies lacking this ethic.

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[11] Pandharinath Prabhu, "Social Effects of Urbanization on Industrial Workers in Bombay," *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 127–43, September, 1956.

[12] Independence Day Speech, Delhi, August, 1959.

[13] Dhirendra Narain, *Hindu Character*. University of Bombay Publications. Sociology Series, No. 8, 1957.

There is in all societies, although in uneven degree, what William Graham Sumner called "a strain toward consistency," with the different parts of the social order tending to buttress one another and thus be in harmony. In India the caste system reinforces the joint family, by teaching that many of a person's roles, especially the occupational one, are fixed at birth. This conception sets rigorous limits on how much striving one can do to improve one's lot, certainly much less than in an open-class society. The joint family, from this standpoint, is only an instrument for fulfilling the dictates of caste. But since, as has been stated, the joint family embodies a strong nurturance component and subordination to domestic authority, the joint family itself offers obstacles to industrialization.

There is still another way in which family organization affects industrial activity and that is through purchasing power. When the family is organized on an individual or nuclear basis, the demand for goods would seem to be greater than when the family manages its economic affairs collectively, as in the joint family. Obviously there is a bigger market for housing when the nuclear family is housed separately. More separate dwellings call for a bigger volume of household furnishings, kitchen supplies and food, although clothing would not seem to be affected one way or the other by the structure of the family. These added demands constitute a stimulus to industry.

In 1959, in one of the most highly industrialized societies in the world, the United States, 97.2 per cent of all married couples maintained separate residences and only 2.8 per cent were doubled up.[14] This estimate compares with the rate of 6.1 per cent in April, 1949, indicating that the number of married couples without own households dropped about 50 per cent in the last decade, probably an indication of a rising standard of living as well as a contribution to that rising standard. American families that live with other families, which the U.S. Census calls sub-families, are likely to be economically dependent. A sub-family is a married man and his wife with or without children or one parent and one or more own children under 18 years old, sharing a dwelling unit of a relative who is the household head. A cross-classification of the income of the subfamily with the income of the family members excluding those in subfamilies suggests that subfamilies are more likely to live with relatives who can afford to help them than they are to live with relatives who need financial aid.[15] From these data the inference may be drawn that those families in the United States that can afford to do so live separately.

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[14] Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports* Population Characteristics Series, P–20 No. 94, August 24, 1959. Washington 25, D. C.

[15] Paul C. Gluk, *American Families*, Wiley, 1957, pp. 98–9.

In the joint family system, economic support is given to dependent and even indigent relatives but potential economic self-sufficiency of a component conjugal unit is not ordinarily a basis for independent functioning by this unit. Of course the family may be functionally joint although residentially separate, in which case the economic demands of the family upon the economy are greater than when co-residence is stressed. The traditional joint family emphasizes co-residence, commensality, worship and property whereas in the present changing situation these aspects are accented less than the rights and obligations accepted by the members.[16]

We conclude our discussion of this highly important question of the relationship of the joint family and industrialization by noting that whereas the relationship between industry and government is much considered and discussed in our time, the relationship between industry and the family is given much less attention. Part of the explanation is of course that the struggle for power is much greater as regards the former than the latter. Also family is a halo word, emotion-laden. In India the joint family is highly revered in most places and any critical examination of it is subject to resistance and displeasure, not always covert.

The importance of the family for political purposes is recognized dramatically in societies newly swept by ideological fervor, as in communist Russia. There, when the Bolsheviks first came into power, and for some time thereafter, patriots tended to regard family sentiment as hostile to the development of loyalty to the state. At least one Indian writer[17] has expressed this same concern, arguing that caste and the joint-family have rallied the allegiance of Indians and have prevented the development of a larger social unity and has resulted in social fragmentation. In somewhat the same way, some observers regard family loyalty as a barrier to dedication to work. In the United States, it is sometimes said that one may be a good family man at the expense of being a good professional worker, for time and attention devoted to one's family mean time and attention taken from one's work. The obverse is also recognized, that there can be preoccupation with one's work at the expense of one's domestic relations, so the ties between family and work are recognized although not yet systematically analyzed by social scientists.

In thinking about this interrelationship of work and family, some misconceptions are apparent. Conspicuous is the assumption that because the joint family is highly functional in agricultural society, the joint family is perforce dysfunctional in industrial society. The joint family is highly functional in agricultural society within limits. The family is well adapted to labor on the land or in the household economy, and is urgent in the absence of extrafamilial agencies equipped to cope with economic need and dependency. But the family is less adequate if the supply of virgin land is highly limited and the size of the family outruns the resources at its disposal, as in India.

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[16] An analysis by I. P. Desai in the symposium: "Caste and Joint Family," *Sociological Bulletin* (Bombay), Vol. IV: 85 ff., September, 1955.

[17] K. M. Panikkar, *Hindu Society at Cross Roads.* Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1955.

The extended family appears to be less suitable to industrial society because, among other things, in a money economy, there is no paid employment available to many, increasing the number of dependents. The family has difficulty coping with the problem and in due course the growth of governmental programs of social security makes family support of indigent relatives less necessary and weakens the notion that lack of family support is wrong. During the early or transitional stages of the change from an agricultural to an industrial society, these governmental functions are imperfectly or even poorly developed and the need for mutual aid by the extended family continues. Indeed, in the early stages of industralization, mass unemployment, and bitter loneliness in the city may strengthen the ties to the extended family. This condition is regarded as representing something of a lag by those who believe that industrialization is inevitably linked to the small family system. According to this view, in time the situation will change and the extended family will give way to the independent family.

This is a conclusion based primarily on experience with industrialization and the changing family in the United States and England. Those who write from this perspective assume that the tie between industrialization and the nuclear family must be invariable. But the evidence from some other cultures raises a doubt as to the validity of this assumption. This is particularly true for the evidence from Japan where the ruling powers embarking on a policy of accelerated, planned industrialization adopted a viewpoint favorable to the extended family. The Zaibatsu, large families operating large businesses, were encouraged by the "Japanese company law", whereas after World War II the aim of the U.S. occupation policy was to break up such cartels. The family control of industry in Japan, it is reported, while more extensive than in the West, has been accomplished without much nepotism. Industry is highly rationalized and employment depends on competence, not family connection. But the pattern of employment in Japan is greatly different from that of the West, where mobility is a distinguishing characteristic. There is a large turnover as employees change jobs, often in quest of better ones. On the contrary, the practice in Japan is for the worker to make a lifelong commitment to his job, so that mobility is minimal.[18]

The burden of the Japanese case is that it raises a question as to whether there may not be types of industrial society, and not just one invariable pattern, as some apparently assume. The question is reinforced by Bendix's studies on Soviet type industry. Much depends on whether the industrial economy is developed mainly by corporate means, as in the United States (with little recourse to the family), or by families with or without the cooperation of the State, as in Japan and the Philippines, or by the state alone, as in Russia. Where the cooperatives play a relatively bigger role in industrialization, as in Scandinavia, the situation is still different; the role of the family in cooperative enterprise is larger and more significant than in corporate enterprise. Israel, with the Hisdadruth (the organization of labor) a large employer of labor, presents still another pattern. The conclusion to be drawn is that there is a variety of types of industrial society, and the interrelations of industry and government and the family take different forms in different countries. This is not to say, however, that there may not be minimal functional requisites to industrialization wherever it occurs, or that one pattern of industrialization may not be more efficient or productive than another, although this has to be considered also in terms of costs of various kinds, material and psychological, social and ethical.

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[18] James G. Abegglen, *The Japanese Factory: Aspects of Its Social Organization.* Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958.

Social Change and Social Class

PETER MARRIS

England

THE cities of Africa—crowded, confused, changing overnight—almost defeat analysis. In Europe we are used to judging a man's income and status by his neighbourhood, his home, his furniture. In Africa you cannot—or rather, you only deceive yourself if you think that you can.

In the centre of Lagos, behind the government and commercial offices, lies a ramshackle and congested neighbourhood. Open drains meander down the middle of the narrow lanes among goats and chickens who rummage in the garbage. The houses are old and patched, of rusting iron sheets and fading ochre plaster, with a gabled attic here and there lurching out of the red-brown sheeting of the roof. Inside, two or three households may share a single room, so full of bed and baggage that there is barely room to put down a chair.

In quarters so cramped, families hardly do anything but sleep, make love, and store their belongings within doors. A group of children squat on a porch, while their Arabic teacher takes them through a verse of the Koran; a woman on her doorstep plaits her neighbour's hair; in the late afternoon, men carry their game of draughts or table tennis into the lane; and on a Thursday or a Saturday night the street may be filled from end to end by a wedding or a funeral party, sipping their beer and whisky under a shelter of matting. And here, more than anywhere else in Lagos, is the bustle of a great commercial centre. In the back yards carpenters and millers, printers and mechanics and blacksmiths run their workshops. On the verandahs tailors bend over their machines. Signboards advertise building contractors, football pool agents, wireless repairers, and 'Your famous fire-eater of the West African Coast'.

But, above all, in every yard and doorway and verandah, from booths and shops, or hawking up and down the lanes, the women are trading—selling cottons, velvets, muslin, and damasks from Lancashire, Madras, Japan; enamel ware from Hong Kong; incense from Bombay; dried stockfish from Norway; cigarettes, tinned food, cola nuts; fruit and vegetables brought by canoe across the lagoon; fried plantains for the office workers, and bowls of porridge for the dockers from the waterside. This jostling, congested, shabby, vigorous neighbourhood is the heart of Lagos. It is now to be pulled down.

Many Nigerians resent such obtrusive squalor in the middle of their Federal capital, where it catches the eye of every critical visitor. As the Minister responsible for slum clearance remarked recently: 'These conditions are humiliating to any person with a sense of national pride'. But the people who live there do not feel humiliated. Nor are they all poor. In the same house you may find a business man with a turnover of £80,000 a year, a teacher and a clerk earning £200 or £300, a tailor who makes, perhaps, £10 a month, and a casual labourer who is lucky if he makes £5. But their rooms will scarcely show which is which: at night the business man piles his goods in a corner of the passage, and his children will unroll their sleeping mats alongside the labourer's brother, who has come for a few nights from their village. The disparities of wealth are much greater than in Britain, but they have not aroused the class-consciousness which bedevils our own society. Why should this be so?

The explanation lies, I think, in the nature of Lagos family life. Some of the old houses of Lagos have been owned by the same family for three or four generations. The rooms are divided amongst the descendants of the founder, so that there may be ten or more households of cousins, brothers, grandparents, aunts, and uncles living under the same roof. Even tenants tend to gather their own kin round them. This symbolizes the outstanding loyalty of Lagos social life: the affection and sense of mutual obligation of the family group.

Nigerians expect to support their parents in their old age, and often elderly aunts and uncles as well. They pay for the education of their younger brothers, bring up their nephews and nieces, help out their married sisters. A man with an income of no more than £10 a month may allot £2 or £3 from it for the support of kinsfolk outside his own household. Besides these personal obligations, the family displays its unity in frequent celebrations—naming ceremonies for the new-born child, marriages, funerals, anniversaries, a send-off for a brother going overseas—and to these each branch of the family will contribute its share. There are often regular family meetings—sometimes weekly, or on a certain Sunday of the month—where the difficulties of members are discussed, disputes settled, and the progress of the family reviewed. Most meetings raise a small subscription, minutes are taken, and officers elected from time to time. In some families, the subscription will be put aside towards the building or repair of the family house, or the running of a corporate family business. Immigrants, who have few relatives in Lagos—especially those from the eastern region—find a similar security in meetings of their countrymen from the same village or district.

If it were not for this family loyalty there would be practically no social security in Nigeria. The family group collects its dues, and distributes its funds to those in need: it affords its members at least an ultimate security against the misfortunes of life. Because of this sense of corporate responsibility, a family does not act with disinterested generosity when it finances one of its members through a university, or sets up another in business. The university graduate with his four-figure salary will be expected to contribute proportionately towards the need of his kin. So family loyalties tend to cut across disparities of wealth, and encourage the better-off to spend their money on their relatives rather than in raising their own standard of living. The rich earn no right to be aloof. The people of Lagos admire and envy wealth : every clerk dreams of making his way abroad to a degree and affluence, and football pools flourish. But they are not snobbish about money. The manners of an egalitarian society surmount gross inequalities of income.

Family Loyalties Undermined?

How long will this remain so ? Will family loyalties go on working against the segregation of rich and poor ? As men are promoted to the senior ranks of the civil service and commercial firms, they find themselves no longer contributors towards a mutual exchange of gifts and services, but the victims of demands which may be beyond their means : to their country cousins their wealth seems almost inexhaustible. Faced with insistent, even predatory claims, they may begin to restrict the range of relatives to whom they recognize an obligation. Then, again, they are not altogether free to spend their money on others if they wish. With the senior service post comes government quarters in a secluded suburb, designed for the commuter with his own car, and servants for his house and garden. The senior executive of a commercial firm will be expected to uphold its prestige in his social manners. And through their education they often acquire, too, a more European conception of marriage—a more companionate attitude towards their wives, a greater sensitivity to the emotional needs of their children.

But though the prosperous may choose to spend more on their homes and their wives and children, and less on their kin, it seems to me that for the poorer people of Lagos this is not possible. They will rather sacrifice marriage for the sake of their ties with the family into which they were born. There may in time grow up a profound difference between the family life of rich and poor, a class division as exclusive and provocative as any we have known in modern Europe.

This conflict between marriage and kin stands out in the way housing affects family life. I mentioned the family houses of Lagos, where three generations of relatives live side by side. Here each married couple can have their own room—or rooms, if a man has more than one wife—and yet remain part of the wider group who live under the same roof. Their obligations to each other form part of a more complex pattern of services which extends to the other households under the same roof. There is always someone at home to look after the old, or the young children ; there is always a pot cooking where you can dip your spoon, and this communal life gives each housewife more freedom to visit and help her own family, and to earn something for their support. But these family houses are disappearing : the family outgrows them, the rooms are let, the property sold. There is no longer vacant land to build new ones. And as Lagos becomes more and more crowded, it becomes difficult for relatives to rent rooms near each other.

People are faced with choices which they did not have to make when their relatives lived round them. A woman may have to choose whether she should go home to look after her old mother or stay with her husband ; a man may find that he can no longer afford to keep two wives and pay his young brother's college fees ; an old lady can have her grandchildren to live with her and do her housework only if their parents are willing to accept a separation. In such circumstances, how do people choose ?

Effects of Slum Clearance

Take, for instance, the families affected by the Lagos slum clearance scheme. Whole neighbourhoods in the longest-settled part of the town are being pulled down, and the residents moved to a new estate on the outskirts of the town. Here, a well-meaning Government has built self--contained houses of one to four rooms, with running water and sanitation, and bravely painted in contemporary colours. Some of the tenants were delighted with their new surroundings. Young couples found a new freedom on the estate—from the control of their elders, from the continual demands for a few shillings from aunts and cousins, from the interference of neighbours. One young accounts clerk remarked to me : 'I prefer living alone than with family. When I stay with family I don't have a chance to do as I like. They will tell me to do something or go somewhere, and, as I'm their junior, I must do it.' Now he sat at home in a comfortable parlour, chatting with his wife, or took her to the cinema ; and while he was at work she planned her small garden or played with her children. It seemed a pattern of life more English than Nigerian. And this, perhaps, is what the planners hoped to bring about : they had brought to married couples the chance of a private life.

For other tenants, the move to the new estate was disastrous. They were isolated from their work, their markets, and their relatives, at the end of a long and expensive bus journey. Unable to meet the expenses of suburban life, some of the husbands sent their wives home to their families, and distributed their children among relatives. Wives, finding no opportunities for trade, left to live with their own relatives nearer the centre of town ; others simply deserted when their husbands could no longer support them. Old people who had lived before in a family house, where they paid no rent, and were cared for, now found themselves neglected. Craftsmen and traders who had lost their customers sold up and at last determined to go abroad out of reach of wives and children and all family responsibilities, in the hope of recovering their fortunes. For these, the kind of domestic life for which the estate was planned was a luxury they could not afford.

Husband, Wife, and Kinsfolk

So, while the move to the estate brought some couples closer together, others it drove further apart; and I think this is only an instance of a more general tendency for the ties of marriage either to become much stronger or much weaker when husband and wife can no longer live together with, or near, their kin.

The wages of most husbands are low, their jobs continually threatened by the flow of hopeful immigrants to the city. Small traders are at the mercy of fluctuations in the market. A woman dare not trust her own and her children's future wholeheartedly to her husband. Husbands and wives, recognizing the strong ties each has with their own relatives, tend to trust each other less, and share less. Feelings are not deeply committed, and so divorce is common, and the frequency of divorce itself makes women protect themselves by a wariness in marriage, a tendency to regard it as a contract which must be exploited before it is revoked.

Because of this contractual conception of marriage a woman will insist that—if her parents have not done so—her husband must give her the means to set herself up in a trade. She tries to secure an independent income which will give her more equality with her husband, enable her to contribute to the support of her own family, and protect her against the breakdown of her marriage. She may be at her market stall from early morning until dark, and this, rather than her home, gets her best attention.

So women are reluctant to become, either in their feelings or for their livelihood, too dependent on their husbands. And this is all the more true of a polygamous household. Jealousies and rivalries may lead to irreconcilable quarrels. Especially if she has not been consulted, a woman may prefer to return to her own people rather than share a household with her husband's new wife. The crowded quarters of Lagos, too, put more strain on a polygamous household, and the cost of renting a second room may be more than a poor man can afford. Yet it is the labourer rather than the clerk who takes a second wife. The poorer you are, the more important to ensure that you will have children to care for you in your old age: while the better-off think less of the help that their children may give them in their retirement, than the cost of providing them all with a secondary education now.

For all these reasons, the less the income of the household the more insecure the marriage. The ties of loyalty to the wider family into which you were born remain very strong, and this gives rise to a pattern of life in which husbands and wives may not live together sometimes for months and years at a time, as family affairs call them away. So children often grow up apart from one or other of their parents—sometimes from both, brought up by an uncle or an aunt, or by one of their grandparents. In this way, the children get used to feeling themselves a member of a family group, looking for love and comfort not so much to one person as to many. So when they grow up it is more natural for them to place their strongest affections and loyalties in the family group, rather than in a relationship with one person.

It seems to me, therefore, that many Lagos families have neither the desire nor the means to accept the social reforms which are being imposed upon them. Public-health officials campaign against overcrowding, dirt, and choked drains. The press, its civic pride outraged, calls for yet more slum clearance. Social-welfare officials encourage women to spend more time at home and keep their children by them. Yet many cannot afford the sacrifices that these reforms entail, and they are only forced all the more to rely on the traditional loyalties which have always sustained them. Forced to choose between a new and more demanding conception of marriage and their kin, they must choose their kin.

There are some—more prosperous, more influenced by European standards—to whom this new conception of marriage appeals. For them, the mutual obligations of the family group have become a system of patronage, and they may be glad to escape from it into the seclusion of a private domestic life. This is why I suggest that there may arise, from such people, a new middle class, cut off from the rest of society by radically different conceptions of social loyalties and the paramount values of life.

As yet there are only hints that such a cleavage in society will come about. But with the coming of independence, people are eager to experiment, to challenge the preconceptions they have inherited from colonial rule. In their haste to command the symbols of progress, an underlying strain upon the integration of society may pass unnoticed until it is too late. It is easier to rebuild a city than a way of life.

Week by week, new banks, new bridges, new hotels, new government and commercial blocks are going up: there are plans for an Independence square, a promenade, a skyscraper. But in the very heart of the town there remain several acres of vacant ground. They have been reserved for residents of central Lagos, whose homes were there before slum clearance razed the site. But the plots remain unbuilt. No way has yet been found to reconcile the desires and means of the people who should live there with the requirements of national pride.

NOTES AND NEWS

I. NOTES

1. Planning and Population Control

Population control must form an integral part of any scheme of rapid development of a nation's economy. Planned production and reproduction must be undertaken simultaneously. In the case of developed economies, further expansion of productive capacity may be aimed at increasing the military power and improving the quality of the population rather than providing for rapidly increasing numbers. In some of the developed countries, the problem is not so much that of increased production as of increased reproduction. In the case of the underdeveloped countries like India, there are two problems ; poverty and the ever-present ghost of Malthus. Poverty must be banished ; but at the same time the ghost of Malthus must also be chained. These two problems cannot be solved in isolation but have to be dealt with at the same time. Economic expansion alone cannot compensate for a constant increase of population, because economic potentialities are affected by population. A stage has already been reached in India where the density and rapid growth of the population are hindering economic development. It is therefore not only unrealistic but suicidal to attempt to solve the problem of production without tackling the problem of population in an integrated manner. Any measures directed towards increased production must be accompanied by measures directed towards a reduction in the rate of growth of our numbers. A mere glance at the demographic picture of the country is sufficient to prove this contention.

Our birth rate is as high as 40 per 1000, as against 15.4 in the U.K., 24.6 in the U.S.A., 15.5 in Belgium, 15.7 in Germany and 19.4 in Japan. In view of our poor economic conditions, the birth rate is shockingly high ; and the death rate is also as high as 28 per 1000. Moreover, nearly 50% of our girls get married before they reach the age of 15. This fact is of great significance because, according to the demographers, the period between the ages 15–30 is the most fertile period in the reproductive activity. An average Indian woman gives birth to from 6 to 7 children as against 2.6 in the U.K., 3.3 in the U.S.A., 5.2 in Japan, 7 in the U.S.S.R. and 2.3 in Holland. Our population is increasing by over 5 millions per year. The increase would be still higher but for the high death rate. A high birth rate is accompanied by a high death rate. A decrease in numbers is not to be achieved by increasing mortality rates further.

A sound policy should aim at a low birth rate and a low death rate. Thus family planning appears to be the proper remedy.

The purpose of this argument is not, however, to suggest that the Government of India has completely neglected this problem in its development plans. In fact it must be said to the credit of the Government of India that it has been the first in the world to recognise officially the importance of family planning. In the first plan a sum of Rs. 65 lakhs was provided for family planning. During the plan period 126 urban and 21 rural clinics were opened. Under the second plan about Rs. 10 million have been made available for starting 500 additional urban clinics and 2000 rural clinics. Together they are expected to serve over 10,000,000 people.

Recognition of the importance of family planning, the provision of adequate finance and the formulation of a sound policy, though important and essential, will not by themselves help in realising the goal.

What is more important is the implementation of that policy effectively and efficiently. It is here that the family planning programme in India has shockingly failed. All planning must come from below ; but unfortunately it has come from above in this country, and family planning is no exception. The clinics were first opened in urban areas rather than in rural areas. It appears as though, after a second thought, the Government realised this mistake to some extent and has tried to correct it by making provision for a comparatively larger number of clinics to be opened in rural areas during the current plan period. Again, the financial provision made in both the plans is insignificant. In the second plan, out of Rs. 45,000 millions to be spent in the public sector, less than Rs. 50 millions are provided. What is worse, even this amount is not being properly utilised.

It is true that the administrators have to face a number of difficulties, particularly in a country where large masses of people live in rural areas, where people are illiterate and poor. Nevertheless the administrators have not taken the necessary initiative and lack the imagination to understand the problem. Only one instance[1] is sufficient to prove this. When the rhythm method of birth control was initiated by the Government of India in certain selected areas in 1952, certain difficulties were met with in teaching this method to the illiterate wives in rural areas. Such a method, whether it is one hundred per cent effective or not, is not at all a suitable one. It is too much to expect an illiterate woman to maintain an accurate record of the menstrual cycle and a record of her fertile and infertile days. Of course this was realised by the administrators. But the remedy suggested, instead of simplifying this difficulty, has made it more complicated. A bead necklace consisting of 28 beads of different colours to indicate the safe and unsafe days during the menstrual cycle was suggested. Every day the woman is required to move one bead from one side of the string to the other, beginning with the first day of her menstrual flow. During the time the green beads appear she will be in her safe period, but when the red ones appear, sexual relations are to be avoided. Apart from the psychological and cultural barriers, the mechanical difficulties, which are common to all human beings, whether literate or illiterate, ignorant or enlightened, cannot be overcome. People simply forget to push the beads. Moreover, this method cannot be standardised by devising a simple bead necklace of this type, because each individual has a different menstrual cycle. Even if this method can be improved and the bead neckleces are prepared in such a way as to suit each individual case, it is not going to be successful at least in the prevailing conditions of Indian society, for the very simple reason that there are barely 7 safe days during the course of a menstrual cycle, one day immediately after the menses and about 6 days before the next menses. It does not require more than ordinary common sense to understand that large masses of people living in conditions of abject poverty and having no other recreation than sexual gratification will not control their impulses and will not subject themselves to the stresses and strains involved in following a method of this kind. It is therefore obvious that energy and the meagre financial provisions are being frittered away in such impracticable experimentation with the ostensible purpose of devising a simple and cheap method of controlling population.

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[1] *Abraham Stone, "Fertility Problem in India",* Fertility and Sterility *(New York), May–June, 1953.*

Our people, though illiterate, are not ignorant. They have a strong measure of common sense. They are not opposed to family planning. A number of sample surveys conducted in different parts of the country such as Baroda, Ramanagaram in Mysore, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Poona, covering both rural and urban areas, show that about 75% of the couples are willing to limit the size of the family and to learn methods by which it might be accomplished. What is required is a simple and realistic method which can be easily adopted by the ordinary people.

There are three important unhappy features of the population policy of this country, which have been largely responsible for the failure of the family planning programme. Firstly, there is ambiguity regarding the population policy and programme and uncertainty regarding the priority that is to be given to family planning. Even the top men at the helm of affairs appear to belittle the importance of checking the rapidly increasing numbers. The planners and other Government spokesmen tell us that ours is the only country where the Government has taken to family planning in real earnest. But at the same time no less a person than our Prime Minister himself stated some time ago that self-sufficiency in food must get a higher priority in this country than family planning. Such statements do more harm than good to the cause of family planning. Family planning is as urgent as self-sufficiency in food. Both must be given equal attention and equal priority. The very objective of achieving self-sufficiency in food will be defeated if the growth of our population continues unchecked. Even if it is possible to attain self-sufficiency in food after making proper allowance for the increase in population, it is still necessary to limit the size of the family in order to raise the standard of living of our people, which is acknowledged as one of the lowest in the world.

Secondly, such conflicting policy pronouncements are bound to affect the minds of those who are entrusted with the task of carrying out the family planning programme. They will create doubts in their minds. They will hesitate to take the necessary initiative and will be reluctant to show the necessary drive and vigour in carring out their tasks. Moreover, the administrators tend to lack understanding of the human factors involved in the present tendency of the population to increase. The officials of the Health Service Administration issue questionnaires to the various institutions and organisations in the country and expect answers to them within four days. They merely issue bulletins from time to time about family planning. People entrusted with research projects by the Government are not properly trained and are unequal to the task.

Thirdly, the financial provision made for the purpose of implementing family planning programmes is far from adequate.

In our opinion, the man in rural India is willing to understand the problem. He realises the burden of a big family and its social and economic implications. Fortunately, no religious ideology of the Catholic type has hardened his attitude in respect of family planning. But he needs to be understood, guided and directed, and a change in his mentality can only be brought about by an appreciation of the cultural complex in which he is brought up. What is needed is a proper understanding of his peculiar difficulties and the supply of the right type of technological appliances and a diffusion of knowledge regarding planned parenthood. Such knowledge must be both informative and demonstrative. Suitable methods for transmitting such knowledge should be evolved and carried out in such a way as to be of the utmost benefit to the common man. Over and above these, the man who sponsors change in this direction needs training in understanding the social, cultural and psychological problems of the ordinary men and women in the peculiar background of Indian society.

2. Impressions from the Stresa Conference

It is easy to overrate the importance of international conferences. Convening in relaxed mood in an attractive place, moving among a crowd of congenial people with some of whom you can be certain to strike up an interesting conversation at almost any hour of the day; being re-united with old friends and making new ones; and, possibly, meeting strangers from far corners of the earth whose faces light up on hearing your name, or who even claim to have read your books; all this produces a state of euphoria in which (because we are fundamentally earnest and puritanical people) we tend to attribute a scientific purpose to what, essentially, is an intellectual pleasure.

It is equally easy, on the other hand, to be cynical about such gatherings, to regard them as no more than glorified " talking shops " or a kind of international fair at which the academic elite of various countries display their intellectual wares, without much chance, however, of effecting any " sales ".

There is a grain of truth in either of these points of view, even though both of them are mistaken.

Looking back now, after an interval of more than three months, at the Fourth World Congress of Sociology (held in Stresa, Italy, September 8-15, 1959, under the general heading " Society and Sociological Knowledge "), it is possible to be sufficiently detached to judge events without exaggerating their importance, yet to be conscious of those elements of the experience which have had a lasting effect.

While, from this distance in time, the impact of individual lectures is blurred (many of them are, in any case, better read in the published Transactions of the Congress), and only outstanding points can still be recalled from the many discussion groups and seminars, some more general impressions have retained their vividness. These concern, in the first place, particular personalities. The intellectual brilliance of Professor Raymond Aron (France), for instance, or the transparent integrity and humanity of Professor S. Ossowski (Poland), whose moral courage moved the audience to a prolonged ovation, stick out as landmarks from an otherwise vague memory.

There is, secondly, a recollection of marked national differences between the various delegations. Despite great individual variety, such national differences in approach to sociological (as no doubt to other) problems were evident between British and American sociologists (all the more remarkable as so many of them, in either camp, originated in Central Europe) and between both of them and the French. (Marx and Weber seem to have had a profounder impact on sociology in France than in any other Western country.) Some of the other delegations appeared to present a kind of collective " persona " to outsiders: the Russians, with their prepared statements and their remote but, nevertheless, unmistakable interest in the proceedings; the East Germans, who never missed an opportunity for political propaganda so simple-minded that it embarrassed even their fellow-travellers; or the Poles with their alertness and open-mindedness. (No homogeneity here, except in their curiosity to observe and to learn.)

The " fraternisation " between Western sociologists and their Polish and Yugoslav colleagues was not only a mutually pleasant and interesting experience but a valuable part of the Congress.

Lastly, it is clear in retrospect that the most important aspect of this conference (as, no doubt, is the case with all similar scientific gatherings) was the opportunity it afforded for private talks between colleagues working in related fields of study. The value of these informal meetings, carried on in the corridors of the Congress Building, in hotel lounges and cafés, and often followed by subsequent correspondence and exchange of literature, transcends the mere enjoyment of congenial conversation. They are an essential instrument for the breaking down of the ivory towers in which so many scientists—even social scientists—almost inevitably work.

II. NEWS

1. Refresher Course in South Asia

Institute of Social Sciences, Agra, 21 December 1959 to 9 January 1960

The Course was arranged by the International Sociological Association on behalf of UNESCO. Its purpose was to acquaint the participants with the most recent work in sociology, to examine the present state of sociological teaching and research in South Asian countries, and to consider the prospects and needs for the development of sociology as an academic discipline in these countries.

The Course had three principal sections, each guided by a Director of Studies, as follows:

1. Theories and Methods of Sociology,
   T. B. Bottomore (London School of Economics).

2. Planning and Organization of Research,
   E. A. Shils (University of Chicago).

3. The Study of Asian Social Structures,
   M. N. Srinivas (University of Delhi).

In addition, Professor R. N. Saksena (Institute of Social Sciences, Agra) who made the local arrangements for the Course, conducted some additional meetings on sociology, social policy, and interdisciplinary research with special reference to India.

There were 21 participants in the Course, from Burma (1), Ceylon (1), India (11), Indonesia (3), Malaya and Singapore (2), Pakistan (2) and Thailand (1), and a number of observers.

The section on Theories and Methods of Sociology was concerned with some major theoretical approaches to the study of society, particularly functionalism and historical sociology, with problems of generalization and explanation, and with a critical review of sociological theories in two fields of study; social stratification and social change.

In the section concerned with Planning and Organization of Research, there was much discussion of the criteria for the selection of research topics in Asian countries, supplemented by critical examination of a number of research projects which were already planned or in progress.

In the section devoted to Asian Social Structures the discussions were largely based upon papers contributed by some of the participants, dealing with a few major aspects of social structure—kinship and family, social stratification, urbanization, race relations, and elite groups. It is hoped to publish the papers later in a volume.

The meetings directed by Professor Saksena gave rise to interesting discussions on the role of sociologists in South Asian countries, the organization of teaching, and the problems of research priorities and research funds.

The participants appreciated greatly the fruitful exchange of ideas and the comparison of research problems which the Course made possible, and they were unanimous in proposing that further meetings of the same kind should be organized regularly in the future.

2. The Fifth All-India Sociological Conference at Lucknow

The fifth session of the All-India Sociological Conference was held at Lucknow, under the auspices of the University of Lucknow, on March 8, 9 and 10, 1960. The Conference was inaugurated by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh, Dr. V. V. Giri, who in his address called upon sociologists to render help in the drawing up of development schemes, quickening the pace of social change and lessening the frictions involved in it, and in giving a proper sense of direction to the Indian youth. The General President of the Conference Prof. D. G. Karve, Vice-Chancellor, Poona University, in his address on Some Sociological Implications of Planned Development pleaded for the application of ethical principles to personal behaviour as well as economic enterprise and governmental action. He said that sociologists, with their comprehensive view of politics, economics and ethics, were the best persons to advise us in this direction. He further said that the caste system could not be changed by constitutional measures alone, and that its breaking up was a slow process. He added that it was matter of interest for the sociologist to consider whether at this stage he had a timely and effective contribution to make to the further breaking down of these anti-social, and, some of them at least, inhuman barriers. He pointed out that just as India had received help from nations more advanced than her, she should render help to countries which are more backward than India herself is. He pleaded for equality for all on a world-wide basis.

Following the General President, three sectional presidents read their addresses. Prof. Ramkrishna Mukerjee, of the Indian Statistical Institute, (Sociology) spoke on Some Considerations on Social Research, Dr. Kamala Chowdhry, of Ahmedabad Textile Industries Research Association, (Social Psychology) spoke on Resistance to Social Change and Dr. B. P. Adhikari, of Lucknow University. (Demography and Social Statistics) read an address on Construction of Socio-Economic Models for Planning. Prof. A. Aiyappan, of Utkal University, the fourth sectional president (Anthropology) could not attend the Conference.

About twenty papers were read at the Conference on Sociology in relation to Planning, the Sociology of Religion, Community Studies, Caste, Population, Personality Studies, etc.

At a general body meeting various resolutions were passed, including one requesting the Government of India to constitute a panel of sociologists for advising the Government on matters relating to planned development.

Dr. K. C. K. E. Raja, Vice-Chancellor, Travancore University was elected as the next General President. Prof. S. C. Dube (Sagar) was reelected General Secretary. The sectional presidents for the next session will be :

Prof. I. P. Desai (Baroda) : Sociology.
Mr. T. C. Das (Calcutta) : Anthropology.
Dr. Durganand Sinha (Kharagpur) : Social Psychology.
Prof. U. S. Nair (Trivandrum) : Demography and Social Statistics.

The Conference was attended by about 75 delegates from all over India. Some overseas delegates also were present, including Prof. T. B. Bottomore of London University, Dr. A. C. Mayer, also of London, and Dr. H. A. Gould of the University of Washington. Excellent arrangements for the Conference were made by Prof. D. N. Majumdar and his colleagues.

3. The First Convention of Social Anthropologists in India

A Convention of Social Anthropologists was held at the University of Lucknow on March 10 and 11, 1960, under the auspices of the Ethnographic and Folk Culture Society. Among others, Prof. N. K. Bose, Prof. D. N. Majumdar, Prof. Ramkrishna Mukerjee, Prof. K. Ishwaran, Prof. S. C. Dube, Dr. S. K. Srivastava, Dr. (Mrs.) Leela Dube, Dr. L. P. Vidyarthi, Dr. T. N. Madan, Dr. A. C. Mayer, Dr. H. A. Gould, Mr. Edward Jay, Dr. Kirk, Mr. Gopala Sarana and Dr. Y. B. Damle participated in the Convention. Although nine papers had been received, only four could be read as no time limit was put on discussions. On the 10th March, Prof. Dube (Sagar) read his interesting paper on Methodological Problems of Group Research. An extremely interesting discussion followed in which emphasis was put on (*a*) defining group research precisely and (*b*) defining the purposes for which group research was suitable. There was considerable difference of opinion on these issues. If the criterion of a good paper is the discussion on it Prof. Dube's paper was a very good one.

On March 11 three papers were read. Dr. S. K. Srivastava (Agra) read a paper on Current Trends in Social Anthropological Research in India. His paper also gave rise to an interesting discussion. Such topics as the following were raised and discussed : (*a*) Is any type of social research by an anthropologist *anthropological* research ? (*b*) Does the authropologist have a different viewpoint from other social scientists ?

Mr. Gopala Sarana (Lucknow) read a review-paper on Edmund Leach's recent paper "What Should We Mean By Caste?" Mr. Sarana tended to disagree with Leach's view of caste and agree rather with Kroeber's view of caste, although Leach explicitly states that Kroeber's emphasis on endogamy and a ranked hierarchy is a wrong one. In the discussion that followed, it was pointed out that Leach's insistence on the caste as a system of interrelationships was nothing new, and in fact Wetser had given an "idyllic picture" of it (as Dr. Mayer put it in his book on the Jajmani System.

Dr. H. A. Gould (Washington) read a paper based on an uncompleted research project on the study of rural immigrants in the city of Lucknow, their caste behaviour, choice of occupation, etc. His paper was called the Anthropology of Industrialization. It highlighted the problems an anthropologist faces when he tackles problems which are not of the kind familiar to anthropologists.

Several participants stressed the utility of the Convention and expressed the hope that it may be held once every year. The Convention followed the 'informal Seminar' procedure. The participants sat round a table; there was a new moderator for every paper; and no time limit was put on discussions. All present agreed that the discussions were of a high standard, and the experience a stimulating one.

4. The International Seminar on Family Research

In 1954, the UNESCO Institute for Social Sciences, under its director Dr. Nels Anderson, invited a small number of family sociologists to attend a seminar at Cologne, Germany. This was the beginning of the International Seminar on Family Research which, upon the suggestion of the participants, was established as a permanent organisation at the second meeting in Paris, in 1955. Dr. Nels Anderson was appointed its permanent secretary. Since 1954 the seminar has held yearly or biennial meetings. More than 50 participants from African, American, Asiatic, and European countries have attended the meetings thus far.

The themes of the meetings were defined purposely broad enough to allow for a wide range of different topics. The papers which were presented at the meetings dealt primarily with the writers' current research projects. The general theme of the first meeting, which was under the chairmanship of René König, Germany, was "The Family in the Changing Social Order". "The Family and the Development of the Child" was discussed at the 2nd meeting, which was chaired by Ernest W. Burgess, USA. The third meeting, under the chairmanship of P. Chombart de Lauwe, France, took place at Haus Hammerstein, Germany. It was concerned with an evaluation of the family in different cultural environments. The fourth meeting, again under P. Chombart de Lauwe, was at Wageningen, Holland and dealt with "Stability, Housing and the

Family". Leopold Rosenmayr was the chairman of the fifth meeting, which was held at Madrid, Spain in 1958. The discussions dealt with the role of the wife and mother in modern society. Dr. Nels Anderson deserves the credit for the planning and for much of the preparatory work of these meetings.

The sixth meeting of the International Seminar on Family Research, under the chairmanship of Gerhard Baumert, Germany, will be held in Poland this fall upon the invitation of the Philosophical and Sociological Institute of the Polish Academy of Science. The theme of the meeting will be "The Family and Industrialisation".

Finally, it should be noted that the recently formed Standing Committee on Family Research of the International Sociological Association (chairman Reuben Hill, secretary Gerhard Baumert) will assume sponsorship of the International Seminar on Family Research.

5. Karnatak University, Dharwar

Karnatak University is one of the younger universities in India, started in 1949 at Dharwar, one of the cultural and educational centres of South India. Before the Reorganization of States (1st November, 1956) the northern part of the present Mysore State was part of Bombay State, which comprised three main linguistic areas—Gujarat, Maharashtra and Karnatak. In order to give equal scope for the cultural development of each area, the then Bombay Government decided to start a separate university for each of these areas. That was how the three regional Universities of Gujarat, Poona (Maharashtra) and Karnatak came to be established. These Universities were actually offshoots of one of the pioneer Universities of India, *viz.*, Bombay, and so their pattern of administration and courses of studies were at first modelled on those of the parent University.

The Karnatak University started functioning in August 1949 and held its first examination in 1950. Even though it was a humble start, it was planned from the beginning to be more than a merely affiliating and examining University. Accordingly, with the cooperation of affiliated colleges, post-graduate instruction in certain faculties of arts and science was organised. Since this was not found to be very satisfactory, the University adopted the policy of concentrating the work of post-graduate instruction at the centre. At the beginning there were only four faculties thus organised. In the course of the ten years of its existence the University has started fourteen more faculties which work efficiently, staffed with men of merit and scholarship.[1]

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[1] Instruction at the post-graduate level is given in the following faculties: (1) Anthropology, (2) Archaeology, (3) Economics, (4) English, (5) Geology, (6) History, including Ancient Indian History, (7) Inorganic Chemistry, (8) Kannada, (9) Mathematics, (10) Nuclear Physics, (11) Organic Chemistry, (12) Physics, (13) Physical Chemistry, (14) Politics, (15) Radio Physics, (16) Sociology, (17) Sanskrit, (18) Statistics.

A department of publication and extension lectures is attached to the University through which lectures by scholars in their respective fields of study are organised at various places in rural areas for the diffusion of cultural values and educational advancement ; publication of scientific literature and a half-yearly University Journal is also undertaken.

In the initial stage, there was difficulty in housing the University Library, the laboratories and the post-graduate teaching departments. The University accordingly started construction on a site of more than 400 acres of land which is " a splendid site, not too far and yet not too near the dust and heat of the town." Huge sums of money were and are being spent in laying out parks and roads, in erecting large academic buildings, in constructing the administrative building, residential quarters for teaching and administrative staff, a hostel for students, a swimming pool and a sport-pavilion. During these last five or six years a beautiful township has sprung up. In this developmental work the two governments of Bombay and Mysore, and the University Grants Commission[2] have also helped to a considerable extent. Another plan of constructing new buildings and opening new faculties is under preparation.

The University aims at, and to a great extent has achieved, the principle of keeping the student-teacher ratio at a proportionate level, so as to enable them to have close, intimate and individual contact with each other. Further, the University believes in the beneficial results of exchanging teachers and students with foreign countries, as this is one of the important ways of achieving a cross-cultural education. In this connection the University has sent its teachers to, and received teachers and students from, abroad.

We would like to record here our appreciation of the valuable leadership and guidance which this young University has been fortunate enough to receive from two eminent scholars and administrators. Wrangler D. C. Pavate, M.A. (Cantab), Vice-Chancellor of the Karnatak University, is in a real sense the architect of this University. It is, in the main, because of his enthusiastic and able leadership that it has been possible for this University to achieve so much within so short a period of time. The other person is Dr. C. D. Deshmukh, the Chairman of the University Grants Commission, who has been a veritable source of inspiration to us. The University hopes and prays that the leadership of Wrangler D. C. Pavate and the sympathetic guidance of Dr. C. D. Deshmukh will be available to it for a very long time to come.

We shall be recording the progress of the Karnatak University in these columns whenever occasion arises.

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[2] A body set up by the India Government to help and guide Indian Universities in their developmental work.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

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1. THE URBAN COMMUNITY: A world perspective. By Anderson, Nelson, Publishers: Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1959. pp. xii; 500; $ 5.50.

2. INDIA'S CHANGING VILLAGES: Human Factors in Community Development. By Dube, S. C., Publishers: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London. pp. xii; 230; 25s.

3. FAMILY AND KINSHIP IN EAST LONDON: By Michael Young and Peter Willmott, Publishers: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London. pp. xii; 232.

4. SURVEY OF THE HANDLOOM INDUSTRY IN KARNATAKA AND SHOLAPUR: Sponsored by N. C. A. E. R., New Delhi, Publishers: Asia Publishing House, Bombay. pp. xii; 274. Rs. 9-50.

5. HUBLI CITY: A Study in Urban Economic Life. By B. R. Dhekney M.A., Ph.D. Publishers: Karnatak University, Dharwar. pp. xx; 282; Rs. 10.

6. CASTE AND COMMUNICATION IN AN INDIAN VILLAGE: By D. N. Majumdar. Publishers: Asia Publishing House, Bombay. pp. 358. Rs. 20.

7. SOCIAL CONTOURS OF AN INDUSTRIAL CITY: Social Survey of Kanpur. By D. N. Majumdar, assisted by N. S. Reddy, S. Bahadur, et al. Publishers: Asia Publishing House, Bombay. pp. 242, Numerous tables. Plates and Maps.

8. AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY: By D. N. Majumdar and T. N. Madan. Third Printing, 1960. Publishers: Asia Publishing House, Bombay. pp. 308; Price Rs. 12-50.

9. WORKING WIVES: By Viola Klein. Published by The Institute of Personnel Management, 80 Fetter Lane, London, E.C.4. Price 7s. 6d.

10. INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS: By Dr. J. B. Das Gupta, Publishers: JAICO Publishing House, Bombay, India. Price sh. 35.

Editorial

WITH the second issue of our Journal we are entering into a really international setting with the well-known E. J. Brill, at Leyden, Holland, who have a world-wide net work of business relations, as publishers. It is interesting to remember that the Journal is now being published in the very place where the idea of such a venture was conceived. E. J. Brill are publishing this Journal on behalf of the Department of Social Anthropology of Karnatak University, Dharwar, India. This makes an addition to the already existing number of East-West links and I hope this link to be of a unique nature.

The importance of comparative sociological knowledge was brought home to me in the course of my two studies in Holland, one on family life and the other on the problems of foreign students in the various research institutes and universities of the Netherlands. These studies and my other experiences in Europe impressed upon me how great is the misunderstanding between the East and the West. Always I felt an atmosphere of "we" and "they".

The misunderstanding between "we" and "they", I came to feel, was due to inadequate knowledge and understanding of the others' ways of life. I came to feel this because I realized in Holland a genuine desire to understand and cooperate with the world outside in the cause of the continuing struggle for coordinated existence. The knowledge necessary to create good-will, however, must, I believe, be scientific knowledge about one another.

Comparative sociology can do much towards better understanding between people and people, nation and nation. In to-day's world, not to understand, or not to like each other, is a luxury we cannot afford. This Journal aims at the furtherance of truth in the hope that ethnocentricism can be eliminated in the world of tomorrow and can appreciably be lessened in the world of to-day. And I earnestly hope that the research work of the kind sponsored by this Journal can be of immense help in the building up of a feeling of "us".

As a preliminary step towards realizing our ideal, it is now planned to bring out the second issues of volumes two and three of the Journal as special numbers on comparative education (Autumn, 1961) and comparative sociology of family and marriage, (Autumn, 1962) to be edited by guest editors, Dr. A. H. Halsey of the University of Birmingham, U.K. and Professor J. M. Mogey of the University of Vanderbilt, U.S.A., respectively.

As another attempt at encouraging publication of research made on comparative lines, we are very soon starting a series of "Essays in International Sociology". The first of the series will be by the late Dr. D. N. Majumdar on a Himalayan Society, and the second by Mr. T. B. Bottomore, London School of Economics, on Indian Sociology.

That it has been possible to realize our ideal of starting this series of Essays in International Sociology and this Journal of Comparative sociology is due in a large measure to the unfailing encouragement and guidance of Dr. D. C. Pavate, Vice-Chancellor, Karnatak University, Dharwar, and our distinguished Associate Editors. Vice-Chancellor, D. C. Pavate has been re-elected to the Office for the third time and it is gratifying to record that during his previous tenures of office the University has been able to expand in all directions.

The associate editors willingly and gladly accepted their roles in this work. In our contact with other countries they serve as connecting links. In fact, it is they who will truly make this Journal comparative. Our sincerest thanks to them.

K. ISHWARAN
EDITOR

Mutual Convergence of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to the Mixed Sociocultural type

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN

Harvard University

1. Three Prognoses

PRESIDENT Eisenhower and other leaders of the West assure us that the future belongs to the Capitalist ("free-enterprise") type of society and culture. In contrast, Premier Khrushchev and other leaders of the Communist nations confidently expect the victory of the Communist type in the coming decades. In difference from both of these predictions I am inclined to think that if mankind avoids new world wars and can overcome today's grave emergencies, the dominant type of the emerging society and culture is likely to be neither Capitalistic, nor Communistic, but a type *sui generis* which we can designate as the *Integral type*. This type will be intermediary between the Capitalist and the Communist orders and the ways of life. It is going to incorpoporate most of the positive values and to be free from serious defects of each type. Moreover, the emerging Integral order in its full development is likely to be not a mere eclectic mixture of the features of both types but a unified system of Integral cultural values, social institutions, and of the Integral type of personality essentially different from those of the Capitalist and the Communist patterns. If mankind does not avoid new world wars and cannot mitigate today's grave emergencies, then its future becomes problematic and dark. Such in brief is my prognosis about the alternative future of the human world.

My main reasons for this prognosis are three: First, that in their pure or extreme form both – the Capitalist and the Communist – orders are very defective and cannot meet the needs of a good and creative life of mankind of the future. Second, both orders are serviceable only in specific conditions for specific periods. In different conditions and periods both become disserviceable and therefore unneeded. Third, progressively both orders, in the Western and the Soviet blocks of nations,[1] for the last three decades have been increasingly losing their specific features and "borrowing" and incorporating in themselves the characteristics of each other. In this sense, both types have been more and more withering and are becoming more and more similar to each other in their culture, social institutions, systems of values, and ways of life. This means that both types, exemplified by the United States and the Soviet Russia, have been increasingly converging to the intermediary type different from Communism and Capitalism. This intermediary type for the time being represents as yet an eclectic mixture of the characteristics of both orders. However, given the necessary time for its peaceful development, it eventually will grow into a unified Integral – social, cultural, and personal – order in the human universe.

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[1] In this article I limit my analysis to the Euro-American continent concentrating on the changes for the last forty years in the United States and Soviet Russia. In regard to China where the Communist system is still largely in its first, coercive, phase, I simply

2. The Decay of Real Capitalism

In this article I am not going to discuss in details the first two reasons of my prognosis. For my purposes it suffices to say that if Capitalism were able to meet successfully the urgent needs of contemporary humanity, it would not have decayed as it did in the leading Capitalist countries and would not have met an increasing resistance to its development in so-called "backward countries." Any country and mankind at large rarely, if ever, discards any important value, or institution, be it political, economic, or other – as long as this value or institution renders a real service in meeting the urgent needs of a given society. If, in our case, the Capitalist sociocultural order is increasingly abandoned even in the previously Capitalist nations and replaced by the Communist, the Socialist, the Welfare State, the Guided Democracy, the Fascist, the Nazi, the "Corporative" and other orders, this means that it has increasingly become disserviceable and obsolescent. This conclusion becomes particularly forceful for the formerly Capitalist countries like Germany, England, France, the United States and most of the Western countries where the withering of Capitalism began already at the end of the nineteenth century, was initiated often by the leaders of Capitalism itself (especially by those who introduced "the corporation economy") and has progressed since "naturally," immanently, gradually, without being overthrown by violent revolutions or by military coercion of foreign

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can state that, if Chinese Communist order is given the peaceful conditions for its free development, in due time it also will experience the transformation essentially similar to that of Soviet Russia. The first phase of any violent revolution, and especially of the Communist revolution, is always predominantly destructive, coercive, and inhumanly cruel. Eventually, if the revolution is not suppressed, it passes from this destructive into an increasingly constructive phase. The predominantly destructive phase of the Russian Revolution is already over and it has entered now into its constructive phase (unfortunately interrupted by the Second World War and greatly hindered in its progress by the subsequent cold and hot wars) while the Chinese revolution is still at the end of its destructive phase and is just entering its constructive stage of development. See about these phases in development of practically all great revolutions in P. Sorokin, *Sociology of Revolution* (Philadelphia, 1924) and in P. Sorokin, *Society, Culture, and Personality* (New York, 1952), chp. 31. Spanish edition of this work is entitled *Sociedad, Cultura y Personalidad* (Madrid, 1960).

armies. At the present time, this withering of Capitalism has already progressed so far that in all Euro-American countries, including the United States, the genuine, "full-blooded" Capitalist – or a real "free-enterprise" – system of economy has become only a sector and not always the major one in the *total* economy of these countries. For the last few decades, especially after 1914, side by side with this "full-blooded" Capitalist system, based upon "full-blooded" private property, there emerged and have grown "the corporation-economy" and "the governmentally-managed economy" – both essentially different from the Capitalist system. And with some fluctuations, these two systems of economy have been replacing more and more the genuine Capitalist economic order. To understand properly this last statement, one has to be reminded of the fact that "the full-blooded," classical Capitalism is based upon "full-blooded" private property which means the right to possess, to use, to manage, and to dispose the owned thing. In the governmentally-managed economy, the officials are not the owners of the national property they control; the owner is the nation and the government is only the manager of the nation's property. Similarly, in the corporation economy the board of directors that manage it is not the owner of the total property of a big corporation; in some 200 biggest corporations of the United States, none of the directors owns even 5 per cent of the property of a big corporation. The owners are tens and hundreds of thousands of the holders of the shares and bonds of these corporations. An overwhelming majority of these owners neither manage nor dispose the corporation's property. These functions are discharged by the board of directors of each corporation who, like the government officials, are not its owners. In the governmentally-managed and the corporation economy we have a basic split of full-blooded property; those who own it do not manage, those who manage do not own it. This basic difference from the classical type of full ownership upon which the classical Capitalist system was based makes the governmentally-managed and the corporation economies fundamentally different from classical Capitalism (with which – intentionally or not – the corporation economy is still mistakenly identified especially by the bosses of the corporations talking of it as "the free enterprise," or "the Capitalist economy").

As practically in all Western countries in recent decades, the sectors of the governmentally-managed and the corporation economy have been systematically growing at the cost of full-blooded Capitalism and as the sector of this Capitalism is already a minor sector in the total economy of the United States and of several other Western countries, this fact clearly testifies of the decay of the true Capitalist system, as pointed out above.

3. The Social Law of Fluctuation of Totalitarianism and Freedom

In a somewhat different way, the same can be said of the Totalitarian-Communist system of economy. By it is meant the system of economy in which private property is abolished; the total economy of the country is "nationalized" and in its entirety is managed by the government. It is "centralized," "planned" economy in which the government decides all the matters concerning the production, the distribution, the exchange, and the consumption of the economic goods. The Communist system is a mere variety of this Totalitarian system of economy.

Under different governmental regimes and different ideologies this system of economy emerged long ago and had occurred many times in human history: in several periods of Ancient Egypt, especially in the Ptolemaic period, in Ancient Sparta and Lipara, in Rome, especially after 301 A.D., in some periods of the Byzantine empire, in Ancient Peru, in several periods of China, India, and many other countries, to mention but a few outstanding cases. It was initiated and introduced by all sorts of governments and under all kinds of "beautifying," "rationalizing," and "sanctifying" ideologies: by the Egyptian pharaohs, the Roman and Byzantine emperors, the Incas of Peru, the Chinese or European autocratic kings, by the host of military conquerors, by the religious authorities like the Jesuits in America, by many Monarchist, Republican, Democratic, Military, Socialist, and Communist governments. No less diverse have been "the ideologies" that justified, supported, rationalized, and beautified this Totalitarian system of economy and government: all sorts of ideologies – religious, moral, political, utilitarian, "nationalistic," "economic," "sociological" and others, beginning with the traditional Egyptian religious beliefs and cult of the Pharoah as God and ending with the recent Communist, Socialist, the Nazi, the Fascist, the Labor Party, the Pentagon, "the Welfare State," and many "Dictatorial" ideologies – have performed this role.

This means that the Communist system of economy and the Communist ideology is only one of many varieties of the Totalitarian systems of economy, ideology, and political regime. In diverse forms they have been predominant in the past and have been frequently occurring in recent times.

The types of economies, governments, and ideologies of all countries are not something constant but continuously fluctuate between the poles of the totalitarian and the strictly free regimes of the *laissez faire*, *laissez passer* type, with a minimum of governmental control of social life, relationship, and behavior of the citizens. At one time the governmental control of economic, political, and other sectors of social life of the citizens increases and the respective systems of economy, government, and ideologies experience a totalitarian conversion (in various degrees); at another period in the same society the amount and severity of governmental regimentation decrease and its economy, government, ideologies and the whole way of life undergo a process of de-totalitarianization or reconversion towards a free economy, government, ideologies, and way of life.

As a matter of fact today's sociology has even a generalized formula that satisfactorily accounts for the how, when, and why of these fluctuations. In a simplified form the formula of this uniformity runs as follows: *Each time when in a given society there appears an important emergency in the form of war or threat of war, or great famine, or great economic depression, or devastating epidemic, or earthquake, or flood,* *or anarchy, unrest and revolition, or other big emergency, the amount and severity of the governmental regimentation invariably increase, and the society's economy, political regime, the way of life, and ideologies experience a totalitarian conversion; and the greater the emergency the greater the totalitarian transformation. And vice versa: each time when in a society its important emergency decreases, the amount and severity of its governmental regimentation begins to decrease and the society's economic, political, ideological, and cultural systems undergo a detotalitarian reconversion towards less regimented and more free ways of life, and the greater the decrease of the emergency, the greater the free reconversion.* I can add to this that *these fluctuations* – or the totalitarian conversions and the detotalitarian reconversions to freedom – depend little upon the wishes of the governments and take place as regularly as mercury fluctuations in thermometers in accordance with the factor of temperature.[1]

In the light of this "social uniformity" or "social law" it is comprehensible why the governmental control of practically all sectors of social life invariably increases with explosion of war or pestilence or earthquake or famine or social unrest or any other emergency. Among other things the uniformity accounts also for a regular and often very sharp totalitarian conversion of the "free, democratic" economy and government in times of war or other emergencies. Further on, the formula shows that various totalitarian transformations of the systems of economy, government, and ideologies are not something rare but on the contrary are quite frequent in the history of practically all nations.

Finally, this "social law" explains also my statement of why the Communist-Totalitarian variety of economy, government, and the way of life cannot meet successfully the vital and creative needs of a good life, free from desperate emergencies, if tomorrow's mankind is destined to have such a good life. The Communist and other varieties of the Totalitarian economy, government, and way of life are the children of the emergency-parents. They are the dangerously strong "medicine" applied for counteracting the desperate "emergency sickness." In the conditions of this "sickness" they are sometimes (though not always) helpful in overcoming the "illness" and in recovery of the normal "health" of the sick body social. As soon as its health is improved, this "medicine" becomes unneeded, even harmful for the respective society. For this reason it is progressively abandoned and replaced by "the normal" regime of social, cultural, and personal life freed from *the excessive* governmental regimentation and other Totalitarian features. Hence the de-totalitarian reconversions that regularly take place with the mitigation of the emergency conditions, as indicated in the outlined "social law" or the "formula of the uniformity."

The net conclusion of this analysis in regard to today's the Communist, "the Military" (Pentagon), "the Nazi," "the Pseudo-Democratic," and all sorts of other "Dictatorial" varieties of the Totalitarian order is as follows: *if in the*

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[1] Cf. for a detailed formula of this uniformity and for the vast body of evidence supporting it in P. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York 1937), vol. 3, chp. 7; in abridged, one-volume edition of the *Dynamics*, chps 29-30; P. Sorokin, *Man and Society in Calamity* (New York, 1942), chp. 7.

next future today's desperate emergencies (of cold and hot wars, of great social unrest, of extreme poverty of a large portion of mankind, of deadly radiation, and others) are going to decrease notably, the Communist and other varieties of the Totalitarian order are going to decline, and the greater the recovery of mankind from these emergencies, the greater the decline of Totalitarianism that is to be expected. If, instead of a notable decline the great emergencies of our time are going to last or to increase for a long time, then the Communist and other varieties of Totalitarianism are bound to grow for as long as the emergencies last or grow. Eventually the lasting emergencies with their Totalitarian offspring may lead to a fatal catastrophy of the human race and may terminate for a long time, if not forever, the creative history of homo sapiens on this planet. Great lasting emergencies, like lasting grave sickness, increasingly undermine the healthy and creative vitality of the bodies social and, if not "cured" in time, they can harm it fatally beyond the point of recovery and can lead eventually the gravely sick organisms of nations, or even of all of mankind to unglorious death or to the incurable chronic agony of "the uncreative life in death." If we assume that today's grave emergencies are going to be mitigated by the "normal," "non-critical" means and ways, then all forms of the contemporary Totalitarianism are going to decline; if the emergencies are going to last or to increase, then the immediate future will bring the victory to the Communist and other forms of Totalitarianism. If after their victory their "dangerously strong medicine" would not cure the grave emergencies of our age, then the chronic "life in death" looms as the destiny of the surviving – disillusioned and gravely sick – part of mankind.

4. Mutual Convergence of the United States and Soviet Russia

Nobody can predict with certainty which of these alternatives will take place in the future. If mankind can avoid the catastrophy of a world war, then other emergencies can be mitigated or eliminated to a great extent. In these conditions the eventual decline of all forms of Totalitarianism appears to be probable. If the emergency of such a war cannot be abolished, then there is no chance for elimination of other emergencies. In these conditions the temporary triumph of various forms of Totalitarianism is to be expected. So far the international policies of the governments of both blocks of the nations have been unsuccessful in abolishing the threat of a new world war and in establishing lasting peace. And there is no guarantee these policies can abolish this emergency in the future. If our hopes in this matter were dependent entirely upon the policies of the existing governments, then the future of mankind would be dark and uncertain.

Fortunately for all of us, the course of human history is only partially dependent upon the policies of the governments. In a much greater degree it is determined by the collective, anonimous forces of humanity – by the totality of actions and reactions of every human being, every human group, and, ultimately, of the whole of mankind. If the policies of governments contradict the course of history which these collective, anonimous forces consciously and un-consciously, in planned and unplanned, in organized and unorganized form endeavor to realize, then in a due time such governmental policies are "cancelled" and replaced by the policies promoted by these collective forces. In these conditions, often the governments themselves are "dismissed" and replaced – in an orderly or violent way – by the governments that are willing and capable to realize the demands of the collective forces of humanity or, if you prefer, of the forces of historical destiny or of guiding Providence.

The discordancy between the course of history required by the interests of mankind and the course of the governmental policies of the United States and Soviet Russia for the last forty years, and, especially, after the armistice, gives a good example of this sort of historical situation. While the politicians of both countries have been feverishly carrying on the policies of mutual vituperation, enmity, cold and hot war; while they have been madly engaged in the armament race and in preparation of a suicidal world war; while both governments have been trying to discredit, to hurt and destroy each other and the other nation by all means available; while for this purpose in their propaganda they have been extolling their own virtues and magnifying the vices of the other government and fantastically exaggerating the irreconcilability of the values and of the biological, social, and cultural differences between the two governments and the two nations; while the governments have been promoting this policy of war - the collective forces of both nations, of mankind, and of history have been doing quite a different kind of work and performing quite a different task – quite opposite to the policies of both governments, of their politicians, and of their "power - elites."

Instead of magnification of the allegedly irreconcilable differences in the system of values, in social institutions, in culture, and the way of life of both countries these forces have been mitigating and decreasing these differences and making both countries increasingly similar to each other in all these fields. Often silently but relentlessly the collective forces have been progressively eliminating the irreconcilability of the values and the real interests of both nations and building the bridge for their peaceful co-existence and cooperation. Instead of diverging both countries from each other, these forces have been converging them toward the intermediary type different from the pure Capitalistic as well as the extreme Communistic type. Both countries have been increasingly borrowing and adopting the values, institutions, and cultural features of each other. This convergence have already progressed so far that at the present time both nations are much more similar to each other – socially, culturally, and in practical ways of life – than they were at the beginning of the Russian Revolution.

The net result of this convergence is a progressive mitigation and elimination of practically all the *justifiable* reasons for continuation of the cold or hot wars, of the mad armament race, and of the policies of the armed conflict. The convergence has already progressed so far that at the present time there is no *justfiable reason* for this sort of policies and relationships between the two nations. If the belligerent policies are continued and if they eventually result into a new world war, the only reasons for this sort of catastrophy are: the inexcusable stupidity, greediness, power-lust and poorly understood tribal interests of the governments, power-elites, and of "the brain-washed" masses of both countries. There is no certainty that these blind and irrational forces would not temporarily prevail in the future, but if such a catastrophy happens, its reasons or motives cannot be qualified as justifiable, rational, and excusable.

Now let us briefly document the trend of the increasing similarity and mutual convergence of both countries toward the mixed intermediary type. We shall begin this survey with the cultural values which are already identical in both countries, free from any mutual conflict in their content as well as in their functions.

1. *Natural Sciences and Technology*. At the beginning of the Communist revolution, the Soviet government wanted to create the specifically "Proletarian" mathematics, physics, chemistry, technology, and biology different from "the Bourgois" mathematical, natural, and technological sciences. After some three years of unsuccessful efforts of realization of this objective, the silly project was completely abandoned and Russian science and technology resumed their interrupted development as a real science and technology whose validity and propositions are equally obligatory for the Communists and the anti-Communists, for the proletarians and the bourgeois. During the last thirty-five years the scientific and technological progress of Russia has been so rapid and great that at the present time Russian science and technology are as advanced as those of any country, including the United States. In some fields they are somewhat behind, in others somewhat more advanced than science and technology of the West. But all in all, they reached the development of science and technology in the most advanced countries of the West. And Russian science and technology in their principles, propositions, theories, and methods are the same as those of the rest of the world. There is no more any silly talk about the "proletarian" and "the bourgois" sciences and technologies. The scientists, engineers, and inventors of the West and of Russia speak the same scientific language, well understand each other, and when given a chance, by the governments, wholeheartedly co-operate with one another in the development of scientific knowledge and technological progress. To sum up: in this field there is no conflict, no irreconcilable interests, and no essential difference between the two countries. Both nations are fairly similar in these fields and are at about the same level of development. In normal conditions, without misuse and abuse of scientific and technological achievements by the governments and militarists, both countries would have mutually profit from scientific discoveries and inventions of each other. This means, that science and technology as values do not give any ground, any reason, any justification for continuation of the belligerent policies "for Salvation of Science and Technology from the Destruction by the Russian (or the American) Barbarians." The scientists of both countries are quite successfully taking good care of scientific and technological progress, especially if they are not hindered by governmental interference in their highly important research.

2. *The Social Sciences and Humanities*. Here again at the beginning of the

Russian Revolution the Communist government permitted only the Marx-Engels-Lenin's interpretations of social phenomena along the line of dialectical materialism. All historical, sociological, psychological, economic, political, ethical and other theories that contradicted or deviated from, this line were prohibited, their authors were often persecuted, their works could not be published, and an enormous number of "the counter-revolutionary books," published before, were taken from the libraries and destroyed. Though the doctrine of dialectical materialism still remains the official doctrine of the Soviet government, nevertheless today's situation in the field of the psychosocial sciences is very different from that of the first years of the Communist regime. First, the Soviet government published in millions of copies many classical works of the pre-revolutionary scholars and social thinkers like the works of the great Russian historian, V. Kluchevsky, or the works of an eminent opponent of the Communist government, G. Plechanov, like the works of eminent social thinkers of Russia – Belinsky, Herzen, Chernyshevsky – and many other, pre-revolutionary works and texts in the social and psychological sciences which have little to do with the official dogma of dialectical materialism. As a detail the biological, psychological and neurological theories of a most outspoken opponent of the Communist Regime, Ivan Pavlov, have become now the cornerstone of many biological, neurological, and psychological theories and practices of Soviet bio-psychosocial science, education, and therapy. On the other hand, such materialistic theories as the pan-sexual theories of S. Freud are radically rejected by today's Soviet social, psychological, and humanistic disciplines. (See the sharpest criticism and rejection of S. Freud's and of the diluted Freudian theories of E. Fromm, K. Horney, F. Alexander by Ivan Pavlov and other Soviet scholars in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 12, 1959, pp. 44–48 and other issues of this journal for 1958–1960.) Second, for the last two decades Russian scholars in these fields have published a large number of first-class works in history, psychology, psychiatry, ethic, and other psychosocial sciences which do not follow at all the line of the dialectical or any other materialism. These works have been published with the permission of the Soviet government by the governmental printing presses. Third, besides the works of the Russian scholars and thinkers, radically deviating from the official line of Marx-Engels-Lenin's ideologies, a large and rapidly increasing number of the non-Marxian and the non-materialistic historical, economic, psychological, psychiatric, political, ethical, juridical, and sociological works of foreign scholars have been translated and published in Soviet Russia during the last three decades. (As a detail, my own works, prohibited before to be imported into Russia, in recent years were permitted in a few copies to be imported there.) Fourth, though the Soviet official sociology still remains the sociology of dialectical materialism, factually under this name the Soviet sociologists have been developing several theories which in several aspects happen to be more idealistic than many a prevalent sociological theory of the West.[1] Carefully reading many publications of the Soviet sociologists I find myself in an essential agreement with several of their theories, principles, methods, and evaluations. Having always been highly critical in regard to the basic principles of all sorts of materialistic philosophy and sociology, in the Soviet sociology of today I find, under the cover of the official sociology of dialectical materialism, many a current of "the integral" or "idealistic" sociological thought.

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[1] This fact manifested itself also at the IVth Congress of the International Sociological

It is true that most of the Soviet sociologists, psychologists, economists, and social scientists still quote in their works the Communist "theological" scripture of Marx-Engels-Lenin. And for a superficial reader these scriptural quotations from the works of "the Communist Apostles and Church-Fathers" may give an impression that nothing is changed in the Soviet psycho-social sciences since the beginning of the Russian Revolution. However, when the Soviet scholars were asked why they were doing these "theological" quotations, their answer was: "Don't you sign all your letters with: 'very sincerely' or 'very truly yours'?" "And do you really mean this in most of your letters?" "Don't these expressions mean a mere accepted routine?" "Our scriptural quotations mean just this sort of the "very sincerely yours" and nothing more." This actual answer correctly explains the real meaning of the scriptural quotations by the Soviet scholars.

Fifth, even the Communist leaders, like N. S. Krushchev and others, have publicly expressed their disagreement with Marx-Engels-Lenin views in a number of important points, like the inevitability of the armed conflict between the Communist and the Capitalist worlds, and in other theoretical and practical problems. This official deviation from the orthodox Communist dogmas is an additional sympthom of the discussed substantial change of the Soviet psycho-social sciences .

Sixth, in public and especially in private meetings of Soviet and Western scholars they already found, to a considerable extent, a common language for discussion of their scientific problems and for mutual understanding of one another. Finally, a particularly strong criticism by the Soviet scholars

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Association at Stresa, Italy, in 1959, as well as in the published reports of the Soviet sociologists about this Congress and today's "beourgois sociology" of the West. The Soviet sociologists find "the bourgois sociology" of today neglecting the great sociological systems of the nineteenth century, dodging the basic social problems, studying instead the unimportant, narrow problems of the commercial interests of various business firms, serving in this way mainly as the hand-maid of business corporations, devoid of basic values of truth, goodness, and beauty, morally and socially nihilistic and cynical and essentially materialistic, hedonistic, and utilitarian in the bulk of its research. This sort of criticism of "the bourgois sociology," together with their own basic sociological, ethical, and philosophical principles, led many "a bourgois sociologist" at this Congress to say that the Soviet sociology turned out to be more idealistic than many sociologies of the West. Every sociologist who systematically follows sociological works of the Soviet sociologists not in their superficial mottoes but in their real contents must acknowledge the essential correctness of this impression about the idealistic currents in the formally materialistic Soviet sociology. See the reports of the Soviet sociologists about the bourgois sociology in Soviet journals: *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 12, 1959, pp. 72-86; also *Vestnik Istorii Mirovoi Kul'tury*, for 1958, 1959 and 1960.

of "the bourgois" social and psychological sciences for excessive relativization of all values, for moral nihilism, for rampant "physicalism," "empiricism," and "positivism," for a pursuit of mainly material-utilitarian interests manifests the same "hidden idealism" of the Soviet psycho-social thought. The following quotations illustrate this point. Criticizing the papers of the Western scholars given at the Fourth International Congress of Sociological Associations, they say, that the paper of R. Aron was "scientifically and morally nihilistic;" that most of the papers on the Family and Marriage "intentionally refused to give an evaluation and especially the moral evaluation of the reported facts... Their allegedly objective research completely fails to distinguish between the moral and amoral (forms of the family and marriage). Their position of an absolute moral relativism practically annihilates the difference between the moral and amoral, the just and unjust, the good and bad, the true and false values and facts... This sort of atomization of all values by the bourgois sociologists, the sociologists of the U.S.S.R., Roumania, and Poland countered by the Marxist-Leninist conception of the family inseparable from the basic principles of the Communist ethics...[1] The Marxian materialism, in difference from the vulgar materialism, does not depreciate in the slightest degree the importance and significance of the moral motives in the behavior of a person."[2] These seven classes of evidential facts show convincingly the essential change of the Soviet psycho-social disciplines for some forty years of the Russian Revolution. There is hardly any doubt that today these sciences are more free from the rigid dogma of Marxian materialism, are more "integral" or "idealistic" than they were at the beginning of the Communist Revolution; in several points they are more "integral" or "idealistic" than many currents of the psycho-social sciences of the West. Additional evidence for these conclusions will be given in the next section of this paper dealing with the contemporary currents of philosophical thought in the United States and Russia.

If for the last forty years the psycho-social sciences of Russia experienced this change, many currents of the psycho-social thought in the United States (and the West) have moved rather in the opposite direction, in the form of the emergence and growth of Marxian, economic, physicalistic, cybernetic, behavioristic, reflexological, sexological, biological, and other forms of what can be styled as the varieties of materialistic interpretations of man, society, culture, and values in their structural and dynamic aspects.

There is hardly any doubt in that for the last few decades the Marxian, the Freudian, the Behavioristic, the Cybernetic, the Mechanistic, the Physicalistic, the Naturalistic, the Sexological (of the type of Kinsey and Co.), the Reflexological, the Biological, the Economic, and several forms of the Quantitative interpretations have successfully invaded the fields of American psychology, psychiatry, sociology, anthropology, history, economics, political science, theories of ethics, law, education, and other psycho-social disciplines. If one simply compares a dozen of the representative American texts of the beginning of this century with the contemporary American texts in each of these disciplines, the comparison will clearly bring out this fact of the growth of these currents of psycho-social thought in the United States. Elsewhere I have shown that exactly these currents have been growing in modern American psycho-social sciences.[3] And practically all of these currents in their theories, ideologies, and techniques are tangibly materialistic in one way or another.

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[1] The new Communist ethics is defined as "the ethics of solidarity, of unselfish help and support in the struggle for the liberation of man from the burden of exploitation and oppression." This ethics is opposite to that of the bourgois egoistic individualism. *Voprosy Filosofii,* No. 12, 1959, pp. 41-42.

[2] *Voprosy Filosofii,* No. 12, 1959, pp. 78-81.

This does not mean that the psycho-social sciences of the United States are now predominantly materialistic. It means however that for the period considered the materialistic currents have been in ascendance in the United States and that today's difference between the Soviet and the American psycho-social sciences is notably less than it was in 1917–1925. These disciplines in both countries have been converging to an intermediate position different from that which they had at the beginning of the Communist revolution.

3. *Philosophy.* Many Euro-American politicians, journalists, ministers, and professors like to denounce the materialistic philosophy of the Soviet Russia and to stress the unbridgeable contrast between it and the prevalent non-materialistic philosophies of the West. If this problem is taken superficially, without a serious analysis of the real character of the Soviet philosophy of dialectical materialism this denunciation and overemphasis of the differences, between the Soviet and the Euro-American philosophical thought would seem to be correct. If however we seriously study what today's Soviet dialectical materialism really means and what are the main currents of the contemporary Western philosophical thought, these "correct" conclusions would appear to be notably incorrect. Yes, the official Soviet philosophy is still the Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism. But do its denunciators realize that today's Soviet proponents repeatedly warn not to mix it with all sorts of "vulgar materialism?" Do the critics know that even in Lenin's *Materialism and Empiriocritism*, published fifty years ago, and especially in today's commentaries on the new edition of this work by Soviet philosophers, the very concept of matter is defined in such a way that if you replace in this definition the "matter" by the Hegelian "*Geist*," the definition would fit this *Geist* (or Spirit) about as well as the *matter?* Here is this definition: "Matter is a philosophical category for a designation of the objective reality given to man in his sensations and perception. This reality exists independently from and is copied, photographed, and reproduced by our sensations-perceptions."[2] Spontaneous, continuous motion or change is inherent and inalienable property of this reality. "The World is eternally moving

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[1] See P. Sorokin, *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences*, (Chicago, 1956)‘ Spanish edition under the title *A Chaques y Manias de la Sociologia Moderna* (Madrid, 1957). French edition under the title *Tendances et deboires de la Sociologie Americaine* (Paris, 1959).

[2] v. Lenin, *Sobranie Sochenii*, vol. 14, p. 117.

and self-developing matter." "Its higher form is represented by organic matter." "It contains the potentials of sensations, reflexes, and conscious thought which are actualized in its dialectic development."[1] In brief, Lenin's conception of matter differs little from Hegel's conception of the incessantly and dialectically self-developing objective *Geist* realizing itself in the dialectic process of the *Geist* "in itself," "in its otherness," and "in itself and the otherness" (thesis, antithesis, and synthesis). Since Marx and Lenin adopted and accepted practically the whole framework of Hegel's philosophy, we must not be surprised at finding that the difference between the Hegelian philosophy of "the objective idealism" and the Marx-Leninist philosophy of "dialectical materialism" is mainly terminological. Factually by different terms: *Geist* and *matter*, Hegel, Marx, and Lenin designate an essentially identical reality and ascribe to it almost identical properties and dialectic process of self-realization. Viewed so, the dialectic materialism does not appear to be so terrible, so different from, and so in contrast with, the Hegelian and other varieties of the objective idealism of the Western philosophy.

In the comments of contemporary Soviet philosophers, "the hidden idealism" of dialectical materialism and its similarity with the objective idealism come out still more clearly. Like objective idealism, dialectical materialism contends that matter, like the Hegelian *Geist*, exists as the objective reality independent from any constructions of the human mind, that this reality is cognizable though our sensations, perceptions, and concepts; like St. Thomas Aquinas, they assert that the criterion of the true knowledge of this reality is the adequacy of our ideas about it with its objective properties (St. Thomas' *adequatio rei et intellectus*); even more, that our concepts are not merely nominal words devoid of any general knowledge but that they are "real" and contain the knowledge of the general properties of the objective reality. In these important points, dialectical materialism turns out to be similar to the philosophical realism of Plato, St. Thomas Aquinas, Hegel and to other varieties of the philosophy of objective idealism, and quite opposed to all forms of philosophical nominalism, including the "constructivist philosophies" of "as if" or *als ob*, of Pragmatism, Positivism, Agnosticism, Logical Positivism, Existentialism, Sollipsism, Excessive Empiricism, Scepticism, Relativism, and other species of the predominantly "critical" (in Hume-Kantian sense), sceptical, agnostic, nominalistic, and "subjective" philosophies of the West.[2]

Furthermore, the dialectic materialism of today openly admits the category of the *absolute* (standards of truth, goodness, beauty and of other values) side by side with the category of the *relative* because to be meaningful these concepts demand each other and because, dialectically, "the category of the relative contains in itself potentially the category of the absolute. Being opposite to each other, at the same time these categories mutually permeate and mutually pass one into another." (in this sort of statements one can easily see the Hegelian "identity of the opposites," "negation is affirmation" and other characteristics of Hegelian dialectical idealism).

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[1] *Ibid,*. vol. 14, p. 124. See also F. T. Archinzev, "Poniatie Materii," *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 12, pp. 143 ff.

[2] Cf. on this point P.V. Tavanez, "Ob instinnosti poniatii" *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 12, 1959, pp. 110 ff.

Following rigidly the line of dialectical logic, some of the Soviet dialectical materialists now and then develop theories congenial to the philosophy of a real mysticism (of St. Augustine-Erigena-Nicolaus Cusanus type) in regard to the conception of the true reality as the "*coincidentia oppositorum*," or to the philosophy of the Thomism and Platonism in a number of important philosophical problems. These tendencies explain why in the works of the Soviet philosophers so much attention is paid to the intricate problems of the Hegelian philosophy (like that of "the negation of negation") or to the works of several contemporary (Belgian, French, and German) Catholic Neo-Thomists. The outlined characteristics of Soviet dialectical materialism explain also its negative attitude towards agnostic, "critical," relativistic, "fictionistic" or "constructivistic" (of "as if," or *als ob* type), nominalistic, "vulgarly materialistic," "sceptical," "excessively empirisistic" philosophies of the West.

To sum up: the dominant Soviet philosophy of dialectical materialism contains in itself a great deal of "the hidden idealistic strains." Despite its use of materialistic terminology, it is much nearer to the Plato-Aristotle-Erigena-St. Thomas Aquinas-N. Cusanus-Hegel philosophies of objective idealism than to all varieties of "the vulgar materialism." In many respects the Soviet philosophy is less materialistic or more idealistic than Scepticism, Agnosticism, excessive Empiricism and Relativism, Pragmatism, Logical Positivism, Instrumentalism, Existentialism, Constructivism, Naturalism, Physicalism in contemporary Western philosophy. In the course of some forty years of the Russian Revolution these "idealistic strains" have been increasingly permeating the Soviet philosophy of dialectical materialism. For these reasons there is no solid ground for fears of disappearance of idealistic philosophy under the impact of dialectical materialism; and there is no justifiable reason at all for starting various crusades for extermination of "the atheistic and materialistic" Soviet philosophy. In its present form it is already more idealistic than many of the ideologies of the crusaders. Left to its own immanent development, the philosophical thought of Russia in the form of dialectical materialism and in that of the increasingly emerging non-materialistic philosophies has been moving and is likely to continue to move toward various form of idealistic, "integral," and other varieties of philosophy.

If on the surface the official Soviet philosophy appears to be predominantly materialistic, on the surface "the official American philosophy" seems to be overwhelmingly idealistic and anti-materialistic. Our politicians, Chambers of Commerce, many ministers, our popular press, radio, and telivision indefatigably denounce "atheistic and materialistic" Soviets, and all forms of materialistic philosophies and ideologies.

If however one studies this problem more seriously, this impression undergoes a substantial change. The main finding of such a study is that materialistic philosophies and ideologies occupy a considerable space among the total philosophies and ideologies of the country. First, among the American professors of philosophy there are the partisans of the dialectic-Marxian, and other forms of philosophical materialism. Second, the majority of the American academic philosophers belong to the schools of philosophy which can hardly be called idealistic, rationalist, or "integral." They contain many strains congenial to materialism rather than to the non-materialistic *Weltanschauung*. Instrumentalism, Pragmatism, Naturalism, Physicalism (as an imitation of the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences), several forms of Empiricism and Positivism, Behaviorism, Utilitarianism, Agnosticism, Scepticism, Freudianism and Psycho-Analysis (taken as a philosophical system), "atheistic Existentialism," cultic Quantitativism, excessive Relativism, and the social philosophies of economic, sexological, endocrimological, reflexological, instinctivist, and similar interpretations of man and the sociocultural world can serve as examples of this sort of philosophies permeated by materialistic, mechanistic, physicalistic, nominalistic, relativistic, and similar strains.

Third, in their vulgar form the materialistic ideologies, especially in their economic variety, are the favorite philosophies of many Chambers of Commerce, business corporations, politicians, journalists, professors, educators, and of many other – the highbrow and the lowbrow – groups. In their public addresses they often profess their devotion to highly idealistic philosophies and values; in their daily business activities, speeches and interpretations they follow in fact the purposes, ideologies, and values of a materialistic, commercial, profit-motivated character contradictory to their high-faluting idealistic propaganda. In their "social and economic philosophies" they are possibly the most energetic propagandists of the vulgar economic and materialistic interpretations of man, human behavior, and sociocultural facts and values. Such ideologies are called by them "realistic" and "practical" in contrast to all idealistic philosophies which they derisively dub as "utopian," and "unrealistic."

Fourth, a large part of the rank and file in the American population are also imbued with a "practical materialism" in the form of an excessive pursuit of the material values of wealth, comfortable living, sensual pleasures, and the like.

These and other forms of materialism occupy quite a large place in American philosophical, social, economic, political, and ethical thought and behavior, in the American system of values, and sociocultural life. For this reason, only complete idiots or unashamed hypocrites can claim that the American (or any other Western) nation is free from "materialistic contamination," is completely idealistic and saintly, and, as such, is entitled to carry on "the holy crusade" against the "atheistic materialism" of Soviet Russia or China.

Side by side with these materialistic currents, there is a vast fund of the idealistic, rationalistic, "integral" and non-materialistic philosophies, values, forms of behavior, of cultural and social institutions, of private and public activities in American sociocultural life. In the academic philosophy this fund is represented by several – objective and subjective – idealistic philosophies, and by such currents of philosophical thought as: Critical Realism, Neo-Thomism, Phenomenologism, Intuitivism, Neo-Vedantism, Neo-Taoism, Integralism, Neo-Hegelianism, Neo-Platonism, Mysticism and other non-materialistic philosophies. In religious life, practically all orthodox theological philosophies – the Christian, the Hinduist, the Buddhist, the Judaist, the Mohammedan, the Taoist, and others – are idealistic. They represent the philosophies of the masses of the population. In social and cultural life, the idealistic and non-materialistic forces manifest themselves in thousands of forms beginning with a multitude of social movements and the acts of generosity on the largest scale, inspired by the highly unselfish and idealistic motives, and ending with many social institutions and cultural values serving the noblest ideals of Truth, Goodness and Beauty.

For the last few decades both – the materialistic and the non-materialistic – currents have seemingly been engaged in a relentless – ideological, social and cultural – struggle for domination on the American scene. Nobody can be sure which of the rivals has been gaining and which has been loosing in this struggle. One result of it, namely the curtailing of the extreme forms of each current and an increasing "reconciliation" of the valid components of each stream into some sort of "idealistic-materialistic" or "integral" philosophy seems to have been growing.

The net result of this survey is that in the field of philosophy the real difference between Soviet and American philosophies is much less than is usually thought. If all sorts of philosophies – the academic, "the official," the popular philosophies of the masses, "the practical" philosophies of daily life, the philosophies embodied in the social institutions, culture, social movements, system of values, and behavior of the people – are considered, nobody can pass a valid verdict as to which of the nations is more idealistic or materialistic. Insofar as the idealistic and non-materialistic currents are seemingly growing in the Soviet Russia, even in its official philosophy of dialectical materialism, and insofar as the increasing "reconciliation" of these currents is occurring in the United States, both countries are seemingly converging to an intermediary philosophical position and becoming more congenial to each other in this important field.

4. *Ethics and Criminal Law.* The professed ethical systems and the legal codes of law of both countries are at the present time essentially similar to each other. The basic ethical precepts of both nations extoll the principles of unselfish love, mutual aid, and other moral commandments given practically in the ethical codes of all great religions and moral systems. The main differences in this field can be summed up as follows: 1) the Soviet ethical system views these precepts as binding and obligatory (or as "the categoric imperatives") on the ground of their own value and of their necessity for the well-being of human beings, society, and mankind, and not because they are commanded by God or superhuman authorities. In the United States the binding power of these precepts is based still, to a considerable degree, upon the religious grounds of viewing them as the commandments of God. 2) The Soviet ethics stresses somewhat

more the absolute, universal, and perennial character of these precepts than the secular ethics (in contrast to the absolutistic religious ethics) of the United States, especially in its utilitarian and hedonistic varieties: in these branches of ethics its values and precepts are regarded as merely useful human conventions which are relative and changeable according to the circumstances. This relativization of the ethical values in these branches of American ethics is strongly criticized by Soviet ethical thinkers and often styled as an excessive atomization of moral values amounting sometimes to a complete moral nihilism and cynicism. 3) As to the problem: to what extent these precepts are not only preached but practiced in the conduct of the Russian and American population, this question cannot be answered definitely. The most probable answer to it is that all in all there is no great difference between the nations: a part of their populations practice what they preach; another part now practice and now transgress them; and, finally, in both nations there always is a minority which openly denies them or professes them hypocritically without practicing them to any significant degree. All in all there is no solid ground to claim that ethically one of these nations is saintly and the other is sinful.

Like the ethical systems, the contemporary codes of the criminal law of both countries are also essentially similar to one another. They prohibit (and punish) practically the same actions of crimes against persons, the State, property, the good mores, public safety, like murder, treason, theft, larceny, rape, indecency, and so on. There are, of course, secondary differences in regard to some of the actions considered criminal in one code and non-criminal in the other and in regard to the severity of punishment and the court- procedures, but these differences hardly exceed those which are present in the criminal codes of different Western countries. Perhaps the most important difference between the criminality of the two countries is that, according to the official statistics of crimes, the occurrence of crimes in Russia is less frequent than in the United States and respectively the rate of criminality in Russia is lower in most of crimes (except the political crimes against the government and the State) than in the United States.

All in all, if at the beginning of the Communist Revolution there were notable differences between the ethical and legal codes of two nations, at the present time these differences largely evaporated mainly through the changes of Soviet law and morality in the course of some forty years of the Revolution. Both countries as well as all others can stand and urgently need a notable improvement of their moral climate and behavior, but such an improvement can take place only through a free effort of their populations and not through military coercion and warfare.

5. *Education.* At the present time, in this field, there are neither important conflicting values nor differences justifying any animosity of the two countries to each other. In regard to literacy, (100 per cent) development of school system and mass education, Soviet Russia has reached the level of education in the United States. The membership of the Russian Communist party likewise is now as well educated as the membership of the American ruling elite. In 1928

there were only 6,000 members with a university and high school education among the members of the Communist party. Now there are some 2,000,000 members with such education. In 1928 in Russia there were only 521,000 technicians and experts. Now there are some 6,400,000 technological experts. At the present time in Russia there are some 30,000,000 pupils in elementary and high schools, some 2,000,000 in technical schools, and some 2,200,000 in universities and colleges of Russia. The differences that remain are of the mutually complementary kind rather than of the incompatible sort. As a matter of fact both countries have already borrowed several features from the educational systems of each other. Perhaps the most important of the existing differences are two, namely, Russia seems to be paying a greater attention to the education and integration of the character of the pupils (side by side with the development of their intellect) than the United States, and the Russian system of education cultivates more "the collectivistic or familistic" spirit and attitudes (without suppressing much the individuality of the pupils) while the United States' educational system fosters more the spirit and attidudes of individualism (without turning it into a wholesale rampant egotism). Furthermore, selection and promotion of the pupils to the status of university students in Russia seem to be more severe and based more upon the personal achievements of pupils and students than in the United States where a large part of the college students are in the college or university just because "going to college" has become a fashionable routine and because the American upper and middle classes "can afford" to send their children to a college or university. The severe selection on the basis of the personal achievements of the pupils in Russia is accompanied with State stipends and fellowships granted to all capable students. This gives to the capable pupils of the poor classes in Russia as much, perhaps, even a greater opportunity to become university students and subsequently to occupy the important – upper and middle – professional, governmental, or "executive" positions than in the United States. However, these and other differences in the educational systems of the two countries are secondary and temporary: each country at the present time is carefully studying the system of education of the other country and does not hesitate either to adopt a valuable feature of the other or to remedy some defect of its own system in the light of the educational experience of the other nation. Factually in this field the spirit of mutual cooperation, complementation, and healthy competition already prevails over the spirit of inimical incompatibility still fostered by a few shortsighted politicans and selfish "crusaders" of various vested interests of a material and nonspiritual nature.

6. *Sport and Recreation.* Before the Revolution the American varieties of sport – hockey, American type football, baseball, basket-ball, volley-ball, golf, squash and others – practically did not exist in Russia. Other forms of sport, like tennis, soccer, skiing, swimming, skating and so on, were practiced only as a variety of personal domestic exercise without any large – regional, national and international – competitive interests. Before the Revolution professional sport played a small part in Russia and in the

field of international sport-competition, Russia was practically absent.

At the present time the picture in this field is quite different. During some forty years of the Revolution all the varieties of American sport have widely spread in Russia. Sport now plays an important role, is intensely cultivated, has assumed in part professional and competitive character, and has resulted, among other things, in the appearance of Russia on the scene of international sports, particularly in the Olympic games, and the victories of the Russian teams have made Russia second to none in this field. This means that in his segment of culture today's Russia has become much more similar to the United States (and to other Western countries) than it was before the Revolution. On the other hand, somewhat surprised by the sport successes of Russia in international competition, the United States and other Western countries have reinforced their efforts in the development of their teams, in cleaning sports from various corruptive elements, and in freeing their national sports from the excessive influence of various commercial motives. In brief, here again we have the discussed convergence of both countries for their mutual benefit and growth.

7. *Fine Arts.* At the beginning of the Communist Revolution the Government tried to develop "the proletarian fine arts." Respectively it called the greatest poet of Russia, Pushkin, "a mouthpiece of the degenerated aristocracy," prohibited several works of Dostoievsky, Tolstoi, and of other Russian writers, prohibited also the performances of such musical masterpieces as "the March Slav" and "the 1812" of Tchaikovsky, several operas of Rimsky-Korsakov and Glinka, and in other ways tried to inhibit, suppress and depreciate many other achievements of the Russian and the foreign "bourgois" fine arts. Completely failing in this silly enterprise, the Soviet government gave it up and since the end of the nineteen-twenties radically changed its fine arts policies. At the present time all the previous achievements of Russian literature, music, drama, painting, sculpture, architecture are glorified more than ever before. Their creators are extolled as great geniuses. Their works are published in millions of copies, reproduced, performed, and popularized by all available means of communication. The living writers, composers, painters, sculptors and artists, side by side with scientists and scholars, occupy the position of the new Soviet aristocracy – from the standpoint of their social prestige as well as their economic standard of living.

A similar change took place in regard to the foreign fine arts and their creators. If before the Revolution, Russia translated the literary masterpieces of the foreign classics possibly more than any other country, now this tradition has been fully restored and even greatly exceeded. The following statistics of books published in 1956 in Soviet Russia gives a good picture of the situation described. All in all in 1956 in Russia 59,000 titles were published, and in total 1,107,000,000 copies, not counting magazines and periodicals. This gives about five books for 1 person – a number quantitatively greater than in any other country. Among all the books published in the field of literature, first place is occupied by the books of the old Russian classics, the second place by the works of foreign classical and eminent authors; the works of the contemporary Soviet writers occupy the last place.

Similar is the situation in other fields of fine arts. Not only the Russian art masterpieces and their creators are known and appreciated in Soviet Russia but also the foreign masters and their creations. Homer, Sophocles, Dante, Shakespeare, and the like in literature; Phidias, Praxiteles, Michelangelo in sculpture; Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven in music; are as much at home in Russia as in any other country.

As to the relationship of Russian-American fine arts, even before the Revolution there was an intense interchange and cooperation between these countries in this field, particularly in the field of literature, music, and drama. Great Russian writers, like Dostoievsky, Tolstoi, Turgenev, Chekhov, and others were well known in the United States and even notably influenced the eminent American writers. The same is true of the Russian music of Mussorgsky, Tchaikovsky, Rimskii-Korsakov, Glinka, Rakhmaninov and other important Russian composers. The Russian ballet and theatrical art, represented by the Moscow Art Theater and others, likewise were highly appreciated and even influenced the American ballet and drama.

On the other hand, Mark Twain, Edgar Poe, W. Whitman, J. London and other American writers were as well known and as popular in Russia as in the United States. Modern American architecture was likewise highly appreciated in Russia.

While this mutually fruitful cooperation was interrupted during the first few years of the Russian Revolution, it has now been fully resumed and grows rapidly. Besides the exchange of eminent artists, symphony orchestras, theatrical companies, ballets and dancers, the music of the contemporary Soviet composers – Shostakovich, Khachaturian, Kabalevskii, Prokoviev, Khrennikov, Miaskovskii, Glière, and others – is quite at home in the united States just as the music of the contemporary American composers – Harris, Piston, Gershwin, Copeland, Bernstein, Hansen, Block, and others is at home in Russia. In literature the works of the old and the recent American writers, like S. Lewis, Th. Dreiser, Hemmingway, Faulkner, Steinbeck, O'Neil, and others are translated and widely read in Russia while the works of the recent Russian writers like Pasternak, Sholokhov, Leonov, Dudintsev, A. Tolstoi, and others are known to the American readers.

With a proper modification the same is to be said of other fine arts, particularly of American architecture, including the art of the movies and television. Mutual fertilization of the American and the Soviet achievements in these arts goes on increasingly to the benefit of both countries in this field. There is not the slightest ground for any animosity between the two nations.

8. *Religion.* In this field the values and interests of both countries are proclaimed by many a crusader for religion or for atheism to be particularly conflicting and irreconcilable. In this country we daily hear the denunciations of "the Godless atheism" of the Soviets in the name of our God-believing and God-trusting nation. In Soviet Russia, likewise, there are still the voices heard

advocating, in the name of science, an invigoration of atheistic propaganda against all sorts of religious superstitutions, ignorance, and exploitation of the masses by "the opiate of the people's mind." In the first few years of the Communist revolution this sort of conflicting situation of atheism *vs.* religion existed indeed to a great degree. During these years the Communist government carried on a most militant atheistic propaganda against all religions, severely persecuted disfranchised, imprisoned and executed many thousand of bishops, priests, and believers, confiscated the property of religious organizations, turned churches and temples into Communist clubs and warehouses, prohibited public religious processions and instructions; in a word, it was engaged indeed into a fanatical warfare with practically all religions and their members. The main motive of this policy was the allegedly anti-Communist, "reactionary," and "counter-revolutionary" propaganda and political actions of the religious hierarchies, leaders and organizations.

For various reasons this persecution and anti-religious warfare of the Soviet government greatly relented already at the end of the nineteen-twenties and with some minor fluctuations this trend continued up to the present time. Today the total religious situation of Soviet Russia is notably different from what it was at the beginning of the Communist regime. The changes have been so many and so great that the irreconcilability and unbridgeable contrast between the allegedly atheistic Soviets and the allegedly religious United States and officially Christian West largely evaporated.

In Soviet Russia religious – *qua* religious – persecution practically disappeared. Instead, the Constitution of the Soviets proclaimed the religious freedom, as an inalienable right of every person. If now and then someone is prosecuted for some crime or policy associated with one's religion, or if the policies of Soviet government are now and then conflicting with the policies of the Vatican or other religious organizations, the prosecutions and the conflicting policies of this sort are due not so much to the religious intolerance of the Soviet Government as to the anti-Soviet and sometimes even anti-Russian *secular political* activities of persons or policies of the Catholic and other religious denominations. (Unfortunately this sort of policies inimical to the Soviet regime and often to the Russian nation are still relentlessly pursued by several religious hierarchies and organizations).

The autonomy of the Russian Orthodox Church, of the Protestant, Catholic, Mohammedan, Jewish and other denominations in religious matters is legally and factually established. Even more: the main expenses of the Russian Orthodox Church and of its Patriarchy are paid by the Soviet State. It subsidizes a large part of the expenses of the administration of the Russian Orthodox Church, of manufacturing the objects of the religious ritual and cult, of training the priests, of printing religious books and publications. The State supports also financially the material needs of the religious personnel; and so on.

At the present time thousands of churches are open and function in Russia; there are, at least, 10 Divinity Schools of the Russian Orthodox Church with 1600 students for training Russian Orthodox priests; some 20,000 parishes with 35,000 priests, discharging their religious duties; some 650 monasteries with 5,000 monks and nuns; all in all, according to the available statistics, the Russian Orthodox Church has now some 50,000,000 members (about 20 percent of the Russian population). The Protestant denominations have some 5,000,000 members. Of the Protestant denominations the Baptists have been especially fast-growing during the last two decades and have 5,400 houses of worship with about 600,000 members. There are more than 1,000 mosques and 1,240 Catholic Churches. (Even in pre-revolutionary Russia the Catholic membership was comparatively small. This was partly due to the unfortunate fact of the policies of the Vatican having often been inimical to the vital interests of the Russian Nation. Due to the same inimical policies of the Vatican toward the Soviet regime – and now and then toward the Russian Nation – the membership of the Catholic Church has hardly increased and still remains small in comparison with the Russian Orthodox and the Protestant denominations.)

These basic facts outline the religious situation in Russia at the present time. From the state of atheistic warfare against all religions at the beginning of the Revolution the Soviet government and Russia have passed now to the state of a religious tolerance and freedom not very different from the situation in the Western countries, including the United States.[1]

I foresee a number of heated objections to these conclusions. "Is not atheistic propaganda still favored and even subsidized in Russia by the Soviet government?" Such is the first objection. My answer to it is: "Yes, it is possibly still favored and still subsidized by the Soviet, though much less than before. But does not the right of religious freedom involve also the right to be an atheist?" If the Soviet government subsidizes the Russian Orthodox Church there is no violation of religious freedom while it finds it also advisable to support the "atheistic denomination" which, as we shall see further, is quite a considerable denomination in all Western countries. And don't the atheists of the West freely carry on their anti-religious propaganda and are not their activities subsidized from various sources, private and sometime even public? So in this point there is no basic difference between Russia and the West, including the Unided States. "But, the objectors continue, is not the number of atheists in Russia immeasurably greater than in the Western countries?" The answer to this question depends upon what we mean by "atheism." If by it is meant a disbelief into the dogmas of some of the institutionalized religions, particularly the disbelief in an anthropomorphic personal God, then such religions as early Buddhism and many forms of religious mysticism have to be considered as atheistic.[2]

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[1] In this respect the evolution of the Russian revolution is typical for most of the great revolutions. Beginning with the oldest recorded Egyptian revolution (in about 3,000 B.C.) and ending with the Cromwellian revolution in England and the Great French Revolution, most of the great revolutions carried on a militant persecution of the dominant religions at their first, destructive, phase and subsequently replaced it by the policies of tolerance and a sort of freedom at their constructive phase. Cf. on this P. Sorokin, *Sociology of Revolution* and *Man and Society in Calamity*.

[2] Early Buddhism explicitly denied the existence of an anthropomorphic, personal

If by atheism is meant a disbelief into the main dogmas of the main Christian denominations, then it remains unknown whether in Russia or in the Western countries, including the United States, the percent of such "atheists" is higher in the total population of these countries. This problem has not been seriously studied. Of the existing few studies, the study of Professor J. Leuba *(The Belief in God and Immortality* (Boston, 1916), shows that about 40 to 60 percent of the American professors and students do not believe in the immortality of the soul, divine nature of Christ, the immaculate conception of Jesus, and in several other dogmas of the Christian religions. A recent extensive poll of the population of various Eropean countries by the International Research Associates disclosed that in Italy only 51 percent believes in these dogmas, in Norway only 42 percent, in Belgium only 33 percent, in France only 30 percent; all in all for Europe about 70 percent of its polled samples of the population declared themselves agnostics and disbelievers in these dogmas. If these results are representative for Europe and the United States, there hardly is any great difference between Russia and the Western countries in this respect.

(If by true religiosity is meant, first, "the feeling of Presence" (in terms of an eminent mystic, Brother Lawrence) that beyond the empirical reality of our senses there are other and higher forms of it; and second, the practice of the moral commandments of Confucianism, or Taoism, or Hinduism, or Buddhism, or Judaism, or Jainism, or Christianity, or Mohammedanism (all basic moral precepts of these and other religions are essentially similar), then we do not have any even remotely adequate evidence for the claim as to whether the Russian or the American or the European population is more religious. Judging on the basis of various fragmentary data the most probable answer to this question is that there is hardly any great difference between today's Soviet Russia and the Euro-American countries.)

The net result of this analysis is that in the field of religion there certainly has been occurring a mutual convergence of Russia and the Western countries. In comparison with the early years of the Communist Revolution, the religious conflicts and differences of the present time are immeasurably less significant and important.

9. *The Family and Marriage.* Again in the early years of the Revolution, the Communist government tried intentionally to destroy the monogamic marriage and the family as "the corner store" of private property and the Capitalist system. Legally and factually complete liberty of sex in its pre-marital and extra-marital

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deity, soul, and any substance whatsoever. The only realities, according to this Buddhism, are some twenty-six "dharmas" – a sort of flash – points and their incessantly changing combinations. Many currents of mysticism also view the ultimate, total reality as the infinite manifold or ocean that contains in itself all its differentiations – ripples, personal and superpersonal, spiritual and material, unchangeable and ever-changing, and so on. The veritable *coincidentia oppositorum* in its infinity is undefinable and inexpressible by any words, concepts, and definitions. According to these mysticisms any institutionalized religious dogma expresses, at the best, only some of the infinite ripples of this *mysterium tremendum et fascinosum.*

forms was proclaimed, together with complete liberty of marriage and divorce, abortion, and other concomitants of the "policy of a glass of water" in sex matters according to which sex was compared with thirst which can and should be satisfied from any glass available.

The disastrous consequences of this policy forced the Soviet government, already at the end of the nineteen-twenties, to change radically by increasingly drastic limitations of this sex-liberty. Instead of glorification of "Sex-freedom Unlimited," the Soviet government began to glorify virginity, chastity, and marriage faithfulness, and began to issue a series of decrees legally approving, sanctioning and requiring these virtues. To make a long and painful story short, at the present time the Soviet Russia has a more stable, more monogamic, and more Victorian family and marriage than practically any Western country and especially the United States. Divorce is not prohibited legally, but obtaining it is so heavily inhibited by financial and legal difficulties that practically it is inaccessible for an overwhelming majority of the Russian population. Abortions are prohibited and punishable. Pre-marital and extra-marital sex relations are strongly disapproved. So also are all ideologies, publications, pictures, plays, novels, radio and television programs advocating and glorifying sex-anarchy and sex-freedom. In general, sex and preoccupation with sex play now a much less important role in social and cultural life of Russia than in that of the United States and European countries (See on that P. Sorokin, *The American Sex Revolution*, Boston, 1956, There are Swedish, Japanese, Spanish, Indian and Portuguese editions of this book.)

To sum up: at the beginning of the Revolution the Soviet government and a part of the Russian population could be accused of undermining the monogamic family and marriage and in promoting sexual anarchy and licentiousness. At the present time the accusations are rather reversed: it is Soviet Russia that is stressing the excessive sex-obsession, sex-perversion, sex-anarchy, sex-abuse for commercial purposes, the permeation by sex of the whole social, cultural, and personal life of the Western countries and a notable disintegration of the monogamic family and marriage there. In all frankness, Russia is more entitled to make this sort of moral censures than the Western countries in regard to Russia. Considering however that the modern sex-anarchy has never been approved by religious, moral, and public opinion of the West, and that the stable monogamic family and marriage are still the sanctioned and the desired form of these and that in recent time in the United States and in Europe a strong public movement for the stabilization of the family and marriage and for a limitation of the sex-anarchy emerged and is growing; considering these Western trends and the tragic cycle with the "happy ending" passed by Russia in this field, these basic facts show again that in this segment of sociocultural life both countries have been converging toward a similar order of sex-life, the family, and marriage.

10. *The Economic System.* In the introductory sections of this paper it has already been shown that the real difference between the economic systems of both countries is much less than it appears on the surface and that both countries

have been converging to a mixed type of economy representing the co-existence of: a) full-fledged free enterprise based upon private property; b) of the corporation economy, and c) of the economy managed by the government. In the total economy of both countries the sector of full-fledged free enterprise is already a minor sector. In Russia it exists and functions mainly in regard to consumer goods, including such goods as accumulated savings, as ownership of an apartment, or automobile, or a house, of a small piece of land or a small enterprise, managed by the owner, or of the tools of artisans, artists, scientists, and the like. All such goods are owned in Russia and can be disposed or willed by the owner to his heirs in about the same way as they are owned, used, disposed, and willed in the United States. In the United States this sector of the economy is larger than in Soviet Russia. Besides consumer goods it covers a large part of "small business" and of agriculture. In these last two fields however the economy of real free enterprise has unfortunately been shrinking for the last few decades and this shrinking is continued up to the present time. In Soviet Russia, on the contrary, this sector has been somewhat expanding during the last two decades, particularly in the field of agriculture. The rights of the collective farms and of their members have been expanding especially after the decree of February 17, 1935 on the *Standard Rules of an Artel*. The land, cultivated by a collective farm, remains at its disposal forever. Each collective farm manages its own affairs autonomously. Each member possesses his own "private property" – a dwelling house, a plot of land for his personal use, from 10 to 150 sheep, from 1 to 10 cows and other domestic animals. Each member is remunerated in accordance with the amount and efficiency of his work. No member of a collective farm can be evicted from it except in case of crime or flagrant violation of the farm rules by the vote of at least two-thirds of the collective farm membership. The management of the farm was initially appointed by the government; now it is democratically elected by the farm community for a specific term. The land of the farm cannot be taken from the community, or sold or become an object of profiteering by commercial dealers. As compared with the status of an American tenant, sharecropper, agricultural laborer or even a farm owner with his farm mortgaged and in danger of foreclosure, the property rights of the Russian peasants are greater and their position is more secure than those of the corresponding strata of the American agricultural population.

The corporation economy does not formally exist in Soviet Russia. Factually however the American corporate economy is a twin brother of the corresponding subdivisions of the nationalized industry in Russia. The total nationalized industry in Russia is divided as in the United States into big divisions of steel-oil-construction and other industries, each division being managed by its board of governmental directors similar to the board of directors of a big American corporation. Neiher of these boards, as was mentioned before, owns the corporation and its property. The only difference between these boards is that in Russia the directors are appointed by the government and are responsible to the government and the nation while in the United States directors and big executives are presumably appointed or elected by the thousands of the owners, that is the bond-and shareholders of the corporations and are responsible to them. Factually they are placed into their position by the small, often self-perpetuating, oligarchic group of the bigger shareholders and executives. A previous study of the American corporations by G. Means and A. Berle *(The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, New York, 1932) and the recent study by several experts (E. S. Mason, ed., *The Corporation in Modern Society*, Cambridge, 1960) show that in none of the big American corporations its directors own even five percent of its property and that this biggest sector of the American economy and, indirectly, the economy of free enterprise are practically managed and controlled, fairly independently from their owners-stockholders, by some 1,000 big executives. These features of the American corporation economy make it indeed very similar to the Russian "nationalized economy of corporations," ruled and managed by about the same 1,000 big executives of the government. Furthermore the board of directors in this sector of the economy determines the prices of their products and the wages of their employees. In classical Capitalism the prices were determined by "the law of demand and supply" of a free competitive market. This characteristic largely disappeared from the economy of both countries. The American economy of corporations has now entered the phase of "the administered prices" arbitrarily determined by the agreement of the big executives of the big corporations. And as time goes on, the secondary differences of this sector of the economy tend to become less and significant from the standpoint of the economic interests of the populations of both countries (remaining important, of course, for the personal interests of the big executives of both nations). Here again, these sectors of the economy in both countries have been becoming more and more similar to each other. Finally, in both countries the government is in business and for the reasons of the factors governing expansion and contraction of governmental management of business (explained above) the governmentally-managed economy is at the present time practically the largest sector of the economy in both countries. In the years of the Second World War practically the whole economy of each country was managed – directly and indirectly – by its government. In these years, there hardly was any basic difference between the economies of "Communist" Russia and the "Capitalist" United States. At the present time, this sector of the economy – legally and factually – is still notably larger in Russia in comparison with the United States. However in Russia it has tended to be less severe, less rigid, and less centralized than it was at the beginning of the Revolution. In the United States since 1914–1920, on the contrary, it has tended to expand even in the time of peace (not counting the extraordinary expansions in the times of the First and the Second World Wars). At the present time direct and indirect regimentation and control by the government of production, distribution, and consumption of economic goods, of prices and wages, of export and import, of business prosperity and recession, of labor-management relationships, in brief, of the total economy of the United States has increased many times in comparison with the situation some thirty-forty years ago. This increase is reflected in a manifold increase of the Federal and State budgets, of governmental employees, of armed forces and armaments, of the statutes enacted for regulation of economic relationships, of government-owned factories, laboratories, houses, engineering works, of land, warehouses, nationalized natural resources, like uranium, of agricultural and industrial products and all sorts of other economic goods. As a matter of fact, the sector of the governmentally managed economy of the United States is at the present time about as important, possibly even more important, than the sector of the corporation economy in the total economy of this country. Only euphemistically or hypocritically the economy of the United States can be called the economy of free enterprise and as such can be confronted to the governmentally managed economy of Soviet Russia or to the largely nationalized economies of England and of some European countries. In all three sectors the total economies of Russia and the United States have been rapidly converging to the "mixed" type of economy and have become more and more similar to one another.

This increasing similarity shows itself in many other forms. Though the total national product of American industry still remains greater and the economic standard of living of the United States population much higher than those of Russia, the eminent difference in these respects tends, nevertheless, to be progressively narrower or smaller. The contentions of N. S. Krushchev that during the next seven or so years Russia will surpass the United States in national production and in the standard of living are too boastful and little probable, nevertheless these contentions may turn to be correct for a more remote future.

Technologically both countries have already become essentially similar to each other. Both nations use similar techniques of production, up to the introduction of the techniques of automation and mass production.

To sum up: the mutual converging of both countries to similar "mixed" systems of economy has been rapidly progressing.

11. *Social Relationships.* All the enormously diverse forms of human relationships can be classified into three main classes: 1) *familistic*, permeated by mutual love, devotion, and sacrifice, most frequently found in the relationships of the members of a good and harmonious family; 2) *free contractual* relationships freely agreed by the parties for their mutual advantage and profit, devoid of love, hate, or coercion; 3) *compulsory* relationships imposed by one party upon the others against their wishes and interests. Of these three relationships, the familistic is the noblest (morally and socially), the compulsory is the worst, while the contractual occupies the intermediary position.

The proportion of each of these three types in the total network of inter-human relationships of a social group varies greatly from society to society, from period to period. If the total networks of social relationships of the United States and Russia are compared from this standpoint, they show the following differences; 1) the proportion of compulsory relationships in the total network of Russia is still notably greater than in the United States; the sector of the contractual relationships in the United States is much larger than in Russia;

and the sector of the familistic relationships in Russia is tangibly bigger than in the United States. In all the Soviet policies of nationalization, collectivization, and partial equalization the moving force and the final results have been not only the force of a rude coercion and often inhuman regimentation by the Government but also the noble power of familistic motives, wishes, and values, especially of the masses of the Russian population. The establishment and development of the familistic relationships in the network of social relationships of Russia has given "the real hidden power" to the Soviet policies of nationalization and collectivization and to the Soviet regime itself. Without this "hidden power" the Soviet government and its coercive policies would have fallen to pieces long ago.

In the course of some forty years of the Russian revolution the marked differences between the American and Russian networks of social relationships have tended to decrease. On the one hand, the coercive policies of the Soviet government have been becoming milder and covering progressively decreasing sectors of human relationships; the familistic and, in a smaller degree, the contractual relationships have been increasing at the cost of the compulsory ones. On the other hand, in the United States the sector of the familistic relationships has also been growing at the cost of the contractual sector. This growth has manifested itself in hundreds of different forms and policies of the so-called "welfare state," in the enactment and establishment of "social security," "unemployment insurance," "wage-minimums," "progressive taxation," "old age insurance," various farm relief measures, in the development of schools and public education, medical care and public health inprovements, public housing, highway construction, rural electrification, and other public works, in civil rights legislation and in a multitude of other measures aimed at amelioration of the vital, mental, moral, and social well-being of the total American population, regardless of any commercial profits of a few individuals or groups. In all these forms the familistic relationships have successfully grown in the presumably "capitalist" United States for the last few decades.

The growth of the familistic and partly contractual relationships in Soviet Russia at the cost of the compulsory ones and the growth of the familistic relationships in the United States mainly at the cost of the contractual ones mean that in this basic field both countries are moving toward a similar type of interpersonal and intergroup relationships of a predominantly familistic character of various degrees of purity and extension.

12. *Political System.* During the first years of the Communist Revolution there certainly was a great conflict between the political regimes of Russia and the United States. In Russia we had the unlimited, tyrannical, totalitarian dictatorship of the top leaders of the Communist party – the most autocratic government that imposed the most coercive regimentation upon every citizen's mind and body, behavior and relationships, and upon the whole social and cultural life of the nation. The government arbitrarily prescribed what each of its subjects had to eat, drink, and wear; in what place and room he had to live; what kind of work he had to do; what he had to read or listen to; what he had

to say and believe, approve and disapprove: whether he may be free or imprisoned, whether he may live or be executed. In brief, the government attempted to turn its subjects into mere puppets completely controlled by dictators. This super-totalitarian policy was enforced by the bloodiest and most inhuman coercion – by mass executions of millions of the "counter-revolutionaries," by imprisonment in jails and concentration camps of many more millions of stubborn opponents, by confiscation of their properties, and by infliction of all sorts of punishment upon all those who did not comply with the orders of the government. In the whole of human history there were not many cases of so much tyrannical, so super-totalitarian, and so inhumanly autocratic government. Such a regime naturally conflicted with the democratic order of the United States, with its elective government, its Constitution and the Bill of Rights, with the freedoms and inalienable rights of every citizen. The basic values of the two political systems were indeed irreconcilable.

However, in the course of subsequent years, a series of important changes have taken place especially in the Soviet political system. The main trend of these changes has consisted in Russia in a progressive limitation of the despotism and super-totalitarianism of the Soviet government and in the expansion of freedom of the Soviet citizens. In the United States it has consisted rather in an opposite process right up to the present time), namely, in the expansion of governmental regimentation, censorship, and control of the political ideologies and behavior of its citizens, in the respective decrease of their freedoms and inalienable rights, and in an increase of totalitarian tendencies in its internal and international policies. This totalitarian trend has been due mainly to the transformation of the United States into the most powerful empire on the earth and of the previously – merely national government – into the most powerful Leviathan in the world. No country and no government can escape some degree of totalitarianization when they grow, especially in a short period of time, from the status of one of the important states and governments into that of the most powerful empire and government. Such a transformation is usually accompanied by an increase of various emergencies, particularly the emergency of the struggle for the maintenance of the position of the greatest World Power which inevitably entangles such a country in an endless series of diplomatic and military conflicts with other governments and particularly with the Soviet government in this case. This emergency in its turn, generates a number of other – political, economic, social, and moral – emergencies for such a country and government, which reinforce the increase of governmental regimentation and control.

Such in brief are the main trends in the political systems of both countries. In Russia the indicated "liberative trend" manifested itself in a multitude of legal and factual changes. Legally, the Constitution of Soviet Russia is one of the most democratic Constitutions of the world: among other things, it guarantees all the main freedoms and inalienable rights of man and citizen. The arbitrary despotism of the government, particularly of the secret police, is has been largely replaced now by the rule of law with its due process. The executions, imprisonments and other severe punishments of the opponents of the Soviet government greatly decreased. Seventy percent of the concentration camps with their slave labor are dismantled and in the remaining camps the regime is now more human and much better in food, housing, and work conditions than before. By a series of laws (April 14, 1957 and others) the citizens are better protected from arbitrary measures of government agents. A large part of the political offenders have been amnestied.

The political offenders are now only about 2 percent of the total prison population of Russia. Though the provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing the freedoms and rights of the citizens are still violated once in a while by the government, nevertheless the citizens enjoy much greater freedom and independence than they did at the beginning of the Revolution. Formally, according to the Constitution, the Soviet government is a democratic government, elected by the population. But, due to a one-party system and only one set of candidates, nominated by the Communist party, to be voted for or against by the population, the elective character of the government still remains largely nominal. To a great extent, the Soviet government is still the government appointed by the Communist party and its leaders. Nevertheless, in many – tangible and intangible – ways the population exerts a much stronger influence upon the elections and upon the Government itself than before. With the passage of the Revolution from its destructive into its constructive phase, the government progressively replaced its destructive policies by constructive ones. In its gigantic reconstruction, it has shown a great deal of capable and farsighted leadership devoted to the real interests of the population and the national interests of Russia. As a result of these policies, it has gained increasing support by the peoples of Russia. At the present time its power is based not so much upon fear and terror, as it was in the destructive phase of the Revolution, that as upon the free support and approval of probably a majority of the Soviet citizens. If, hypothetically, the government and its policies are submitted to a really free vote of the population, they probably would receive a "yes" vote from a majority of the voters. In this sense it can style itself a democratic government or the government of "a people's democracy."

These sketchy lines show clearly the main trend in the change of the political system of Russia. It can be summed up: from the unlimited totalitarian despotism to increasingly democratic and constructively responsible government as a leader and servant of the Russian population and of the world at large.

Since its beginning the political system and government of the United States have been one of the best democratic regimes known to the history of mankind. During the last forty years discussed, they have progressed in many ways toward a still better and "familistic" democracy serving the nation and the world at large. These positive achievements and tendencies have been unfortunately marred by several totalitarian tendencies, due to the indicated factors of the elevation of the United States to the position of the most powerful empire and to a series of wars and other important emergencies hardly avoidable in the process of such a rapid elevation. These totalitarian tendencies manifested themselves not only in enormous expansion of government control and regimentation of economic and other spheres of sociocultural life, discussed before, but also in many national and international policies of the government and in various changes in the political system of the nation. Having declared a "holy crusade" against Communism and its alleged "world domination" – what practically meant belligerent crusade against the Soviet government, and the Russian nation, and against all other Communist regimes, the American government has involved itself and the American nation into all the inevitable consequences of such a policy. It had to expand in the way of a compulsory draft the American armed forces far beyond the size of a peaceful period. And this expansion of army, navy, and airforce to almost three million drafted men means an enormous step in the totaliarization of the country because the organization of the armed forces is the most totalitarian of all social groups. The whole life and the whole behavior of a soldier is completely controlled and up to the smallest detail regimented by the military code and by his superiors. The commander in chief or any superior officer can send thousands of soldiers to death in a battle. The food, drink, uniform, living quarter and all the activities during every 24 hours are rigidly prescribed for the members of the armed forces. Their body and soul do not belong to themselves but belong to the armed forces, their superiors, and to the nation. To repeat: out of all kinds of organized groups the military organizations in their very nature are the most totalitarian and most autocratic. For this reason, any notable expansion of these forces in any country means a notable expansion of a military totalitarianism in the total political system of the country. It is but natural that with this expansion the influence of the supreme military authorities upon the whole political life and the policies of the nation increases also. These inevitably become stamped by the features of "a military (or the Pentagon) totalitarianism" – a twin brother of all, including the Communist, totalitarianisms.

The cold and hot wars with the Communist block of nations led to legal and factual outlawing of all Communist organizations, to open procesution of all Communists and "fellow-travellers," and to "hidden" discrimination, disfranchisements and factual punishments of not only the Communist but of many non-Communist organizations as "fronts," and of a multitude of non-Communists, sometimes even anti-Communists, as "fellow-travelers," "sympathizers," "subversives," and "disloyal." In these and other ways, a considerable part of the American citizens have been intimidated and limited in their freedoms and inalienable rights. These policies of the American government have been but a reversed replica of the totalitarian policies of the Soviet government in regard to the anti-Communists and "subversive" non-Communists. On a still larger scale the totalitarian tendencies have manifested themselves in the increased official and semi-official demands of "the conformity" of the citizens with the prescribed patterns of political thought, and political behavior; in fostering "the guilt by association" in denunciation and persecution under the pretext of the "contempt of Congress" or of a court of all those who "deviated" from the officially approved modes of conformity; in imprisonment and internment in concentration camps of many "conscientious objectors," and religious non-conformists; in an expansion of the inquisitorial functions of various Congressional Committees, like the American Committee on un-American Activities, the Committee on the National Security and others which in their procedures and policies often remind one of the worst inquisitorial agencies of the early Soviet Regime. In the zealous pursuit of their security tasks these American agencies have even degraded and given a derogatory meaning to the First and the Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States by disdainfully calling "the Fifth Amendment subversives" all those who in their defence referred to these amendments for protection of their freedoms of speech or publications.

Fortunately, the development of these totalitarian tendencies have met a strong resistance on the part of the American public and, so far, has been moderate and limited. Despite their increase in the United States and their decrease in the Soviet Russia, the political system of the United States still remains much more democratic and free than the Soviet system. However, the difference between these regimes is progressively narrowing and both systems are converging to some intermediary type combining the features of democracy and totalitarianism, Familism and Caesarism, freedom and autocratic leadership.

Due to these increasing similarities, the two nations become more and more alike in the electivity of their governments and in their party system. As mentioned before, both governments are elective but in Russia, with its one party system, the citizens can only vote "for or against" the candidates nominated by only one – the Communist – party. In the United States we have a two party system and can vote for the candidates of either the Democratic or the Republican party (the candidates of other minor parties have no chance to be elected to the top positions of the Federal and the State governments). However, the difference between the Democratic and the Republican parties has now become so small and intangible that as a rule it is less significant than the difference between "the left wing" and "the right wing" members of the same party. This means that factually this country has been evolving toward one party system functioning under two different names. For this reason in these basic features of the political regime both countries have also tended to become more and more similar to each other.

The same is to be said of their international policies. In their – unnecessarily and unfortunately started – cold and hot war, with its armament race, its useless waste of the natural resources, of human energy and life (in one Korean "police action" the total number of the victims was larger than in all the Napoleonic wars), with the pending danger of the nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological warfare, both countries are pursuing almost identical policies of using all available means of damaging and destroying the other country and its government. All the laws – divine and human – all the moral principles and the provisions of international law limiting warfare, are practically discarded and paid no attention to by both governments. Both governments repeatedly declare that they are ready and willing to kill hundreds of millions of the non-combatant civil populations, to turn into the "abomination of desolation" the cities and villages, to poison all the sources of food and drink, and, if need be, to make this planet uninhabitable for the human race as well as for other forms of life. Both governments in their propaganda liberally preach similar high sounding sermons on justice, peace, freedom, democracy, truth, and now and then they quote even the Sermon on the Mount or other great gospels of the sublimest love and unselfish mutual aid. Both governments likewise try to recruit by all available – decent and indecent – means all sorts of allies for this suicidal enterprise. In this recruiting business both governments magically transform all the feudal, autocratic, and oligarchic political regimes of the recruited governments into "free" and "democratic" or into the regimes of "a people's democracy." As a result of this magic, the dictatorial regimes of Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Formosa, Batista's Cuba and of all dictatorial regimes of Latin America, of South Vietnam and other countries, allied with the United States, in a twinkling of an eye, have become "free and democratic governments" devoted to "freedom and peace with justice," while all the totalitarian and autocratic regimes allied with the Soviet government, miraculously became "people's democracies" and "freedom loving governments." It is difficult to decide which of the two governments is more cynical and hypocritical in their struggle for power and domination. The real tragedy of this struggle is that it is carried on at the cost of the vital, mental, moral, and social well-being of the populations of the two countries and of all of mankind, and at the cost of all the great, universal and perennial values continuously undermined, degraded, abused and misused in this struggle by the ruling elites of both nations, and, finally, at the cost of survival of the human race on this planet.

To sum up: in the political field both nations have been becoming increasingly similar to each other in good as well as bad characteristics.

5. Conclusion

The preceding brief analysis of the changes and tendencies in the main segments of culture, social institutions, systems of values, and the sociocultural life of both nations demonstrates indeed that in all these basic fields both countries have been becoming increasingly similar to each other and converging mutually toward a mixed type, neither Communistic nor Capitalistic, neither Totalitarian nor Democratic, neither Materialistic nor Idealistic, neither totally Religious nor Atheistic-Agnostic, neither purely Individualistic nor Collectivistic, neither too criminal nor too saintly. At the present time this Mixed type represent an eclectic mixture of the characteristics of both countries devoid of the unity of the new-Integral-cultural, social, and personal system.

If a peaceful and unimpeded development of today's Mixed type is given a real chance there is hardly any doubt that eventually it will grow into a unified type of a magnificent Integral order in both countries as well as in the whole human universe. Each country will be building this new order in its own variation and each variation is likely to be nobler, more creative, and better than most of the previous sociocultural orders in human history. Viewed in this light the discussed convergence is a hopeful symptom and heatlthy process. As such it can be heartily welcomed by all who really care about man, culture, and all immortal values created by man on this planet.

The survey shows also that at the present time among all the different values of the two nations, there is not a single value which justifies the continuation of the present belligerent policies, and absolutely no value which in the smallest degree can redeem the great crime of starting a new world war. This does not mean that such a war cannot be started: in spite of all his great progress man still remains, to a considerable extent, an irrational, passionate, destructive, cruel, and greedy creature; and human wickedness still remains fairly alive in human beings and especially in the ruling groups. If the present destructive struggle between the two countries and the two blocks of nations is continued and if, especially, a new world war is started, the real reasons of these catastrophies are to be looked for not in the high sounding great values invoked by the culprits of the world conflagration but in their stupidity, irrationality, greed, irresponsibility, and a plain human wickedness.

The Traditions of Intellectual Life: Their Conditions of Existence and Growth in Contemporary Societies

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I

THE modern outlook – the outlook of independent curiosity, openness to experience, disciplined inquiry and analysis, reasoned judgment and the appreciation of originality – is the common property of the modern intellectual in all countries. It is contained, in the most diverse ways, in all intellectual activities – in art, science, scholarship and systematic thought. It is the possession or the aspiration of the intellectuals everywhere in the contemporary world.

The modern outlook has grown up with the development of modern European civilization. From Europe it has spread in nearly every direction – into Russia, into the Americas, to Africa, to South Asia and around Asia to all the countries of Southeast Asia and to China and Japan.

The modern outlook grew up under special European conditions of a stable but loosening Christian conception of the world. One condition was the approximate unity of the intellectual classes within each national society, through their association with Church and State and through their share in a unitary cultural tradition formed around a classical humanism in a Christian reinterpretation. Another condition was the high status of intellectual activity, connected with its association with Church and State and the auxiliary and interconnected institutions of universities, aristocracy, gentry and landownership.

Modern intellectual life was born in the polity of absolutism which in the course of modern history turned occasionally towards varying brightnesses of enlightenment, towards monarchy with limited powers, republican liberalism and democracy in different mixtures. It came into being in societies which were markedly hierarchical in structure. Most were peasant societies, feudal or bureaucratic in their government. It thrived in these, as it did in mercantile patrician republics and in constitutional monarchies.

The modern intellectual outlook, in its early centuries, was the work mainly of amateurs. It was a passion, a hobby, an avocation to most of the great creators of modern intellectual traditions. It was not a profession, and there was relatively little institutional provision for creative intellectual exertion.

The modern outlook has been protean in its form and in its content. It has assimilated the discipline of the universities, it has adapted itself to the professional practice of art and literature. It has added new subject matters and changed the distribution of its interest. It has reached into politics and acquired diverse substances in that contact with the various streams of political action.

Modern intellectual life has, in its career of more than four centuries, grown steadily, consolidating and refining itself, expanding its resources, deepening and ramifying its penetration, enriching its traditions and therewith giving new opportunities for their transformation by the oncoming generations of creative talent. The problem which it now faces, on a world-wide scale, is whether it can live under conditions in which it has never had to live before.

The new conditions in which modern intellectual life must be carried on arise from changes within the pattern of intellectual life itself and from changes in its political, economic, organizational and cultural environments. Some of these changes have taken place within the societies in which intellectual life has already reached a high level of creativity. Others arise from the extension of the practice of intellectual life into areas of the world to which it is new, in which it is not a native growth, and where, unlike Europe, it has not emerged from the internal evolution of indigenous intellectual traditions.

II

Within the continuous flow of the tradition of modern intellectual activity, there has been a pronounced expansion of the systematically cumulative mode of intellectual work, and closely associated with that expansion, has gone an increased density of scientific and scholarly activity. A larger proportion of a tremendously enlarged intellectual class now is engaged in forms of intellectual production which require a deliberate and specific articulation of their own work with what has just gone before. The greatly heightened application of our best talents to science and, to a lesser degree, to scholarship – and the nature of scientific and scholarly progress and of our methods of training in research – have led conjointly to a gigantic multiplication of the amount of scholarly and scientific literature in every field which the members of the intellectual community must read‘ and to which they must contribute. The point has long since been passed when a single person in the course of his lifetime could know the best works of the past and present in every field; we are already at the point where the individual can scarcely read all that is relevant to his field of interest within his own discipline; if he also wishes at the same time to maintain contact with the highest points of intellectual production of the past as well, he must be very selective indeed. These necessities restrict the range of the intellectual's attention, narrow his interests and loosen his attachment to the larger intellectual community and its traditions. Alternatively, they condemn an intellectual to a degree of dilettantism which is hardly compatible in most instances with creativity in those fields, notably science and scholarship, where the tradition to be mastered is highly articulate, compact and intricate.[1]

This problem does not yet confront the intellectual classes of those countries – underdeveloped and both totalitarian and pluralistic – which are not at present conducting advanced scientific and scholarly research on a significant scale.[2] It is, however, beginning to appear in India, which is intellectually the most advanced of the pluralistic underdeveloped countries; and it is already a massive factor in the lives of the intelligentsia of the advanced totalitarian countries, such as Soviet Russia and East Germany.

III

The changes in the evironment of intellectual life are nothing other than the changes from the world of European princely absolutism and constitutional Whig and bourgeois liberalism to those very different conditions which exist today in Europe and everywhere else in the contemporary world. The changed situation is visible in every sphere in politics, in economic life, in the organizational matrix of intellectual activity and in the cultural cosmos which surrounds it.

The major variants of the situation of the modern intellectual life are: (1) the pluralistic mass society, democratic in its political constitution, industrial in its economy, individualistic and pluralistic in its culture; (2) the totalitarian society, oligarchical politically, already highly industrialized or seeking energetically to become industrial, and attempting to impose rigorously a unitary ideological pattern on an elaborate modern cultural life; and (3) underdeveloped countries which range from totalitarian and military oligarchies to democracies in their political form, mainly agricultural economically but seeking to become industrial and primarily traditional in their culture, with the bearers of modern outlook more discontinuous in their culture from the rest of the population than is the case in the advanced countries of the West.[3]

In the Western countries, as in the most advanced totalitarian countries, the traditional patterns of intellectual life and the modern intellectual outlook confront a disproportionate growth of the technological sector of the intellectual classes, which is characterized by highly specialized training and professional activities and a very attenuated contact with the inherited traditions of humanistic and scientific thought. In advanced pluralistic societies the organization of intellectual life has been changing, not as a result of ideological considerations (which are important forces in their own right in the advanced totalitarian countries) but because of the increased military and industrial importance of science, changing intellectual interests, new techniques of enquiry and the emergence of new forms of financial support. The latter group of factors are integral to all advanced societies whether they be pluralistic or totalitarian. In the advanced societies, furthermore, the tradition of intellectual life co-exists alongside of what is called "mass culture", a vast body of mediocre and brutal culture of a type which has always existed but which is now greater in volume and immensely more visible and audible, as a result of the development of films, radio and television, than it ever was in the past. This phenomenon of "mass culture" is more pronounced in the advanced pluralistic countries of the West and in Japan where the level of economic development and the political regime allow it an ampler and more free expression. But in the more advanced totalitarian countries, and in the most urbanized sectors of the underdeveloped countries, the same sort of mass culture is stirring; but, because of the relative poverty of all these countries, and the centralized control of the culture of the totalitarian countries, mass culture has a more muted and harried existence.

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[1] The problem is less severe in those fields in which the tradition is less articulate and where a systematic and deliberate continuity is less imperative, as in literature and art.

[2] Nor does it affect the creators of literary or artistic works except in so far as it affects the size and receptiveness of the audience which will be available for the consumption of their productions.

[3] Many of the totalitarian countries are underdeveloped; several of them resemble the pluralistic mass societies in their level of industrialization, in their occupational structure and in the elaborateness of their intellectual activity and traditions. These latter countries – the Soviet Union, East Germany and Czechoslovakia – all manifest marked tendencies to pluralism, which their totalitarian constitutions suppress or hold in check.

IV

In all modern and modernizing societies, intellectual activity, feeding on the modern intellectual tradition, has acquired a functional importance which it did not possess in earlier centuries in the West. In all countries, advanced and underdeveloped, which seek to live at the height of modernity, intellectuals have had thrust upon them tasks and responsibilities which they have been unable to refuse. The state, the economy, and society have needed them and will continue to need them even more in the future; if they could not obtain the co-operation of all of the older generation which – might have held back because of dislike for the particular form of the modernizing regime or because of the distastefulness of such activities as have come to be required of them – or if the older members were insufficient, new strata of intellectuals could be and in fact were created to perform the desired functions.

A modern state needs an elaborate system of higher education to create these new "functional" intellectuals – civil servants, applied scientists, engineers, accountants, educators – that whole range of professional middle-class, "tertiary" occupations which are integral to a modern economy, which are indispensable to a modern military establishment and which are an essential in the functioning of state and society. A certain kind of intellectual is necessary for these tasks and even more so are those intellectuals who can produce them in institutions of higher education.

In the advanced societies, institutions for the production of intellectual personnel already exist. There, the problem is their adaptation to the production of larger numbers, and of new kinds, of specialists. In the underdeveloped countries, the institutions through which these intellectuals are to be produced must be either created or built up from a very rudimentary state. There, even more than in the more advanced countries, the recruitment of teaching staffs which will be sufficiently in contact with the great intellectual traditions which nourish their subjects is a major problem.[1] The supply of highly qualified persons is bound to be small; and the world-wide increase in demand, together with the demand within each country for a numerically large output, accentuates the difficulty. The lowering of the standards of staff recruitment as well as the standards of admission and graduation of students is a constant threat under these conditions.

In underdeveloped countries, the older generation of the stratum with modern intellectual training is bound to be very small. The extension of the range of recruitment means that new strata who have had little contact, prior to their formal training, with the modern intellectual tradition are now drawn into the corps of intellectuals. In the more advanced countries, which have already a large intellectual class, its further extension means that a lower average capacity must necessarily be drawn upon if all functional tasks are to be attempted and more or less fulfilled.

Everywhere, the state presses by decree and by financial assistance for this numerical extension in the output of persons with the qualifications thought necessary for the performance of those functions which the state wishes to use or to have performed outside state institutions. Large numbers and "forced marches" are repugnant to the effective transmission of the traditions of intellectual life, which is brought about through identification with a closely observed and experienced model and by an intimate experience of creative intellectual work. The creative impulsion of intellectual life, passed on by an osmotic process in a personal relationship between teacher and taught, between master and apprentice, is antithetical to this pressure of numbers which overwhelm such personal relationships. If the average capacities are lower, then increased numbers make transmission more difficult.

The high degree of specialization which is demanded in the practice of these professions, and the backward working repercussions of this demand on the courses of study, exercise a similar influence. Receptivity to intellectual traditions depends on the prior intimacy, such as is communicated in the atmosphere of an educated family, on personal qualities of sensibility and curiosity and on the breadth of the formal training which the oncoming generation of intellectuals receive. The extension in numbers and the social range of recruitment place a heavier burden on the breadth of formal training, if receptivity and assimilation of intellectual traditions are to be achieved. Where, therefore, formal education is compressed and specialized, as national necessity and the internal development of many subjects require, the result is a specialist whose specialistic outlook is not embraced in a broader matrix of feeling for the imponderable elements of intellectual tradition.

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[1] This is a problem which may be rendered more acute by the introduction of considerations of class origin in deciding on the appointment of staff, or ethnic or national or other non-intellectual qualities. It was for a long time a problem in totalitarian countries, both advanced and underdeveloped, and it is beginning to emerge as a problem in the newly established underdeveloped countries, such as Ghana.

As the years of the present century pass, the proportion of the educated classes with a general cultural blindness increases in all countries. In England, the prestige of Oxford and Cambridge, and the aristocratic-gentry ideal of the cultured gentleman, offset this to some extent. In France, the humanistic component in the public opinion of the educated classes, as well as the stiffly classical element in the syllabus of the secondary schools, also tend to offset it to some extent, just as in Soviet Russia the Victorian ideal of culture, of being "*kulturny*," also makes for a partial mollification of this tendency towards a "deeper illiteracy" in the professional classes. Nonetheless, despite the resistances, the movement goes on. It will probably become even more pronounced in most underdeveloped countries, totalitarian and pluralistic, than in those which already have a considerable intelligentsia firmly and diffusely attached to the traditions of modern intellectual life.

V

Alongside this functional need for intellectuals which is felt in all modern and modernizing states, and which contributes to their increase, the elites of totalitarian states believe they must intervene in the process of the formation of intellectuals and in their subsequent activities in order to affirm their political ideology, which they deem to be required for the integration and order of their societies. This involves intrusion into the heart of the process of intellectual production as well, or at least as close to its heart as an intellectually uncreative and external authority can ever come. Communist totalitarianism, perhaps even more comprehensively than National Socialist totalitarianism because of the greater elaborateness of its doctrine, has attempted to dominate the content of intellectual activity so that its results would correspond with its ideology. It has not just been a matter of assuring that intellectuals observe their civil obligations and avoid subversive actions and proposals, or that they produce works which will be useful to the state. It has rather been an effort to make intellectuals create in such a way that what they create will exemplify and affirm the ruling ideology.

To achieve this end, totalitarian elites have established a comprehensive system of control. They have attempted to organize intellectual life far beyond what is required either by the inner nature of contemporary intellectual activity or by the functional tasks which the state, the economy and society place before it. In many fields, this political machinery prescribes a degree of uniformity which is incompatible with the indeterminateness which is inherent in any creative undertaking. Through the control of appointments, promotions, funds, and publication and distribution facilities, totalitarian elites have tried to predetermine the content of the output of their intellectuals, particularly in those spheres which touch most closely on the sacred ideology or on politically sensitive questions.

This has entailed the intrusion of standards which are, on the whole, inherently foreign to intellectual creativity, and to the elaboration and development of intellectual traditions. In pluralistic societies, both advanced and underdeveloped, intellectual achievements are judged preponderantly according to intellectual standards, and promotions and appointments are in the main oriented towards these standards – although occasionally political, religious, communal and personal considerations enter – and the political elite abstains from entry into such matters. In totalitarian societies, the political elite tries to impose its own standards on the intellectual community.

This imposition can be carried out – to the extent that it is carried out – only through the creation of a bureaucracy to supervise intellectual work and to check on its conformity with official expectations. Naturally this bureaucracy attracts, on the whole, persons of a type who have little sense of what is involved in intellectual creation. This hampers their capacity to supervise effectively – which is in any case an impossible task – and generates a certain degree of tension between those creative intellectuals who are loyal to the regime and the supervisors.

VI

Modern intellectual life has become increasingly organized. The ideological grounds for some part of this organization are of special importance in the totalitarian states. Even where the ideological pretension has been absent, the sheer functional utility of intellectually qualified persons in modern and modernizing societies has caused much of modern intellectual life to become bound to an organizational machine. Much of this organizational machinery arises from the dependence of intellectual institutions, and even of individual, uninstitutionalized intellectual activity, on the financial support of the state.

There has been an immense increase in the expenditures for intellectual activities in the budgets of practically all modern and modernizing states. Universities in almost all countries are now dependent on their governments for financial support. In England, where the two older universities were almost entirely self-sufficient financially forty years ago, and where the modern universities received only a fraction of their funds from the state, the situation has changed profoundly. In the United States, the improved position of the state universities and the increased share of Federal funds in the budget of the great private universities are accompanied, as in England, by a comparable increase in the conduct of scientific research by the civilian and military branches of the government. Parallel developments may be seen in all other countries, such as India, Japan, and Soviet Russia, which operate a modern university system and seek to accelerate scientific and technological research.

The fiscal policies of modern states have contributed to the destruction of the classical type of Maecenas: in India, the Maharajahs no longer perform the functions of patronage, which was once one of their redeeming features. In England, death duties have eroded the great fortunes. Only in the United States does private patronage still occupy a prominant position in the support of intellectual work. There, an old form of patronage, the foundation, has been adapted to modern intellectual life. It has been organized, freed of the element of personal clientage which was present in the classical patron-client relationship, and extended into every sphere of intellectual creation.

Changes in the nature of scientific research in many fields have promoted organization. The large scale which is characteristic of many contemporary scientific and scholarly enquiries has enforced the need for collaboration and administration in spheres where they were practically absent in earlier centuries of the modern age.[1] This change in modes of intellectual procedure has, in turn, added to this financial dependence on extra-intellectual institutions. The large scale of scientific and scholarly enquiries made possible by collaboration has called for large funds: Not only do more research projects now require larger staffs than were conventionally required in the 19th century, when the professor and his research students supplied the necessary manpower, but scientific research has become prodigiously more expensive simply because it requires vastly more complicated apparatus. Reaching outward into the heavens, inward towards the particle, the instruments of science can no longer be paid for from the private purse of a landed gentleman, or by a small regular grant for the maintenance of a laboratory. The complicated apparatus requires a larger staff to handle it. The newer types of social and economic research – nation-wide enquiries into consumers' budgets, studies of national income and industrial productivity, investigations of social and political attitudes on the basis of national samples – cost sums which would have been unimaginable to investigators in these fields five decades ago. The scientist and scholar cannot now, as easily as they did a century or a half-century ago, decide to follow a certain line of interest and then set about it forthwith, without consulting anyone else or seeking financial aid. Now they must apply for a grant from a government department, an academy, a foundation, or their own university, which must itself then turn to the government or a foundation. This process is most advanced in the United States, but it has also made great strides in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan and India. For these same reasons, and additional reasons as well, it is perhaps more pervasive and dominant in the Soviet Union.

These changes have given rise to a large bureaucracy which now administers the financing and conduct of intellectual life. The contemporary bureaucracy which looks after the administration, finance and conduct of intellectual activity is much more elaborate and permeative than the ministries of the German or the other European states where ministries of culture and national education exercised much power in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This bureaucratic apparatus, by its nature, exercises a considerable influence in the choice of problems and even of persons, procedures and substantive approaches to intellectual work, even where the officials consciously try to divest themselves of any powers over the content of what is done. It is, therefore, something of a restriction on the autonomy of intellectual activity. It presents a constant possibility of becoming a real danger, which, if not so great in pluralistic societies – where the bureaucracy tries to avoid introducing explicit political considerations and to be guided by the most outstanding academic opinion – as it is in totalitarian countries, remains nonetheless an always open opportunity for the introduction of an extra-intellectual component into intellectual decision.

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[1] It is not that there were no large-scale "projects" before the present century. The great encyclopaedias were works of immense collaborative effort, the monumental undertakings in the publication of historical and literary source materials entailed a great deal of collaboration over long periods of time. Nonetheless, the intellectual bureaucracies of past times seem to have been smaller, looser and less specialized than are our contemporary intellectual-administrative bureaucracies.

VII

The progress of technology in films, television and wireless has also added to the numbers of corporately employed intellectuals. There is little difference in this trend in any of the three types of countries we are discussing except with regard to numbers, and the greater prominence of political-ideological considerations in personnel policy and in the assessment of intellectual products in the totalitarian countries.

The private scholar and the independent author, free from the control of writers' unions, and with free access to a variety of separate publishers, still exist in Western countries and in the pluralistic states of Asia and Africa. In the former, the diminished proportion of the institutionally unconnected rentier or free-lance scholars and literary men within the intellectual classes still leaves, thanks to greater literacy and ample purchasing power, a large enough market to support many independent authors. In the latter – poorer and less literate – countries, however, entirely independent or self-sustaining authors are relatively rare phenomena. Alongside of these, intellectuals employed in universities, schools, colleges, newspapers and periodicals, broadcasting systems, in governmental and private administrative or research posts form the vast majority.

In totalitarian countries, this stratum of corporately employed intellectuals has also multiplied – as it must in all countries advancing in industrialization and granting great powers to the state.

In these countries, rentier intellectuals cannot exist; but literary men and artists who are self-supporting through their works certainly do exist and many flourish. They do not, however, enjoy the same independence as writers in pluralistic countries, because their membership in the politically required writers' association and their conformity with its demands govern their access to the public. Although the actual work of literary production inevitably – owing to the very nature of such creation – is carried on individually in totalitarian countries, a thoroughgoing organization of the literary profession has been carried out. Exhortation, praise, and censure are officially allocated according to a more or less unitary policy, and decisions to publish or to withhold from publication of any work are made in the same way.

There is no functional necessity in modern large-scale society for such a degree of organization and control over the processes of literary and artistic creation. It is contrary to every need of such creation. In so far as it is ever fully successful, it attains that success only at the cost of creative achievement.

VIII

The modern elites of the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa have come to the aspiration for modernity in a situation in which their own countries were largely devoid of any institutional framework for the conduct of a modern intellectual life. Their modern intellectual outlook was acquired through study in universities in the centers of Western civilization or institutions in their own countries founded by foreign missionaries and administrators. The provision of such opportunities was very sparse as was the opportunity to employ this outlook in a vocation after its acquisition.

In these countries, except for India, the modern intellectual elite has been very small; its field of operation was confined in the main to government, service, college teaching, politics, journalism (which was often political) and the practice of law (also often a platform for political activity); there were few opportunities for modern scholarly or scientific research, and modern forms of literature had a tiny market and very few who could practice it professionally.

Except for a few centers in particular subjects in India and China, there were no possibilities for advanced research and teaching in modern subjects throughout those areas of the world. The scientific services of the government were staffed mainly by foreigners. Posts for highly trained persons in industry were very few, because industrial employment as such in underdeveloped countries was scant and such industry as there was had not yet taken to the employment of scientists, qualified engineers and other types of intellectuals; such posts as there were went to foreigners.

To cross the threshold of modernization, it is necessary to create a corps of intellectuals – especially since it has not been felt that the entrepreneurial class could be entrusted with the responsibility for economic development. This has demanded the creation of a system of intellectual institutions where previously there had been only rudiments and fragments.

In striving to rectify these deficiencies, governments[1] have had almost a monopoly of initiative, as well as a near monopoly of the financial resources for taking such initiative.[1]

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[1] In some instances, the initiative has been exercised by the colonial government in anticipation of the needs of the prospectively independent state.

For these reasons, the tendency towards the corporate organization of intellectual activity is more preponderant in underdeveloped countries than in the advanced pluralistic countries. Leaving aside the ideological motive for organizing and co-ordinating intellectual activities, this tendency predominates because there is so little else alongside of which it could take a place. The underdeveloped countries, apart from India and China, have received only a very small inheritance of independent modern intellectuals. Their poverty and illiteracy restricted the market from which self-sustaining modern intellectuals could live, and the land-owning and mercantile classes did not produce many creative intellectuals in the modern sense, who were able and willing to remain outside of government service.

Thus, even in the promotion of an artistic and literary intelligentsia, governments have felt called upon to evince interest and to act through financial provision and institutional establishment. Governments cannot write books or paint pictures; and where they do not wish to control content but to aid creation, they have sought to provide the conditions under which writing and painting could be done. This has also required organization to consider applications, administer grants, award prizes, facilitate publication, etc.

In research in science and scholarship, governments in most of the new countries have lavished attention on the extension and elaboration of the old institutions founded for such purposes by the foreign rulers before their withdrawal and on the creation of new ones. Since these activities, together with the production of qualified intellectual personnel, are among the first interests of governments, there is little reason to be surprised that the non-institutional or independent intelligentsia in underdeveloped countries occupies such a minor place.

If left to the initiative of those hitherto in charge of them, and if nothing much were added to the resources hitherto available, the existing institutional apparata of intellectual life in the underdeveloped countries would remain in a state of elementary disaggregation. Governmental action and finance are indispensable if anything at all is to be done. They bring, however, the dangers of pressures for output (of personnel and publications), of political interference in appointment policy and in the determination of teaching and research programmes. Much more important, however, is the question which they raise as to whether institutional establishment and development, however generous, can successfully implant modern traditions of creative intellectual life.

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[1] As might be expected from the nature of the social structure in most underdeveloped countries, there has been relatively little private initiative in the instigation and financial support of intellectual activity.

IX

Despite the nearly universal diffusion of the modern intellectual outlook, and of the intellectual procedures it involves, its Western origin remains a fact of more than historical importance.

In every country to which it came, there was an indigenous culture which dominated the lives of the vast majority of the inhabitants. In Asia, these indigenous cultures had a continuous history of long duration and great achievements, and this added weight to their compellingness. They were cultures of very great intrinsic intellectual, moral and aesthetic value; they were elaborate, coherent and comprehensive. They had, in the priesthood, in monastic orders and in the traditional teaching profession, intellectuals of their own.

The modern intellectual outlook and the traditions in which it grew were foreign to this indigenously traditional intellectual culture. Their foreignness was underscored by their association with foreign conquerors who imposed their hegemony on the indigenous society, supplanting or dominating the traditional political elite.

The modern intellectual outlook has exercised an irresistible fascination on certain strata of the societies outside the European centre. In Asia, particularly, but also in Eastern Europe and in Africa, it has won adherence through its critique of tradition and its individualism, which would liberate man from the heavy burden of an individuality-suppressing culture. Since, however, its devotees, in the areas of the world to which it was not native, remained in important ways very attached to their traditional pattern of life, they came, because of this surviving attachment, to feel inferior to the foreign culture which attracted them so much and which they esteemed so highly. The situation was not made any easier to bear by the often explicit derogation of their own culture and society that they encountered among their foreign rulers and even in the works and attitudes of intellectuals of the foreign culture which they so much admired.

This feeling of intellectual inferiority, vis-à-vis the West, still exists in the underdeveloped countries and, indeed, in almost all areas of the world. It survives in the Soviet Union, it was common in the United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries and is not yet entirely dead there. Among the more backward totalitarian countries[1] and among the intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa, it is very strong. The fascination with the Western intellectual outlook has in the main been strongest in those sections of the population which have become fervently nationalistic. (These two conflicting attachments are very closely connected with each other). For political purposes as well as outof deeply rooted sentiments, the political-intellectual elites of these countries assert the greater appropriateness of their own cultural tradition to their national life. At the same time, they seek to remodel their own societies so that they will conform more closely with the Western tradition. Because of this, the traditional political elite of chiefs and the traditional cultural elites direct a continuous attack against them for their betrayal of their indigenous tradition[1] and their pursuit of foreign gods. The modern intellectual tradition is thus subject to a two-sided attack from its own proponents and from those who are more wholeheartedly opposed to it.

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[1] The feeling of provinciality with respect to the metropolitan culture in these countries acquires an additional complication through the establishment of the Soviet Union as a cultural metropolis from which to draw guidance. It is at least the intention of the Communist elite in these countries to replace the West by the Soviet Union as their cultural metropolis. The effort has, however, been unsuccessful.

The situation is made more involved by the fact that, in all the more or less pluralistic underdeveloped societies, the major languages for maintaining contact with the modern intellectual tradition must be Western languages. In many of these countries, a European language is the medium of instruction, particularly at the higher levels; where it is not, much of the reading of the students and the teachers must still be in books either printed in European languages or translated from European languages. The reality and the subjective experience of dependence on the metropolitan culture remain, and with them, the tension between this defendence and the indigenous traditional culture. It will continue to be so until the modern indigenous intelligentsia, devoted to modern intellectual traditions becomes creative in its own right, produces its own literature and its own scientific and scholarly research, and its own modern *belles lettres*, on a level which convincingly justifies the esteem, which it demands. When this occurs, then the self-esteem of the intelligentsia which creates and consumes it will become wellfounded and it will transcend its provinciality.

X

The strains of provinciality and the struggle with their own indigenous and yet alien cultural traditions are not problems which confront the more advanced pluralistic countries, where the modern intellectual traditions are indigenous. The preoccupation with the metropolis was to some extent a serious problem in the United States, but even in its worst phase, American culture was only a provincial culture vis-à-vis the metropolis of Britain, France and Germany, and there was never an alternative cultural tradition, deeply different in substance, which exercised a pull in the opposite direction.

Another counter-pressure against the modern intellectual tradition has begun to attract the attention of intellectuals in the advanced pluralistic societies, above all, in the United States, and to a lesser extent, Great Britain, France and Germany. It has begun to emerge in distorted form as a preoccupation of Communist ideologists in the more advanced totalitarian countries. We refer here to the mediocre and brutal cultural products presented on such a vast scale over the newer mass media of film, wireless and television and consumed by all classes outside the intelligentsia.

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[1] The Communist elite in the Soviet Union tries to resolve this source of opposition by extirpating the traditional intellectual elite in its ethnically distinctive and economically underdeveloped areas, and promoting only those members of the indigenous society who appear to be free from all attachment to their traditional culture. This path is not open to the modern elites of the pluralistic underdeveloped societies in Asia and Africa, since it is contrary to their principles and to their commitments to the values of their own traditional cultures.

In all advanced industrial, countries a higher standard of living and more leisure have released desires for simple, crude and exhilarating pleasures in sections of the population formerly bound down by fatigue, tradition and necessity. The result has been a consumption of "popular culture." In large cities of India and other underdeveloped countries, its first tinkles and rumbles can be heard. In the economically advanced totalitarian countries, the same tastes and aspirations exist but they are repressed by the Communist elite. A puritanical ideology, and resentment against the indulgence of their "masses" and their "youth" in pleasures imported from the West and not provided for by Marxism, account for the refusal of the Communist elite to acknowledge the legitimacy of these strata of culture.

Many intellectuals in the Western countries look upon popular culture as a challenge and a threat to the inherited traditions of creative intellectual life. It does compete with works which stand in the superior intellectual tradition; in its aspiration for an expanded audience, it draws personnel from the circles which have been brought into contact with the great traditions; and by its visible and audible presence and its obvious popularity and capacity to give pleasure, it affronts the claims of creative culture to universal validity and universal acceptance.[1]

XI

The traditions of modern intellectual life have shown a high degree of adaptability. They have shown themselves able to withstand a quite considerable degree of involvement with corporate forms. Indeed, certain parts of these tradition have never flowered as they have within the structure of the universities. They have been able to withstand their dependence on the state for financial support and their occasional surveillance by the state. The great achievements of the French and German universities under state financial and administrative control in the 19th century, and the no less great achievements of the British universities since the entry of the state as their chief patron, are ample testimony of the capacities of certain strands of the modern intellectual tradition to adapt themselves to new circumstances.

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[1] In the advanced Communist countries, it is regarded as a form of American corruption, which infects those who have not been adequately penetrated by their own ideological tradition. In the underdeveloped countries, both traditional and modern intellectuals, both pro– and anti– Western, regard it likewise as a corruption which flows from an amoral industrial civilization. Even the modernizers wish to avoid it.

Nor has political tyranny such as the totalitarian states have exercised shown itself able to destroy the tradition of modern intellectual life. The impressive achievements of Soviet physics and chemistry, and the great vitality and curiosity which many observers have noted among the younger generation of Soviet academic intellectuals, are evidence that political supervision and far-reaching demands for ideological conformity cannot be truly successful in their efforts to permeate and dominate intellectual fields in which a great tradition has been alive and which still attract creative talents of a high order. As long as some measure of autonomy is left to the acknowledged superiors in a field of intellectual work to choose and train their closest collaborators and their most intimate apprentices and to control what is published in their organs of communication, the tradition can live on despite temporary appearances of submergence. Even where, as in the field of literature, those who are made the custodians of the organs of communication, the publishing houses and the critical reviews, are conforming political place-holders and flatterers of the mighty, the extinguishing of a great literary tradition does not lie within the powers of the tyrants and their supine agents.

Nor does it seem that mass culture as the environment of superior cultural activity constitutes a menace of serious proportions. The vigour of contemporary American science, scholarship, literature and painting belie the accusations of those who see in mass culture the ruination of the great intellectual traditions.

Within the advanced pluralistic societies, specialization which develops from the internal evolution of the intellectual disciplines constitutes a greater impediment to the growth of the modern intellectual tradition than most of the external distractions arising out of those societies. Specialization postulates the unquestioning acceptance of an inherited framework of analysis and it often proceeds to forget it. Traditions grow not merely from the elaboration of the inherited framework but from its continuous transformation and deepening. It is not that specialization renders this type of growth impossible. It does, however, render it more difficult. Particularly as specialization becomes a common characteristic of the world of learning, mutual criticism across the boundaries of specialization is obstructed; and it is just at the boundaries that growth occurs.

It is unnecessary to stress the injury which extreme specialization does to the transmission of the intellectual tradition in its broader sense. Not only are the substantive content, the particular works of that tradition, forgotten; but the sensitization of the mind to wider possibilities of thought that the modern tradition carries with it is diminished by the loss of contact.

If specialization continues unchecked and if institutional means are not discovered which can retain its intellectual advantages and prevent some of its harmful repercussions, there will be little hope of a continuing creativity at deeper levels. The great intellectual tradition will be transmitted haltingly and discontinuously. It will have to be recurrently rediscovered by the powerfully inquisitive mind which, with little direct help from the tradition, breaks out of the restraints which specialization imposes.

The constraints of tyranny, the tribulations of excessive administration, the dilutions and distractions of mass culture, the shrinking, of specialization, are all, in a sense, barbarian at the border of intellectual life. The capacity of intellectual life to resist their invasion comes down, in the last analysis, to the strength of the tradition itself. This is not merely a tautology.

If the intellectuals of a given country feel themselves attached to the great models of intellectual work, if they have incorporated the standards implicit in that work into their own outlook, and embedded them in a sense of self-confidence about their own capacities to bring them actively into intimate contact with the universe, then we may say that the intellectual traditions are strong. Such intellectuals will be able to forestall the invasion. If, on the contrary, the intellectuals of a country – for whatever reason – are indifferent or unobservant about the great works and personalities of their own intellectual history (and not just the intellectual history of their own nation), if they do not observe the the standards implicit in these works in their own intellectual conduct and feel no identity with the past or present of their subject of ostensible concern, if they feel little self-confidence in their own capacity, or in the intrinsic worthwhileness of bringing those standards into a transforming contact with reality, we may say that the intellectual traditions are feeble. Under such conditions, the invasion cannot be resisted.

Intellectual traditions undergo elaboration and transformation because human beings of a high degree of creativity become genuinely imbued with them, breathe and emanate them. The modern intellectual tradition is no unchanging substance, and reverent acceptance will bring it to a standstill. It can go on only if there is a mutual contact between itself and energetic minds who are capable of accepting its discipline as a point of departure and who can then come back to it from a newly attained standpoint and critically reassess and reformulate it. Such minds enliven the sensibilities of young people, mould and guide them in their own direction, and implant into them some of the lively relationship to tradition which they themselves possess.

This active, outgoing orientation towards an intellectual tradition becomes, in those who accept its discipline, a personal quality as tough, as rooted, and as unyielding to external pressures as the most constitutive quality of a strong, expansive personality. The fundamental qualities of such personalities cannot be changed or instigated or uprooted by exhortation or by the promise of rewards or by threats; and by the same token, the active orientation towards the intellectual tradition has great resilience and resistive powers. It is formed by the exercise of intellectual powers on a problem and a subject matter, and it is maintained through that exercise and through direct contact with those who share that orientation and through an intellectual conviviality with their unseen presence.

The superimpositition of a bureaucratic administration, the organization of an elaborate system of financial provision, and other distractions and temptations might draw the weaker away from intellectual work or cause them to temper their sails to the winds of grants, official favour, promotion, and the pleasures of ordering other people about. They do not break down the attachments of the firmly attached. They cannot enter into the intimate relationship between colleagues equally devoted to their tradition or between master investigators and their apprentices. Tyranny may crush men physically, it can thrust them into the outer darkness where they are unable to do their work, it can silence them, and it can corrupt them, it can rule its society with the aid of the police and the army; but it cannot destroy the intellectual tradition except in so far as it annihilates those who bear it. Modern tyrannies have never succeeded in doing this – though they have exiled many and sent many others to concentration camps.

As long as totalitarian regimes allow creative personalities who have had contact with the great intellectual traditions to work in libraries and laboratories, to have pupils, and to be in touch with each other through their published writings and through conversation, the continuity of and growth of intellectual traditions are not seriously in danger. Somehow the mind finds its way and the stream flows onward.

This assumes, however, that the modern intellectual tradition is already there and that there are strong personalities ready to receive it. The situation of the underdeveloped countries, however, is not like this. There, the tradition has not yet taken root, and the major problem is its implantation.

The modern intellectual tradition can become implanted in the countries where the traditional culture is alien to it. For this to occur, however, requires some release of the creative potential, its emancipation at least partially from the discipline of its own indigenous tradition and its inflammation in its deepest reaches by the modern traditions. It requires genius and a position in the apostolic succession which links genius to genius across generations and national boundaries. It requires the congeniality of an environment populated with strong and like-minded persons, free to go their own way. It requires a self-confidence which is genuine. In the underdeveloped countries, the modern intellectual atmosphere is attenuated, self-confidence is thinner, and the chances of ignition are correspondingly smaller. But they exist.

In such countries, the tyranny of bureaucracy, the counter-pressures of specialization and of the much denser and more permeative indigenous traditional culture are greater dangers than they are in the advanced countries. They are not, however, inevitably victorious. The success of the Japanese in assimilating and going forward with the modern intellectual tradition and the appearance of scattered geniuses in India in the present century are evidences that the essential ingredients exist. It is the task of statesmen to allow the sparks to turn into flames, and to avoid the temptation to smother them in elaborate and expensive structures of administration and incessant demands for immediate and useful results.

XII

Ultimately man is an incorrigibly wayward and wilful creature. The "old Adam" cannot be expunged from the species. Neither can the active, curious, pushing, questioning, self-disciplining mind. Unlike the old Adam who needs no tradition, the active mind does need its own traditions. Once such minds are enabled to find contact with those traditions which will guide and form them, and if they are allowed within their own intimate sphere a freedom of play and movement, we may look with assurance on the chances of the modern intellectual tradition to move ahead, to transform itself and to continue to be what it has been. And all this under very different circumstances from those which presided over its birth and early years.

The Sociology of Economic Development

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IN the sense that operational consequences are always a criterion for evaluating knowledge, it seems that recent technical assistance and economic development programs have proved a windfall for social science.[1] For some 15 years now the historical supremacy of older, more precise, "hard" sciences has been challenged by the experiences of Western technical experts in their attempts to guide social change in underdeveloped countries. The challenge reflects, I believe, a slow and often painful realization that economic development is essentially a complex sociological phenomenon, and not, as we Americans have often assumed, merely a problem of superimposing Western techniques and organization upon the indigenous cultures of traditional societies. However, we are not entirely to blame for this easy assumption, since our own patterns of socialization have inculcated a free and easy receptivity to technical change that masks the difficulty of achieving change in such societies.

My aim in this essay is to suggest that social science has much to offer in analysing the cultural roots of technical change and, possibly, in helping bring it about. Sociology seems especially useful in this context because its major themes and constructs involve social systems, their institutions, values, and time-honored mores, all of which are critical for change. Gunnar Myrdal has recently posed the sociological context of technical change in poorer countries:

> The initial situation in all these countries is one where most of the people are culturally isolated in local and provincial communities, and often split within these communities by social, religious, and ethic chasms, and usually by extraordinarily wide economic inequalities. This stale and rigid social structure, which is not conducive to cooperation for economic development, is the consequence of long stagnation. Now it is the major obstacle to progress.[2]

Myrdal speaks of social class, cultural isolation, religious and ethnic values, social structure – essentially socio-psychological realities whose understanding requires a confluence of social sciences, and a cultural sensitivity which has not been characteristic of technically-oriented, Western, capitalistic society. Gradually, however, we are learning that economic development is, in a sense, indivisible; it must proceed in a multi-faceted way in which ideological change, modification of traditional social structures, education, transportation, health, industrial development, and the rest, move forward in some roughly equal progression. This conceptual innovation is largely the result of an emerging sociology of economic development.

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[1] The following remarks reflect my own experiences (liberally mixed with hindsight) with a United Nations technical assistance program in the Middle East. I have been especially impressed by the difficulty of introducing change in a "foreign" society when the agents of change are usually (and often necessarily) selected on the basis of technical expertise, with little knowledge of social science or the culture of the host country.

[2] *Beyond the Welfare State,* Yale University Press, New Haven, 1960, pp. 207-8.

It is a social science truism that the accurate delineation of a problem is more important and more difficult than its solution. The art of asking the right questions, of restructuring conventional patterns of thought and conception, is often the most creative part of innovation. But one does not conceptualize in a vacuum. Tools in the form of constructs, disciplinary training, definitions, and method are required, particularly where one's initial perceptions and knowledge of a national culture are tentative and confused, as is the case not only with the foreign expert in a strange society, but equally so of the technically-oriented "nonindigenous" resident of the society who also lacks such tools. It is most revealing to observe a group of skilled technicians and businessmen, who may have lived in a given foreign country a decade or more but are unable to define the existing problems and requirements of social change simply because they have not had the training which would permit a sociological or psychological conceptualization of the issue. Nor could one fairly expect that experts in applied fields should be able to do so.

Precisely here, it seems to me, social science has a great opportunity to test the validity of its formulations. More significant for those who believe that it is not fatal for a discipline to have practical consequences, social science can help bring about the revolution in satisfactions that poorer countries demand. Many social scientists would put it more positively that we have a compelling moral obligation to do what we can to enhance human equality and opportunity. Even at the uninspired level of national selfinterest in maintaining an equilibrium in world society, our course is clear enough. For these reasons social science may soon enjoy a gratifying recognition as being among the most relevant disciplines for achieving the most pressing goal of this century: the equalization of human opportunity, security, and dignity on an intenational scale.

Let me suggest a few social science concepts that seem useful in facilitating technical assistance, broadly defined as a problem of social change.

In the context of the critical need to find out what problems are most relevant to our efforts to effect social change, the concept of *socialization* seems most useful. (I am not speaking here of an unconscious or haphazard application of such concepts, but rather of a positive use of the whole battery of accumulated tools and systematic knowledge). Somehow, we tend to be fully aware of the mechanics and consequences of socialization in our own society, but often we do not bring the same objectivity and analytic skill to our confrontation of another national culture. Anthropologists, of course, are an exception, and I am speaking here mainly of those of us who have tried to carry out technical change, as distinct from those whose interest in foreign areas is rather more scholarly, and much less frustrating.

The concept of *socialization* deals with the central question of how a given society inculcates its major values and shapes individual personality. This concept seems most useful for technical change in raising the central question: What are the major values that have been internalized by the modal personality of a given culture? Such a question isolated the major areas for investigation, and provides a construct for explaining behavior and for pointing the way to the factors that will be critical for change in the area. Equally important, it permits one to avoid the superficial and erroneous explanations of behavior that necessarily follow the evaluation of "foreign" practices in terms of one's own irrelevant, ethnocentric standards.

In sum, the socialization concept points one toward conceptualizations and evaluations that are culturally germane to the area being analyzed. It avoids such operational absurdities as suggesting the introduction of free enterprise in countries whose annual per capita income is under two hundred dollars. It avoids, as Gunnar Myrdal has suggested, the error of applying Western economic concepts and analytical tools, such as the "law" of supply and demand and conventional theories of capital formation, to countries whose economic organization, limited capital resources, political ideologies, and traditions make either a "mixed-enterprise" system or a full-blown socialism almost certain.

It seems at present that many of the critical values and cultural dynamics visible in poorer countries are not compatible with the development of the ideal Western bureaucratic model for organizing industry and government.[2] If one sets up as characteristic elements of this model such variables as objectivity in recruitment, impartiality in handling clientele groups, rationality (the most direct and technically-legitimate nexsus between means and ends), and the validation of authority primarily upon skill rather than upon formal position – one often concludes that some traditional values in such societies are inapposite to the demands of the ideal model. This working hypothesis is in good part possible because social science has asked questions that emphasize the normative basis of the apparently machine-like Western model, which superficially appears to be not only value-free, but conflict-free.

By way of illustration, let us take one bureaucratically-relevant value, authority, and trace some of its consequences for social change, when change is defined as the effort to introduce rational, largescale organization in an underdeveloped society. Most observers agree that the nature of authority is a critical variable. A socially-sensitive agent of technical change would know that Western socialization has ideally legitimated organizational authority on the basis of fairly objective criteria such as professional training, competence, experience, and so on. With many exceptions, including nepotism and artificial restrictions upon access to the required training and education, such detached, impersonal

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1 Robert V. Presthus, "The Social Bases of Bureaucratic Organization" 38 *Social Forces* (December, 1959).

criteria have been the main basis for legitimating individual authority.

Even authority based upon formal position in the bureaucratic hierarchy must be (or at least, often is) justified on the ground that the officeholder *merits* the position on objective bases of intelligence, experience or achievement in a field in which precise indexes of evaluation do exist. The rules, procedures, secrets, and certifications that characterize professional training in the U.S. both reflect and reinforce this condition.[1] In a sense, then, authority is objectified, that is, it is divorced from personality and centered in training and proficiency.

It is, of course, a commonplace that alongside this practice (and often justified on objective grounds) has existed a system of legitimating authority by hierarchy or formal position. This bureaucratic necessity creates much of the conflict seen in organizations, pitting as it does the authority of position against the more widely-accepted authority of skill. Despite this disadvantage, position or formal authority is useful. Not so much in terms of the common chain-of-command rationale, but rather in its effect of muffling conflict about the big ends of the organization. It is most interesting that this "conflict-free" aspect of the ideal bureaucratic model, which is among the few empirically-established bases for its vaunted efficiency, is rarely discussed. Very briefly, the great operational advantage of the centralized authority characteristic of the model is that it enables relatively quick, authoritative, and conclusive decisions to be made concerning the major goals of the organization. Since these are highly normative, they might otherwise lead to virtually endless conflict.

Returning to the assumed legitimation of authority in the Western bureaucratic model, it is often thought that similar bases of validation exist in other cultural contexts. But each society tends to differ in the relative weights it assigns to the several potential legitimations for both social and organizational authority. In some underdeveloped countries the main bases of legitimation are not entirely consonant with the demands of the ideal model. They rest upon other time-honored prescriptions, reflecting different historical experiences and different forms of social and economic organization.

In Thailand, ideal bureaucratic demands for stable, institutionalized authority, based upon technical skill, are fractured by the cultural affinity for informal, extra-bureaucratic measures of controlling public administration.[2] Authority based upon formal position in the hierarchy or upon skill often defers to social status in the wider community, again reflecting time-honored patterns of status consciousness and the resulting modes of interpersonal conduct. Appointments to the government service thus "frequently" reflect personal and political influences.[3] The extra-bureaucratic bases of authority include membership in cliques that, unlike many Asian societies, do not reflect family ties, but are composed of the entourages of department and division chiefs. In what appears to be a sport in the organizational family, this condition results in the so-called informal organization coinciding with the formal structure.

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[1] Robert V. Presthus. "Authority and Organizations," *Public Administration Review* (winter, 1960.)

[2] Edgar L. Shor, "The Thai Bureaucracy," Special Issue on Comparative Public Administration, 5 *Administrative Science Quarterly* (June, 1960), pp. 66-86.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

Another classic example is the extended family or tribal basis of authority which controverts such bureaucratic demands as impartiality in the allocation of government services and the granting of official loyalty to impersonal, abstract entities such as the organization, the community, or the "public interest." In some cases, it is regarded as morally wrong to set such claims above those of opposing family interests.

Some observers conclude from this that the extended family system often seen in traditional societies is antithetical to industrialization. While this often appears to be so, social scientists have recently urged that careful qualifications are necessary. In the first number of this *Journal*, Nimkoff and Middleton argue that the joint family is not necessarily an obstacle to industrialization, and that such related variables as nepotism (often regarded as its hallmark) are relatively common in Western society.[1] They show that the extended family has not inhibited complex economic organization in countries such as Japan. However, it can be a handicap in the sense that some of its motivating values are, unlike the Protestant Ethic, dysfunctional for capitalistic enterprise. For example, the centralization of authority in the head of the joint family limits personal autonomy, competitiveness, and mobility, all of which have been vital requirements of modern economic organization.

An equally critical variable for bureaucratization is a radical change in the conceptions of time and the universe that characterize many poorer societies. In predominantly agricultural societies, it is natural that time tends to be equated with nature and the inexorable change of seasons. Man's control of events seems minimal and the universe itself seems changeless. Such realities are apparently reflected in a very long-range view of time and of innovation. Consequently, bureaucratic virtues of punctuality, a "time is money" value, and an almost neurotic concern with meeting schedules are not part of socialization. Nels Anderson has suggested recently that urbanism is always accompanied by a temporal revolution, in that man must budget his time and generally develop a new perspective as to its value and appropriate allocation.[2] In a sense, this is the result of his greater control of the environment through complex organizations, but one must ask if there is not a question as to who is really controlling whom.

Social science has provided other organizing concepts that are proving useful in isolating the essential questions in economic development. Recent attempts to equate child-rearing patterns among American families with the demands of effective participation in a bureaucratic society seem most suggestive for analysis and understanding in expanding areas. In this way, we get a direct link between the socialization process, the modal personality of a given society, and the functional requisites of its institutions. Miller and Swanson have shown how the parents' perceptions of the roles and attitudes required for success in contemporary American society are built into the child's personality. They conclude that the earlier "entrepreneurial" society, characterized by rough competition and amorality, has been replaced by a "welfare bureaucracy" in which "striving and extreme and vigilant self-control [are] less necessary than before."[1] While this seems rather too favorable a view of interpersonal relations in the big organizations that characterize American society, the authors find parents training their children for this new world and treating them in terms of its values.

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[1] "Is the Joint Family an Obstacle to Industrialization," 1 *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* (March, 1960), pp. 109-18.

[2] "Western Urban Man Faces Leisure," 1 *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* (March, 1960), pp. 10-11.

The suggestive point for this essay is that parents do inculcate values and behaviors that seem to prepare their young for the occupational world. This suggests that child-rearing patterns in any society can provide cues as to the character of its major social organizations and the kinds of personal skills and attitudes that are functional in them.[2] Here again, the great gain is the simultaneous and conscious use of social theory and the focussing of one's attention upon the society one wishes to influence, rather than misapplying assumptions from one's own national context. Any discipline that can release us from the prison of our "inarticulate major premises" is invaluable. Mannheim and others have shown how seductive such cultural paroachialism is, and perhaps the experience of a decade of U.S. technical assistance programs provides further testimony.

I personally feel that the experts who have usually been involved in such programs tend especially toward technical and cultural introversion. This is first because their forte is the rather complete mastery of a rather limited field, say, of some phase of agriculture or public administration. We know that individuals tend to enter professions or trades that suit their personality's demand for certainty, precision, complexity, simplicity, or whatever their idiosyncratic psychic needs. Thus people who enter narrow technical fields tend to feel that, after all, their own special field, as developed in their own society, is properly the bench-mark for similar technical development everywhere. They will undervalue and be impatient with cultural barriers to technical change, particularly deep-seated behavior patterns and their irrationality when set against the demands of rapid economic development, and the resulting necessity to find less-than-total alternatives for innovations that apparently require only acceptance to bring about immediate and radical change. The chronic frustration of such technical experts abroad could in many cases be greatly eased by an appreciation of such socio-psychological concepts as socialization and cultural relativity. But the frustration remains, just because technical expertise and cultural sensitivity are rarely found together. That this lesson is being learned is shown, happily, by the appearance of several American training programs for those who work or plan to work abroad. Such programs are less concerned with technical matters than with the instruction of their members in the culture of the area which they hope to influence. Like all learning, or unlearning, this is a difficult process.

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[1] *The New American Parent*, New York, 1958, p 54.

[2] The way that differences in middle-and-working-class child rearing affects the child's attitudes toward largescale organizations and his ability to perform successfully in them is treated at some length in my forthcoming, *The Organizational Society*, to be published by A. Knopf, New York, in 1961.

In sum, I have tried to suggest that the social science disciplines, and particularly sociology, are about to enjoy a larger share of that delicious advantage long monopolized by the physical and applied sciences: recognition of being operationally relevant in the "real" world. Western technical skill and economic organization remain barren if they cannot be integrated with the cultural values of poorer countries, and social science provides conceptual and analytical tools that ease such integration.

Changes in the Family and the Position of Older Persons in Germany

by

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The Changing Social Position of the Young and the Old

A comparison of empirical knowledge about modern society with the picture of social life that we can derive from different literary sources of the past reveals basic changes in the structure of the family. This comparison also reveals basic changes in the role and status of the old. It appears that these two tendencies are strongly interrelated: the changes in the role and status of the old affect the structure of the family, and the changes in the family in turn affect the position of the old.

Our focus will be upon the changes in the family as far as they affect the old. However, at least passing consideration should be given to some changes in the relative position of the young and the old in the society. In pre-industrial civilisations, in which the economic and social conditions remained almost unchanged from one generation to the other, experience was most important for the functioning of the society. Since experience accumulates with increasing age, older persons were accorded positions of high prestige and respect. By contrast, in modern industrial societies, characterized by rapid technological progress, experience has lost much of its value. It is adaptation that is now of ever increasing importance for the maintenance of the social system. The loss of status and respect for the old as a consequence of the decreasing value of experience is accentuated by the difficulty old people have in preserving adaptability with increasing age.

Observations in Germany show that this tendency toward a loss of status of the older persons has gained momentum during the last fifty years in accordance with the acceleration of economic development; there is evidence that it was stronger than ever in the last decade. The changing position of the old

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[1] Paper presented at the Fifth International Congress of Gerontology, San Francisco, August 7-12, 1960.

I wish to thank Dr. Erwin K. Scheuch of the Sociological Department of the University Cologne for his helpful suggestions and advice.

finds its most obvious expression in the present situation on the labor market: younger applicants are consistently preferred to older ones, and older persons are forced into early retirement. A similar trend toward younger candidates can be observed in the sphere of politics.

These fundamental changes in the relative position of the young and the old in our society should be kept in mind, when we analyze the changes in the family as they affect the older persons. Some of the changes we observe within the family are undoubtedly influenced by the general changes in the position of the older persons within modern society.

Trends in the German Family and the Effect of the War

According to studies on the development of the family as a group of related persons living together in one household, we find in Germany a distinct trend toward the smaller family consisting of the married couple and their minor children. We also observe the emergence of new relationships between family members. The majority of the families in Germany is still characterized by a more or less intense predominance of the husband.[1] However, there is little resemblance to the former authoritarian position occupied by the father in the older bourgeois and patriarchal type of family prevailing in the last centuries. The trend is to an equalitarian partnership-type of family in which family life is no longer centered around the figure of the father; rather husband and wife consider each other as equal partners who jointly decide family issues.[2] Thus, the observations fit into the general trend of modern family development as it is found in the Western societies and some of the societies in the East as well – a development of which Ernest W. Burgess gave an early description about fifteen years ago. Again, as far as Germany is concerned, there is evidence of an acceleration of the changes in family structure and family life during the last five decades, and an especially strong stimulation by the events of World War II.

Different views were held by German scholars in recent years about the influence of the specific situation in Germany during the war and postwar period. In the first investigations after the war it was observed that the number of persons making up a family household had increased. Sociological studies found evidence of stronger cohesion among family members.[3] Having turned into evacuees and refugees, the young couples or widows moved into the house of their parents; the older persons moved to their middle-aged children. Often the extended family was felt to be the last factor or stability in a world of destruction. The family reoccupied social functions which it had at least partly lost to other institutions long ago, among others the care for the old. While on the one hand the war had intensified tendencies of family disorganisation, expressed by the frequency of separation and disruption, it may be concluded from these observations that it had also intensified tendencies of family cohesion, especially among members of the extended family including the older parents and their middle-aged children. Some scholars expected the development of new conceptions regarding family life. A detached view, however, permitted by the increasing distance from these events, proves many of the effects to be short-range adjustments to unusual living conditions. In so far as there have been any lasting influences, they appear to have strengthened and accelerated evolutionary tendencies already observed for many decades. Neither do we find a reversal of trends nor do we discover entirely new conceptions. It must be stated that the war and post-war events have been of secondary significance for the basic changes in family structure and relationships as well as for the changes in the status and the role of the old.

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[1] Gerhard Baumert, Deutsche Familien nach dem Kriege, Darmstadt 1954, p. 167.

[2] See the compilation of research findings by René Könisg, Family and Authority, The German Father 1955, in: The Sociological Review, Vol. 5 No. 1 p. 107-127.

[3] Helmut Schelsky, Wandlungen der deutschen Familie in der Gegenwart, 3rd. ed. Stuttgart 1954

The Changing Role of the Child

The position of the old is strongly determined by the relationships between parents and children. No other changes in German family life have affected the older persons as much as those which concern the role and the position of the child in the family. In summarizing the present position of the child in a few general statements the following tendencies should be emphasized: The child of today has become more liberal and independant. As education is increasingly aimed at the development of the child's personality, its individuality is more and more respected. The relationships between the child and the parents are more informal. The older children are gaining a companion-like position and begin to carry more weight in decisions within the family. We know that these are evolutionary tendencies in accordance with the trend from the authoritarian-patriarchal type of family to the equalitarian-partnership type. On the other hand, considerations that are based on symptoms reflecting a general trend do no take into account the influence of traditional views on the parent-child relationships which are still strong in Germany, nor do they reckon with differentiations regarding the role of children in families of different social standing.

Comparisons of recent survey findings with literary sources from the last century are sufficient to demonstrate that parents today perceive the role of their children quite differently than parents did a hundred or fifty years ago. These differences in views are partly caused by changes in the economic and social conditions. For many families in the upper social classes the meaning of the children was based on their function as future heirs of the family property and family tradition. The children were educated with respect to their maintaining the continuity of the family. But the size of inheritances is shrinking, and as a consequence the role of the child as the perpetuator of the family heritage becomes increasingly insignificant. The maintenance of family tradition – which, in any case, is difficult if the nuclear family is considered the central unit of the family – looses its original sense; the idea of family tradition tends to vanish. Simultaneously, the view of the role of the children changes in the lower social classes too. For many families in these classes the meaning of the children rested on the expectation, that they could soon contribute to the family income and would be the supporters of the parents when they were old and could not participate in the labor force any more. Education was directed to the preparation for this role. Today relief and support of the aged parents has become more and more a matter of governmental and private social welfare institutions, and less a concern of the family and the children. The aged parents become increasingly independent of the economic support of their children. In Germany this development was encouraged by the first social legislation in the Bismarck era; it reached a new hight in the recent old age security laws of the Adenauer administration.

If we state that the child in the upper classes loses its function as the heir of family possession and family tradition, and the child in the lower classes its function as the supporter of the old, it must be added, however, that at the same time in Germany these tendencies are accompanied by an increasing inclination of the parents to identify themselves as individuals with the child and its future. The emphasis on the child's advancement in social rank connected with efforts to provide good schooling and professional training – which is so evident in the findings of post-war studies in Germany[1] – indicates the character of the present-day prevailing parent-child relationships. It seems likely that the relationships between parents and children are also influenced by the spread of birth control which means that more and more parents have a limited and planned number of children.[2] All these developments have brought about a basic change in the parents' attitudes toward the child. Psychologically the position of the parents becomes ever weaker, and the child increasingly dominates the family. It may well be that the change in the relationship of gainfully employed children to their working-class parents is characteristic, in general, of the attitude of the parents to their children in the German family: In earlier times it was usual that children turned their earnings over to their parents. Today many children surrender only a minor share for food received at home, or (as it is frequently found) they live in the household of their parents but keep their own earnings. While in former times in Germany one sometimes spoke of an exploitation of the children by their working-class parents, it seems more justified today to speak of an increasing exploitation of the parents by their children.

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[1] G. Wurzbacher, Leitbilder Deutschen Familienlebens, 3rd. ed. Stuttgart 1958
G. Baumert, Jugend der Nachkriegszeit, Darmstadt 1952.

[2] See R. Freedman, G. Baumert, and M. Bolte, Expected Family Size Values in West Germany, in: Population Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 2 1959, p. 136-150.

The new aspects of the role of the children and the new parent-child relationships, which emerge in connection with the development towards a companionship family, lead to a weakening of the institutional ties between the aged parents and their middle-aged children. Parents and children are no longer bound together by their common interest in the position and the future of their family of procreation. The education of the children is no longer strongly directed to their moral obligation to the tradition of the extended family and specifically to their obligation to support aging parents. As a result, the relationships between aging parents and their middle-aged children are less determined today by an institutional code of conduct. The children are still legally obliged to take care of their parents in case of need. But with the old age insurance system reaching all groups of the population, even the farmers, such support is needed in extreme cases only. Thus the relationships and the decisions about living arrangements are increasingly being determined by individual affection or by rational considerations concerning the income of the old and their possible functions in the family household.

Family Contraction and the Exclusion of the Older Persons.

Had living arrangements and social norms remained unchanged, the probability that a family household includes aged parents would be twice as high today as at the turn of the century. The proportion of persons 65 years of age and older more than doubled; the percentages of the West-German population in this age group was: about 4% in 1900, 7% in 1939, and 10% in 1955. On the other hand, the statistical figures show a persistant decline in the size of households during the last hundred years. In 1871 the average size of private households was 4.6, in 1950 3.1. We know that several factors contribute to this reduction; but there is evidence that it largely reflects the increasing tendency toward the exclusion of the aging parents from the families of their married children.

The general trend has reached different stages in different areas. There is a marked difference between urban and rural families. The trend to the smaller family and the exclusion of the aged parents has proceeded less far in rural areas, and has gone furthest in metropolitan areas. Data collected in the Darmstadt Community Survey reflect this situation for Germany in general. As the data show, the size of the family household decreases with increasing distance from agricultural life: family size is highest for the families of farmers, and it is lowest for families in the city. In between are the values for intermediate types of the family: the part-time farm family, and the non-farm family in the rural area. A comparison of these various types of families according to the number of generations living together in one household reveals the following differences: the extended family with three or more generations in co-residence occurs in 42 per cent of the full-time farm families, in 16 per cent of the part-time farm families, but only in 9 per cent of the non-farm units living in the rural communities and in merely 5 per cent of the families in the city[1] (See Table 1).

Table 1

Number of Generations Living Together in Urban and Rural Families in a West-German City and its Hinterland[1]

		Rural Families			
Number of generations	*Urban families*	*non farm families*	*part-time farm families*	*full-time farm families*	*total*
	%	%	%	%	%
One generation	36	27	35	7	25
Two generations	59	64	49	51	62
Three generations	5	9	15	37	12
Four generations	–	–	1	5	1
	100	100	100	100	100

1 Darmstadt Community Survey, 1950, Probability Samples, 387 families in the city, 434 families in the Hinterland.

Living Arrangements and Family Contacts

The present state in the evolutionary processes finds its reflection in the living arrangements of older persons. The West German Census of 1950 reported 17% of the population 65 of age and over living alone. A more recent representative survey of the living arrangements of the aging found 23 per cent of the older persons in West Germany living in one-person households. 35 per cent were living with their spouse, 12 per cent with spouse and children, and 20 per cent with children only.[2] This means that roughly one third of the older persons in West Germany are living with children while two thirds are not living with children but with their spouse only, or with other persons, or alone.

A break-down of the data by community size clearly indicates a tendency towards the exclusion of the old with increasing size of community. In small rural communities (up to 2000 inhabitants) we find 47 per cent of the older persons living together with their children; in larger cities (more than 100 000 inhabitants) the respective figure is 22 per cent. While in the cities the coresidence of the aged parents with their middle-aged children seems more and more to become the exception, it is still the prevailing form of the family among farmers. Of persons 65 years and older classified as farm population, 71 per cent live in a household with children, while only 2 per cent were found to live alone.

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[1] G. Baumert, Familien, op. cit., p. 44.

[2] Survey of the DIVO-institute, 1958, probability sample, West German population 65 years of age and over, 821 cases.

In appraising the evolutionary process it is interesting to note that the proportion of older persons living with children is higher in the middle classes than it is in the lower classes. It appears that the exclusion of the old from the families of their middle-aged children has proceeded less far in the classes in which the families still have some possession to pass on to the next generation, and where a relatively larger number still has a family business. We may assume that the possesion of a house is a decisive factor for the living arrangements of the old. In fact a survey in Nordrhein-Westfalia, West Germany's most populous state, shows a marked difference in that 51 per cent of those who live in a house owned by the family are living together with their children, as against 34 per cent of those who live in a rented house or dwelling[3]. Taking personal visits as an index of the contact between parents and children, we find that more than half of the older persons who have surviving children but do not live with them in one household have frequent and regular contact with their children: 7 per cent state that that they see their children less than once a year, 18 per cent see them at least once a year, and 20 per cent at least once a month; however, 55 per cent see there children regularly at least once a week.[1]

If we try to summarize the findings on living arrangements of older persons in West Germany we arrive at the following general statement: about 30 per cent of persons 65 of age and older are living with their children in one household, 25 are living nearby with contacts at least once a week, another 25 also maintain family relationships with their children but don't see them very often – in some cases only once a year or even less; 20 have no surviving children.

Table 2

Living Arrangements of Persons 65 years of age and over in West Germany[2]

Living arrangements	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
	%	%	%
Living alone	13	30	23
Living with spouse	49	25	35
Living with spouse and children	17	8	12
Living with children	14	25	20
Living with others or no information	7	12	10
	100	100	100

[2] Survey of the DIVO-Institute, 1958, Probability Sample, West Germany, 821 cases.

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[3] Survey of the DIVO-Institute, 1959, probability sample, Nordrhein-Westfalia population 65 years of age and over, 1248 cases.

[1] Surrey of the DIVO-Institut, 1958.

Status and Role of the Old in the Family

There are two possibilities which may lead to the joint household of the aged parents and their children. Either the children do not leave the home – this is the older form – or they move away, have founded their own home and then invite the parents, mostly the widowed, to join the new household – this being the modern form of coresidence of the young and the old. In the first case the old are the owner of the house or dwelling and the head of household; in the second the young usually have the dominant position.

In Germany the old form still prevails over the modern form. 65 per cent of the older persons living with children designate themselves or their spouse as head of the household. Only 35 per cent live in a household with the child or his spouse being the head. Even in some of these cases the young live in the home of the old: According to the traditional view of the dominance of the man, which still survives in this respect, the son or the son-in-law will be declared as the head of household if the young couple lives in the home of the aged mother.

Many of the younger couples living with their parents wish to move, but are forced to stay with the old by the housing shortage and the high rent they would have to pay for a dwelling in one of the new housing projects. In view of the strong tendency toward the separation of the young and the old, which can be observed increasingly not only in the cities but in rural areas as well, it seems safe to conclude that the proportion of common households of younger and older generations will decline rapidly with decreasing housing shortage. Indicative are the findings of a representative survey of workers and employees in West Germany concerning their old age expectancies: 79 per cent voiced the opinion that aged parents should not live with their grown up children; only 11 per cent answered in favor of living together and 10 per cent were undecided.[1] With the young not forced to join a household with their parents by an institutionalized code of conduct – which is already the case in Germany –, nor compelled by such unusual conditions as the housing shortage – which will be the case soon – the decision to live together or not will be based increasingly on the dominating factors of modern family life: on affection and economic partnership. In former times one of the children and his spouse had to live with the old in order to take care of them, possibly with the common support of all the children, and this was done quite independently from the ability of an old person to fulfill certain roles in the family. Today expectations concerning the ability of an old person to fulfill certain roles and economic considerations of both the old and the young, will become more and more decisive in plans to invite the aged parents.

With regard to their economic considerations the position of the older persons will be strengthened with the increasing amount of old age pensions. If they wish to be admitted to the younger couple's home, they can point to the fact that they will not be a burden on the family budget but may even contribute to the family income. Ignoring the influence of affection, a very simple relationship between the income of the old parent and the desire of the children to have him in the home can be observed: the desire growing with the proportion of pension which exceeds the expected living costs of the old.

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[1] Ludwig von Friedeburg und Friedrich Weltz, Altersbild und Altersvorsorge der Arbeiter und Angestellten, Frankfurt am Main 1958.

The changes in the family are affecting both the aging father and the aging mother; but apparently the older man so far has been affected more fundamentally. Not only is his position weakened by the changes in the social position of the young and the old in general, but also by the decline of the father's and grandfather's authority once exercised in the older family system. Often in present-day Germany the aged parents play an essential role in those families which are making strong efforts to gain or to regain a higher social status. The parents and grandparents jointly aim at the social advancements of the children transplanting their personal hopes of life to them. Again, economically the grandmother plays the more important role; she is the one who runs the household and cares for the children thus, enabling the wife to seek gainful employment. The increasing occupational activities of married women in Germany seems to be one of the few factors which at least presently work against the further loosening of the ties between the aged parents and their middle-aged children.

The Soviet Brand of Sociology

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THE USSR has no dominant type of sociology which could be compared to what is known as Sociology in the Western world.[1] What the Soviet authorities consider sociology is subjected to the whole idea of Marxism-Leninism (plus Stalinism), taught either as Political Economy or Philosophy, or as part of general political education; this substitute, in turn, is under the supervision of a Party institution, the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the Central Committee of the CPSU.[2] The Academy of Sciences of the USSR has a section on social sciences, but this is composed of institutes of philosophy, economics, ethnography, law, and history, and none of these grant degrees in sociology, although we read about the theses which are related, ideologically, to the field of sociology – such as "The Defense of Socialist Society – A Sacred Task and Honorable Duty of the Citizens of the USSR."[3]

In the framework of Western sociology, Soviet studies in this field are mostly propaganda, featuring, usually, the glowing reports on life on the collective farm, of unblemished happiness among factory personnel, and progress in public health and education. "At best, formal descriptions on the settlement of disputes in economic production or case studies on model housing projects would provide information on atypical and ideal instances."[4]

More recently, some hesitant steps toward empiric sociology have been taken, however, in the post-Stalin period, by the cultivation of the "Applied" aspects of sociology, such as industrial sociology or the field of group relations, with perhaps medical sociology and more refined testing techniques yet to come. (Interestingly enough, there have been several translations into Russian of several works on cybernetics). While condemning the empiricism of Western research, Soviet specialists have also acknowledged the need to do "concrete social research," to investigate in practice individual institutions and more broadly to introduce such higherto neglected concepts as social change.[1]

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[1] For specific details, see: Roucek, Joseph S., "Russian Sociology and 'Sociology' under Communism," 892–921, in Roucek, Joseph S., Ed., *Contemporary Sociology*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1958: Labedz, L., "The Soviet Attitude to Sociology," Chapter 21, 185–201, in Laquer, Walter Z. & Lichtheim, George Eds., *The Soviet Culture Scene*, 1956–1957, F. A. Praeger, New York, 1958.

[2] Counts, George S., "*The Challenge of Soviet Education*, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1957, 280–282.

[3] For the description of the machinery of the Academy of Sciences in the USSR see: U.S. Office of Education, *Soviet Commitment to Education, Report of the First Official U.S. Mission to the USSR*, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1959; Counts, George S., *op. cit.*, 203–204; Vucinich, Alexander, *The Soviet Academy of Sciences*, Stanford University Press, 1956.

[1] Dallin, Alexander, "The Soviet Social Sciences After Stalin," *The Library Quarterly*, XXVIII, 4, October, 1958, 308–321.

The Marxian Concept of Sociology

The gulf between the Soviet and Western concepts of sociology is due to the ideological approach; reduced to the simplest essentials, the Western concept of sociology is based on empiric research, while in the USSR all sociological questions are related to the problems of the theory and methods and aims of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.[2]

Much of the "social science" works published in the USSR is of propaganda nature, and includes texts of speeches by party and government leaders, and various other materials describing in glowing terms the progress of "socialist construction." These works are often issued in vast editions, and are often highly topical. Social, historical and the other social science fields are ones in which Communist dogmas are laid down for in particular frequency, and thus these subjects are treated on "a high ideological level." All the conclusions must meet the party's requirements. Translations from non-communist foreign writers are few, and those that are published are often "abridged," deleting the passages not agreeing with the party line.[3]

Political restrictions are especially severe in the social sciences, including history, where research is allowed only on topics approved in advance by the government. In fact, cases have been known of refusal of higher degrees even in scientific subjects for alleged servility to foreign achievements.[4]

The results appear in the complaints in the Soviet press of the dogmatic approach of researches in this field, and also in the titles of theses and published works which indicate almost exclusive concentration on subjects likely to produce conclusions of obvious utility for propaganda purposes.

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[1] *Voprosy Filosofii*, Moscow, No. 4, 1956, and No. 1, 1957; and *Kommunist*, No. 3, 1958, 77–91.

[2] The Soviet approach to the concept of social sciences can be gained from: UNESCO, *International Social Science Journal*, XI, 2, 1959: "Teaching of the Social Sciences in the USSR."; Shakpkarin Ab., "Introduction," 155–167; Pahskov, Al I., "Political Economy," 168–175; Malodtsov, S., "Philosophy, Sociology, Logic, and Psychology," 176–184; Konstantinov, N. A., "Pedagogy," 185–186; Artsikhovsky, A. V. & Nadtotcheev, D. I. "History," 187–201; Pospelov, G. N. & Zvegintsev, "Philology," 202–210; Karev, D. A., "Legal Sciences," 211–220; see also: Feuer, Lewis S., "A Neo-Marxist Conception of Social Science," *Ethics*, LXX, 3, April, 1960, 237–240; Meek, Ronald L., "The Teaching of Economics in the USSR and Poland," *Social Studies*, X, 4, April, 1959, 339–359; Nahirny, V. C., "Soviet Criticism of Western Sociology," *American Catholic Sociological Review*, XIX, 3, October, 1958, 238–246.

[3] Gorokhoff, Boris I., *Publishing in the USSR*, Indiana University Publications, Bloomington, 1959, 12–13. According to official figures for 1957, for books and pamphlets of all types, in that year 8,048 titles and 158,987 copies were published under the category of "Political, Social and Economic Literature"; these represented 13.6% of the titles in all fields, and 15.2% of the copies.

[4] Scott, Derek, J. R., *Russian Political Institutions*, Rinehart & Co., New York, 1957, 224.

Philosophy in the USSR

Since Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism is the Soviet substitute for sociology, it is important to appreciate the concept of Philosophy. (The Academy of Sciences of the USSR has a section on social sciences, but this comprises only institutes of philosophy, economics, ethnography, law, and history). There are numerous universities and institutes in the Soviet Union where philosophy is taught and research in that field carried on. The leadership is taken by the Academy of Social Sciences, the Philosophical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Moscow State University.[1]

Soviet publications differ, to start with, from those in the West. They are extremely centralized; the editions of works that are published are much larger than is usual in the West. There are comparatively few strictly scientific publications, while numerous textbooks and writings of a popular character appear. Between 1947 and 1957, there was only one professional journal, *Voprosy Filosofi*. In 1958 appeared *Filosofskie Nauki*, which represents the philosophical series of the *Scientific Contributions of the Ministry of Higher Education.* Philosophical articles also appear in the Academy's *Izvestiya* and similar series published by the Academies of Sciences and a few universities, as well as in other organs, such as *Kommunist* and *Pravda*, the leading communist periodicals. The Soviet philosophers produce numerous collective works within the framework of the publications of various universities or independently.

The Soviet philosophers emphatically deny that they work within the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist framework; they stress that they promote a "scientific" philosophy – that they rely on experience and follow the laws of reason alone. But none dare to question any of the basic dogmas of Dialectic Materialism, refuse to question any of the "classics" (Marx, Engels, Lenin – until 1956), denounce numerous purely scientific theories, and any form of "revisionism" is punished as a crime.

A Soviet spokesman describes "Philosophy, Sociology, Logic and Psychology" (a chapter of this title, by Molodtsov, V.S., in *International Social Science Journal*, XI, 2, 1959, 176–184) as being rooted in:

> "The prevailing philosophy in the USSR is dialectical and historical materialism. The overwhelming majority of Soviet students of philosophy regard the dialectical interpretation of natural and social phenomena, and the corresponding attitude to these phenomena, as correct and essential. The everyday reading of millions of Soviet people consists of such classics of dialectical and historical materialism as Karl Marx's *Capital*, F. Engels' *Anti-Duehring* and *Dialectics of Nature*, and V. I. Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*

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[1] Bochenski, Joseph H., "Philosophy Studies: Subject, Object and Organization," *Soviet Survey*, XXXI, January–March, 1960, 64–74.

> and *Philosophical Notes* ... The study of the relations between the abstract and the concrete, the logical and the historical, the sensory and the rational, and also the study of the fundamental categories of scientific modes of thinking, in particular correlative modes (form and content, substance and appearance, possibility and actuality, necessity, necessity and chance, etc.) are regarded by the majority of Soviet philosophers as the most fruitful and promising trends in the development of philosophy."

Sociology, according to Molodtsov

> "constitutes a part of philosophy. Marxist sociology is historical materialism, i.e., a materialistic conception of history rejecting all supernatural, super-sensory, transcendant causes of social and historical motives, and concentrating on realistic, materialistic factors of life and production on the basis of man's many-sided spiritual existence. The keen interest of Soviet people in historical materialism stems from the very nature of Soviet society, which is deliberately establishing a new system of social relations unprecedented in the history of mankind. The problems of historical materialism which most interest the soviet people, including specialist research workers, are those relating to the conscious exploitation of the objective laws of social development (in the same way as man conciously uses the laws of nature for his own purposes); the problems of subjectivity and objectivity as such; and the question of the social creativity of the popular masses, the relation between freedom and necessity, and the part played by ideas in social development.
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> "Thus, the main features of philosophy of teacing in the USSR, are first, the importance attached to the theoretical and cognitive significance of philosophy; and, secondly, the fact that equal importance is attached to its practical significance, and the recognition of the close bearing philosophy has on practical matters, on the life and practical problems of Soviet society."[1]

The Marxist concept of science can be explained from the cultural aspects. His ideology crystallized when there was a dominant tendency to found scientific laws in the field of history and social sciences. Marx "extended the power of reason, under its most precise formulation, as scientific laws," in the field of economics and sociology (and by implication used the same pattern for psychology" to the extend to which he considered psychological phenomena causally connected with social and economic factors.").[2]

Marx set his scientific claims upon a set of absolute truths, propounding that social laws must function according to the model of physical science, that every sociological and psychological phenomon depends ultimately on material factors. He believed that the social ideas and ideals which are invoked to explain the behavior of men and institutions cover up the clash of economic interests. A struggle for acceptance is carried on by conflicting special ideals and which-ever one wins in the end determines the ruling beliefs of an epoch. "The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class."[1] Or, Engels noted rather vaguely, that juridical, philosophical, and religious ideas may qe "the more or less remote offshoots of the economic relations prevailing in a given society."

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[1] Molodtsov, op. cit. 178.

[2] Barbu, Avedei, *Democracy and Dictatorship: Their Psychology and Patterns of Life*, Grove Press, New York, 1956, 231. In spite of the numerous of Karl Marx's writings, only one has appeared so far assembling the scattered passages which directly relate to sociology: Bottomore, T. H., & Rubel, Maximilien, Eds., *Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, Watts & Co., London, 1956; the Introduction, 1–28, summarizes Marx's sociology and social philosophy, and the remainder is a useful guide to the literature on the influence of Marx's ideology.

Since the ideology is a mere reflection of the economic forces, then we can deduce a true picture of society from the ideology alone; the basic antagonism between classes is accompanied by conflicting ideas concerning the good and bad, and sometimes, the true and false. Max conceived all social philosophies and theories as either myths or scientifically grounded doctrines. Myths are either false, refuted or refutable by evidence, and ideas, which, although able to rally and inspire or discourage and demoralize large masses, are too vague to be tested. Both types of myths function as psychological rationalizations of interests which, put forward by a class in defense of its economic interests, remain below the conscious level. In Engels' words: "The real motives impelling him (the thinker) remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all." (Rationalization is the modern equivalent of this usage). According to Marx, all social philosophies which teach that interests are common in a class society are myths.

In addition, all social philosophies and theories incompatible with Marx's own and which aim to give a true account of the structure of society and its development are also myths. Marx thus uses the concept "ideology" as a comprehensive term for both classes of myth, especially for any explanation justifying the *status quo*. But Marx's own ideas and theories are "scientific," since they can stand rigorous examination. Thus all communist spokesmen consider dialectical materialism as "the science of society," a more scientific approach to society than any other philosophy of today, since it stands uncompromisingly for the supremacy of the scientific values in life.

In line of this reasoning, Stalin proclaimed in 1952:[2]

> "Marxism regards laws of science – whether they be laws of natural science or laws of political economy – as the reflection of objective processes which take place independently of the will of man. Man may discover these laws, get to know them, study them, reckon with them in his activities and utilize them in the interests of society, but he cannot change or abolish them. Still less can be form or create new laws of science."

Or, Stalin's statement regarding the dependence of ideologies on the mode of production is worth quoting:[3]

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[1] See: "*Excerpts from* The German Ideology," Chapter IX, 246–261, in Feuer, Lewis S., Ed., *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels*, Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, Garden City, N.Y., 1959.

[2] Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," supplement to *Soviet Weekly*, October 30, 1952, ii, quoted in: Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, *Soviet World Outlook: A Handbook of Communist Statements*, 1954, 397.

[3] Stalin, "Dialectical and Historical Materialism" (September, 1938), *Problems of Leninism*, Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1947, 585.

> "Whatever is the mode of production of a society, such in the main is the society itself, its ideas and theories, its political views and institutions. Or, to put it more crudely, whatever is man's manner of life, such is his manner of thought."

The application of this approach to science can-explain the "curious" approaches to life in the USSR. Soviet "sociologists" and "social scientists" work on the assumption that human society is rational and therefore bound to respond to human rational influence. Or Lysenko can acvocate that the scientific control of nature allows man to create new forms of life, thus foreshadowing the image of a man-made and man-controlled universe. According to dialectical materialism, the world is a developing system of material forces which exist independently of all consciousness, human or divine; these forces are governed by certain basic laws which explain the connections of things. In other words, the laws of change, as formulated by dialectics, are considered the laws of material changes; or, reversely, material conditions are conceived as constantly changing according to dialectic laws. Historical materiolism "proves" that, in terms of the apparent "contradictions," capitalism is doomed and communism inevitable. By knowing the laws of change of social conditions, the Marxists can clain the knowability of all things, the possession of the key to history, and thus also be a "science." Although, from the Western standpoint, Marxism relies on fixed dogmas which it refuses to scientific tests, it drawn its own confidence from the illusion that the materialistic analysis of society implies "authentic knowledge."[1]

Ethnography

The field of ethnography is probably the nearest discipline to the Western concept of empiric sociology; at the same time, it can hardly be compared to Western social anthropology or even cultural anthropology. It is mainly limited to the material aspects of the cultures of various Soviet peoples, to "folklorism," social history, and the research into the various tribes in the USSR. "As a study of historical cultures it is largely a hand-maid of history and archaeology."[2]

Yet, even in this area several objections can be raised against the approach used by the Soviet ethnographers. During the Stalinist period, ethnography was liberately utilized for patriotic purposes, stressing the value of the Russian historical influences and the benefits of the Soviet regime. Then, Soviet ethnographers are still dominated by the outmoded views of Morgan and Tylor.[1]

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[1] There is an endless flow of books analyzing, demolishing or promoting the Communist ideology; among the more useful summaries, see: *Facts on Communism*, Vol. I: *The Communist Ideology*, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1959; Hock, Sidney, *Marx and the Marxists*, D. Van Nostrand, Princeton, N. J., 1955; Barbu, Zevedei, *Democracy and Dictatorship: Their Psychology and Patterns of Life*, Grove Press, New York, 1956, Part III, "The Psychology of Communism," 173–266; Mayor, Henry B., *Introduction to Marxist Theory*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1960; etc.

[2] Labedz, L., "The Soviet Attitude to Sociology," Chapter 21, 185–201 in Laqueur, Walter Z. & Lichtheim, George, Eds., *The Soviet Cultural Science* 1956–1957, F. A. Praeger, New York, 1958, 187; Krader, Lawrebce, "Ethnography: Scope and Achievements," *Soviet Survey*, October–December, 1959, 63–70; Valerianovich, Viktor, *Contributions to the Anthro-*

The Soviet ethnographers must always feature the Marxian teleological outline of history in the scheduled march of humanity from primitive communism to the classless society; thus we see, as a result, among the titles published by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR such treatises as: *Anglo-American Ethnography in the Service of Imperialism.* According to Krader, "Whereas in the West ethnography is a descriptive field, Soviet ethnographers consider their field to be the development, relations, and conditions of culture."[2] These Soviet specialists simply do not see this field as the study of peoples, as in Britain and the U.S.

Probably the most outstanding work in this area of knowledge has been done in problems bordering on archeology and linguistics.

With the shift of Soviet attention to the "underdeveloped" areas in the world, Soviet anthropologists launched a new journal of Oriental studies in the spring of 1955; and within the span of short two years, there appeared numerous monographs on individual countries of Asia and Africa; Congresses on Asian studies were held and extencive academic exchanges in this field were started. The same year saw the foundation of a separate publishing house for Eastern literature, the opening of training and research centers on Asia in various parts of the USSR (particularly the Turkic republics of Central Asia, and the systematic attraction of language students, graduate researchers, and sensior analysts into this field.[1]

Soviet Views of Western Sociology

Much information on what ideas the Soviet "sociologists" have about Western sociology can be gathered from the book by Demidenko, which, according to Symmons, is "much more informative on the state of social theory in the Soviet

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pology of the Soviet Union, by Bunaak, V. V., Debets, G. F., & Levin, M. G., with contributions by Abdushelishvili, M. G. (and others), trans., Peabody Museum, Cambridge, Mass., 1960 (bibliography, 174–176, and bibliographical references included in "Notes," 183–192; *International Social Science Journal*, XI, 4, 1959: "Teaching of the Social Sciences in the USSR": Part I, "Nomads and Nomadism in the Arid Zone: Introduction," by Berque, J.; "The Ecology of Nomadi Pastorialism," By Krader, Lawrence; "Some Aspects of the Socio-Economic and Cultural Development of Nomads in the USSR," by Tursunbayev, A. & Potapov, A.; "Geography, Politics and Nomadism in Anatolia," by Planhold, Xavier de; "The Bedouins and Tribal Life in Saudi Arabia," by Belaissi, A. S.; "Sedenteriazation of the Bedouins in Israel," by Muhsam, H. V.; "The Sedentarization of Nomads in the Western Desert of Egypt," by Aboud Zeid, A. M.; "Somail Nomads," by Silberman, Leon; "The Evolution and Settling of the Nomads of the Sahara," by Monteil, Vincent.

1 Tolstoy, P., "Morgan and Soviet Anthropological Thought," *American Anthropologist*, XXXIV, 1952.

2 Krader, *op. Cit.*, 63; citing *Ocherki Obshchei Etnografi*, by Tolstoy, S'P., Levin, M. G., and Cheboksarov, N. N., Moscow, 1957, 7.

3 Dallin, *op. cit.*, 314.

Union than it is on the 'bourgeois sociology' which it purports to discuss."[1]

According to Demidenko bourgeois "sociology" is simply bourgeois "ideology," and "unmasking of contemporary reactionary bourgeois sociology is a necessary condition for a successful struggle of all the progressive forces of society against the antiquated system of capitalism." Since sociology in the West is not a science but an ideology, there is no reason to separate it from other ideological weapons used by the defenders of capitalism. This logic evidently induced the author to include among the "bourgeois" sociologists such names G. Santayana, S. Freud, J. Burnham, A. J. Toynbee, Herbert Hoover, J. F. Dulles, next to W. F. Ogburn, E. A. Ross, Jessie Bernard, and F. Tatzel.

According to Demidenko, "bourgeois sociology," which began to "decompose" as early as the middle of the last century, was forced by the development of historical materialism to retreat into a blind alley and to disclose in full its reactionary essence. It lost completely its scientific character and assumed the role of apologist for the tottering capitalistic system. It broke down into a miltitude of schools, large and small, which argue over various non-essential issues: the Psychological School, Social Darwinism, Racism, Malthusianism, The Greographic Trend, Technocracy, Sociology of the Atom, Theory of Elite, Theories of Social Stratification, Social Mobility and People's Capitalism, Microsociology, and the Sociology of the Right-Wing Socialists.

The first five of these "schools" are presented as serving the exploitative and imperialistic goals of the capitalist elites. The Psychological School is ready to interpret all the forms of opposition against capitalism as proofs of maladjustment and mental illness, while Neo-Malthusianism and, related to it, Psycho-Racism not only affirm permanent biological and cultural inequality of human beings, but even justify such monstrosities as sterilization laws which in the U.S. are actually used against the "progressive strata of population."

The second group of "schools" are said to be mainly the propaganda mouthpieces of capitalism. They try to conceal its real character by playing up such topics as the alleged "managerial revolution" and "people's capitalism," by misrepresenting the true meaning of social classes and class struggle in the capitalist countries, and by trying to scare the nations of the world by a threat of atomic disaster. Behind this last stratagem there is an ambitious scheme of a world state ruled by the American businessmen. (The book contains no bibliography, no quotations – except those from the communist literature).

A selected group of Western sociologists is violently branded. George Gurvich is called a "Machist," or Claude Levy-Strauss "a reactionary."[2] The contributions of Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead are "openly dictated by the attempts of reactionary circles to stir up hostility among peoples, to facilitate the policy of domination over the Asiatic nations, the policy of colonialism."[1] Jessie Bernard "justifies the use of any means, including espionage and subversion, to achieve a goal. She praises Hitler as a practical "expert" in the theory of strategic games."[2] Professor F. Ogburn prefers "not to notice such phenomena in the U.S. as the impoverishment of millions of toilers on the one hand, and the increasing fabulous profits of the monopolists on the other."[3]

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[1] Demidenko, A. I., *A Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Sociology*, publication of Advanced Party school and A.O.N. attached to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (the Chair of Dialectical and Historical Materialism), Moscow, 1958; reviewed by Symmons, Konstantin, in *The American Sociological Review*, XXV, 1, February, 1960, 121–22. Another summary of the presentation of the anti-Western sociological pronouncements can be found in: Laqueuer & Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, Chapter 21, "The Soviet Attitude to Sociology," 185–201.

[2] *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, 1955, No. 2, III.

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[1] Ibid., 21.

[2] Bagramoc, E. & Lavrentiev, "Racist Inventions about the Japanese Nation," *Kommunist*, No. 9, 1956, 113–120.

[3] Episkposov, G. L., *On Some Aspects of Contemporary Reactionary Bourgeoisie Sociology*, All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge, Moscow, July, 1956, 6.

Castes, Outcastes, and the Sociology of Stratification

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INDIA is well-recognized as a society where are to be found those most striking of all social categories, the pariah castes, the Untouchables, whose occupations are regarded as so polluting, so morally defiling, that their practitioners must be kept segregated as much as possible from other members of society.[1] What is not so well-recognized, however, is that certain other Asian countries have possessed analogous social groups which bear a close resemblance to India's Untouchables. Furthermore, there are to be found throughout other parts of the world, in both the past and the present, systems of caste relationships which include in some instance notions of untouchability, if not the institution itself. In the former category are the Eta of Japan (Donoghue, 1957; Ninomiya, 1933), the Paekchong of Korea (Osgood, 1951), The Ragyappa of Tibet (Bell, 1924, 1928), as well as untouchable-like groups that have been recorded in China (Chang, 1955), Burma (Hutton 1946), and Ceylon (Hocart, 1950). In the latter category, are such widely divergent caste stituations as the American antebellum South (Dollard, 1949), Polynesia (Hocart, 1950), Tribal Africa (Fortes, 1950; Herskovits, U.K.), classical European antiquity, Latin America (Tax, 1952; Tumin, 1952), and modern European colonialism.

In this paper an attempt will be made to explore in necessarily preliminary terms the reasons for the occurrence of caste structures, and their most extreme manifestations, untouchable groups, in so many different places and in so many different sociocultural contexts. Obviously, unless one is to believe in multiple cases of unique social causation, societies displaying caste characteristics may be suspected of having structural properties in common which predispose them to develop along such lines once the right combination of historical events takes place.

The study of caste groups is but a particular aspect of the study of social stratification, and social stratification is to be found is one form or another in almost all human societies (Tumin, 1952, p.3). Outcastes are, of course, simply a variety of caste group, despite the misleading implications of the word used to designate them; their presence in a society announces that caste in one of its more rigid manifestations is to be found there. Their presence also announces in the case of Asia, that a mingling has occurred between certain indiginous social institutions of the society and what I shall later refer to as the 'Hindu Ethic' which has been introduced by the process of historical diffusion.

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[1] The Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (1955–1956) reveals that Untouchable groups number 55, 327,021 and that Scheduled Tribes number an additional 22, 511, 857. This yields a total of 77, 838, 878 who are defiled from the standpoint of orthodox Hinduism.

Social stratification is the formation of clusters of individual occupational roles into a ranked system of work categories. Stratification takes place whenever a society grows so complex that work[1] becomes occupational in character (i.e. specialized) and the number of occupational roles becomes so great that discreet discriminations cannot any longer be made between each for purposes of assigning rewards and prestige.[2] Roles become part of a category of roles whose reward - and prestige-value in the society are approximately the same; in other words, they form a social stratum whose position is to be understood in relation to other strata[3] consisting of other similarly clustered social roles of different rank. People occupying these social roles, and their kin, experience one another with greater frequency than they experience occupants of social roles lodged in other strata and, as well, come to have certain perceptions of the overall social order in common due to their similar general position and reward-level in it. In other words, the occupants of social roles in a given stratum of society come to form a subcultural group with an empirically differentiable standard of living, moral outlook, level and type of education, socialization pattern, etc., etc. The uniformity and rigidity of such subcultural variation in turn depends heavily upon whether a society's stratification system allocates occupational roles on the basis of ascriptive or achievement criteria. In the former case, role and role-occupant tend to be merged into a single qualitative entity whereas in the latter a distinction is made between the occupant of a role and the role itself. The type of stratification system in which person and occupational role are a single qualitative entity we may call *ascription-oriented;* the type of social stratification system in which a distinction is made between person and occupational role we may call *achievement-oriented.*[4] Obviously, the main reason for this difference is the desire to inhibit social mobility in the ascription-oriented stratification system and to encourage it in the achievement-oriented stratification system.[5] From the standpoint of subcultural patterns rooted in the system of occupational stratification, it is to be expected that the former will display more deeply developed and more static features of this kind than will the latter; their mode of integration will tend to be more *accommodative* and less *assimilative* than the latter. This is of crucial significance for understanding caste groups, as will be seen presently.

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[1] The term "work" is meant here in the broad sense of any type of full-time specialization.

[2] Figures supplied by the U.S. Government in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles show that an urban industrial society like the U.S.A. contains more than 20,000 occupations.

[3] In employing this "interaction" conception of the relative subcultural implications of achievement-oriented and ascription-oriented stratification, I am using notions inspired by the reading of Homans' (1949) *The Human Group.*

[4] The influence of Parson (1953) and his collaborators upon the use of this terminology and the ideas they convey is herewith acknowledged.

[5] The nature of industrial organization is such that values like "efficiency," "ability," and "ingenuity" must be encouraged in some measure as a condition of its successful operation. Parsons (1953), et. al., have put this more elaborately with their "pattern variables" concepts which speak of work roles as being filled on a basis of *universalism* (as opposed to *particularism*) and *achievement* (as opposed to *ascription*) and of persons in work roles being

Each of the two forms of social stratification is associated with a particular kind of civilization, the ascriptive type with non-industrial and the achievement type with industrial civilization. This also is crucial for understanding the formation of caste groups because caste, being simply the most exaggerated manifestation of ascription-oriented stratification, can originate only in non-industrial civilizations (although once in existence it may "carry over" into an industrial civilization, especially during the nascent phases of the latter's emergence). In their pure forms, however, each type would be mutually exclusive of the other and, although the pure expression of either would be possible in social reality, wherever industrialization has reached advanced stages of development occupational groups with ascribed status have tended to be sharply reduced in their number and importance. On the other hand, the large-scale "traditional societies" (i.e. non-industrial) have revealed only the most limited tendencies to disassociate the status of persons from the status of the work which they do.[1]

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evaluated according to *affectively neutral* (as opposed to *affective*) and *specific* (as opposed to *diffuse*) criteria. To encourage these qualities in social relationships means the encouragement of occupational mobility because *performance* rather than *nativity* is being made the basis for determining occupancy of an occupational role. This is another way of saying that role and role-occupant cease to be regarded as a unitary entity.

[1] China was one limited exception, as will be seen later on in the text. Many non-industrial societies which tended to identify person with occupational role, but which did not develop a strong "caste ethic," displayed lattitude for some mobility either through hypergamy or through simple change of occupation. Egypt, according to Ghurye (1957), want through different phases during her history on this score. During the "Pyramid age," although there was ascription-orientation for most categories, "the ... professions ... of a priest, a scribe, and a warrior, though generally they ran in the same families, yet there was no restriction against anyone following any of these callings, even if one's father might not have professed that particular calling but had carried on one of the other two." (p. 144) Things had changed by the earlier Ptolemies. By then, "only persons descended from priests could enter their profession." (p. 144)

An interesting aspect of stratification is the realization that the clustering of occupational roles displays a general similarity in all complex urban societies. The *highest stratum* contains predominantly roles concerned with the wielding of paramount power; the *intermediate stratum* tends to contain "Technical" roles, the specialized functions through which power is implemented and productivity is executed; and the *lower stratum* tends to contain menial and unskilled roles which permit neither prosperity nor power. Thus:

LEVEL I .... Leadership and Power
LEVEL II .... Technical Implementation
LEVEL III .... Menial, Unskilled functions

The main difference between industrial and non-industrial civilization is the way in which roles and role-occupants are regarded: as separate in the former, as identical in the latter. In both, however, the frequency of mobility through intermarriage or change in occupation is greater between two adjoining strata than between the two polar layers.

With these notions concerning the characteristics of social stratification in mind, let us now examine some of the features of non-industrial civilizations which predispose them toward the development of ascription-oriented stratification systems in general and caste groups in particular.

1. In non-industrial civilizations, technology is based upon manual and animal energy and productive activities are performed in kinship groups (Gould, 1959; Bennet and Depres, 1959) .This means that occupations are part of the intrafamilial socialization process and are thus internalized as an intrinsic part of the parent-child relationship. Occupations are "inherited" at birth, are believed to be transmitted in the "blood line", and are therefore seen as part of the person himself. This is especcially true with elite occupations, on the one hand, and reprehensible occupations, on the other.
2. The ruling group are a sacerdotal elite who believe and teach that their status is divinely ordained and mystically preserved. Much of their official duties consist of performing or overseeing rituals which stress the sacrosanctness of their position in contrast to the morally inferior position of their subjects. Rigid absolutism is the normal form of political power in non-industrial civilization.[1]
3. Groups of professional priests and literati who minister to the ritual needs of and render service as administrators for this sacerdotal elite are another important feature of the non-industrial civilization; they supply rationales for its pretentions and disseminate the culture's moral credo and its ritual expressions to the populace at large. It is these groups who, more than any others, formulate the moral premises of their society into a usuable 'ethic'.[2]
4. The urban centers of these civilizations house the sacerdotal elite, religious and administrative groups, the numerous other specialists who cater to the needs of civilized consumers, and the various menial groups who perform necessary unskilled tasks. These cities embrace a comparatively small proportion of the non-industrial society's total population (less than 20%) and they survive by their ability to expropriate the surplusses created (under administrative compulsion) by the majority living in small agricultural villages.
5. Peasant village communities contain the bulk of the nonindustrial civilization's population. They consist of small clusters of kinship groups (usually corporate families, but not always, cf., Tax, 1953) which produce food by manual and animal power and a rude technology simultaneously for their own consumption and for the market. These communities strive for as much organic stability as possible, i.e., they try to meet as many of their own subsistence and technical needs as they can. They represent a

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[1] Naturally, the model of the Braham Caste is uppermost in my mind here. But it seems that a functionally equivalent class came into being in almost all the "traditional" societies.

[2] The major civilizations of Asia got their basic non-industrial pattern or urban and village social organization and technology from the Fertile Crescent. This basic pattern could be called the "Bronze Age-type," inasmuch as it is this period in early history in which its original charateristics were formed. (Childe, 1941, 1946).

balance of centripetal and centrifugal forces, the former born from their efforts to subsist and from the considerable automomy they enjoy because technology is too weakly developed to enable productive activities to be removed from the nexi of kin group and local community; the latter born from the necessity that they produce a surplus and supply the needs of the urban centers and thus maintain numerous interactive relationships with these centers (Redfield, 1955, 1957; Gould, 1959), and from the inherent impossibility of any human community of any degree of complexity being totally self-sufficient.[1] Consisting of limited numbers of kin groups, peasant villages are marked by personal, face-to-face relationships which facilitate easy determination of identity and thus of status (Redfield, 1957). This is one of the most crucial factors in the causation and perpetuation of ascription-oriented stratification system.

III

Thus, ascription-oriented stratification systems are found in societies where occupation is rooted in kinship structures, where urban development is limited in quality and quantity by this fact because productive activities must be dispersed in countless rural communities whose primary concern is local subsistence, and where sacerdotal absolutism is the primary means employed by ruling elites to legitemize and perpetuate their pre-eminent position in the social order. Together, these conditions mean the virtual non-existence of social mobility and the forcing of occupations into hereditary molds. Occupational strata resultantly tend to be associated with groups of people who are perennially identified with and evaluated by the work they do. Should events take place in such societies which lead to any degree of serious and systematic moral formalization of the hereditary occupational distinctions, the result is the emergence of caste. By moral formalization is meant the development within the society of a religious system which presupposes that to some degree (the degree varying in different cases) the hierarchy of stratification reflects the different amounts of moral goodness and badness possessed by the members of society and that the ethical implications of this are that the various delimited groups must for their spiritual well-being practice endogamy and various other forms of social avoidance and exclusiveness. We may call this the emergence of a ‘caste ethic’.

The operation of a ‘caste ethic’ makes entirely understandable the existence of so-called outcaste groups.[2] When the occupational order is made the basis for the moral hierarchization of society, purity for the superordinate strata can be had only at the expense of impurity for the subordinate strata. This is the case because occupations adjudged morally inferior are just as essential to the successful operation of the society as are those adjudged morally superior (Gould, 1958). When seen in the context of the non-industrial society, this is especially important because most of the population lives in peasant communities where the quest for maximal organic stability is a paramount consideration. If the 'caste ethic' of a society proscribes occupational functions essential to the performance of agriculture, say, or to community sanitation, then in each such community the persons who perform these occupations must absorb the onus of moral reprehensibility connected with them but must perform them nevertheless because *someone* must do so if the community is to survive. This, in my opinion, is the fundamental social structural dilemma of the caste society and it is of necessity resolved by putting certain groups identified with impure tasks in the position of being simultaneously outside the pale ritually and inside the pale functionally. This is achieved not by ostracising the practitioners of such tasks from the community but by circumscribing the range of their social interaction in whatever way and to whatever degree the dominant and "pure" groups in the society believe is necessary to protect themselves from "contamination". We are speaking here, of course, of the extreme manifestations of this dilemma in which pariah groups occur who are subjected to maximum amounts of social avoidance and circumscription. But the general principle holds in any society where some measure of the' caste ethic' is to be found.

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[1] A view implicit in Childe’s evolutional theory.

[2] The term is useful to dramatize the unusual status of such groups, but from a theoretical standpoint it is highly misleading.

Non-industrial societies confronted with problems of multiethnic integration seem to be particularly prone to the evolution of a 'caste ethic'. India, the caste society *par excellence*, is also a classic case of ethnic variety. Since the dawning of the Bronze Age a twofold process of accommodation has taken place there. On the one hand, there has been a constant flow of peoples through the Khyber Pass, out onto the Hindustan Plain and thence into all reaches of the country. On the other hand, there has been a pattern of continuous movement of tribal peoples into the orbit of Hindu civilization. Groups in the former category have tended to stabilize into strata controlling privileged occupations because they have normally come into India as conquerors able to enforce their status claims. Groups of aboriginals have tended to stabilize into strata embracing the defiled and degraded occupations because they have lacked the social power to enforce their status pretentions. The aboriginals are variants of the so-called "Dravidian" (Ghurye, 1957) sub-racial stock – very dark, broad-nosed, squat; the Steppe peoples have been predominantly Caucasic and secondarily Mongoloid as far as their impact upon India has been concerned.

Thus, there are to be found in the various regions of India continua of racial and cultural characteristics which roughly correspond to the specific complex of accommodation that has occurred there historically. To a degree, Hinduism seems to represent the evolution of a moral-ethical system which has elaborately reconciled the great variety of groups who have come to make up the society sufficiently to permit their integration into the pattern of non-industrial civilization. This has been achieved, in general, by ratifying in ritual (or 'morally intrinsic') terms the position in the division of labour which the political and technological characteristics of a given group have enabled them to occupy relative to others.

In many other caste situations, similar problems of accommodation have arisen and seem to have been resolved along similar lines. The fact that such contact situations occur in the context of non-industrial civilizations where ascription-oriented stratification systems are preexisting social structures is in my view a most important variable in this. Another important variable is the fact that conquerors are normally a numerically inferior group with superior political power. Lacking the capability to completely absorb the conquered into their own ethnic-cultural mold, they must on the contrary find ways of avoiding being themselves absorbed into the majority whom they rule. By adopting and enforcing a conception of society which sees every perceived stratum as rigidly fixed in status and as a reflection of the differential moral worth of people, i.e., by formulating a 'caste ethic', this end can be accomplished. Most colonial situations of 19th Century vintage seem to be of this kind, as was the pre-Civil War American South; parts of tribal Africa have displayed this tendency, as have Central and South America.

But an ethnic interpretation will not by itself account for all the instances of the emergence of caste structures, even in societies where it can be shown that such factors have played a part in their development. It will not, for example, account for all the caste variety found in India. Although some high caste north Indian groups show a preponderance of Caucasic traits and many low caste groups are unmistakably of the racial forms associated with aboriginals, Ghurye (1957) notes that in general, "Brahmans of each of the linguistic areas show greater physical affinity with other castes of their region than with the Brahmans of other areas and of Hindustan." The rigidities inherent in the occupational stratification system of the non-industrial form of civilization are often adequate enough to engender attitudes of difference between the various stata that are quite comparable in kind and degree to those which might occur as a consequence of ethnic-cultural interaction. Where the two operate in concert, the foundation is laid for the most elaborate expressions of the 'caste ethic'. This would seem to be the real basis of India's 'classic' position in the realm of caste societies. But the ethnic factor is not essential to such developments, it would seem. Empirically, it is a matter of having to observe each case on its merits and in this way to determine what specifically in any given instance led to the crystalization of a 'caste ethic.' This becomes a project in itself of such scope that its initiation can only be suggested here. It is a matter of determining how and when a conception of morally intrinsic difference between occupational strata already distinguished from one another on an ascription-oriented basis came about. Quite likely it will be discovered in some instances, for example, that groups of low or pariah occupations have had attributed to them an alien origin by folk mythology even though in reality no such alien origin can be proved, this being due to the fact that a well-developed concept of 'difference'[1] can easily lead to ideas that those who do reprehensible and defiling work are so outside the pale that they must be of different origins. In this connection, Passin (1955) observes in the case of Korean, Tibetan and Japanese Untouchables:

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[1] My use of the word "difference" is intended to convey an implication which Pocock (1957) has brought out most vividly in his two essays on the subject of caste.

> Whatever the actual historical facts may be, their separation from society is often attributed to their alleged alien origin... These popular attributions express the feeling that outcastes are so different from oneself that they must be a different race. (p. 40)

IV

Let us turn now to the phenomenon of outcaste groups in various parts of Asia, for in them we find one of the most striking manifestations of the emergence of the 'caste ethic' in lands outside of India. It is desirable to consider these first because their nature makes it clear that Indian civilization has playep an indirect role in their development. In learning the nature of this role it will be possible to observe how a set of indigenous developments in each society were affected by cultural diffusion in a manner which caused the formation of a "caste ethic" sufficiently strong to produce a stratum of occupational roles possessing pariah status.

The societies who besides India have in their history experienced the development of clearly untouchable groups are Korea, Japan, and Tibet. In Korea this category was called Peakchong, in Japan it was known as Eta, and in Tibet it was called Ragyappa. All had in common the fact that they consisted of people whose occupational roles involved them in activities which from the standpoint of their respective cultures made them morally impure and thus simultaneously outside the ritual pale of their society yet essential to its proper (culturally speaking) functioning.

Both the Peakchong and the Eta were thought to be impure because their work dealt with the slaughtering of animals and the tanning of hides. The Eta were also responsible for the removal of dead animals and human bodies and for the removal of dirt. On this account, these two groups had to live in separate sections of the community removed as much as possible from the possibility of defiling contacts with the "clean" members of society. They were compelled to practice strict endogamy and were in general not considered worthy of being accorded the usual civil guarantees. One could not eat with them, go to their homes, or have any ordinary social intercourse with them. In all these respects the position of the Paekchong and the Eta were equivalent to the status of Indian Untouchables. And what is most important, the categories of occupational roles for which outcaste status was allocated were fundamentally the same as in India. People who killed animals, removed their carcasses, made leather products, or removed dirt, or, as Passin (1955) puts it, were associated occupationally with "blood, death and dirt", were adjudged outside the moral pale in all three places.

The Ragyappa of Tibet were scavengers and animal slaughterers and were responsible for clearing away carcasses. Some categories of Ragyappa were also responsible for breaking up the corpses of deceased monks for feeding to the vultures – a special trait of Tibetan Buddhism, or Lamaism. This caste group was compelled to live on the outskirts of Lhasa, practiced endogamy, and was held to be morally reprehensible and ritually dangerous to associate with. Yet, like the Eta and the Paekchong, as well as India's Untouchables, the work done by the Ragyappa was indispensable to Tibetan society, given its cultural premises; the group was functionally wholly within the pale despite being ritually outside it. They spared the orthodox highstatus Tibetans from moral contamination by themselves absorbing the full onus of ritual impurity; in exchange they enjoyed whatever advantages accrue from having an assured monopoly over certain occupations.

According to Hutton (1946), there was a time in Burmese history when pagoda slaves were regarded as pariahs but this was apparently not because they had anything to do with dead organisms or other "dirty" occupations in the Indian sense. Perhaps the sigificant fact is that a fully developed concept of untouchability existed in Burma even though somewhat different in content from the Asian areas so far considered. We will turn a little later to the question of how this phenomenon might have come about. Meanwhile, let us note only that throughout Malaya-Indonesia there is evidence of only the faintest manifestations of the 'caste ethic' despite obvious and long-standing cultural contact with nearby India. Bali and Timor are well-known exceptions to this, however. There a form of avowed Hinduism is found complete with caste structures.

Ceylon has caste groups but no officially recognized outcaste groups. In general, it may be said that Ceylon has a clearly well-entrenched 'caste ethic' but far less strong than one might expect given her close proximity to India. Put as a general observation, it would seem that to the north and northeast of India there is evidence of the occurrence of untouchability in forms extremely analogous to that found in India, but that to the south and southeast there is evidence of a much milder development of caste structures on the Indian model.

V

Throughout the whole region we have been considering above, non-industrial civilization began penetrating by 3000 B.C., and was universally well-established by 1000 A.D. The first civilization in this area came to western India; either it came as a matter of cultural diffusion from Mesopotamia or else it developed partially independently and then got accelerated and elaborated by contact with the former. This is, of course, the famous Indus Valley civilization whose great cities of Harappa and Mohenjo-daro indicate the existence of a highly differentiated population, an extensive and powerful sacerdotal elite, and a vast hinterland of lesser cities and towns and agricultural villages. Undoubtedly this is the foundation upon which Indian society arose and among the excavated sites from which our knowledge of this civilization comes have been discovered great bathing centers suggesting an early concern with ritual cleansing and coins imprinted with typical symbols of later Hinduism like the cobra, the Brahma bull, and the yoga sitting posture (Wheeler, 1953; Piggott, 1950).

Excavations make it plain that a stratified system of occupations existed. Not only does the architecture and lay-out of the cities, and the fact that such elaborate material culture could not have been achieved in the absence of specialists, suggest this but also studies of the neolithic villages integrated into the economy of the civilization suggest it, because some appear to have been specialized in supplying one or two commodities only to the urban centers (Linton, 1954).

At this stage it is virtually certain that occupational roles and their practitioners were defined as a single entity and that resultantly stratification was ascription-oriented. Since no translatable writing has ever been discovered we cannot be sure whether a true 'caste ethic' had made any of the occupational strata morally intrinsic. The existence of structures which must have been palaces, others which must have housed prosperous subordinates of higher authority, others which must have domiciled some sort of priesthood or professional ritualists, and so on down to structures which obviously betray menial status tell us that some kind of royal power was operative and that hierarchy was richly developed. The evidence of the public baths and the Hindu-like symbols lends to the hypothesis that some idea of ritual purity was operative, and thus that a 'caste ethic' had sprung up, but nothing can be known about its nature or range of applicability.

At any rate, the coming of the so-called Aryans around 1500 B.C. heralds the commencement of conditions in India which lead directly to the creation of a highly variegated system of caste groups. The specific impetus seems to have been supplied by contact between Aryans who were either racially different from the indigenous population, or else were different in ways which they could render socially visible through the cultural system their presumably superior military power was able to impose and which they rationalized into "racial" terms. The evolution of the Hindu religious classics reveals a gradual crystallization of a 'caste ethic' which divides society into a hierarchy of five morally intrinsic, occupationally-rooted strata: Priests (Brahamans) Warriors and Rulers (Kshatriya), Traders and Cultivators (Vaisyas), Menials (Sudras), and the utterly defiled occupations (Chandalas) (Hutton, 1946; Ghurye, 1957). The point is that ideally the system which emerged consisted of a priestly caste whose primary functions were ritual and sacerdotal, whose moral sanctity could be preserved only by the avoidance of numerous varyingly impure tasks whose onus therefore had to be born by other social groups (the other *varnas*) whose moral status was evaluated accordingly. As noted earlier, as the 'caste ethic' developed in India and as the resultant morally intrinsic occupational groups formed, one after another, their hierarchical arrangement reflected their relative socioeconomic power. Aboriginals consistently remained in the lower categories of the caste order since their hunting and gathering economies yielded them neither the force nor the numbers needed to seriously challenge the culturally more advanced people who filtered through the Khyber Pass.

Religion and secular power were somewhat bifurcated in the Indian civilization between Brahmans on the one hand and Kshatriyas on the other. It is felt by some that this bifurcation both reflects and was an important basis for the pattern of rivalry which later led to the emergence of Buddhism (Ghurye, 1957; Davids, 1903). The historic Buddha was a Kshatriya who was reared in the foothills of the Himalayas along the northern periphery of Hindustan and who founded a religion which clearly challenged the supremacy of the Brahman schools of mysticism which had enjoyed virtually uncontested supremacy in the ancient centers of Magadha and Kosala. The essence of early Buddhism seems to have been that its sought to modify the ritual and doctrinal extremism of Brahmanism and thereby to make a wider arc of humanity eligible to strive for and achieve spiritual enlightenment.

Caste distinctions were played down somewhat by early Buddhist doctrines, which came to be known as Hinayana. By the fourth century B.C. the new religion had grown important enough to become the creed of the Maurya Emperor Asoka, and to form a major part of the religious synthesis, compounded of Buddhism and Brahmanism, which he attempted to make the ethical basis of his vast empire. On his Rock Edicts he published the fruits of this distillation, as illustrated in the following quotations from two of them:

Rock Edict, No: 1: 1. No animal may be slaughtered for sacrifice.
2. Tribal feasts are not to be celebrated.
3. Docility to parents is good.
4. Liberality to friends, acquaintances and relatives, and to Brahmans and recluses is good.
Rock Edict, No: 2: 5. Not to injure living this is good.
6. Economy in expenditure, and avoiding disputes is good. (Davids, 1903).

By the beginning of the Christian era, Buddhism had come full cycle. Having had centuries to grow and develop and get incorporated into the social structure of several Indian dynasties, it had acquired more and more elaborate rites, doctrines and physical wealth and had become far removed from the rather elemental ethical credo originally propounded by Buddha. And what is essential in this from the standpoint of our discussion is that the modifications undergone by Buddhism made it emerge doctrinally quite close to the Hinduism from which it originally parturated. The Mahayana, or "Greater Vehicle", which came officially into being after the Council of Kashmir held during the reign of the Kushan Emperor Kanishka (120–142 A.D.), had taken over from Hinduism the doctrine of *avatars* (reincarnation), the doctrine of World Soul (*Fatma*) and numerous other items which the historical Buddha had rejected or played down (Rawlinson, 1953). And perhaps what is most important for Buddhism's role in helping to generate a 'caste ethic' in other parts of Asia (for such is the assertion of this essay) is that both of its forms retained the Hindu abhorrance of doing violence to living things (*Ahimsa*). But before going further, it is necessary to examine the pattern of development of non-industrial civilization in the rest of the Far East.

The other great center of Farther Asian civilization was China. A neolithic phase was dawning along the Hwang Ho River by 2000 B.C. and the idea of urban life, and the metallurgical and other specializations on which it was based, had spread to this region by the middle of the second millenium B.C. (Linton, 1954). Out of these beginnings emerged the great sequence of Chinese dynasties which produced a civilization rooted, like all non-industrial societies, in a peasant-village economy and crowned with one of the most remarkable administrative structures ever achieved in antiquity. The imperial political system of China was based upon sacerdotal absolutism which conceived of the emperor as a supreme and unquestioned ruler responsible for performing rituals assuring the health, tranquility, and productivity of society. But the great bureaucratic system which supplied Chinese dynasties with the administrative structure and personnel capable of marshalling and utilizing vast resources of men and material in the service of the state was an influence which made Chinese social stratification somewhat a typical of non-industrial civilizations. For it was achievement-oriented. (Goodrich, 1951; Chang, 1955).

Although there were well-developed tendencies toward fusing persons with their occupational role, the "civil service" separated person and workrole to the degree that individuals could advance to new positions if their performance on the Confucian examinations warranted it.

In reality, entry into the bureaucracy was confined almost exclusively to one stratum, the gentry, since literacy was presupposed as a condition of candidacy – a qualification that this one group in the society could consistently fulfil but which members of other groups, such as the peasantry, rarely could.

In addition to supplying ethical canons for a "merit system" of bureaucratic mobility, the 'Confucian ethic' (formulated by Confucious about the same time as Buddha founded his 'ethic') supplied justification for deposing an emperor whenever natural calamities or national disasters reached a magnitude which suggested that he was lacking in virtue and thereby failing in his sacerdotal obligations. Thus, the core 'ethic' of Chinese civilizations contained features which could be said to be diametrically opposed to a typical "caste ethic" like Hinduism or a modified "caste ethic" like Buddhism. This is an important point to keep in mind when considering the question of Buddhism's impact on Chinese civilization.

Both Korea and Japan got the basic structure of their civilization from China by cultural diffusion. Neither borrowed the "Confucian ethic" in a form which led to achievement-oriented patterns of administrative selection or political skepticism, however. Their imperial systems were much more the usual types of hereditary, sacerdotal absolutisms which have marked most non-industrial civilizations. Stratification was ascription oriented.

Japan, in addition, had the doctrine of Shintoism which, as one author (Desai, 1958) puts it, sees "the universe as composed of a myriad sentient parts, a nature worship of which the mainspring was appreciation rather than fear, and an ancestor worship that springs from ... the sun-goddess." He continues:

> "As one might expect in a cult so concerned with nature, most of its observances have to do with growth and decay. Growth is good and decay is evil, life is desirable, death is abominable. So we find on the one hand prayers and thanksgiving for the harvest or the birth of a child, and on the other a severe ritual to guard against or to wash away the pollution of sickness and mortality. It is in this that the Shinto cult develops rituals of purification, gratification and worship so similar to the rituals developed under the influence of the Hindu pantheon..." (p. 406)

In short, Shintoist Japan had the kernel of a 'caste ethic' in the pre-Buddhist period. "It was upon this native cult that the science and philosophy of Buddhism impacted." Pre-Buddhist Korea also revealed tendencies to equate moral stature with occupational stratum, but probably not as much so as Japan. Observes Passin (1955):

> "There was ... already inherent in the early Confucianism of Korea a predisposition to consider that the lower the occupation, the more immoral, the more lacking in virtue, it was." (p. 37)

Southeast and South Asia got their patterns of civilization via India and got later infusions of religion, both Brahmanism and Buddhism, from the same source (Linton, 1954). But civilization dawned much later in these regions and in no instance did civilizations of the depth and magnitude of China and India emerge there. Yet their basic characteristics were nevertheless those we have noted as being typical of non-industrial civilizations.

Tibet got patterns of civilization as a byproduct of her position astride the trade routes between the Far East and the rimland regions of south and southwest Asia. These patterns were meagre and sufficient to give rise to only a few truly civilized (i.e. urban) loci, namely Lhasa, Shigatse, and one or two others. (Shen and Liu 1953), The country is too poor in soil and too mountainous in terrain to support a large-scale non-industrial civilization. Thus. Tibetan society has really comprised a few cities of limited facilities and complexity, housing ascetic bodies who worship a "God King" and who profess a variety of Buddhism, and surrounded by a nomadic-pastoralist hinterland. But what stratification there is is heavily ascription-oriented.

VI

The general social structural setting of the section of Asia wherein untouchability has occurred has been described and related to our general theoretical views concerning social stratification. Now we can turn our attention to some of the specific combinations of events which within this area gave rise to a "caste ethic" and the resultant social groups in some parts, to only the barest suggestion of the phenomenon in others, and to no 'caste ethic' and concomitant social structures at all in still others.

Regarding Japan, Korea, and Tibet, the crucial variable seems to have been the entry of Mahayana Buddhism. Especially in Japan, where Shintoism already had set the stage for a 'caste ethic,' the arrival of Mahayana in the seventh century A.D., with its aversion to violence toward living thing and its elaborate doctrinal and organizational structure, brought about the crystallization of a morally intrinsic attitude toward occupations concerned with "blood, death, and dirt" and thereby brought the Eta into being. As for Korea, the Paekchong are to be found as a clearly untouchable group after the coming of Mahayana Buddhism in the sixth century A.D. Notes Passin (1955):

> "When Buddhism began to take hold in Korea ... its proscription of the killing of animals and its vegetarianism played a very important role. The normal contempt for menial occupations was joined by the Buddhist judgement that they were not only contemptible by evil." (p. 37)

The Ragyappa, by the very nature of one of their chief functions (breaking up corpses), presuppose the occurrence of Lamaistic Buddhism as a condition of their existence. They are defiled because their ritualistically essential task is blood-stained and deeply abhorrent. They are in this regard a typical social manifestation of a 'caste ethic'.

South and southeast Asia, where civilization was less developed and later in coming and where Hinayana Buddhism was the main religious diffusion, show few really well-developed untouchable or other caste groups. Social stratification throughout the area was ascription oriented and thoroughly hierarchized, of course, and this meant that people were evaluated in accordance with their occupational role. But a 'caste ethic' provoking abhorrance of lowly occupations and enjoining elaborate patterns of social avoidance and ritual purification in case of contact seems to have been absent. Timor and Bali have castes on the Hindu model and this seems clearly the result of survival there of a very early Brahmanic incursion (Linton, 1954). We have noted that Burmese temple slaves were rated as pariahs at one time but this appears to be the only genuinely caste group the country has known and even this group was not a major or permanent feature of the society.

Only in Ceylon, among the areas affected by Hinayana are there to be found reasonably well-developed caste groups, and even here the existence of outcaste groups is denied. But it is clear that a 'caste ethic' exists which, as Hocart (1950) puts it, has made untouchability a fact of life, even though an officially unacknowledged one:

> "I am not aware that at the present time any distinction is made in Ceylon between low castes and people outside the caste system (sic), outcastes. Yet if the term does not exist, the institution does: the Rodiyas are completely outside the pale ... they are completely excluded." (p. 6)

Barbers, drummers, potters, and the like all form intrinsic parts of the sacrifical structure of the Ceylonese caste system and thus have had added to their normally low status the onus of being considered ritually repellant. Respecting washermen, Hocart suggests that their "low rank" has "something to do with ... the washing away of menstrual blood." In other words, in Ceylon, occupations are regarded as a property of the persons performing them, stratification is resultantly ascription oriented, and the hierarchical differences between occupational strata are regarded as morally intrinsic.

Ceylon's 'caste ethic' clearly got its main impetus from the entry of Hinayana Buddhism. This began during the reign of Asoka (Smith, 1958) when, it is alleged, this great ruler sent his son at the head of a missionary delegation to convert Ceylon to the "Dhamma." What specific qualities might have existed in pre-Mauryan Ceylonese civilization to enable it to develop a stronger 'caste ethic' than other areas affected by Hinayana is not clear. Perhaps migrations of people already steeped in the values of Indian social organization, due to the closeness of the island to the Subcontinent, set the stage for this later spectacular development.

However, we have seen that in general the portions of Asia where the most clear-cut caste structures emerged were those which had developed the most complex non-industrial civilizations and had received Mahayana Buddhism by diffusion later on – viz., north and northeast Asia. The areas where the least clear-cut caste structures emerged were those which had developed smaller scale non-industrial civilizations and had received, primarily, Hinayana Buddhism by diffusion later on – viz., south and southeast Asia.

Clearly then, Buddhism in its two forms contained in its structure, to varying degrees, notions about existence and morality which when applied to the everyday affairs of men engendered a 'caste ethic' – one which especially tended to generate so-called outcaste groups due to the strong horror of uncleaness and killing. This becomes understandable when we recall that Buddhism in its two principal forms originated in India, the caste society *par-excellence.*

We have already noted some of the events and conditions associated with the rise of Buddhism in India. Hinayana was the original form propounded by Buddha and his immediate followers; it was a simple ethical-moral system, shorn of many of the major doctrinal and ritual tenets of Brahmanism and perhaps akin to later Buddhistic development in a manner analogous to the relationship between "Nazarene" Christianity and later "Pauline" Christianity (cf. Gibbon, 1941). But in either form, Buddhism was Indian, a product of men culturally rooted in the social structure of India and concerned with struggles and rivalries between groups indiginous to that society.

Buddha was a Kshatriya. As Crooke (1897) says:

> "Buddha would undoubtedly have called himself a Hindu, and admitted that his was only one of the multitudinous sects which Hinduism is always throwing off ... the movement was possibly as much social as theological. It found, on the one hand, a haughty, bigoted priesthood, on the other an aristocracy ruthless in its coercion of the lower races." (p. 67).

The point is that ideas of purity, of abhorrance of killing, and of *translating these ideas into patterns of avoidance and other social forms,* were not alien to Buddhism in practice, but were on the contrary a rather natural expectation given its gestation in India and in terms of prior Brahmanic moral-ethical premises and their social manifestations. Ghurye (1957) is most explicit about this:

> "... according to later works dealing with Buddha's life, Buddha is never represented to have chosen any but the families of the two higher castes of his previous birth. In the opinion of the great majority of the monks, caste distinctions had value even after persons had joined the brotherhood ... From these facts we conclude that in the matter of caste-restrictions the preachings and actions of Buddha had only a general liberalizing effect. He does not seem to have started with the idea of abolishing caste-distinctions, nor do his actions, as described in the Jataka-stories, demonstrate an utter indifference towards the accident of birth; much less do they evince any conscious effort to annihilate caste." (pp. 71–72).

Within India, where a stronger 'caste ethic' had been achieved under Hinduism, Buddhism in either form was a "liberal" doctrine in the sense that its moral tenets engendered a milder 'caste ethic'. But Buddhism's great significance was its messianism, and I contend that the ethical implications of its doctrines gave rise to a 'Hindu ethic' in certain other Asian societies which had wholly lacked a 'caste ethic' or had manifested it in a form weaker than it took in Buddhism.

Mahayana was especially influential in this respect because it reincorporated many of the Hindu doctrinal concepts which Hinayana had rejected and developed an overall structure (intellectual sophistication, large-scale monastic organization, powerful synthesizing tendencies) which suited it to the task of penetrating the great non-industrial civilizations to the north of India. Mahayana achieved it definitive form in the crucible of northwestern India during the period of Indo-Scythian domination when Hellenism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Chinese civilization converged. This was the so-called Kushana period when, as Rawlinson (1953) declares, "Buddhism ... was transformed from a highly individualistic philosophy of life into a world religion, and spread along the Central Asian trade routes ... to China itself." (p. 79).

Yet China did not develop outcaste groups in the full sense of the word. She had many of the preconditions which in Korea and Japan conduced to a 'caste ethic' but, as earlier noted, China's 'Confucian ethic' with its acceptance of certain achievement-oriented principles worked at opposite purposes to the former. There is another factor too which may have been just as important in preventing Buddhism from gaining the kind of hold on Chinese civilization necessary to promote a 'caste ethic'. One might call this the failure of Chinese Buddhism to rise above "politics" and achieve a position of absolute sacrosanctity. This in turn might have been a function of China's imperial structure which made the emporer's status and virtue dependent upon his ability to maintain order and prosperity; for when a dynasty was discredited, many of the groups and ideas it supported were rejected with it.

Space does not allow a long discussion of this point, but perhaps the rough lineaments of the argument can be traced. Mahayana Buddhism began making serious inroads into China during the second century A.D., as the Second Han Dynasty was in process of devastating collapse. A passage from Arthur F.

Wright's matchless essay (1957) on the "interaction" of Buddhism and Chinese society describes the setting:

> "... the upper level of the Han sociopolitical order was riven by conflict ... the moral and political sanctions of an earlier day were undermined and discredited ... a mood of uncertainty and questioning developed within the elite."
>
> "Upon the peasantry fell the burden of supporting a corrupt and divided upper class... In the years before 317, therefore, the peasantry is sunk in misery and sullen discontent... The break-up of the Han peasant society, then, is one of the factors that prepared the way in this period for the spread of an alien religion." (p. 20)

For a time, according to Wright, Taoism filled part of this gulf, but ultimately it was Buddhism which took over the major role as a "protestant" doctrine to which the elite could turn intellectually and the masses could turn ritualistically. Buddhism grew in importance throughout the period of chaos which followed Han's disintigration and reached its climax during the next period of dynastic florescence, the Sui-T'ang (Sui unification of the north occurred from 581–589). But even at its florescence Buddhism never succeeded in disassociating itself from the dynasties which officially supported it. Thus, when the T'ang emporers began losing esteem due to waning of their imperial fortunes, a resurgence of Confucianism occurred which grew to such degree that by the ninth century, Buddhism was experiencing persecution. After 900, the Buddhism that remained was far short of the universalistic moral position it had come to enjoy in so many other parts of Asia. Chinese civilization had incorporated some Buddhistic notions into its dominantly Confucian synthesis but had left the "ecclessiastical structure" confined to sectarian status. From China, however, Mahayana had diffused to Korea and Japan and came to enjoy there a much more commanding moral position.

Yet Buddhism was not entirely without its effects upon Chinese social stratification. During the Sui-T'ang, Buddhism's ethical rejection of killing was reflected in certain state policies:

> "The suspension of state business was decreed for certain of the Buddhist holy days, and the state ordered the cessation of all executions, killing, and butchering during the days of special observances in the three months of Buddhist abstinence. The severity of the penal code was somewhat moderated, and the death penalty was used more sparingly." (Wright, 1957, p. 32).

Moreover, after Buddhism arrived, a category of occupational roles came to be adjudged so abominable that their practitioners were declared ineligible to take the Confucian examinations. These were the so-called "Mean People" who, according to Chang (1955), included policemen, lictors, jailors, gatekeepers coroners, grain collectors, and runners. Chang's list refers to a later period than that being dealt with here and it is to be wondered if earlier some roles such as butchers, barbers, tanners, etc., might not also have been included in the category. The evidence in hand, however, suggests that for whatever reasons the tendency to think of menial jobs as morally intrinsic was not wholly absent.

VII

We can but briefly allude to other parts of the world where some sort of 'caste ethic' has arisen. In Polynesia (Linton, 1954, Hocart, 1950), tribal life grew sufficiently complex to give rise to some measure of stratification. Nobility and commoners were subdivided on the basis of a concept of *mana*. Royal personages could not be approached by the laity without causing dreadful consequences. In western Africa, the royal leader was morally sacrosanct while iron-workers, on the other hand, were considered morally defiled and worthy of isolation and avoidance. In Africa and America, Whites bar intermarriage and many forms of social intermixing in response to a moral dictum that dirt, meniality, degeneracy, etc., are traits inherent in Negroes and hence "contagious" if allowed to enter the White blood-stream. Segregation and Apartheid originate in the effort of a Caucasian minority group with a majority of power in their hands to cling to privileges wrung at the expense of a vast, technologically backward, politically weak Negro populace. But this basic struggle has been gradually rationalized into a 'caste ethic' which makes ascribed differences in privileges and functions between the two groups morally intrinsic.

Colonialism, involving peoples of radically different ethnic and cultural antecedents, is but a more general manifestation of the same process. It is perhaps the one form of casteism which can be originated by an industrial nation since it involves an effort by the masters, who come to conceive of themselves as morally superior because technologically superior, to keep a non-industrial people (deemed morally inferior on that account) from making the transition to industrialization. For in this way, the former are able to use the resources and the consumptive inclinations of the latter without incurring the risks of competition, loss of markets, and weakened political power which come about with the attainment of cultural and technological parity. It is this complex of motives which help supply the basis for the engendering of a 'caste ethic' in such situations. It is a moral formalization of distinctions brought about by the differential distribution of power and its technological well-springs.

It is not really as simple as it is made to appear here, however, since the relevant moral-ethical features of specific colonial-contact situations need to be gone into to see why some areas developed a more pronounced 'caste ethic' than others. Black Africa would be a desirable focus for this type of investigation because of the obvious difference from colony to colony in the degree to which Negro-white differences were rationalized along caste lines. Such is beyond the province of this paper, however.

Finally, Greece, Rome, and Medieval Europe require a brief comment. In the Graeco-Roman world there was a distinction between freemen and slaves which had some caste-overtones but, it is suggested, only slightly. Greek democracy and Roman Law both worked against the formalization of truly defiled groups devoid of all normal civil guarantees. Church Universalism during the MiddleAges had a similar effect, although the social order was rigidly ascription-oriented and some of the dirty occupations caused their practitioners to be viewed with some measure of abhorrance. But it cannot be said that a full 'caste ethic' prevailed which adjudged groups of functionally essential workers as outside the ritual pale.

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Pattern of Ritual Friendship in Tribal India

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FRIENDSHIP as one of the voluntary forms of inter personal relationships has not been given due consideration by the social scientists, though it has been to a certain extent studied by sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists but the largest share and credit goes to the psychologists. The sociologists, and particularly, the anthropologists have grossly neglected this part of interpersonal relationships, because they have been preoccupied with the studies of kin relationships and behaviour among different kins.

The present paper, therefore, attempts to describe the concept of ritual friendship in Tribal India.[1] It also focusses on some dimensions of friendship which may be taken up for cross cultural validation.

Of more than twenty monographs consulted on the tribal peoples of India twelve reported ritual friendships. Materials on more casual friendships received only incidental mention. The space devoted to friendship in these monographs ranged from two to twelve pages of quite uneven detail. Since ethnographers vary greatly in what they report, the difference in this coverage cannot be considered a measure of the salience of ritual friendship in the twelve tribes.

There are certain striking uniformities in the descriptions. These may derive in part from the fact that nine of the twelve tribes are concentrated in Assam, Bihar and Orissa, in part from the fact that the twelve tribes all have a mixed hunting and horticultural economy and share a similar kinship organization that stresses partilineality, patrilocal residence and clan exogamy and finally, in part from the fact that only six ethnographers are responsible for the twelve monographs.

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[1] The following sources have been consulted for information on ritual friendship in twelve tribes of India.

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A summary of the sources consulted is given in Table I.

Table I

Summary of Sources

Tribe	*Location*	*Language group*	*Author*
Baiga	Central India	Chhattisgarhi	Elwin, 1939
Bhutia	Orissa	Munda	Roy, 1935
Birhor	Bihar	Munda	Roy, 1925
Bondo	Orissa	Dravidian	Elwin, 1950
Kharia	Bihar	Munda	Roy, 1937
Lakher	Assam	Tibeto-Burman	Parry, 1932
Ao Naga	Assam	Naga	Mills, 1926
Rengma Naga	Assam	Naga	Mills, 1937
Muria	Central India	Gondi	Elwin, 1947
Oraons	Bihar	Munda	Roy, 1915
Sontals	Orissa	Munda	Archer, 1947
Tharus	Uttar Pradesh	Tharuhati (mixed Hindi)	Srivastava, 1958

Types of Friendship.

The analysis of the data suggested the possibility of distinguishing three types of ritualized friendship. No sharp line can be drawn between these types, but they serve here as rough and ready points of reference.

Serious type: Entails lifelong obligations and responsibilities; is entered into with elaborate rituals.

Non-serious type: Entails fun and romance; may or may not involve lifelong obligations and commitments.

Trivial type: Shortlived "going about" pacts, emotional involvements, and obligations trivial.

An analysis of the terms used by each tribe to designate friendship does not yield a sharp and consistent general typology of friendships for the twelve tribes. This is due in large part to the non-comparability of the source material even when the same ethnographer reports on different tribes. Any attempt to give such a tabulation quantitative expression would lend the results a spurious precision. Nevertheless, an analysis of some forty-five friendship terms in twelve tribes reveals that a specific term for friendship occurs more frequently for serious male friendship than for serious female friendships (type 1); and that specific friendship terms are far more numerous for serious friendship and whether male or female, than for non-serious friendships. Metaphoric terms, like tree and flower names are common for female alliance (serious or non-serious) and for non-serious and trivial alliance (male, female and cross-sex). Serious friends in five tribes (Birhor, Baiga, Kharia, Bondo and Tharu) do not address each other by name but by specific friendship terms. This is considered a mark of respect.

In general, therefore, some virtue seems to attach to the rough typology suggested here with the understanding that the terms "serious," "non-serious" and "trivial" are simply reference points on a continuum. The most highly structured and valued alliances are the serious male friendships. The least structured and valued alliances are the trivial cross-sex friendships. It is, in fact, difficult to determine whether the latter should really be considered friendships or are in fact joking relationships between potential spouses.

The data do not deal systematically with psychological implications of friendship, but some ethnographers comment casually about the emotional basis for formation of ritualised friendships. For example, among the Birhor,

> ... when two boys perceive a strong attachment for each other and desire to make the bond permanent, they enter into a form of artificial friendship with the approval of their parents.[2]

Non-serious friendships appear to be more spontaneous and more quickly formed than serious ones.

In serious friendships, the inaugural ritual is reminiscent of wedding ceremonies. The contracting individuals are usually older adolescents or adults and are, therefore, fully conscious of the responsibilities and obligations of this relationship. Feasting, entertainment, gift exchanges, and some times oaths pledging lifelong friendship are some of the common features of this ritual which may occur at the home of either friend. For example, among the Bondo, the friends invite friends and relatives to a brief ceremony. A priest tells them to rise and addresses the Supreme God (Mahprabhu) in a brief prayer to invoke His blessing and make Him a withness to the alliance:

> "O Mahaprabhu, O Pat Khanda Mahaprabhu. these two have somehow or other come together in a surprising friendship. Let this friendship never be broken. Let their affection for one another be equal. Let there be no deceit between them. If this friendship should ever break, then let my own eyes be lost."[3]

Thus the prayer not only gives the two friendships strength and inspiration, but it also contains threatening sanctions. Such friends enter into an alliance by a solemn covenant and remain reliable allies for life.

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[2] Roy, 1925, p. 527.

[3] Elwin, 1950, p. 39.

Non-serious friends (Type 2) generally do not swear a pact either before God or any group, nevertheless in some cases they accept in fact the desirability of continuing the relationship for their lifetimes. In such cases ceremonial gestures are less elaborate than in serious friendships. A boy or a girl after developing some liking for another, attaches a flower or the twig of a tree in the hair or on the ear of the chosen person. Thereafter that person is addressed as friend.

The behaviour and emotional data on serious and non-serious friendships suggest the following generalizations; Serious friendships to a considerable extent may be considered a sacramental bond. Such friends show each other much more deference than do non-serious or trivial friends. One has the impression that a postulated need for affiliation is more fully expressed in serious than in non-serious friendships, and that expressions of affection, support, confidence and respect are far more frequent in serious than in non-serious alliances. The serious relationship involves greater opportunities for interaction, for intimacy, and for intensity and these behaviours are exhibited in prescribed manners. The non-serious relationships permit expression of lightness and joking, of frivolous confidence with considerable latitude in the manner of expression. This dichotomy is reminiscent of respect and joking kin relationships.

Each tribe considered here presents a hierarchy of friendships. Serious friends occupy a higher social status in this hierarchy than non-serious or trivial friends.

Age and Duration of Friends.

The sources do not provide the exact ages at which friendships are formed. Approximate ages have been inferred from terms like "boy", "girl" "man" and "woman." It had been assumed that boys and girls refer to adolescents, men and women to adults. These assumptions have not been made arbitrarily since the author's judgment was based on the total description of friendship in a particular tribe before an age rating was given. Table II offers a summary of these data.

Tabel II

Ages at which serious Friendships are formed

Adolescents only	*Adults only*	*Both*
Bhuiya	Ao Naga	Kharia
Muria	Lakher	Oraons
Santal	Bengma Naga	Birhor
	Tharu	Bondo
		Baiga

Friendships in childhood and old age are not mentioned in the sources. It is assumed, therefore, that ritual friendships are not customarily formed at those ages, and that adolescence and early adulthood are the preferred periods for ceremonial friendship.

Another generalization that emerges from the data is that in no case do formal friendships cut across age groups. This does not mean that an exact equality of age between friends is implied, but only that the age range between them is not wide. In the five tribes where both adolescent and adult friendships are formed, they are contracted within the same age group.

The more serious friendships that involve lifelong obligations are generally formed between adults rather that between adolescents. This finding as to the significance of age for the stability of friendship is given support by work done on school friendships among children and adolescents in the United States.

Non-serious friendships may or may not last for life. The most striking difference between serious and non-serious alliances is that the termination of non-serious friendships does not incur as much social disapproval as in the case of the serious type. Among the Tharu, for example, the preson who breaks a serious friendship tie loses the respect and confidence of the entire community.

Unisexual and cross-sexual friendship.

For none of the twelve tribes are serious friendships across sex line reported. Friendships across sex lines are usually considered "light". Among the Rengma Naga, there are two types of cross-sex friendships. The more frequent and more weighty type is known as *logwa*, *lenyu*, *aziwata*, *etsupfu*. The terms may be freely used in reference situations, but if used to address a girl they may carry sexual connotations. This kind of alliance is contracted between an adult man and a woman coming from different clans. The second type of cross-sexual friendship is called *nyeshe*, the term coming from the name for the white beads which young girls wear. This is a triangular friendship formed when two adult men who are friends, not necessarily unmarried have a young girl to be their *nyeshe*. Thereafter the three only address each other by that term. The men are supposed to perform valiant deeds in honour of the girl, and she, in turn, must feast them. Mills writes: "It would be going too far to say that the men become the girl's lover, but it is generally understood that considerable liberties are permitted."[1]

Among the Kharia, a kind of friendship may be formally contracted between a man's sister and his wife's brother, between a man's brother and his wife's sister. This is called *goi* which is also the term used between girls who are friends. The prevalent custom of exchange marriage would seem to facilitate these cross- sex alliances. That they are equated terminologically with female friendship is an interesting point that deserves closer investigation.

Among the Muria, cross-sex friendships when they occur are usually made

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4 Mills, 1937, p. 152.

between kins, particularly between a man and his older brother's wife and the two have a joking relationship. This alliance is not a real friendship but if it does develop beyond the normal kin tie it may become formal friendship. Not only cross-sex, but also unisexual friendships are uncommon among the Muria. From childhood the Muria are trained to do things together, they have strong feelings against jealousy and anything that might provoke it and any kind of partiality or favouritism is resented by them; the institution that requires thy Muria boy to sleep every night with a different girl in the common dormitore (ghotul) is likely to discourage an exclusive attachment to a member of the other sex or to a member of his own. Perhaps the most perceptive explanation was given in answer to Elwin's querry "why are there so few friendships?" "Because we are more interested in girls."[1]

Thus, the encouragement of heterosexual and transient relationships seems to deter the Muria from enduring friendships either between the sexes or within sex lines. In most Muria villages, however, the special attachment a boy and a girl may feel for each other may be ceremonialized by a mock "marriage" in the *ghotul*. This is seriously performed and entails all the features of the real marriage. The other children take the part of the participants' families, and thereafter behave in accord with their assumed roles. After marriage, the boy and girl should be strictly faithful to eadch other, infidelity may lead to "divorce".

From this survey of the twelve tribal populations in India, the following conclusions can be reached on the dimension of sex in relation to friendship. Serious friendships are more frequently contracted between members of the same sex. Cross-sex friendships are rare and wherever they occur, are considered as less important than unisexual ritual friendships. They may also serve as a secondary reinforcement to the existing kin relationship or may culminate in marriage, thereby shifting their social role. No tribe has cross-sex friendship exclusively. With the possible exception of Oraon where demands on friends are great, males contract such alliances. They need not, or may never, be equated explicitly or implicitly with any kin relationship. Whatever social functions friendships fulfill (and these will be discussed below), they seem to be based primarily on individual initiative and wishes.

Range of friendships.

In no tribe it is customary to have more than one serious friend. Non-serious friendships, on the other hand, are sometimes contracted with more than one person. The Lakhers, for example, have two types of formal friends: the primary friend *(kei macha)* and the secondary friend *(kei hawti)*. Almost every Lakher has a primary friend and he does not worry much about making another of the secondary type. Moreover, he is not allowed to have a secondary friend unless the primary one agrees, since a primary friendship entails heavy trust, responsibility and confidence.

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[1] Elwin, 1947, p. 458.

In general terms, this suggests that there is a direct relationship between the seriousness (intensity) of a friendship and the number of friends a person may have. This is a hypothesis that warrants systematic study.

Place of friendship in the interpersonal relationships of a society.

The function of friendship may be divided into two broad categories, personal and social. As has been indicated earlier, ritualised friendships fulfill directly or indirectly certain social functions, but also meet need dispositions of individual personalities.

The literature indicates in various ways the importance of serious friendships in comparison to other interpersonal bonds. Briefly summarised, the following comments have been made by the ethnographers on this subject.

> Equally sacred to blood relationship among the Kharia.[1]
> Almost as binding as marriage for the Muria.[2]
> Equal to blood relationship among the Birhor.[3]
> Equal to the brother relationship among the Santal.[4]
> Higher than ties of blood or marriage for the Tharu.[5]

Thus most of the tribes tend to value friendship as much as the kin relation. The Tharu alone places friendship above all other interpersonal relationships. They have a proverb, "One may leave one's brother but one cannot leave one's friend."[1]

When friends are considered as the equivalent of brothers, this may either mean that the relationship is intense or that the friends assume some of the duties of a real brother. Among the Santals, for example, friends are brothers by courtesy and share the other's wedding expenses.

Thus, it seems clear that friendships find a reference and pattern in the sibling and other relationships but that in no tribe is friendship actually confused with a kinship tie. Four tribes (Rangma Naga, Ao Naga, Bondo and Bhuiya) stress the importance of equality between friends. This is a quality that cannot exist between kin in these societies where kin relations are meticulously hierarchized.

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1 Roy, 1937, p. 161.
2 Elwin, 1947, p. 456.
3 Roy, 1925, p. 533.
4 Archer, 1947, p. 60.
5 Stivastava, 1958, p. 100.
6 Ibid. p. 100.

Role of the family and community.

The role played by the families of friends can be considered in terms of the influences exerted on the formation and the maintenance of ritual friendships. The interactions and obligations between the families of ritual friends also warrant consideration.

Permission of the family to enter into a ritual friendship is not required by nine tribes. However, for the Kharia, Birhor, and Oraons, family approval is required before a ritual friendship may be contracted. For instance, among the Oraons, boys and girls do not make friends before they obtain the formal approval of their parents, who usually give their consent but warn, "You should bear in mind that you will have to remain friends to the end of your days."[1] One should not assume, however, that the selection of particular individuals is made by the family. The data indicates that in almost all cases friendships are a matter of personal choice.

Once a ritual friendship has been established, the friends' families begin to interact in their new roles. For instance, among the Tharu, friends assume each other's entire family obligations, and must be consulted on every important family affair. Among the Birhor and Kharia, friends assume the role of blood relations. They observe each other's ceremonial pollutions and taboos at birth, death and marriage. This serves to bring all concerned into greater interaction.

Thus, even the individually determined choice of ritual friends may involve each partner in the other's family and community obligations. The broad social implications of such serious ritual obligations serve to perpetuate a relationship whose genesis was purely dyadic.

The importance of friendship to the internal equilibrium of a whole community is most markedly illustrated by the ritual friendship *(sahiaro)* between women among the Oraons. Since village exogamy is practised in this patrilineal society, wives generally come from different villages "and are not therefore expected to be naturally friendly to one another."[2] The permanent residents are conscious of the desirability of maintaining village strength and solidarity not only by common bonds of habitat, but also by "an artificial form of relationship which they term "village relationship" *(gao nata)*.[3] They therefore encourage the married women to enter into *sahiaro* friendships with each other. Such a ritual friendship is practically regarded as a blood relationship so far as the two families are concerned. The Oraons consider the *sahiaro* relationship as a matter of village necessity to protect the entire settlement against witchcraft and hostility from another village. This alliance of married women provides every woman with the opportunity to have a friend, it brings families into closer relationship than even the ties of village relationship *(gao nata)*, and it assures the woman, her family and finally her entire community against risk, disease, and calamity that alien spirits might, at the beck and call of outsiders, precipitate. Despite the social functions of this relationship, the selection of a ritual friend is considered an individual and voluntary choice on the part of the two principals.

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[1] Roy, 1915, p. 404.
[2] Ibid, p. 397.
[3] Ibid, p. 388.

Summary and conclusions.

There are in tribal India two broad types of ritualised friendships: serious and non-serious. In comparison to non-serious friendships, serious ones are more commonly formed between adults, whether male or female, then between adolescents; they are usually more enduring; they are more commonly entered into by males than by females and are almost always between members of the same sex; they have specific, non-metaphoric terminology; they are highly valued socially and are considered as important as kin ties; they are reinforced by the social ties; they are established between two groups of kin. Serious ritual friendships suggest in their ritual and behaviour an analogy to marriage.

Serious friendships may be characterised as enduring and dependable. They involve two persons in obligations, trust, confidence and respect. Non-serious friendships may be characterised as more romantic and light in emotional tone and less stressful of the obligations involved. They suggest in emotional tone an analogy to a love affair.

Turning from certain generalizations based on the scanty material available for tribal India to certain universal propositions, it is further suggested that both the unisexual and cross-sexual friendships are less intense on a society that encourages heterosexual relations from childhood on.

The following characteristics may be suggested as basic to all friendship relations:

1. it is voluntary;
2. it is dyadic;
3. there are reciprocal obligations,
4. there is mutual affect (phrased variously as confidence, reciprocity, exclusiveness etc.).

For *ritual friendships*, certain additional characteristics should be added:

1. it is between non-kin;
2. it is socially highly valued;
3. it is given symbolic formulation (in ceremonies, in terminology, etc.).

Finally, on the continuum from the most elaborate type of ritual friendships to the most incidental kind of voluntary, dyadic relationship in which reciprocal obligations and mutual affect operate, it may be possible to establish a series of reference points that may have universal application whether or not any one society has given them formal recognition.

Social Change and Social Structure in Transitional Societies*

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RELATIVELY little is known about social change although it is a subject on which a great deal has been written. Social scientists stress the study of the dynamic in social systems, but few accept the risks involved in gaining the knowledge and skills needed to initiate and measure changes in functioning social systems. We are only at the initial stage of the systematic codification of the working knowledge and skills necessary for the researcher to get into, and maintain himself within the social science laboratories of functioning social systems. This is a preliminary attempt to establish such a beachhead.

While social scientists are not spending any sizable proporion of their time in learning how to initiate and maintain change in functioning social systems, a wide variety of practitioners are. These include at one extreme the consultants and administrators of programs of technical assistance, and at the other extreme, the "grass roots" technician. Most of these men know a great deal intuitively about the problems of working with people in situations of change. Their work, however, is continuously subverted by their lack of theoretical comprehension of processes of social change.

It is the intention of this paper to focus on the analysis of the structure of social relationships present in transitional societies, and their consequences for the absorption of change. It will be necessary to examine the matrix of norms, values, and customs as they order and control behavior, and permit of or resist social change. It will involve the consideration of the problem of what changes in structure will permit economic and social changes to be introduced with what functions and dysfunctions in the particular aspects or segments of a social structure. In a sense, then, this is an attempt to set out some basic considerations involved in the transcultural transmission of innovations in transitional societies.

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Culture Contact

When cultures come in contact with each other we may observe the initiation of change through such contacts. Culture contact occurs at several points simultaneously, and even the apparently isolated transfer of a culture trait is a complex process because of the functional relationships existing between different traits in any culture. The introduction of change in a culture contact situation must take into consideration the general cultural developments in the recipient society, and must be understood and desired by the populations of those countries. In culture contact situations involving the transfer of modern techniques it will involve changes in several dimensions. The primary change may be technological, but it is accompanied by associated changes in the fields of social relations, customs, habits, and often values and beliefs. No matter how circumscribed the culture item which is transferred, the adopting culture must make adjustments to integrate it into the cultural whole.

This does not mean that the introduction of technological change in transitional societies is bound to result in sweeping alterations in the institutional and value systems. It does not mean that the traditional systems of social control and integration will disappear. Cultural replacement is not synonymous with economic growth. The civilizations of transitional societies are in no danger of being replaced by the machine culture of the West.

Among the Cree Indians of the rapidly industrializing Hudson Bay area of northern Canada the outboard motor has been added to the canoe. No longer are the northern waterways quiet havens for the trapper or the fisherman as the Indian goes skimming by with his outboard motor wide open. However, in absorbing the outboard motor he failed to accompany this with the absorption of the outboard light on his canoe. Now at night, these lonely waterways are as dangerous as Times Square.[1]

The Transitional Society

The transitional society is one which is involved in change from subsistence production to specialization, exchange, and the production for markets. It is usually characterized by diverse levels of social organization and cultural tradition. Major factors which distinguish this type of social system are: the traditional land tenure system is undergoing both change and attack; a pattern of working for wages is emerging; patterns of saving and investment are slowly and with much difficulty coming into being; the net increase in population continues to grow; governmental activities and taxation are on the increase; and a pattern of slow growth of urbanization is to be found.[2]

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[1] This is based on my field notes during the summer of 1956.

[2] See B. F. Hoselitz, "Non-Economic Barriers to Economic Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, No. 1, March, 1952, pp. 8–21.

The transitional society is then a complex social system for which it is impossible to generalize from any particular segment. However, it is possible to characterize them as societies in which the habit of technological advance is missing. There is a lack of belief in the culture that change is available as a path to the reorganization of the traditional patterns. They are deficient in entrepreneurship, private and public. The social matrix of the legal and institutional framework serves as an obstacle to an open system of social mobility. The transitional society has problems of education and health that maintain the social system in a tight grip of changelessness.

Social Structure

It is only by studying a society's structure, its system of values, and the usages through which its structure functions and is maintained the we gain some idea as to how to introduce change.[1] The innovator is engaged in introducing change upon an arrangement of individuals and groups in a patterned set of interrelationships.[2] These relationships are defined and controlled by a complexity of norms, values, myths, and the more concrete facts of technology they share. The members of each sub-group in a social structure possess cultural and other attributes in common which they do not share, entirely, with the members of other groups. The uniformities which emerge result from the sharing of characteristics which are maintained by social pressures which involve leadership and the subordination of followers to leaders.

The introduction of an innovation produces alterations in the social structure. The strain, however, to which existing social relations are subjected differ with the kind of innovation. Social structure, on the other hand, through its arrangement of people relative to one another, orders change. Innovations, when they are functional to the society as a whole, are contributions to the persistence and ordered change of the structure of the larger society of which it may be a part. A social system faces the balancing of the force of cohesiveness of a social structure against that of innovations which tend to destroy this cohesiveness.

Transmission of Culture Traits

Any transfer of modern technology is a form of acculturation. It occurs, in general, at several points of contact simultaneously. It is involved in affecting the values of the group, and, there is, therefore, the need of knowledge of these values.

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[1] Talcott Parsons and N. J. Smelser, *Economy and Society*, The Free Press, Glencoe, I 11., 1956, p. 246.

[2] See statement of Simon Marcson in *Porceedings of Columbia University Seminar: Development of Pre-Industrial Areas: Theory, Research and Policy*, Columbia University, New York, October 8, 1957.

The social structure of any society constitutes an interrelated whole, and changes in one section will have repercussions on the others. It is important, in transcultural transmission, that this be recognized, since the social structure channelizes the existing systems of communication and cooperation. These channels have developed over generations and they have successfully established systems of working relations, and therefore the means for organizing available human resources. If these structural channels are not exploited in the transmission of culture traits, then a vital resource has been missed.

This can be seen in the case report of the ancient village assemblies or panchayats of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. Opler[1] reports that these village assemblies had for many years been in competition with the British courts and had suffered in influence and prestige.

> "After independence, in 1947, by the United Provinces Panchayat Raj Act, they were given legal status, encouragement, and considerable authority over local matters. Today the United Provinces government is making these *Gaon Panchayats* the center of its effort to introduce modern programs in improved agriculture and education."

Although it is difficult to say how effective these ancient legislatures are as channels of change, there is some feeling that they would have been effective opponents of technical innovation if ignored.

Structural Prerequisites[2]

The analysis of social change cannot be conducted without knowing the basis from which the change took place, and the state to which it is moving. The introduction of change in any planned and controlled sense cannot occur without knowing the conditions necessary for change to occur. Prerequisites set the required conditions for change. The interest here is in the structural prerequisites of any pre-industrial society subject to the introduction of change.

Innovation, then, in the transitional society is a process engaged in restructuring elements of the social structure such as the system of social relationships involving elite and deprived groupings. The extent to which this is perceived evokes resistance to the restructuring innovations.[3] Impairment of the power positions of the elite, such as through the introduction of education in Middle Eastern countries, leads to resistance.

Closely related to the impact of the structural system of relationships in the adoption of new techniques is the refusal to adopt innovations affecting productivity. When the power and prestige of elites is based on land, as in many Latin American areas, effective industrial productivity is a threat, and, therefore, is resisted by these strata and the necessary wealth or entrepreneurship is unavailable.

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[1] Morris E. Opler, "The Problem of Selective Culture Change," *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas*, Edited by B. F. Hoselitz, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1952, p. 126.

[2] See Marion J. Levy, *The Structure of Society*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1952, p. 71 for a discussion of the concepts of functional and structural prerequisites.

[3] See W. E. Moore's analysis of discontinuity in social systems in *Industrialization and Labor*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1951.

Similarly, the recruitment of entrepreneurs, either for the public or private sectors of the social system, will be impaired by these structural conditions. If the prestige and power of the elites is based on family land holdings, these strata will not be a source of recruitment. Entrepreneurs to aid the expansion of the innovations in the social system would have to be recruited from either marginal economic activities or from marginally educated strata.

In such a social system higher education does not function to train entrepreneurs, or as a matter of fact, to train any type of specialist. Since prestige is linked to traditional elites, mobility and mobility producing conditions are at a minimum. Higher education does not function then as a status sifting device and as an aid to mobility since this would aid in restructuring the system. Higher education under these circumstances produces highly literate products for limited areas such as law and philosophy. It looks askance at anything that smacks of practical training.

In a sense, then, we are saying that the social structure reflects itself in the motivations of its members. Commitments to the life of the entrepreneur or to the industrial worker do not occur under these conditions. Motivations in acquiring new skills, to move with the job or to leave the kinship system – these are at a minimum. Motivations to adhere to the punctuality and discipline of urban industrial life are largely absent.

The pre-existing technology constitutes another determinant in affecting social change.[1] The technology is necessarily tied to the system of stratification, and to the related matrix of values, norms, and customs. The course of technological innovation will, therefore, be interrelated with the social structure. It will also be influenced by the way in which those who introduce new techniques manage the problems of their own peculiar structure of power.

The social structure in the instance of a subsistence economy will define the needs of its members at not only minimum levels but within limited areas. These need systems may be so different from that of the need conceptions of the innovators that the two groups will find it difficult to establish a cooperative working arrangement. The inability of the innovator to function on this level will limit the possibilities of controlled change.

The role of structured needs may also be discerned in the instance of an innovation which depends upon the manner in which the particular group as a whole perceives it. Some innovations require simultaneous adoption by all the members of a given social system. In such an instance the need for change must be perceived by most of the members. If this is not the case, the operational difficulties of innovation become overwhelming.

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[1] B. F. Hoselitz, "Problems of Adapting and Communicating Modern Techniques to Less Developed Areas," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 2, No. 4, January, 1954, p. 249.

No society functions without the occurrence of strains and tensions. Transitional societies have many sources of resentment and dissatisfaction rooted in the social structure. These resentments are receptive to change if the changes are not perceived as being forced. If not, they can function as important channels for restructuring the society by depending upon the dynamics of their motivation.

Another structured element of change in any society is to be found in the generational differences. No matter how slight such changes may be in some transitional societies, change does occur. It is evidenced by the fact that language, technology, and forms of political organization have changed. This constant change is indicative that there is a system of channels for change if the structural prerequisites are understood by the innovator.

Consequences

It is analytically insufficient to set out prerequisites for change without including an estimate of the requisite factors which must be taken into account once the innovation has been introduced and change is in process. Once change has been introduced it will erode the old institutions, and there will emerge new ones more compatible with further change. However, this does not occur at an even rate. Powerful segments of the social system who are tied to the status quo continue to modify the innovations and to deflect them, and if a plateau should be reached then they attempt to restructure the altered structural elements so as to erase the occurrence of change.

The transitional society is especially vulnerable to political stimuli.[1] Because by definition they are subject to change, they have been aptly described as "uncertainty systems," that is, without a stable system of expectations. Within such a system the struggle for survival of key institutions may occasion violence, and provide powerful obstacles to successful change. Explosive political expression becomes the means then of redirecting the course of social change. Such a social system will come to conceive of itself as being persecuted and exploited, and will develop techniques for controlling the direction of social change. Under these circumstances it will develop a nativistic movement with a well organized underground, or more subtle forms of resistance may appear. This may take the view that innovation represents an attack on the indigenous culture, and must be resisted in every manner possible. The consequences then, anticipated and unanticipated, of change in transitional societies constitute additional requisite conditions which permit of the establishment of a preliminary statement on the structural prerequisites for social change in transitional societies.

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[1] David E. Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1955.

Married Women in Employment

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(An earlier version of this paper was read at the Annual Conference of the British Sociological Association in 1960.)

THE growing practice of married women to work gainfully outside their homes has recently received a great deal of attention, both of the academic and the popular variety. It has been the subject of numerous conferences, research projects and students' theses, as well as arousing a veritable flood of newspaper articles and controversies.

There are many good reasons for either kind of interest, the academic as well as the public one. To the sociologist, the topic offers an almost classical example of social change – a social change, moveover, which is taking place under our very eyes and at a speed which facilitates observation. It affords a vivid illustration of the effects of technological advance on the social structure – on the institution of the family, in particular; and it provides a case study in the change of social attitudes and mores under the impact of demographic developments and growing industrialisation.

Social scientists are concerned with the problems the phenomenon raises for industrial management, with its implications for higher education, training and recruitment, its possible effects on young children, and on public policy issues, generally.

The widespread popular interest has been aroused, partly because of the apparent novelty of the problem, and partly because at a time of full employment the desire of many women for a more varied range of activities than the home can offer coincides with acute shortages of staff in the very fields of employment which are traditionally "feminine" and in which women form a substantial proportion of the personnel.

The teaching and nursing professions are cases in point, as are the social services. Their continued existence, not to mention their necessary expansion, will be jeopardized – as the authorities concerned have had to emphasize with increasing urgency – unless more married women can be recruited. In this connexion it has now become customary to call "wastage" what, until only a few years ago, was generally considered "a woman's place".

An increasing number of light industries, expanding distributive trades and public as well as commercial services compete with each other for the semi-skilled and unskilled hands of women. Shortages of office staff and of domestic servants have become chronic. Virtually all single women who are not still at school or in training are gainfully employed. Hence the only potential reserve of labour are married women.

The novelty element of women's "dual role" is, however, more apparent than real. The combination of domestic activities with some economic productivity is, on the contrary, a traditional pattern of women's lives in all non-industrial economies. It was, historically, the accepted order of things in Western society wherever, and as long as, the family was the primary economic unit; it is still common practice in the agricultural communities which form a large part of the world's population today.

The cleavage between the attitudes in industrial and pre-industrial countries towards the "dual role of women" was obvious, for instance, at a recent congress held in Istambul by the International Council of Women on the theme of "Women and the Family in a Changing World". The problems of married women with jobs outside the home dominated the interest of the Western delegations, while the issue was of less concern to the representatives of the emergent countries who accepted without question the fact that women do two jobs, one at home and one in the fields.

In the early days of industrialisation, too, large numbers of women were employed away from home, in the new industries and even in the caol mines. It will be recalled that the first piece of social legislation in Britain, the Factory Act of 1802, was concerned with the protection of women and children in industry.

In the mid-Victorian era, the Census of 1851 recorded one married woman in every four as having an "extraneous occupation", that is, an employment other than housewife; among the widows, 2 in every 3 had occupations outside their homes.

The work those women did, although mostly of the personal service variety, included a wide range of occupations, from cotton operatives to dress-makers and milliners, from washerwomen and seemstresses to lodging-house keepers, book-binders, steel-pen producers, shoemakers and butchers.

The conditions of work in those days of course left much to be desired. They were often appalling and sweated labour was widespread, particularly in the textile and garment industries. Moreover, those women had an average family of six children and an expectation of life of no more than 45 years.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that the employment of married women was considered to be an unmitigated evil and resorted to only where the wife's earning was absolutely essential to prevent starvation.

The introduction to the Census of 1851 therefore states: "The duties of a wife, a mother, a mistress of a family, can only be efficiently performed by unremitting attention; accordingly, it is found that in districts where the women are much employed from home, the children and parents perish in great numbers."

This historical situation has made a deep and lasting impact on popular attitudes towards the employment of married women. It explains partly, at least, why the working-class man today shows, on the whole, a stronger emotional resistance to his wife's taking a job than does the middle-class husband: The collective memories of hunger and distress, of neglected homes and children, and of mothers working to the point of exhaustion, are still alive in this class – in Britain, at any rate.

As the living conditions of the people improved in the wake of growing industrialisation, the proportion of married women in employment gradually decreased. At the beginning of this century fewer than one in seven married women in Britain worked outside their homes; in the 1930s, with their mass unemployment, the numbers went down still further; nevertheless, the Census of 1931 returned nearly one million married women in employment.

During both world wars the recruitment of women into the labour forces was stepped up. In the course of World War II, a compulsory national service was introduced in Britain from which only mothers of young children and women over the age of 50 were exempt.

At the end of either war, however, most married women returned home and left "the jobs for the boys".

This reversal to pre-war conditions was in the last instance, however, very shortlived. From 1947 onwards, the number of married women in employment rose steadily. In 1951, i.e. at the last population census, just under 3 million married women – nearly 1 in every 4 – were gainfully occupied; by 1957 the number was little short of four million, or 3 in every 10 married women.

The development in Britain, just described, differs somewhat from other Western countries. In the USA, for instance, it started at a lower point and rose more steeply, while in France the proportion of married women in gainful employment has steadily been about one-third, ever since the first census was taken. The present position in these three industrial countries is, however, roughly the same, as far as the proportion of married women in the labour force is concerned.

What is new in this situation is not, as we have seen, the fact that married women go out to work, but that they are doing it in an "affluent society." They are no longer driven by distress and hunger but by the mechanisms operating in a prosperous, highly developed and expanding economy. By and large, their impulse is not poverty but the incentives of a rising standard of living. Their efforts, on the other hand, materially contribute to the raising of these standards.

It may be worth halting for a moment to cast a brief glance at the changes that have occurred during the last hundred years in order to see the present development in its true perspective.

First and foremost are the demographic changes. The average size of the family has been reduced from six to just over two. At the last Census in Britain, in 1951, 35 per cent of all households with married heads had no children at all. (If all types of households are included, the proportion of childless homes was 44%.) In more than half of the households with married heads there were no children under the age of 16.

When discussing the question of married women's employment, the consideration which naturally comes first into peoples' minds is the risk this may involve for young children. I shall come back to this important issue in a moment. For the time being, however, let me point out that the number of married women in employment might still be increased quite considerably without necessarily involving any young children at all.

Secondly, women's normal expection of life has risen to well over 70 and the general standard of health has improved in all classes of the population. That means that a woman today no longer spends practically all her adult life in raising a family. When she has finished bringing up her children she may have 40 or more years ahead of her during three-quarters of which she is likely to be fit to do a good day's work.

The extension of life applies, of course, to men only to a slightly lesser degree. Together with the smaller family it is one of the reasons why an increasing part of the population is above retiring age. It is one of the reasons, too, – together with the lengthening period of education which the continuing technical progress and an increasingly complex and expanding economy make necessary – why a relatively smaller proportion of the population is available for the many jobs and services which a modern society requires. The working, productive, sector of the population is being reduced from both ends of the age scale. Hence the problem of manpower shortage is with us and is likely to last.

The list of other social changes which have occurred during the same period is too long for enumeration. One of the major contrasts is brought into relief if we recall the Registrar General's comment of 1851 that "the duties of a wife ... can only be efficiently performed by unremitting attention". Thanks to the enormously increased number of services – both commercial and public – this is not only no longer true but an atmosphere has been created (to which the advertisers of innumerable household commodities incessantly contribute) in which "unremitting attention" to housework is felt to be inefficient rather than virtuous. Except for mothers of young children, domestic work is no longer considered a full-time occupation and many women regard it either as laziness or waste of time not to seek another outlet for their energies.

The fact that practically all girls are in employment before they marry and that many of them have skilled occupations for which they have been specially trained contributes to this attitude. This practice has revolutionised women's lives and has made them incomparable with the feminine existence of past generations. It has had two kinds of consequences: for the girls themselves, on the one hand, for the community, on the other hand.

For the young women it has meant that they are used to earning their own money, to being financially as well as personally independent, and to moving freely among people other than their own families. It has made them interested in a wider range of things than keeping house – even though they are as keen as ever to marry. The increased marriage rate and the lower average marriage age, which have been characteristic features of the post-war period, are eloquent witnesses to this fact.

Moreover, many young women – particularly those who have been trained for one of the more highly skilled jobs or professions – feel personally involved in their work and committed to it. They are reluctant to give up their jobs at a point when they have just reached a reasonable level of proficiency.

For the community, this widespread employment of young women means that a vast amount of effort and money has been invested in their education and training and that they represent sources of potential labour at a time when there is, as we have seen, a chronic shortage of manpower.

The problem with which we, as a community, are faced therefore is how to draw on these resources of skill and womanpower without jeopardizing the values of family life and the prospects of future generations.

Before we can start thinking with any realism about the ways to tackle this complex and delicate problem, we shall have to have a clearer picture of what is actually going on at this moment. We cannot begin framing a policy without knowing the essential facts about the present situation. We ought to know, for instance, why so many married women go out to work – whether it is out of necessity or whether some other factors are driving them on. We want to know how much they work and what kinds of jobs they do. We need information on how many mothers of young children go out to work, why they do it, and what arrangements, if any, they are able to make for their children. Without this knowledge it is impossible to assess, e.g., the need for day nurseries or other child-minding arrangements.

Unfortunately, what information exists is scanty and scattered; the experiences gathered in one sector of this field is not made accessible to others. There is, clearly, a need for some co-ordinating body, such as, for instance, the American National Manpower Council of Columbia University which has done invaluable work in the USA, in order to stimulate necessary investigations and correlate all relevant data so as to prepare the ground on which social policy could be based. On the subject which seems most important of all, namely, what effects the employment of mothers away from home has on the development of their children, we know next to nothing. This is a field in which there is a crying need for independent and scientifically conducted research.

The things we know from official sources in this country and which have a bearing on our subject can be summarized in one sentence: We know, from the returns published by the Ministry of Labour, how many women are employed, what industries they work in, and what age groups they are.

That is to say, we know that 3¾ million married women are insured in the "employee" class, and that the highest rate of employment among women is in the years after school-leaving, at the age of about 18, that the numbers go down gradually in the age groups of 25 and more, and then begin to rise again in the early and middle thirties until they begin to decline once more after the age of 50. From this it is evident that many women withdraw from the labour force when they have small children and begin to come back again when their children are of school age and beyond.

We do not know, however, how many of them work full-time and how many part-time. Even less do we know what part-time work actually involves.

Does it mean a couple of hours each day, or a daily shift of 5–6 hours, or is it two half-days a week and in what way are these variations distributed?

Since the Ministry of Labour gets its information from the National Insurance cards and everybody who works a minimum of 4 hours a week (or, if in domestic service, 8 hours a week) has to pay the full insurance contribution, it is impossible to say from the number of persons insured how many of them work a full week and how many do less. The Ministry occasionally supplements its information by asking particular industries how many people they employ on a part-time basis; but there is no complete nor reliable information available about the country as a whole nor about the many non-industrial establishments which employ part-time labour.

The Census of 1951, apart from being now nine years out of date, seriously underrated the number of women doing part-time work, largely for reasons connected with the wording of the census questionnaire. It is estimated that the figures returned were about 40% too low.

From an enquiry which I undertook recently[1] to find answers to some of the questions mentioned above, it would appear that at least half of the married women who are employed in this country work in part-time jobs. This was one of the main surprises which emerged from my investigation and if it is correct – and if it is, further, correct, as my survey seems to indicate, that 4 out of every 10 married women who have no employment at present would like to do part-time work – this would put a new complexion on the problem of employing married women. It would mean that one of the more urgent questions to investigate would be as to how industry and the public services can best be adjusted to meet the needs of this type of worker, either by creating more part-time jobs, or organising shift work, or drawing on part-time labour for relief work during periods of high pressure, etc.

Some of the other main points which transpired from the survey may here be briefly summarized. It was based on a sample of over 2.000 men and women, interviewed in all parts of the country, and representative as to age, sex, class and regional distribution. The method is neither infallible nor does it provide a complete answer to everything we want to know; but it gives some clues and may be a starting point for more comprehensive and detailed studies.

More than one-half of the working wives in my sample (53%) had no children under the age of 16. Of those who had children, over two-third had no child under school age. In most instances either the women themselves were at home from work when the children returned from school or their husbands or near-relatives were there to look after them. Only a tiny minority – of the order of 3 in 100 working wives – did not make provisions of one kind or another for their children during their own absence at work, or left younger children in the care of older brother or sisters. It is among this minority that one may expect to find some of the "latchkey children" who have given rise to so much public alarm.

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[1] "Working Wives," Institute of Personnel Management, London, 1960.

Three-quarters of the working wives in the sample said, not surprisingly, that they worked for economic reasons. Money, however, means a great variety of things to different people. There are still, undoubtedly, many women who have to go out to work to "keep the wolf from the door" – women whose husbands are in poor health or unemployed or who fail to give their wives enough housekeeping money. The *cri de coeur* of a working woman: "I want my pay-packet because I have 6 children and I am fed up having to tell them we can't afford this that and the other" will strike many a chord.

Some women would say they have to work to keep up hire purchase payments and others to avoid entering hire purchase commitments; or they *have to work* in order to afford a better home, or a holiday for the family, or to buy decent clothes, etc. On the whole, one gets the impression that it is the higher standard of living which people expect that acts as an incentive to women to make the extra effort – the television set, the washing machine, the holiday abroad, and, in many instances, the better education of their children . "My boy has a scholarship and I want to help him to take advantage of it", is a typical answer of this kind, or: "I want my son to follow the career of his choice without the financial worry that has dogged my own life".

Another theme that recurs with many variations is this: "It's financial worry that causes nagging"; "we are a much happier couple because we don't have to argue over trifles"; "my husband had to go without pocket money for many years – it breads resentment which undermindes a marriage".

Finally, and by no means the last in the order of frequency, there is money as the symbol of, and means to, independence and self-respect. "I don't have to feel guilty every time I want to go to the hairdresser", was said many a time, as was also: "I want to feel that *I* have contributed to our home".

So much for "money" and what it stands for. It is, however, often not the only reason given. More typical is the answer: "I want the money and I like meeting people" or: "It's for the money, of course, and it helps keeping me young". More than half of the working wives who had given "money" as their main reason for having a job said they would also want to work if their family income were larger. The reasons, in order of frequency, were (1) to meet people, to escape the loneliness of the home, (2) the more varied and interesting life a job leads to compared with housework, and the mental stimulus it provides, and (3) in more general terms, many women say they "enjoy the work".

This, incidentally, does not apply only to women who have interesting occupations. Interest in a particular job is, naturally, more frequent among women in professional or semi-professional occupations, but this must be differentiated from the vaguer feeling of enjoying work as such, which is much more frequent than one might expect. There was the woman who said: "I have worked for a firm for the past 18 years; during that time I have been a woodworker, machine operator, lorry driver and a typist, and I must say these have been the happiest days of my life. I have made many friends and travelled to places I should never have had the opportunity of seeing but for this work...". Another woman said: "My job as a school-cleaner is not an important one, I know, but it has changed me from a bored and irritable housewife into a happy person who has gained a sense of independence and achievement without neglecting my home and family".

Nobody who reads these and similar statements can be in any doubt about the "therapeutic" value of work as such. This appears to be accepted by the medical profession, too, for quite a number of women said: "My doctor told me to take a job – and I have never looked back since," or words to that effect.

The vast majority of husbands seem to have more than just acquiesced in the situation. Over two-thirds of them positively approved of their wives' working – some with enthusiasm. There is, as said earlier, a certain class division in their attitudes in that there is a higher rate of disapproval in the lower social classes. Among the men favouring their wives' employment the majority, as one would expect, welcome the additional income as the main attraction – but it is not an overwhelming majority, merely 56%. Many of the husbands mentioned that the job had made their wives more contented, had given them an additional interest, had made their marriage more of a partnership, and the like.

To sum up: If the assumption is correct – and all evidence points in this direction – that there is an increasing need of manpower and, in particular, of skilled manpower and, further, that many women over the age of, say, 35 will be available for employment, at least part-time if not full-time, and that many of them are eager to work; if, moreover, it is true to say that the time, labour and money invested in women's education are wasted if not put to the best, use it follows that some social adjustments will have to be made in a variety of fields.

The education of women will have to be undertaken with that period of "latency" for the raising of a family in mind. Refresher courses will have to be provided for those wishing to re-enter a profession after a prolonged interval, and adult education will have to be expanded – possibly including the use of radio and television for the purpose – for those wishing to acquire a qualification at a more advanced stage of their lives than has hitherto been customary.

Those responsible for advising young girls on the choice of careers will have to impress on them that they can expect to have a long adult life after they have brought up the family they hope for and that during that period they will wish to make use of their abilities. They should therefore prepare themselves with this contingency in their minds.

Employers will have to explore methods of work organisation which would enable them to make the best possible use of the labour resources available, which may well mean taking in larger numbers of women above the customary recruiting age and providing more part-time jobs.

The most immediate need at present is for more systematic and co-ordinated research into the many aspects of this problem and the collection of a body of evidence – if possible, based on comparative studies – to inform an enlightened social policy.

NOTES AND NEWS

1. NOTES

1. Dhirendra Nath Majumdar

1903–1960

The fifty seven years of Professor D. N. Majumdar, one of our distinguished Associate Editors, sat very lightly indeed on him at the time of his sudden and tragic death on the 31st May, 1960. He was in very good health and at the height of his intellectual powers. He worked long hours and travelled widely, in fulfilment of his many engagements all over India, without showing undue physical strain, often to the envy of younger men. On the 31st May, the last day of the academic session at the University of Lucknow, where Professor Majumdar was Head of the Department of Anthropology and Dean of the Faculty of Arts, he went through a busy day with his usual high spirits, although he complained of a headache. His last engagement for the day – and alas! – his last in his life, was at a coffee party given by the Vice-Chancellor in the evening. At this party one of his junior colleagues joked with him, saying that he looked young. "I have heard that joke before," replied Professor Majumdar. The irony of fate: he was dead three hours later. From the party he drove home with one of his closest friends who was also his personal physician. They had dinner together at which Mrs. Majumdar also was present. Soon after the doctor left, Professor Majumdar's daughter, his only child, called on the telephone from Calcutta inquiring about him; she had had a bad dream, she said. She was told by her mother that all was well. But all was not well; Professor Majumdar was not well: he was lying unconscious in his bed. By 11.30 he was dead from a cerebral haemorrhage.

Born in 1903 in an East Bengal village, Majumdar was educated at Dacca and Calcutta. He took his M.A. in anthropology with distinction from Calcutta University in the early twenties, and was awarded the PremChand Roychand Scholarship. He visited Bihar to work among the Hos. In 1928 he joined the University of Lucknow as a lecturer in the Department of Economics and Sociology under Radhakamal Mukerjee, and began giving courses in anthropology. He also maintained his interest in the Hos and paid them several visits. By the mid-thirties he had enough material on them to carry it with him to Cambridge. There he wrote his doctoral thesis under Professor Hodson. He also attended Professor Malinowski's seminars in London and was deeply influenced by him.

Anthropology was long neglected at Indian Universities and it was only in 1950 that Majumdar was made the Professor of Anthropology at the University of Lucknow within the Department of Economics. In 1951 a Department of Anthropology also was created of which he was made the Chairman. For ten



Dr. D. N. MAJUMDAR

years he looked after this Department as a mother looks after her child. It was entirely due to his efforts that the Department soon became internationally known. The Department and the students who have come out of it to spread out into the far corners of the country, like his earlier pupils, are the greatest contribution Majumdar made to Indian anthropology. He trained enough people in the subject to provide a body of young men who today fill most of the many positions in the universities which need young anthropologists.

At the time of his death Majumdar was the doyen of Indian anthropologists. Though not the oldest he was the most distinguished of them all. He represented a vanishing type, the *general* anthropologist. He had during three and a half decades of his research career made original contributions in the fields of physical, as well as social-cultural anthropology. His interests and methods never grew stale. In the thirties, when he first became widely known, he was in the forefront of a new movement in anthropological research, viz. acculturation studies. His first publication, *A Tribe in Transition* (London, 1939), was a study of acculturation among the Hos. At the time of his death he was engaged in the latest types of research assignments nowadays being undertaken by anthropologists. In 1958 he published a village study, *Caste and Communication in an Indian Village* (Asia). Shortly before his death, early in 1960, two more of his books appeared, viz. *The Social Contours of an Industrial City* and *Race Elements in Bengal* (both Asia). These books show the width of his scholarship and bear testimony to the fact that he kept abreast of the latest research interests and developments in anthropology. At the time of his death he had two books in the press and at least two more were in active preparation. The books in the press are *Himalayan Polyandry* and *Chhor Ka Ek Gaon* (Hindi).

He wrote several other books including *The Fortunes of Primitive Tribes* (Universal, 1944), *The Affairs of a Tribe* (Universal, 1950), *The Matrix of Indian Culture* (Universal, 1947), and *Races and Cultures of India* (Asia, 1958). He contributed over 200 papers to many journals, and founded a journal *The Eastern Anthropologist* thirteen years ago. *The Eastern Anthropologist* today has an international circulation. He travelled widely in India studying tribal and peasant cultures (U.P., Bihar and Madhya Pradesh) and carrying out serological and anthropometric surveys (U.P., Gujarat and Bengal).

Many honours came Professor Majumdar's way in thirty years of his active career. He was the first Indian to receive his Doctorate in Anthropology from the University of Cambridge. He presided over the Anthropology Section of the Indian Science Congress when he was only 34 years old. In 1941 he was elected a fellow of the National Institute of Sciences. He received the Gujarat Research Society Medal for his contributions to Physical Anthropology in 1950 and the Annandale Gold Medal for his contribution to Asian Anthropology in 1958. He lectured at Universities in the U.S.A., the U.K. and Europe. At the time of his death he was a member of the Research Programmes Committee of the Planning Commission, a Foreign Fellow of the American Association of Physical Anthropologists and a member of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population. Few honours probably gave him more pleasure than did the invitation from the Wenner-Gren Foundation to represent India, Pakistan and Ceylon at the International Symposium on the World Status of Anthropology held at New York in 1952.

Tributes and messages of condolence from India and overseas poured in after his death. The Department of Anthropology, Calcutta University, passed a condolence resolution, under the Chairmanship of Professor Chattopadhyay, in which it has been recalled that Majumdar was a distinghuished student of that Department. Professor Meyer Fortes wrote from Cambridge: "We remember his outstanding contributions to Anthropology and are proud that he was a graduate of this Faculty (of Archaeology and Anthropology)".

Those of us who had the privilege of knowing him intimately will remember him most for his cheerfulness, courtesy, hospitality, helpfulness, and kindness. His attitude towards life was one of optimistic striving and he inculcated this spirit in others also. He loved company, and particularly the company of young people. No wonder he kept young in appearance and habits, for after all is not youth an attitude of the mind? Well may it be said of him:

"Some burn damp faggots, others may consume
The entire combustible world in one small room..."

2. International Conference on the Family at New York

23–26 August, 1960

The first international family life conference to be held in the United States of America met in New York City, August 23–26, 1960. As the combined Annual Meeting of the National Council on Family Relations, and the International Union of Family Organizations, it drew more than 700 delegates from some thirty different countries.

The Far East was represented with participants from Cambodia, Ceylon, India, Japan, Korea, Pakistan, and the Philippine Islands. Egypt, Israel, Tunis and Turkey had one or more representatives each. Europe was well represented with delegates from Austria, Belgium, England, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland. South Africa and New Zealand had one delegate each. Most heavily represented were the countries of the Western Hemisphere – Argentina, Canada, Chile, Haiti, Puerto Rico, and the United States.

Those who attended the conference were without exception persons with professional interests in family life. There were representatives of governmental agencies at national, regional, provincial, state, and local levels, as well as of international agencies such as the United Nations and UNICEF. Embassies and consulates sent official representatives. Schools, colleges, and universities were well represented by several hundred participants. There were officers and professional staff members of family organizations of many types and functions from many countries. Health and welfare agencies and services were represented by a number of physicians, teachers in medical schools, clinicians, nurses, and public health workers. Religious personnel of many faiths, denominations, functions and nations came individually and collectively. Sociologists, Psychologists, Home Economists, Anthropologists, and Marriage Counselors shared research and practice of their various disciplines in their common concern for family wellbeing.

This was not an easy conference. There were many who wanted desperately to come who could not find the necessary financial resources to make the long trip. More than one hundred letters requesting travel assistance reached the United States in advance of the conference – from all parts of the globe. Some who had registered months ahead, had to cancel at the last minute when hoped – for foundation funds did not materialize.

For those who came there were problems of communication. Americans generally speak only English. Even though many have come originally from other parts of the globe, there is a tendency to drop the secondary mother tongue and to converse only in English. The graduate level "reading knowledge" of French, German, and/or Spanish is inadequate for intimate communication with persons at home only in these tongues. Simultaneous translation is prohibitively expensive, so other ways were found in multi-lingual persons condensing addresses in advance of the sessions, and being available in small group meetings throughout the conference. Thus all heard everything – in several tongues.

Communication at deeper levels was surprisingly well achieved. It was soon recognized that there were basic differences in the emphases on strengthening family life in Europe and in the United States. Europeans, along with Asians, and South and Central Americans tend to focus upon economic supports for family wellbeing, whereas family security for professional workers in the United States tends to be defined in terms of emotional and social facets of personality and of interpersonal interaction. Communication of feelings, goals, and values revealed cultural differences within the discussion groups. For instance it early became apparent that European tradition tends to emphasize family pride and continuity; while American goals tend to focus upon achievement and mobility.

International and intercultural differences were found to be highly challenging. American educators were confronted with the pertinent questions of delegates from countries where the schools have no equivalent place for education for family living i.c. – "How do you know whether such education is effective?" The East paused to consider the emotional nature of family interrelationships, at the same time that the West was exposed to descriptions of the elaborate ways in which families are aided economically toward achieving family security in countries like France and Belgium.

The theme of the conference was "Personal Maturity and Family Security." The basic question being considered was "How can personal maturity and family security be achieved in a rapidly changing, multi-cultural, technological world?" It was generally agreed that families everywhere are changing rapidly, throwing off old ways, and trying to find new bases for security and new levels of maturity. Efforts were made in plenary sessions, in discussion groups of about twenty delegates, and in the section meetings to probe the theme in various family contexts. Professional papers, panels, and reports of research were shared in a score of section-meetings under such headings as:

Family Life Education in the Schools
Family Life Education in the Community
Religion and the Family
Marriage and Family Counseling
Research – The Family and Its Socio-Economic Environment
Research – The Family and Its Interpersonal Environment
Research – Family Roles

Research – Family Security and Personal Maturity
Early Child Development
Parent Education
Economic Aspects of Family Security
Family Life Education in the Colleges

Family security was generally recognized as being something more than financial security alone. It was variously defined as the ability to meet and weather crises, and to include a certain predictability of relationsship (of "knowing where you stand even when you are moving"). Flexibility was widely stressed as essential in today's families which must be able to change, to create new roles as necessary, and to look for and treasure difference, as central in family security.

Personal maturity was seen as both growing out of family security and contributing to it as family members mature. It was defined in major addresses and in informal discussions as the ability to be independent and to make one's own decisions creatively; harmonious development of the person, a real inner unity translated in his manner of being responsible in the world; openness toward the rest of mankind, freedom from crippling emotional pressures; sensitivity to the forces operating in a given situation and to the several alternatives available, including the probable immediate and remote consequences for each alternative on oneself and others. One delegate said, "The hallmark of maturity is one's ability to handle one's feelings with honesty and responsibility." Another stressed the point that maturity is never completely reached, that man is looking for a way of traveling, not a station along the road, and that "When we're green, we're growing; when we're ripe, we're rotting."

Recurrent problems throughout the conference sessions were: 1. Young marriages, 2. Freedom, discipline, and self-control in child rearing, and 3 changing values and culture conflicts. Married minors are a general concern in the United States where increasing numbers of high school and college students marry before completing their education. Changing patterns of child-rearing reflect new conditions, and a considerable body of research exists that is only imperfectly communicated to practicing parents. Ambivalence within the family is seen in one adolescent's lament, "Don't fuss over me, I'm not a baby... but if you don't I'll feel neglected." Culture conflicts and pressures impinge upon mobile families in today's world in ways that further challenge the family life educator, researcher and counselor.

There was a consensus on the central importance of parent education, parent teacher cooperation, and education for family living for children and adults of all ages. Successful programs were described in detail, and general principles were discussed. It was emphasized in both research reports and informal discussion that students of even tender ages as well as more mature scholars can: 1. learn to apply causal understandings of human behavior and to unlearn arbitrary and biased tendencies in dealing with persons; 2. accept co-existent differences in human society; 3. enjoy others beyond the immediate family and community; 4. assume responsibility as a path to reaching maturity; 5. learn to endure frustration; 6. find lasting values that help to be secure even in uncertainty; 7. participate in their own education at the level of their best ability; and 8. develop toward their own highest potential. These were seen to be goals for modern educational programs concerned with personal maturity and family security.

Premarital, marital and family counseling were recommended for all persons and families as they mature through the various stages of development, as well as for families in conflict and trouble. Physicians, pastors, teachers, social workers and counselors shared experience on the various approaches and methods that are being found most effective in counseling modern family members. The case conference method in which counselors review their current cases in staff sessions with their fellow workers and specialist consultants such as psychiatrists was described as highly successful.

There was general agreement that family life research should be encouraged, and coordinated so that the urgently needed understanding about contemporary family life might be developed. It was suggested that universal concepts from divergent studies be formulated and used as a base for further research work. Considerable discussion of the need for effective social research interpretation resulted in the recommendation that research findings for strengthening family life be more widely available.

The maturity of the family life emphasis in professional thinking was evident in 1. the dearth of clichés and stereotyped responses to current problems; 2. the willingness to review any concept or practice that came up for discussion; 3. the general recognition of the complexity of contemporary situations that make orally simplified value judgments undesirable. For instance it was recognized that research findings and clinical evidence make it inaccurate to pity working mothers because of unfortunate consequences on their families, as was more common a few years ago; 4. the perceptible move away from a militant demand for equality between the sexes, and equalitarian relationships in the family toward the more considered value of flexibility as a favorable quality of modern family living; 5. the diminution of viewing one's own program with pride in favor of a greater willingness to share common concerns, problems, and goals, as well as a readiness to evaluate objectively the results of the many efforts being made to promote family security and personal maturity around the world.

Strengthening the moral fiber of families is imperative everywhere today, according to various discussions at the conference. Clarifying values is an essential task amidst current confusions, rapid change, and widespread secularization of life. One group strongly emphasized that religion gives man a definition of himself in his cosmos, and that if values are not specifically articulate in a culture, they tend to disappear. Family visiting, mutual help, flexible roles, family friends among one's own kind were seen in recent research as supporting mobile families in encouraging ways.

As the conference ended there was a heartening sense that the interests of the family are a concern of sympathetic and experienced workers in countries around the world. Beyond the differences and the challenges were the even more evident areas of agreement and consensus on the importance of the family in developing human personality and the need for further study, review, work and professional fellowship in future international conferences built around a concern for families everywhere.

3. The Sixth Indian Sociological Conference at Sauger

15, 16, 17 october, 1960

The sixth session of the Indian Sociological Conference was held at Saugor, Madhya Pradesh State, India, on October 15, 16 and 17 under the auspices of the Department of Social Anthropology of the University of Saugor where Dr. and Mrs. Leela Dube played hosts. The Conference met in four sessions: Sociology, Social Anthropology, Social Psychology and Demography and Social Statistics.

At the Congress thirty-five papers were presented including the Presidential speech of Prof. Kali Prasad, Vice-Chancellor, Lucknow University, and speeches of Sectional Presidents – Dr. Durgananda Sindha, of the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur (Social Psychology) and Dr. K. Ishwaran of Karnatak University, Dharwar (Social Anthropology).

The papers read at the Conference covered the following topics: Social change, Caste and kinship, Leadership and Communication. Broadly speaking, Prof. Kali Prasad's speech on "Industrialization and Social Change" presented a general framework for discussing various topics.

In the analysis of social change brought about by the introduction of technology, Prof. Kali Prasad observed that the resistance to change would be greater if the value structure of a given society is rigid or narrowly homogeneous and undifferentiated or is completely controlled by authoritarian modes. In the process of change three systems – of technology, of social structure and of value-pattern – are involved which inter-act and affect one another and cannot function in isolation. At the base of the former two lies the importance of the value system, for it gives them significance and purpose. Industrialism with its technological and value systems has affected the counterparts of the receiving culture whereby the social structure to which the individual was thoroughly adjusted is disturbed. When the individual is unable to adjust to, and the societal value-system is impervious to get modified by, the forces exerted through industrialism, then, we find tension, anxiety, loneliness suffered by the individual and disequilibrium in the society. The individual is snatched, as it were, from his familiar value system and placed in the new environment giving him opportunities; it is the individual's responsibility to adjust to the new system and live, or become maladjusted or annihilated. The societal disequilibrium influences norms and value pattern, production and consumption complex, communication and power structure. Prof. Kali Prasad as well as Dr. Durgananda Sinha suggested that the social scientist who is interested in the analysis of social change and its problems, must develop two-line research, viz., on the Individual and on Culture, so as to measure 'psychological lag' or 'uneven development.'

The Bhills of Udaipur were the subject of a paper presented by Mr. Prabhat Chandra, of Jabalpur University. Living in the vicinity of the Aravali Hills, these Bhills were forced to leave their life of geographical and social isolation in 1940 and to settle down as farmers. The then government of Mewar, gave them land so that they could turn farmers. This transition from a wild life to that of settled agriculturists marked the beginning of a new development in tribal economy and culture. Roads, transport and cultivation have brought them in contact with non-tribal people and the Hindu social hierarchy which they began to imitate. Social contacts with the low caste Hindus are many, whereas those with the high caste are rare. In this new situation brought about by the culture contact, the Bhills are striving for vertical mobility, moving up by imitating food habits, dress, marital relations, customs and other ways of living of superior groups. In this process of transformation of the Bhills there are many individuals and families that are left behind in the race for 'catching up' with modern civilization and the latter are showing symptoms of disorganization.

'The Sirahas,' studied by Mr. H. N. Pande of the University of Saugor, are a priestly group in the Bastar tribal district of Madhya Pradesh. Since long they wielded considerable influence in the social, political and religious spheres of the tribal people. They were medicine men, diviners, worshippers of tribal gods and deities, black-magic-healers and ritual agents. But under the impact of community development programs the status of the Sirahas is changing. The introduction of panchayat administration and modern ideas of medicine and treatment have severely affected their secular status, and have forced them to confine themselves to the religious sphere. In utter despair to adopt themselves to the changing situation, the Sirahas feel that they are being attacked on their own territory and so feel frustrated.

Equally interesting is the case of the Hindu priests of Gaya, a well known Buddhist centre, in Bihar state. The Gaywal life was characterised by caste-consciousness, ritualism, priestly profession and orthodoxy. However, owing to many developments during the last decades, they have, in general, become much more secularized and commercialized. Alcoholic drinks, meat, and inter-dining are being accepted by them. Thus the Brahmanic way of life of the Gaywal has become degenerate in the eyes of the rest of the Community and they themselves are experiencing a sense of shame. This study was presented by Dr. L. P. Vidyarthi of Ranchi University.

Two other papers, presented by Mr. Khare of Vikram University and Mr. Yogesh Atal of Punjab University, revealed the changes taking place in the Rajasthan region. In Udaipur, where opportunities are provided for women to take jobs outside their home, the traditional family is showing signs of disruption and of losing the traditional attitudes toward the employment of women. In schools and textile industries there is an increasing number of unmarried working women. And the change in the economic status of the woman does not seem to have been accepted as a welcome change for the people do not appreciate their "free life" and for that reason they are not considered as suitable mates. In the second study, we find described the efforts made by the Rao Bhats, the group next to the Brahmins, to raise their social prestige in the light of changing conditions by modifying their names to "Bhatts" (Lit: priests). Rao Bhats show utter discontent and anger if they are called Raos or Rao Bhats, and feel elated if they are addressed as Bhatts.

Mr. C. M. Abraham of Vikram University, traced the changing pattern of the Nambuthiri Brahmans of Kerala State, a high caste people. The caste system in Kerala, in fact, has received great attention from social scientists for its peculiar characteristics and complexities. Purity and pollution notions, as for instance, prevalent in the caste-hierarchy of Kerala at the apex of which are the Nambuthiris, have been recorded in many a book on caste in India. A

Nayar should keep a distance of six feet from the Nambuthiri, an artisan, twenty-four feet, a Tiyan, thirty-six feet and a pulayan, sixty-four feet. The customs and behaviour of the people in relation to each other were patterned in the same way. In this tradition and caste-bound Kerala society drastic changes are witnessed due to law, education and technology. The Nambuthiris, formerly, owned large estates and the family property was impartible and inalienable. It was the practice of the Nambuthiris to marry only the eldest son, who only could inherit the family property, from the same caste, whereas the younger sons were allowed to marry Nayar women, a typical example of compulsory Anuloma (hypergamic) marriage. The children born of such union were considered as belonging to the Nayar family (Tharwad) and they could not be taken to be Nambuthiris (Illam). The conspicuous consequences of such an arrangement are the increase in the number of spinsters, the dowry system, carelessness and lethargy in the younger sons, among the Nambuthiris. With the abolition of land-lordism by legislation in 1953 and 1958 the institutions of inheritance and marriage were drastically affected. Now the junior members of the 'Illam' also share the family property and seek partners from the same caste. This has brought them an enterprising spirit in economic activities, emancipation of women and reduction in age differences between marriage partners. Cultural factors in the emergent modern society in Kerala are such that they are posing a challenge to the older generation and this has resulted in anxiety and frustration on the part of the old people. These changes are also affecting others like Nayars by dislocating the existing relations with the Nambuthiris.

Studies in social change focussing attention on leadership in Indian rural society were presented by Mr. Baij Nath Singh and Dr. S. K. Srivastav of Agra University. The studies reveal the fact that in the villages where the Community Development Programme is in operation people are suffering from frustration as they found that their ideal image of their leaders was shattered and in the villages where the programme is yet to be implemented people are earnestly hoping for the directed change to be introduced in their area. The studies also reveal that the emergent leadership, despite its democratic background, is based on traditional lines, kin-oriented and caste-minded. The failure to implement the Community Development Programme, it was suggested, was due to the failure to adopt new values on the part of the individuals.

The problems revealed in the studies, mentioned above, indicate the general situation prevalent in almost all parts of India facing industrialization. There is everywhere the clash between the old and the new, the high and the low and the sacred and the secular. Wherever failure to change is witnessed we find tensions, anxieties, anti-social behaviour. In short India in the emergent situation is torn between expectation and frustration. To what extent the value system of Indian society would be amenable to the new culture is a problem to be investigated and studied.

In some of the papers submitted at the Conference it was a attempted to examine in empirical studies the Indian societal structure in the light of borrowed concepts and theories and this is not desirable, as was pointed out by Dr. K. Ishwaran in his presidential speech: "The key to the understanding of Indian culture, or any other culture for that matter, lies in understanding the vital concepts like Dharma and Karma... I should like to appeal to the student of Indian society to take a very serious note of unscientific concepts like Sanskritization which are unfortunately gaining currency... we should reshape our tools to make our work more scientific."

On the whole the conference was successful in bringing many young social scientists from all parts of India and in providing a common forum for discussing the Indian societal problems and changes.

The next session of the Conference will he held at Dharwar under the auspices of Karnatak University, in December, 1961.

4. German Institute for Developing Countries

This joint foundation of members of the German Federal Diet of all Parties and of the Federal ministries, was established in 1959 at Berlin and is housed in a beautiful castle, near a lake, with sufficient houses to accommodate administrative and research departments as well as guests.

There is a board of supervisors, Dr. Rudolf Vogel, M. P. being the president and Mr. F. G. Seib, the director and manager. Besides, there is an advisory board of experts in the field of scientific and cultural relations that assists the director in planning programmes. The Institute is actively cooperating with German institutions like churches, trade unions, cooperative societies, employers' federations and other central organizations which are engaged in promoting the 'Developing Countries.'

The Institute gets working capital from special funds under the administration of the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Federal Republic. The costs for seminars with foreign participants are covered by the Foreign Office.

Objectives of the Institute are to supply information to leading personalities from the developing countries in the field of administration and economy by conducting seminars and excursions, to give an opportunity to scientists and experts from the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries to exchange opinions about the economic, social and cultural problems within the framework of meetings and conferences and to give information to German experts planning to spend some time in the developing countries.

The Institute organizes six week international seminars conducted by leading scientists and personalities for leaders from countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America ('the Developing Countries') to deal with problems peculiar to those countries. Agricultural Cooperation, Vocational Training and Professional Schools, Public Health Service, Adult Education, Forestry, Local Government are some of those fields. These seminars are intended also to measure the profit that guests obtain from German experience and to create better understanding of the various cultures and the politico-social background of development.

The Institute conducts informative courses for German experts who may go to developing countries in order to acquaint them with the psychological and sociological conditions of those cultural groups. Besides, other meetings are held to consider problems of training and sponsoring trainees and the questions of cooperation with these countries. These are one-week courses that train 25 to 30 persons of selected groups.

There is a research department attached to the Institute which makes surveys to gain an impression of the difficulties and effects of the training programmes for students and trainees from these countries in regard to areas of culture, attitude to work etc. There is also a documentation department that collects all German publications about development aid to those countries so as to publish a bibliography annually. This department maintains a central file of German experts having special knowledge of these countries and publishes regularly minutes of the meetings and study reports.

The Institute issues "Mitteilungen" through which it maintains a net-work of scientific correspondence.

5. The Institute for Theoretical History and Basic Psychosocial Research. International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. (Institut für theoretische Geschichte und geisteswissentschaftliche Grundlagenforschung. Internationale Gesellschaft für vergleichende Kulturforschung).

By the initiative and leadership of Dr. Othmar F. Anderle, these mutually connected research institutions were established in Salzburg in Austria, in 1960. The officers of the Society are: President: Pitirim A. Sorokin; Secretary-General: Othmar F. Anderle; the members of the *Kuratorium* of the Institut are: O. F. Anderle (Zalzburg) E. Betti (Rome), C. Brinton (Harvard), P. J. Danièlou (Paris), A. Dempf (München), A. Hilckman (Mainz), P. Th. Michels (Salzburg), P. A. Sorokin (Harvard), A. J. Toynbee (London), J. Vogt (Tübingen), F. Wagner (Marburg). The research of the Institute is divided into three main parts: one dealing with the basic problems of universal history and psychosocial *(geisteswissenschaftlich)* disciplines, a second with the problems of integration of general history, third, with the meta-history and philosophy of history. The main task of the Society is a comparative study of civilizations or cultures. Instead of the hitherto dominant interpretation of historical and social processes in "terms of nations," the recent significant works of Spengler, Jaspers, Toynbee, Rostow, Northrop, Kroeber, Ortega y Gasset, Sorokin, and others have introduced the interpretation of these processes in the "terms of civilizations or cultures." Through international co-operation of all scholars interested in a comparative investigation of the structures and life-courses of known civilizations or cultures, the Society aims to continue and develop this kind of study systematically and as validly as possible. The Institut is to serve as the center of documentation and information for all synoptic research in universal history and comparative study of civilizations. Membership in the Society is open to all qualified scholars. Membership fee is $ 5. The inquiries should be addressed to the secretary-general, Dr. O. F. Anderle, Bahnhofstrasse 5, Salzburg, Austria or to the president, P. A. Sorokin, 8 Cliff Street, Winchester, Mass., or to Prof. C. Brinton, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

II. NEWS

1. Seminar on Levelling up Tribal Bihar at Ranchi

31 July – 2 August, 1960

A three day seminar on Levelling up Tribal Bihar was held from 31st July to 2nd August, 1960 at Ranchi and was organized by the Council of Social and Cultural Research and the Department of Anthropology of Ranchi University in which Dr. L. P. Vidyarthi had taken organizational responsibility. There were four sessions in which anthropologists, tribal leaders, social workers, and administrators participated in discussing many problems confronting the aboriginals (Adivasis) of today and in finding out scientific and practical solutions to them. The seminar was concluded by Professor N. K. Bose, Director, Department of Anthropology Government of India.

Throughout the Seminar the focus was towards analysing and evaluating the effects and principles and methods of implementation of the Community Development Project as it as in operation in the tribal areas of Bihar, a state in the Indian Union. Radical changes were suggested in the spheres of planning and execution by taking into consideration the social and economic conditions of the simpler societies. The most interesting part of the Seminar was that many scholars presented papers based on their intensive researches made in those areas of immediate concern of the Seminar. Besides, there were efforts made to portray the impact of Chrstianity and industrialisation on the tribal people. New approaches to tribal welfare as an integral part of social welfare were also put forth for consideration. The Seminar was on the whole successful in analysing the problems of the tribal people and in suggesting practical solutions that could be profitably made use of.

2. The Fifth U.N. Session on the Prevention of Crime at London

8–19 August, 1960

The second quinquennial session of the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of offenders was held from 8th August to 19th August, 1960 in Church House, Westminster, London.

The Congress was inaugurated by the Lord Chancellor of U.K., the Rt. Hon Viscount Kilmuir, G. C. V. O., in the Assembly Hall of Church House. As even its balcony galleries were packed, additional accomodation was provided in the adjacent Hoare Memorial Hall, with close circuit television and relay of speeches.

For the purpose of considering the items on the Agenda, the Congress was divided into three sections:

(a) Section I dealt with Juvenile delinquency (especially new forms of it) and its prevention and treatment.

(b) Section II discussed how to prevent delinquency (criminality) resulting from social changes and accompanying economic development.

(c) Section III studied Pre-release treatment and after care as also integration prison labour in the national economy.

Several hundred Government delegates represening the different U.N. member states, attended. A notable exception in this respect was India. One of the officials of the High Commissioner's office in London was present, at the inauguration only and in his private capacity. The only Indian representative who participated in the meeting of the sections was Prof. K. P. Chattopadhyay, delegate of the University of Calcutta. He delivered a report on Juvenile Delinquency in Calcutta in Section I, and at the request of the UN Secretariat, contributed a report also to Section II on social maladjustment in rapidly developing modern industrial areas. Prof. Paul Tappan of the University of New York presided over Section I, while Dr. W. Middendorff Judge, Federal Republic of Germany acted as Rapporteur. Dr. E. Galway, now chief of section of the UN, acted as one of the Secretaries of this section.

A number of films on topics related to the agenda were shown at the end of some of the Sessions, and visits to Prisons, Borstals, and Approved Schools were arranged for delegates on August 17th. A number of lectures were also organised, of which special mention may be made of the one on "Criminological and Penological Research" by Prof. L. Radzinowicz, Wolfson Professor of Criminology, University of Cambridge. The final Plenary session of the Congress was held on 19th August and the decisions taken in sections were placed before the house and accepted, with some agreed amendments. The delegates were entertained on 8th August at a reception in Lancaster House by the Government of the United Kingdom, and at a garden party at Trinity College Cambridge on 13th August. Arrangements were also made for visits to Prisons on the continent of Europe for those who wanted to do so, after the session of the Congress. The office of the Congress functioned extremely well, and restaurant, cafetaria and refreshment facilities were excellently arranged. A Journal was issued daily, reporting in brief the proceedings of the preceding day.

3. The 1960 Meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York

28–31 August, 1960

The American Sociological Association held its 55th annual meeting in New York City on August 28–31 at the Statler Hilton Hotel. The main activity, as usual, was the presentation of a large number of papers on a variety of sociological subjects. There were 87 sessions, each having several speakers, so that the meeting offered a total of about 340 papers.

The titles of the sessions indicate the range of topics presented: The Family, Locality Relations, Medical Education, Methodology, Personality Responses, Religion, Small Groups, Social Differentiation, Sociology of the Arts, Sociology of Politics, Industrial Sociology, Social Psychology, Sociology and History, Sociology of Complex Organizations, Sociology of Deviation, Sociology of Medicine, Underdeveloped Areas, History of Sociology, Sociology of Law, Sociology of Literature, Sociology of Occupations, Demography, Social Change, Sociology of Knowledge, Sociology of Music, Race and Ethnic Relations, Sociology in Action, Sociology of Planning, Theological Education, Current Sociological Theory, Public Opinion, Sociology of Popular Culture, Mental Health, Social Structure, Basic Assumptions, History of Social Thought, and Ideological Conflict.

In celebration of the Centenary Year of Herbert Spencer's Principles of Sociology, a special evening session was held with an address by Werner Stark on "Herbert Spencer's Three Sociologies," and another by Pitirim A. Sorokin on "Variations on a Spencerian Theme: Militant and Industrial Types of Society." The visiting German sociologist, Leopold Von Wiese, was introduced for a few remarks on Spencer.

Because of the unexpected death of President Howard Becker a few months before, his son, Christopher B. Becker, a historian at Yale University, read the presidential address which had been prepared by his father on the subject "Normative Reactions to Normlessness."

Two new official Sections were formed at this meeting – a Section on Criminology and a Section on Sociology and Education. Sections on Social Psychology and on Methodology had been previously formed.

The attendance at this meeting was approximately 2,000, larger by several hundred than any previous meeting in the history of the Association.

The 1961 meeting will be held in Saint Louis, Missouri, from August 30 to September 2. In 1962 the meeting will be held in Washington, D.C., from August 30 to September 2. Immediately afterward, at the same place, will be held the Fifth World Congress of Sociology, arranged by the International Sociological Association. Sociologists from all over the world are expected to attend.

4. The 11th Annual Convocation of Karnatak University

24 November, 1960

The 11th Annual Convocation for the conferring of degrees was held on 24th of November, 1960. Dr. A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, a distinguished scholar and statesman delivered the Convocation address. The Chancellor, H. H. Jayachamaraja Wodeyar, the Governor of Mysore State, presided and conferred degrees on 1318 students of which 1020 received their degrees in person.

Reviewing the progress of the University under the guidance of Vice-Chancellor D. C. Pavate, Dr. A. Ramaswami Mudaliar said that nothing could be more disastrous for the development of sound higher education than "ill-advised interference of political heads in purely academic matters." Referring to the role of the university authorities, particularly Vice-Chancellors, he said, "they have a duty to perform, to stand firm against proposals which destroy the very purpose of university life and education. Great educationists in all democratic countries have vigorously fought for the academic freedom which it is essential that universities should enjoy. Let not the facile argument be advanced that the government authorities that may direct academic activities are the 'chosen representatives of the people, answerable to the people and responsible to them."

Acknowledgements

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EDITOR.

BOOK REVIEWS

Survey of the Handloom Industry in Karnatak and Sholapur, India, 1959

The object of this survey is to study the economics of the handloom industry in the five districts of Karnataka, in India, in order to suggest some measures to make it economically viable. In the attempt to meet its aims in practice, the industry encounters some difficulties, i.e. lack of funds, inefficient methods of production and marketing, and the official emphasis is therefore on reorganization on a cooperative basis in order that the industry may play a dominant role in covering the local consumption of textile during the period of the second Five Year Plan.

The survey therefore covers many aspects of the economic position of the industry, and does so in much detail.

Methodologically, the study is made on a sound scientific basis and is systematically clear. Great care was taken to obtain correct results, and control over the counting was strengthened. In addition, the survey was started in two different rounds, in order to allow for seasonal variants.

The beginning of the survey deals with the organization, structure and size of the industry. Organization is classified according to three main types, as well as to workers. This classification is very important for an indication of the progress of the industry, and it also facilitates proposals for improvement.

The production process itself is divided into a number of stages: principal methods of production; the distribution of active looms according to the type of workers and the size of establishments; idle capacity according to size. These all form an important part of the survey.

The capital structure is divided into loans and advances. The master weaver generally plays an important role in supplying loans; cooperative societies supply advances in rural centres. A discussion of original replacement costs and capital-output ratio illustrates, to some extent, the difficulties which have to be faced before the industry is able to develop.

Types of production output and their value according to size and class, in rural as well as in urban centres, are fully covered by statistical tables.

Marketing methods and sales values, divided over types of produce, are clearly stated.

Employment, income and expenditure are classified according to types of workers; working hours are given in more detail in the statistical tables.

These tables are generally very satisfactory and convey the impression that tremendous effort has been made to collect the data and to classify them thoroughly. The questionnaires are phrased in a scientific manner, but the grouping of the data gathered from the questionnaires depended largely on the efficiency of the classifiers.

However, the foreign reader requires further clarification in order to help him to appreciate the real economic position. For instance, he needs to know the evolution of the industry, the causes of its localization, and its social aspects. To mention the number of labourers engaged in the handloom industry, without indicating the total labour force of the region and the country, and, likewise, to mention the capital and production figures, without indicating their relationship to the total figures of the region and country, does not help when measuring the importance of the industry.

It is clear that there is competition between the milling and handloom industries, but how far does this competition extend and to what degree will it affect the handloom industry? In this respect, a study of costs and prices of production units and of the consumer class of each product will help to limit the competition and thus protect the handloom industry and encourage it in its economic survival.

More detail would be useful about the government aid to this industry and its reaction to the aid, also about the cooperative movement, in order to discover how much this helps to mitigate the authority of the master weaver over the independent workers, outworkers and the contract workers.

It would be beneficial if the survey mentioned the terms and periods of loans, and their purposes and other financial help, in order to study whether the terms of the loans suit the financial position of the weavers.

To appreciate the real value of assets, index numbers of prices are of great importance. Also, the index number of the cost of living is necessary in order to discover the increase in real wages. These details are lacking in the survey, and its is therefore very difficult for the observer to deduce many important facts.

The survey assumes that the reader has some knowledge of the different kinds of loom, but he may not be aware of the economic advantages of each sort. The neglect of such a factor may be a weak point in the policy aiming at the encouragement of production units.

The survey does not mention the value added. This is important because it has a national income aspect and, also, can help illustrate the industry's assistance in the promotion of national income.

The data were collected in two rounds (1957 and 1958). However, the statistical tables are not covered by the dates, and this may be misleading for the reader, e.g. tables 131 and 132 show data collected in the preceding month and year.

It is important to mention first the total figures and then to continue with more detailed figures, but the survey does not give much attention to this.

In conclusion, if the above mentioned points were taken into consideration, the survey would be more significant both to the policy maker and to the student of small scale industries.

A. D. METTMALLY.

Viola Klein, *Working Wives.* London, Institute of Personnel Management, 1959.

In recent years the subject of women at work has attracted the attention of researchers in the social field, particularly because the employment of married women, though this appears to be an accepted part of western life, has raised a number of problems caused by extreme views as regards social status, value system and religious ideology. The present study of Dr. Viola Klein attempts to describe, analyse and interpret the social, economic and psychological aspects of the employment of married women in Great Britain. However, the reviewer feels that the findings of such studies are more valuable especially to industrially advanced countries where married women are the only labour reserve in times of emergency and industrial expansion. In fact, such investigations reveal the conditions under which married women would like to work. Thus Dr. Klein's finding that a larger number of married women prefer to have part-time jobs should not be overlooked by the educational and social welfare agencies and the industrial entrepreneurs of the country in question.

Secondly, the survey reveals – rather not surprisingly – that the women's lives are dominated by their dual role of wives and mothers. The home and the family are the focal points of interest and are regarded by married women as their main responsibility. It is really a welcome sign that the idea of marriage as a partnership is widely accepted today and is replacing the old ideal of division of functions between husband and wife.

The central point of this investigation is: why married women go out for work and how they and their husbands feel about it? Is it due to their urge for emancipation, or any other social or economic reasons? Dr. Klein tells us that it is not an urge – for emancipation but a great desire to have higher standard of living; but this is possible only if husband's attitude is not negative. However, men in general appear to be less conservative in their attitude towards their wives working outside than it was thought to be.

It is striking to note the differences in social habits between the classes, because no woman belonging to the upper and the middle classes gave financial independence as a reason, but a high proportion (79 %) of the lower social classes gave money as their main reason for doing outside work. It is, however, by no means the only incentive because, other reasons such as boredom at home, more leisure, and pleasure in meeting people are also cited. However, the financial incentive to work was found to be predominant in all social classes.

To conclude, this survey has thrown more light on the important but somewhat neglected aspects of employment of married women and thus inspires further thinking on the problem such as possibilities of providing part-time work, without of course, ignoring efficiency and other related aspects of the problem.

Karnatak University ,Dharwar C. B. TIGADI.

B. R. Dhekney, *Hubli City: a Study in Urban Economic Life*, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1959, $ 3.00.

This survey of Hubli City was sponsored by the Research Programmes Committee of the Planning Commission, as a part of its study of socioeconomic conditions in selected Indian cities. Professor Dhekney works within the tradition established by those volumes in the series which have already appeared, and the limitations of his book seem to be those of the series in general. Its publication therefore offers an occasion for reflection upon the methods and aim of the series.

Hubli City virtually consists of a collection of tables (approximately 150) with accompanying explanatory comments. An almost entirely descriptive work, it represents the competent gathering and arranging of a great deal of data, with little analysis or interpretation. The subjects treated are 'the growth of the city and its population, in-migration, occupational and employment structure, incidence and nature of unemployment and under-employment, housing conditions, levels of earnings and incomes in different occupational categories, and the extent and nature of inter-generation occupational mobility, (page 195). Each of these topics is given more or less equal emphasis in a separate chapter.

Within the tradition he has accepted, the author has done his work well, and the report will undoubtedly serve some of the more immediate and limited ends of the Planning Commission. However, the same can be said of the decennial census. The issue we want to raise, therefore, concerns the most efficient and appropriate use of the survey method in the socio-economic study of cities, and the proper place of such studies in the framework of national planning.

When the survey method is utilised merely to make a supplementary (and of course, highly detailed) census, much of its potential value is lost. A survey confined to a sample of families, for example, can only produce a view of the city as an amorphous mass of families and individuals. It assembles a number of facts about the residents of the city, but very little about the network of social and economic relations in which they are involved. Thus, the author makes more than one reference to the importance, in the economic life of Hubli, of the Railway Workshop and the Bharat Mill, but no real information about these – or other – institutions is provided. If some account of the activities of such organizations had been incorporated into the survey, and analytically related to the information on families, the result would have been a view of the functioning of the city such as no census can provide. Moreover, we might have had some inkling of the forces likely to produce changes in the relationships investigated.

When we look at the Indian city studies, of which Professor Dhekney's is one, in the planning context, we find that they have not approached the urban community with the intention of seeking answers to pre-formulated questions or of solving specified problems. But, surely, a greater application of scientific reasoning and a problem-solving approach are essential if the planners are to utilise the materials provided by those who conduct the surveys. Planners must concern themselves with significant relationships between social facts and with approaches that promise to have a high predictive value. If the Research Programs Committee is to help generate solutions to the pressing urban problems that currently face India – such as rapid city growth and rural-urban migration – attention will have to be shifted from the accumulation to the interpretation of data. In particular, there will have to be a sharper focus upon community structure and articulation.

R. H. Turner
O. Andrew Collver

International Urban Research
University of California, Berkeley.

Nels Anderson, *Urban Community*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 500. 1959;

This books deal with the growth of urbanism and an urban way of life under modern socio-economic forces as a global phenomenon with a very wide perspective. Modern technological and other influences have particularly effected the urban community, and, as the author says, we have entered in 'an era of striding cosmopolitanism'. Professor Anderson has made an elaborate analysis of the social processes involved and deserves to be congratulated for having made a very valuable contribution to the sociology of urbanism. The book is divided into 18 chapters covering all the aspects of urban life, its growth and social change. The chapters dealing with the inter-relationship between urbanism and ruralism, population phenomena and the family under modern urbanism are of particular interest.

So far the existing literature dealing with the urban community has been mainly concerned with the Western urban community, particularly the American one. The author has covered a much wider field and developes certain universal principles. The book is a definite contribution to the study of the urban community as a general sociological phenomenon.

Last, the author's attempt to deal with urbanism from the point of view of work, leisure, government and security is highly commendable. The approach to the study is more or less on inter-disciplinary lines with the difference that instead of being the result of teamwork, the problem has been discussed from the various viewpoints of history, economics, political science, psychology, geography and demography. In short, the book is a comprehensive study of urbanism and the urban way of life in contemporary society.

R. N. SAKSENA.

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Manuscripts and other editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, K. Ishwaran, Department of Social Anthropology, Karnatak University, Dharwar, Mysore State, India.

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